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FOREWORD
The W. E. Upjohn Institute is pleased to publish the first
in-depth study of the most basic element of the Comprehen
sive Employment and Training Act (GETA)—Training. The
central finding of this study is that CETA training is a pro
ductive investment returning benefits to society at well above
costs.
This volume includes a summary of findings and recom
mendations prepared by the designers of the study, Sar A.
Levitan and Garth L. Mangum, an analysis of national
longitudinal data written by Robert Taggart and summaries
of detailed field studies completed on 11 sample prime spon
sors.
The findings are particularly timely as the training pro
grams are being redesigned in light of shifting economic,
demographic and political realities.
Facts and observations as presented are the sole respon
sibility of the authors. Their viewpoints do not necessarily
represent positions of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research.
E. Earl Wright
Director

Kalamazoo, Michigan
November 1981
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PREFACE
In its first 8 years, the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act (GETA) hardly suffered from want of atten
tion. Legions of evaluators, critics, defenders, and reformers
have scrutinized the program since its inception. Surprising
ly, however, they have tended to ignore the most basic
element—the T in GETA—and have focused instead on the
program's employment aspects and administrative issues.
Emphasis on employment components was inevitable, since
job creation was a primary strategy. The successive addition,
expansion, and later contraction and final abandonment of a
large and countercyclical public service employment pro
gram represented major shifts in policy, and the process was
highly controversial. Throughout, the uniqueness of
CETA's decentralized policymaking drew attention to its
management and decisionmaking procedures, or the lack of
them. In 1977, youth demonstration projects took center
stage. Reenactment in 1978 focused on issues of recentralization, allegations of fraud and abuse, and recategorization,
and, in addition, sought to target CETA more closely on the
economically disadvantaged population. Training conse
quently received little scholarly or public attention. Even the
annual congressional appropriations, accompanied occa
sionally by flurries of activity adding new demonstration
projects, concentrated on funding levels and intergovern
mental relations.
The focus of this study is on the quality, effectiveness and
management of CETA occupational skill training and on
complements to employability development such as basic
education, English as a second language, and training for
VI

job search. The primary emphasis is on adult programs
operated at the local level. The study is concerned not only
with assessing CETA training but also with describing its
contents, institutional setting, and administrative structure.
The quality of training in a decentralized decisionmaking
system can be assessed only by direct observation at the local
level, which requires detailed field study. The effectiveness
of the results can be determined by an examination of
postprogram labor experiences of participants. However,
CETA prime sponsors and their training contractors have lit
tle information on training outcomes beyond the first few
weeks following training. Fortunately, a long range
longitudinal followup system is in place at the national level
through the Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey
(CLMS), while the CETA management information system
(MIS) can be a source of substantial data on costs.
Because CETA training varies so widely, the selection of
the sample areas is crucial. Since available resources limited
us to 12 case studies—only 11 were completed for inclusion
in this volume—we selected sites that are geographically
distributed, representing a wide range of political and deci
sionmaking structures, and whose performance, as assessed
by national indicators, is diverse. The second key in case
studies is to assure that the field researchers are
knowledgeable, yet objective. The resulting combination of
areas and the researchers are:
Baltimore, Maryland—Gregory Wurzburg, Youthwork,
Inc.;
Dallas, Texas—Robert McPherson, University of Texas;
Indianapolis, Indiana—Earl Wright, W.E. Upjohn In
stitute for Employment Research;
Montgomery County, Maryland—Marion Pines,
Baltimore Metropolitan Manpower Consortium;
Vll

North Carolina Balance-of-State—Edward Dement,
MDC, Inc.;
Ottawa, Michigan (not included in this volume);
Penobscot, Maine—Andrew Sum and Paul Harrington,
Northeastern University;
San Francisco, California—Garth L. Mangum, University
of Utah;
Seattle, Washington—R. Thayne Robson, University of
Utah;
Tucson, Arizona—Garth L. Mangum, University of Utah;
Utah—R. Thayne Robson, University of Utah; and
Worcester, Massachusetts—Morris A. Horowitz and
Joanne Loscalzo, Northeastern University.
The above include two moderate-size cities (Worcester and
Tucson); five large cities (Baltimore, Dallas, Indianapolis,
San Francisco and Seattle, each with a population of over
500,000); five counties, including one metropolitan county
(Montgomery), a rural county in Michigan (Ottawa), and a
consortium of three rural counties (Penobscot); a state act
ing as a single prime sponsor (Utah); and a balance-of-state
(North Carolina).
All major regions in the country are represented in the
study: New England by Penobscot, Maine, and Worcester,
Massachusetts; middle states of the Atlantic seaboard by
Baltimore and Montgomery County, Maryland; the
Southeast by North Carolina balance-of-state; the Southwest
by Dallas, Texas and Tucson, Arizona; the Midwest by In
dianapolis, Indiana; the Mountain states by Utah; and the
Pacific Coast by San Francisco, California and Seattle,
Washington.
Though our sample cannot be called statistically represen
tative of the 476 prime sponsors funded in fiscal 1980, it can
be considered illustrative of most of the kinds of organiza
tions and activities typical of prime sponsors. What we
Vlll

found is a reasonable representation of the realities of
CETA. Each was studied by a knowledgeable and author
itative CETA watcher who received complete cooperation
from the actors on the scene. Complete case studies for each
prime sponsor are published in a companion volume, CETA
Training: A National Review and Eleven Case Studies,
The "worm's-eye view" of CETA training from the local
level is supplemented by the "bird's-eye view," based on na
tional management information for all prime sponsors and
impact information gathered for all CETA programs. This
supplementary assessment by Robert Taggart focuses on the
aggregates resulting from the diverse experiences noted in the
case studies and suggests the representativeness of the trends
and outcomes noted in specific locations. It also provides
estimates of impacts and insights concerning patterns of ef
forts which are only possible to derive from studies involving
large samples of trainees drawn from many prime sponsors.
The findings of most importance relative to the local ex
perience are highlighted in the first section in this volume.
The overview of the whole project, "Summary of Findings
and Recommendations," explores the quality of CETA
training by:
1. Providing historical and national perspective for the
case studies.
2. Assessing the quality of training found at the 12 sites.
3. Examining CETA's decisionmaking processes related
to training.
4. Offering recommendations for improvement of train
ing quality.
Unless otherwise stated, all information about prime
sponsor operations is from their respective internal sources.
The customary references to data sources have therefore
been deleted. These data do not necessarily agree with data
released by the U.S. Department of Labor.
IX

We are indebted to our colleagues who prepared the case
studies for critical review of this overview. Mary Bedell sup
plied editorial comment on the case studies, while Richard
Belous, Howard Bloom, Janet Johnston, and Brian Linder
reviewed the overview. Nancy Kiefer, Cathy Glasgow and
Gwen Luke provided administrative assistance in carrying
the project through the usual drafts. We are also indebted to
the 12 GETA prime sponsors and the U.S. Department of
Labor for their cooperation.
This study was conducted under the auspices of the Na
tional Council on Employment Policy. The Edna McConnell
Clark, Ford, Charles Stewart Mott, and Rockefeller Foun
dations funded the study. In line with their usual practice,
the foundations left responsibility for the design and content
of the studies and the overview to the authors.
Sar A. Levitan
Garth L. Mangum
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Summary of Findings
and Recommendations
Sar A. Levitan and Garth L. Mangum
The basic premise of the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act (CETA) was that local decisionmakers could
design and deliver services more appropriate to their local
economies and populations than any nationally uniform pro
gram. Therefore, the nature, quality, and effectiveness of
the programs offered by 476 prime sponsors manifests great
diversity. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some
generalizations from examination of the national enroll
ment, costs, and outcomes data and from intensive study of
the training activities of 12 prime sponsorships. First, the
conclusions and then the supporting arguments:
1. CETA training is a sound social investment. The na
tional data suggest that the social returns for each dollar
spent on CETA-funded classroom training amount to $1.14,
while each dollar spent for on-the-job training (OJT) returns
$2.28. When public service employment is conducted as OJT
in the public sector, it too has a substantial payoff, but that
is not true of run-of-the-mill work experience projects.
2. The quality of CETA classroom training is primarily a
product of the local institutions. Prime sponsors normally
buy services from whatever training entities exist in the com
munity. Fortunately, more prime sponsors have access to
some high-quality training institutions, but the others must
settle for what is available. However, though CETA may
have had limited impact on the quality of training available
in most communities, it has had a major impact on the will
ingness of training institutions to enroll and serve
economically disadvantaged trainees.

3. The dependence of CETA on the availability and quali
ty of the local training system applies to other services. Most
often, the CETA prime sponsor functions as a broker and
coordinator of services rather than as a service deliverer. The
chief elected official and prime sponsor staff can encourage
quality services but, with few exceptions, cannot deliver
them. The prime sponsors depend, therefore, on the perfor
mance of: (1) the education and training institutions; (2) the
public employment service, which provides labor market in
formation, certification of eligibility, payment of
allowances, operation of intake and assessment centers,
marketing of OJT, and other linkages with the employer
community; and (3) local community-based organizations,
which are spotty as to their service delivery capacity but im
portant for their client-advocacy role.
4. Judged by the quality of facilities, equipment, cur
riculum, and instruction, the quality ranking of training in
stitutions in descending order tends to be: (1) private pro
prietary schools, (2) public vocational and technical schools,
(3) skill centers developed under the auspices of the Man
power Development and Training Act (MDTA) between
1963 and 1973, and (4) training activities of communitybased organizations. However, choice among institutions is
complicated by the fact that ranking in terms of ability to
understand, relate to, and serve the disadvantaged is exactly
the opposite. Therefore, prime sponsors are constantly forc
ed to compromise between these two sharply differing
measures of quality.
5. While CETA training is a continuum of earlier pro
grams, significant changes have evolved. The most notable
changes developed under CETA are:
a. Greater utilization of broad occupational offer
ings, achieved primarily through referral of eligible
individuals to mainstream training programs in
private and public schools and colleges.

b. The expansion of nonoccupational training ac
tivities such as remedial basic education, English as
a second language, prevocational orientation, and
job-search training.
c. Participation by communities not previously serv
ed.
d. The additional or expanded use of new service
deliverers.
6. Persistent obstacles to improvement of the system are:
a. The federal prime sponsor rating system credits
procedure rather than substance and neither
measures nor rewards quality.
b. The data system measures short run rather than
long-run outcomes. Longer-duration training has a
higher rate of return than training of short dura
tion. To date, only the short-run data have been
available to decisionmakers.
c. CETA has not succeeded in linking its offerings
with complementary services offered by the pro
grams or sequencing the training and services it of
fers.
d. The high payoff of OJT is also not apparent to the
prime sponsor in the short run. Marketing OJT is
expensive for prime sponsors in terms of staff time
expended. In addition, the subsidy, equalling 50
percent of the wage for a few weeks, tends to be
primarily attractive to marginal employers.
e. The allowance system distorts incentives for under
taking training. Many of the disadvantaged
clientele must have financial support to afford
training participation, but uniform allowances at
the level of the federal minimum wage for all
enrollees appear to encourage some to participate
more for the sake of the allowance than for the
training.

f. The federal budgetary process denies prime spon
sors opportunity for long-range planning.
g. The federal staff is ill-equipped to provide useful
technical assistance.
h. Both prime sponsor and federal staff lack training
backgrounds.
Still, there is reason to take satisfaction in CETA training
accomplishments, but there is ample opportunity to make a
sound system better. The key steps are:
1. Training and employability development should be
made the highest priority of the CETA system.
2. The system should encourage and support a two-tiered
structure of classroom instruction, consisting of a
remedial career-entry phase, designed to serve the
disadvantaged with remedial education, career ex
ploration, job-search training, and occupational skills
that can be acquired in no more than 36 weeks; and a
career-development phase available to those who prove
themselves in the first phase.
3. To induce employers to provide on-the-job training,
subsidies should cover a "try-out" period during
which the trainee is in the workplace but receiving a
CETA stipend until the employer has an opportunity
to assess the trainee's worth. Public service employ
ment should, in most cases, function similarly, as
public sector OJT.
4. The training allowance system should be reformed to
include: (1) reimbursement for the out-of-pocket ex
penses of training participation, paid to all, (2) a sub
sistence component based on family income, and (3) a
cash incentive for high performance.
5. The federal funding commitment should be made to
prime sponsors at least 2 years ahead.

6. An aggressive personnel exchange system should give
federal, state, and local staff substantial experience at
each of those levels.
7. A technical assistance, staff training, and curriculum
development entity should be developed that is capable
of bringing meaningful help to the local level.
8. A rating system should be devised stressing qualitative
factors and rewarding positive long-range results. The
system should reflect data derived from the Con
tinuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey upon which
the first point of this summary was based.
9. There should be constant experimentation in search for
improvements in the quality and outcomes of training.
The adaptation by local training institutions of
computer-assisted and computer-managed instruction,
already proven in Job Corps to be effective with a
disadvantaged population, deserves serious considera
tion.

1. The Scope of CETA Training
Antecedents
Congress passed the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act in 1973 with the aim of consolidating federal
employment and training resources. Chief elected officials,
known in CETA parlance as prime sponsors, representing
local units of government with populations of more than
100,000 and states on behalf of smaller areas, were eligible to
participate in the program. Prime sponsors were to plan,
design and administer local programs consistent with general
federal guidelines, subject to local advisory council review
and regional Department of Labor approval.
CETA is best understood and appraised as a continuation
of employment and training programs that had existed since
the early 1960s under the Manpower Development and
Training Act (MDTA) of 1962 and the Economic Opportuni
ty Act (EOA) of 1964. It made available under one
authorization a range of services aimed at improving the
employability and earnings experience of workers from lowincome households. On the administrative side, CETA
transferred decisionmaking authority at the state and local
level from the state employment service, state boards of
vocational education, and local community action agencies
to elected officials identified as prime sponsors.
This study is illuminated by the recognition that CETA in
herited from its predecessor programs the institutions or ser
vices they established, though significant changes have been
made in the ways in which those institutions are used and in
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the mix of services provided. Labor market interventions
under CETA's predecessors were limited to classroom and
on-the-job training, remedial education, work experience,
subsidized public employment, and supportive services to
make participation in the other components possible. CETA
has added to this list a range of nonoccupational training. As
the program's title indicates, its offerings can be divided be
tween those that stress job creation and those that emphasize
employability development. The latter is the focus of this
study.
Prior to CETA, training occurred primarily in three in
stitutional settings, with minor use of a fourth. Initially,
most training was offered to class-size groups in existing
public vocational education facilities. This arrangement suf
fered from serious drawbacks. First, the training was often
offered at inconvenient hours because the facilities were fully
utilized during regular school schedules. Second, the schools
offered the trainees a limited range of occupational choices.
Third, the out-of-school population of generally limited
education was taught by instructors accustomed to, and with
pedagogy designed for, mainstream in-school youth.
An alternative soon emerged that attempted to correct the
first and second problems. The remedy was tuition payment
for, and referral of, individuals to ongoing postsecondary
vocational and technical school programs (known as in
dividual referral). But that was useful only for those who
could compete with the regular student body.
The third alternative was the skill center. This new institu
tion was developed specifically to meet the needs of MDTA
enrollees drawn mostly from among the poor and deficiently
educated, classified as the "disadvantaged" population.
Modular training curricula were structured for adaptations
to individual instruction, so that trainees could enter im
mediately upon enrollment, rather than await the start of a

new class, and progress to some extent at their own pace.
Emphasizing individual needs, trainees could begin without
prerequisites and leave for employment when their potential,
their endurance, or their resources were exhausted. Remedial
education, either preliminary to or integrated with occupa
tional training, was available to those who needed it. The
skill centers also provided supportive services, centering on
the personal problems faced by the trainees. The services in
cluded advocacy counseling to help with personal problems,
transportation, minor health care, child care, job develop
ment and placement. The skill centers utilized whatever low
cost facilities were available, burdening the centers and their
trainees with an unfortunate stigma. Observers expressed
concern that the student body included a mixture of the up
wardly yearning and those attracted mainly by the stipends.
Since the state boards of vocational education were
responsible for providing the training sites, limited use was
made of private training institutions. Occasionally training
was contracted with private proprietary schools. Additional
possibilities that emerged out of the antipoverty movement
were the community action agencies (CAAs) and the
community-based organizations (CBOs). Only a few CAAs,
the Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC), and the
Operation Service-Employment-Redevelopment (SER), and
organization oriented toward serving Mexican-Americans,
played significant training roles during that period.
A technical assistance operation known as AMIDS (Area
Manpower Institutes for the Development of Staff) provided
inservice staff training, curriculum development, and other
help directly to the federally supported training sites, but
these disappeared with the advent of CETA.
Given the limited resources and the clamor for enrollment
by the eligible population, program administrators attemp
ted to ease the conflict by cutting the duration of training
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and making it possible to enroll more applicants in training
programs. The problem was compounded by the fact that
enrollees were paid stipends, consisting of the average state
unemployment compensation payment plus allowances for
dependents and training-related out-of-pocket costs for
adults, and lesser amounts for unmarried youths. The
stipends consumed half of the resources. The law also re
quired restricting training to occupations having
"reasonable expectations of employment."
This combination of a disadvantaged clientele, pressures
for immediate placement, and the short duration of courses
limited the training choice to entry-level preparation for oc
cupations requiring rudimentary skill and characterized by
high turnover rates. Three-quarters of all pre-CETA
classroom enrollments were in seven occupational categories
and all at the entry level: clerical, health care, automotive
repair, machine operation, welding, building service, and
food service.
On-the-job training began slowly and accelerated so that
by 1968 about half of MDTA's enrollments were in OJT
slots. Representatives of the public employment services or
community-based organizations offered employers an
average of $25 a week for 26 weeks (the equivalent of 15.6
hours pay at the minimum wage in the early 1970s) as a sub
sidy for hiring MDTA eligibles. Predictably, only the small
marginal employers were attracted by the subsidies and then
only if the most qualified among the eligible were selected.
Since these employers normally lacked training capability,
the subsidy primarily bought a placement in a low-paying
job. Nevertheless, the costs were low and the placement was
built in, with retention likely, so a high ratio of benefits to
costs was assured.
CETA was introduced, not because MDTA and EGA were
failures, but because it was thought that local political ac-
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countability would produce a service mix, including training,
better adapted to the local scene. In addition, it was assumed
that quality would improve if local institutions had to com
pete for the right to provide GETA services. Focusing on
what has happened to the quality and effectiveness of train
ing under CETA should help answer whether those assump
tions were correct.

Magnitude of CETA Training
Under CETA, the nation's commitments to employment
and training programs rose dramatically, but employment
generation captured the lion's share of dollars and people.
There were over 2 million new enrollees in CETA programs
in fiscal 1980. Over two-thirds of these new participants were
in work components, or nearly half if the youth summer pro
gram enrollments are excluded. Job creation components
also accounted for two-thirds of the 1 million service years of
employment and training activity estimated for fiscal 1980.
The number and distribution of service years by program
components follow:
CETA component
Total
Local programs
Classroom training
On-the-job training
Summer youth work experience
Youth transition services
Nonsummer work experience
Public service employment
Job Corps
National programs

Service years
(000)
1,097.5

Percent
distribution
100.0

1,041.8

95.2

219.9
54.3
126.2
41.3
252.3
347.8
35.7

20.0
4.9
11.9
3.7
23.0
31.7
3.2

20.0

1.8
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Whereas training expenditures predominated in the policy
mix prior to CETA (accounting, for example, for nearly 2 of
every 3 dollars expended in 1969), they fell to less than a
fourth of CETA outlays by 1974 and to only 15 percent in
1978, before rebounding to 21 percent in 1980. The source of
the relative shift was massive allocations to job creation
rather than decreases in training funds. In fact, with plen
tiful employment funding under other titles after 1975 and
with public sector employment proscribed under Title IIBC
after 1978 (the title giving prime sponsors the most discretion
to choose among alternative services), more of that title's
funds could be expended on classroom training and OJT, as
follows:
Fiscal year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

Outlays (in millions)
Classroom
OJT
$ 77.9
$ 309.6
168.4
606.2
739.8
207.5
872.6
257.8
941.5
224.0
1,224.6
216.1

The relative distribution of training dollars has also
shifted during the first 6 years of CETA. OJT has accounted
for between 8.7 percent and 13.8 percent of Title I or IIBC
expenditures, while the share of classroom training during
the same period rose from 34.4 percent to 57.1 percent of
IIBC allocations.

Fiscal year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

Percent of Title IIBC
(former Title I) outlays for
Classroom
OJT
34.4
8.7
35.7
9.9
42.1
11.8
46.5
13.8
12.4
52.3
57.1
10.4
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The rising expenditures for training have provided oppor
tunities for an increasing number of persons in need. The
new participants, or annual flow through training programs
each year, rose rapidly over the early 1960s to 336,000 an
nually in fiscal 1967. The participant levels reached 481,000
annually by 1972, and declined during the next 4 years.
Growth resumed in 1976, reaching a peak of 773,000 in 1978,
followed by a decline over the succeeding 2 years. Most of
the secular increase resulted from the growth of local
classroom training enrollments. In fact, average OJT par
ticipants during the first 6 years of CETA were only twothirds the average from 1969 to 1974. With the erosions of
inflation and the beginnings of budget cuts, the pattern of
Title IIBC (or its predecessor) training enrollments has been
as follows:
(in thousands)
Service years

Individuals

Fiscal year

Classroom

OJT

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

291
514
537
580
569
494

74
148
170
193
157
132

Classroom
69
146
173
188
163
152

OJT
17
39
44
54
40
36

This study focuses on the regular and continuing funding
that Congress appropriated for training under CETA, ex
clusive of Job Corps. In addition to direct allocations to
prime sponsors, funds were also allocated under Title IIBC
to state governors for vocational education. Other training
funds came from youth training programs, a special ap
propriation for a demonstration skill training improvement
program (STIP), a private sector initiative program (PSIP),
and other titles of CETA. The Title IIBC formula allocation
has accounted for about half of the CETA training, as the
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percentage breakdown of fiscal 1980 enrollments and expen
ditures indicates:

Source of Funds
Total training
IIBC
Supplemental vocational
education
HD
III
STIP
IV
Youth employment
Job Corps
VI
VII (PSIP)

(percent distribution)
Expenditures by Participants by
program
program
components
components
100.0

100.0

49.9

61.0

4.7
1.4
1.5
2.6

*
2.1
3.3
1.3

6.5
28.0
0.7
4.7

11.8
9.3
0.6
10.6

'Participants counted under Title IIBC in CETA MIS reports.

2. Local Vantage
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act pro
vided funds in 1980 to 476 state and local govern
ments—known as prime sponsors—for the delivery of ser
vices designed to improve the skills and the employment op
portunities of low-income individuals experiencing dif
ficulties in the labor market. While not necessarily represen
tative, the 12 intensive case studies are a microcosm of the
CETA system. This can be demonstrated by first comparing
them on a few key variables with national averages. The
quality and effectiveness of the training provided by each
prime sponsor is assessed, and the aspects of regulation and
administration that have an impact on quality are reviewed.
The national and local reviews then become the source of
conclusions and lessons related to the entire system.

Classroom Training
Allocation Determinants
Nationally, prime sponsors enrolled half of their Title
IIBC participants in classroom training. Most of the prime
sponsors interviewed indicated a preference for classroom
training, and all but Baltimore, San Francisco, and North
Carolina balance of state enrolled a higher proportion than
the national average in classroom training. But because of
15
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variations in costs per enrollee, expenditure patterns did not
coincide with those for enrollments, as indicated below:
Classroom training under Title IIBC, fiscal year 1980
Percent of
Percent of
total expenditures
total participants
Location
48.4
50.3
U.S. average
10.1
10.4
Baltimore
53.0
75.1
Dallas
65.7
54.5
Indianapolis
48.4
62.4
Montgomery
North Carolina balance
33.6
39.6
of state
18.9
62.5
Ottawa
2L6
53.2
Penobscot
53.1
41.0
San Francisco
68.0
55.7
Seattle
81.3
63.6
Tucson
65.8
57.0
Utah
60.3
71.9
Worcester

Nationally, neither the local unemployment rate nor the
age structure of the participant population explain the dif
ferences in service mix. Also, in making cross-prime-sponsor
comparisons, it is not certain that common definitions were
used. It might also be expected that classroom training
would decrease with rising unemployment; however, the op
posite has tended to be true. As unemployment has risen,
more Title IID and VI PSE funds became available, thereby
freeing up Title IIBC money for added training. On a crosssectional basis, there is a tendency for those prime sponsors
with the lowest unemployment rates to show the greatest
commitment to classroom training, a relationship which
does not hold true for on-the-job training. The major depar
tures from this generalization are those less-populated areas
with limited access to training institutions or private
employers.
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Location
U.S. total
Baltimore
Dallas
Indianapolis
Montgomery
North Carolina balance
of state
Ottawa
Penobscot
San Francisco
Seattle
Tucson
Utah
Worcester

1980 civilian
labor force
(000)
102,908
734
510
397
309
1,684
70
87
399
776
141
554
158

1980 unemployment
rate
(percent)
5.8
6.3
3.8
5.5
3.5
7.1
4.7
6.4
6.6
5.6
5.1
3.8
4.7

Prime sponsors have also complained about the require
ment of maintaining the same level of service to youth under
Title IIBC after the addition of new Title IV youth programs
in 1977. This provision forced them to emphasize work ex
perience under Title IIBC, since this was the most common
youth activity in this title. Yet, the studies found no consis
tent correlation, positive or negative, between the share of
IIBC funds devoted to youth activities and the ratio of train
ing to work experience under that title.

Institutional Setting
The providers of classroom training varied widely among
the 12 sites studied. In Seattle, Tucson, and Utah, the major
providers were the skill centers, which originated under
MDTA. In San Francisco, the use of community-based
organizations was favored, along with minor use of a skill
center and a substantial amount of individual referral to
private schools and the community college system. In North
Carolina, the community colleges and technical institutes
had most of the action, as was the case in Penobscot, where
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private colleges rounded out the classroom training facilities.
In Dallas, two school districts and two CBOs shared most of
the training activity. The overriding concern was with pro
viding low per-capita cost training. Baltimore and Worcester
used a mix of public and private schools and some employers
to provide classroom training. Rural Ottawa County, lack
ing training facilities of its own, provided living expenses and
tuition aid to send many of its trainees out of the area. Some
of the more rural areas of the Penobscot consortium follow
ed a similar practice. Montgomery County enrolled its
trainees in public and private schools, as well as local col
leges. Indianapolis relied wholly on individual referrals to
public and private colleges.
To generalize from the case studies, public postsecondary
schools seem to provide most of the training, with skill
centers in second place, followed by CBO-run schools and
then private proprietary schools. In contrast to the national
picture where individual referral purportedly predominates,
enrollments in class-size groups were more common than in
dividual referrals in all of the study locations, but this was
true primarily because of the unusual CBO delivery system in
San Francisco, Seattle, and Dallas.
Though skill centers played the predominate role in three
locations, they were important in two others and supplemen
tal in one. In Seattle, Tucson, and Utah, the skill centers pro
vided the bulk of occupational training for the prime spon
sor, but, in Baltimore and San Francisco, the skill center had
a limited CETA role. These MDTA institutions still seem to
be characterized by the same advantages and shortcomings
they offered during the earlier period. Their staffs are
typically dedicated to serving a disadvantaged population,
and a range of on-site services required by disadvantaged
trainees is generally available. On the other hand, the train
ing tends to be limited to an average of 26 weeks and a max
imum of 36 weeks (except for health care occupations where
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licensing requirements require longer training periods); the
facilities are often poor, though the equipment is generally
adequate, and the institutions are likely to have low prestige
in the community.
Most skill centers make use of existing structure. For in
stance, the Tucson skill center was initially housed in aban
doned department store, garage, and restaurant buildings. In
Utah, one skill center is in a former laundry building and
another, in what was formerly a high school. The Baltimore
skill center is also in an abandoned high school, as is the
Dallas facility, although the latter has been lavishly remodel
ed. The San Francisco skill center is housed in an abandoned
elementary school. However, the latter institution has lost
most of the attributes that typify a skill center. The Seattle
facility, which was the major provider of CETA occupa
tional training in that city, was exceptional in being the only
center built for that purpose. Owned and operated by the
Seattle Opportunities Industrialization Center, it has the
allegiance of its enrollees and the black community, but
although it is well-designed and -equipped, it still does not
appear to command the general prestige that its quality
deserves.
Beyond these examples of MDTA continuance, the oc
cupational training locus seems to have shifted to standard
public vocational schools and proprietary schools, sup
plemented by specialized programs run by CBOs. In the
mainstream public and private institutions, which serve the
general population, CETA enrollees are referred individually
to the regular program, with any necessary fees paid from
CETA funds. This approach provides the CETA enrollee
with training as good as that available to the taxpaying or
feepaying public and allows participants to report to peers or
prospective employers, "I'm at the technical college," rather
than, "I'm in CETA."
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The drawback is that only those who are fairly selfmotivated and who can compete with the regular clientele in
the school will last. Some schools do provide remedial educa
tion, but that is not the norm. A few prime sponsors follow a
sequencing process in which an enrollee can spend time in a
remedial component at one institution and then be referred
to a skill training institution. However, almost every CETA
prime sponsor has far more applicants than available slots,
and the case studies found waiting lists for training ranging
from 3 to 6 months. Thus, most sponsors considered it in
equitable to invest heavily in some eligible persons, thereby
leaving no funds for others. The regional office staff, and
national policy as well, reinforced this concern by inveighing
against high per-capita cost and setting up an assessment
system that commends program for combining low costs and
high immediate placements but largely ignores the quality of
training offered.
Community-based organizations also play a larger role
under CETA than they did under MDTA. The Opportunities
Industrialization Centers (QIC) have been in the skill train
ing business since the mid-1960s and in many cities provide
high-quality training in a wide range of occupations. The
Seattle OIC, as noted, is an outstanding example. However,
in many other cities the OIC offering is limited and, in some
places, of low quality. OIC provided a narrow range of
training in Dallas and North Carolina, and it had been drop
ped for poor performance in San Francisco and Mont
gomery County. Often, as in Dallas, the prime sponsor must
share responsibility for not simultaneously supporting and
spurring the CBO to higher-quality efforts.
While OIC offers occupational skills, other CBOs tend to
restrict their offerings to remedial prevocational components
and to sponsorship of on-the-job training. However, the
trend is for local community-based organizations to add
entry-level skill training components. Facilities tend to be
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unsatisfactory, but the training emphasizes those occupa
tions that require little training equipment. CBOs are par
ticularly effective where the primary concern is with the in
struction of English as a second language. In some cases, the
support of CBOs may be motivated by a desire to "give them
a small contract to keep them alive." However, the San
Francisco and Seattle CBOs are both politically potent and
offer highly competent instruction.

Training Occupations
High turnover occupations predominated among the
training activities of the 12 case studies. Most of the
enrollments seem to be in clerical, health care, automotive
and auto repair, welding, machine operation, building ser
vice and food service, just as they have been since the days of
MDTA, but some significant change has occurred. Clerical
and health care occupations are, in generally high demand so
that, depending upon the level of investment in time and
training costs, jobs can be found at lower or higher levels
within the occupational cluster. Given the backgrounds of
the enrollees and the relatively short training time allowed in
most CETA programs, the clerical trainees tend to attain on
ly marginal levels of skills. Yet the demand is sufficient in
most locations to assure a respectable placement rate in the
60- to 80-percent range. Admission to health programs tends
to be more selective. Training for licensed practical or voca
tional nurses, an MDTA creation, continues to be the
outstanding CETA health care program. Training extends
from 36 to 52 weeks, and placement is almost guaranteed if
state certification standards are met. Yet, within the health
care category, the Nurse's Aide Academy program in Dallas
is evidence that programs of short duration can be produc
tive when attuned to the needs of the client population and
the demands of the labor market.
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There seems to be a small and sporadic, but still signifi
cant, trend toward a broadened occupational range in classsize projects. Training for computer-related occupations and
office machine repair are on the increase. Other occupations
are added from time to time in response to local economic
conditions, but the conditions and the programs rarely con
tinue over long periods of time. In fact, CETA-funded train
ing activities appear to be more flexible in phasing in or out
according to community need than is common among train
ing institutions.
The trend toward increased use of individual referral has
expanded the range of occupations for which training is of
fered and is nearly as wide as the total offering of the local
training institutions, but the numbers trained add up to few
in each occupation. Examples from the 12 case studies in
clude radiologic, biomedical, psychiatric and graphic
reproduction technicians, dental hygiene, drafting, air con
ditioning, computer programming, graphic reproduction
technician, and cosmetology. However, many of these are
2-year programs. CETA tries to limit enrollment to 36
weeks, with an average, scheduled course duration of about
26 weeks, and it rarely pays for more than 52 weeks of train
ing. In a few cases, in Penobscot especially, CETA was
found to be paying tuition allowances for the first half of a
2-year training program, leaving those who can afford it to
finish at their own expense. Apparently there is interest in
long-term training but an unwillingness to pay the price of
reducing the numbers served since for every person enrolled
in an expensive long-term training course, others are left
without service.
To demonstrate the importance of this kind of activity, the
skill training improvement program (STIP), initiated in
1977, earmarked funds for both high level skills and longterm training. The funds were allocated to prime sponsors on
a competitive basis. To support the same training for the
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same number of enrollees from regular prime sponsor funds
would have absorbed a high proportion of available funds
and resulted in the rejection of many applicants. However,
the last grants for STIP projects were awarded in the first
quarter of fiscal year 1979 from fiscal year 1978 funds, and
no additional funds have been allocated for the program.
Other problems are associated with long-term training.
Not only are these training programs more costly, but they
tend to have higher dropout rates and no higher immediate
placement rates than short-term courses, even though the
analysis of national data indicates that their payoff in the
long run is greater. Many eligible people lack the persistence
and financial ability required to last through a long-term
training program. They are apparently willing to train for
the relatively low-paid jobs plagued by high turnover rates
that seem to be available even during economic slumps.
As a matter of general policy, the Baltimore prime sponsor
had opted for expensive, longer-term offerings in its regular
training program. That was achieved at the price of con
siderable selectivity among applicants. The Seattle skill
center had historically shown a preference for long-term
training, thereby contributing to criticisms of high percapital cost. Worcester's largest skill training activity was in
low-level clerical skills, but it had also carefully selected
enrollees for electronics and computer programs. Mont
gomery County tried high-level skills on an individual basis
without stipends but had to screen 1,100 applicants to find
33 persons qualified for a biomedical technician program.
Several others had similar experiences with STIP. While the
completion rates in these long-term offerings were generally
lower than in short-term courses, those who completed were
placed in jobs with considerably higher pay.
Success at running long-term training for high-level oc
cupations presupposes either concentration on a better-
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prepared segment of the CETA-eligible population or a
greater investment in remedial activities. The Baltimore
prime sponsor has clearly made the selectivity choice for oc
cupational training, as has Worcester for some of its pro
grams. Utah and Penobscot had CETA-eligible populations,
which in general had these characteristics, but they had not
chosen to invest in long-term training. Tucson has chosen to
serve a population ready and willing to qualify for
minimum-wage jobs, while San Francisco stressed relatively
low-cost English as a second language for predominately
female immigrants. Dallas chose to focus on a needy black
population but then failed to adjust the curriculum to meet
those new needs. For others, the choice between lower-level
enrollees and higher-level skills remains a troublesome one.

On-the-Job Training
Seven of the prime sponsors studied enrolled a larger pro
portion of their IIBC participants in on-the-job training than
the national average, including Penobscot and Ottawa,
which enrolled more than double the national average. The
variation in the percent of funds and participants enrolled in
OJT was even greater than in classroom training.
Most of the prime sponsors studied praised OJT but then
tended to make relatively little use of it. Enrollment in OJT
ranged from 0.2 to 24.6 percent of the total IIBC enrollment
in the 12 sites, despite the favorable results already indicated
and the cost advantages documented below. The key deter
minant in the use of OJT appeared to be the relative ag
gressiveness of the agencies accepting the OJT marketing
assignment, which is usually delegated to the public employ
ment service, CBOs (especially Urban League), and local Na
tional Alliance of Business (NAB) chapters.
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On-the-job training under Title IIBC, fiscal 1980
Percent of
Percent of
Location
total participants
total expenditures
U.S. average
11.4
10.4
Baltimore
3.8
4.1
Dallas
16.4
9.3
Indianapolis
0.2
0.5
Montgomery
1.2
0.6
North Carolina balance
of state
13.7
12.1
Ottawa
24.6
13.4
Penobscot
23.7
15.9
San Francisco
12.4
22.5
Seattle
19.0
10.7
Tucson
2.1
1.7
Utah
17.1
17.3
Worcester
5.3
7.5

Penobscot used the state federation of labor as one of its
OJT developers and had established a well-designed and
carefully monitored system, linked with other services.
Worcester had a high-quality, coupled classroom/OJT pro
gram sponsored by local banks and administered by the local
NAB chapter. In Seattle, Utah, and North Carolina, the
employment service marketed OJT far more energetically
than did the prime sponsor. Ottawa County had no
classroom training institutions, and OJT served as an alter
native to sending trainees outside the area at a high cost for
transportation and lodging; Dallas had the advantage of a
tight labor market to help "sell" the advantages of on-thejob training to employers. Indianapolis used OJT only in
isolated cases because employers had earlier criticized the
4 'red tape" that it involved. Private industry councils ex
pressed interest in OJT promotion but were only beginning
to get involved in the effort when the case studies were
prepared.
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For the prime sponsor, a major obstacle to greater use of
OJT is the high staff costs involved in persuading individual
employers to contract for OJT slots. Many employers are
reluctant to take on a CETA enrollee. They tend to question
the qualifications of the eligible population and are fearful
about the amount of red tape that may be involved in the
contracting process. The result is tnat, in most cases, only
small marginal employers, to whom a half wage subsidy for
3 to 6 months may be attractive, sign up for one or two
trainees. Moreover, in some rural areas, an absence of even
small employers makes the development of OJT contracts
nearly impossible.
One much-advocated approach to serving the disadvantaged is a remedial education/classroom instruction/on-thejob training sequence, which Penobscot had achieved for
some enrollees. However, given the limited funds available,
the outside pressures to keep per-capita costs low, and the
logistical difficulties involved in developing such complex
programs, most prime sponsors considered it more ap
propriate, if not more politically expedient, to run three
parallel programs. The expansion of job-search training
seems to be adding a fourth parallel track for the job-ready,
who may need only placement services, but for whom the
public employment service does not have an appropriate job
listing. The tendency is for prime sponsors to decide on some
division of available funds for each of these tracks, contract
for the needed services, and then monitor the activities under
each contract.
San Francisco is an example of a prime sponsor that ad
vocates high-support OJT and has had some positive ex
perience with it. (The emphasis is reflected in the expenditure
of a high proportion of funds to support a rather low pro
portion of its participants.) The program is an example of
the remediation/classroom training/OJT sequencing pro
cess. It begins with a commitment from the employer to take
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on one or more of those persons who have successfully com
pleted the first two training phases—usually with some
limited right of selection. Often the employer provides a
training facility at the workplace, along with some equip
ment and instructional assistance from the company person
nel office for a work-simulation training phase. Those who
attain a prescribed performance level, or a predetermined
proportion of them, are then offered permanent employ
ment by the firms involved.
Well-paid jobs on a structured promotion ladder, with ac
companying job security and fringe benefits, have been at
tained through this route. Examples include employment
with a grocery chain, a public utility, and an engineering
association. Nevertheless, the level of enrollments fluctuated
with the needs of the companies—frequently involving affir
mative action requirements—and could not be sustained.
Not only must a willing employer be found, but uncommit
ted dollars must be available at the appropriate time—and
these programs tend to be expensive. Both community and
federal pressures are aimed at committing every expected
program dollar at the beginning of the fiscal year and
thereafter keeping costs low. Yet, a cooperating employer
may find it difficult to adjust his labor needs to the schedule
of federal fund allocations. Thus, launching a successful
OJT effort usually involves the fortuitous availability of
funds that are either uncommitted or deobligated from other
contractors or prime sponsors.
The San Francisco prime sponsor also offers an illustra
tion of an approach that is related to the high-support OJT
program, but is less expensive and therefore has a chance for
greater continuity of funding. Advocacy organizations for
minorities, women, and the handicapped are funded for the
sole purpose of making placements, without offering any ac
companying remedial education. As a prime sponsor staffer
put it, representatives of these advocacy groups "follow the
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equal employment opportunity enforcers around offering
companies relief by providing selected, though CETAeligible, people with the right affirmative action
characteristics.*'
North Carolina used an alternative approach, called
"work site assessment," which was funded by the state
rather than CETA. In this program, workers are paid a sti
pend by the employment service while they are assigned to a
host employer's establishment. After a trial period, the
employer may reject the worker, offer unsubsidized employ
ment, or accept an OJT contract.
Beyond these few exceptional programs, OJT was a
useful, if routine, component of each prime sponsor's reper
toire of program strategies. Its high benefit-cost payoff,
clearly noted at the national level, was unknown to local
operators and not readily apparent from any of the data
available to them. The difficulty of marketing OJT, the high
administrative cost of the personalized contracting process,
and the overrepresentation of marginal employers among the
contractors acted as disincentives to heavy sponsor involve
ment in that activity. The fact that planned OJT expen
ditures were substantially greater than actual expenditures
for most of the prime sponsors indicates both the desire for
OJT and the difficulties of its promotion.

Nonoccupational Training
The expansion of nonoccupational training is one of the
most intriguing developments among CETA training ac
tivities. Included among these efforts are instruction in basic
education, English as a second language, prevocational
orientation, coping skills, motivation, and job search train
ing. These services are sometimes supplied separately and
sometimes, in any combination, included as adjuncts to oc
cupational skill training.
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The steady increase in the educational attainment of the
work force and the decline of jobs that do not require at least
some reading, writing, and simple arithmetic skills make lack
of basic education an increasingly serious handicap. General
education development (GED) certification as a substitute
for a high school diploma is, therefore, a component of
growing importance. Many CETA eligibles cannot succeed
in occupational training without first or simultaneously par
ticipating in remedial education and often in English as a
second language. Some programs have demonstrated their
ability to raise reading and arithmetic performance three
grade levels during a 12-week course, though the usual pro
gress is less dramatic.
The persistence of Spanish as the mother tongue among
rural peoples of the Southwest and Puerto Ricans on the
East Coast, together with the flood of more recent im
migrants from Latin America and the Far East, has made
English as a second language (ESL) the largest training pro
gram of some prime sponsors. Increasingly, it has become
vocational English as a second language (VESL) with the ad
vent of curriculum materials teaching language in a job con
text. ESL (or VESL) tends to be highly successful in terms of
placement rates, retention rates, and the gain between preand post-training wage rates. San Francisco had the widest
range of ESL offerings among the 12 prime sponsors
studied, enrolling persons whose native tongue was Spanish,
Chinese, Korean, Filipino, Vietnamese, Cambodian, In
donesian, and Russian. Seattle also had a growing ESL com
ponent, serving various Asian refugees. Dallas and Tucson
offer ESL for Hispanics, with Operation SER as contractor.
Other primes had more limited ESL activities. For all of
these groups, their very presence so far from their points of
origin is evidence of their motivation, and many have
substantial skills that can be applied only after language
competence is obtained.
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North Carolina had the heaviest investment in prevocational orientation, with a state appropriation of $2.3 million
in addition to CETA funding. In 47 of its 58 community and
technical colleges, CETA and non-CETA disadvantaged
enrollees are given 8 weeks of a combination of remedial
education, career exploration, and various life-coping skills.
The numbers enrolled exceed the numbers enrolled in
CETA-funded occupational skill training. This human
resource development (HRD) program emerged as a natural
consequence of reliance on public postsecondary institu
tions, which were not prepared to deal with a disadvantaged
student body. Though it functions within the same institu
tions, it is separate from and not linked with occupational
skill training. The Baltimore prime sponsor was unique in
establishing its own in-house faculty for conducting most
nonoccupational training as an alternative to contracting it
out.
The hottest new entry among the nonoccupational pro
grams is job search training. A person who knows how and
where to search and how to impress an employer can usually
find at least a high-turnover, low-paying job. Typically, the
job search program enrollees are taught during a 2-week
course to prepare resumes, fill out applications, and practice
answers to the most common questions asked by interview
ing employers. The enrollees then learn to use the telephone
yellow pages and classified advertisement sections in the
newspapers in order to identify employers likely to have the
job they want and for which they are qualified. They practice
telephoning skills and then spend long, supervised hours call
ing for interview appointments. Reported placement rates
tended to range from 70 to 90 percent among the cases
studied, though parallel programs for work incentive pro
gram (WIN) enrollees in the same cities were observed to
have as low as 30 percent success rates. Moreover, there is as
yet no substantial data on retention rates and, more impor-
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tantly, no data on whether or not the participant has obtain
ed a permanent job-seeking skill, which works in subsequent
spells of unemployment.
The nonoccupational offerings rest on two assumptions:
that a high proportion of jobs require no specific pre-entry
skills and that turnover produces a flow of jobs, even during
less-than-prosperous times. However, few programs indicate
how to distinguish between primary and secondary labor
markets and how to choose and attain jobs with promise.
Unlike occupational skill training, which is usually provided
by public education institutions and proprietary schools,
private contractors appear to dominate nonoccupational
training, except for ESL where community-based organiza
tions predominate.

Training Costs
Training costs varied widely across the study sites, but
gross cost data are of limited value because the scope and
content of the training differed widely (Table 1 which is
drawn from national DOL data sources includes only in
structional and administrative costs but not allowances). On
ly Indianapolis and Seattle of the 12 prime sponsors exceed
ed the national average cost per positive termination of
$3,170, with only Indianapolis recording a higher-than-theaverage national cost per placement of $6,508.
Important factors in determining the costs per participant
and per outcome include the ratio of nonskill to skill train
ing, the average length of training, the occupational mix, the
institutional mix, the client characteristics, the dropout rate,
and the extent of local subsidies. Costs per placement or
costs per positive termination depend, of course, upon the
characteristics of the participants, the state of the local
economy, and the availability of positive alternatives to
placement. According to national data, the positive termina-

Table 1 Program costs, fiscal 1980 (IIBC, excluding allowances)
Cost per participant

United States
Baltimore
Dallas
Indianapolis
Montgomery
North Carolina
Ottawa
Penobscot
San Francisco
Seattle
Tucson
Utah
Worcester

Classroom
$1,328
682
928
2,299
1,435
1,008
376
513
1,898
2,099
1,566
1,143
952

OJT
$1,130
766
747
4,082
941
1,056
679
844
2,662
897
933
1,001
1,620

Per positive
termination
$3,170
1,098
2,332
5,973
2,847
2,137
2,159
2,035
2,111
3,582
1,828
1,735
1,924

Rate
67.0
87.7
69.2
72.8
78.9
78.4
78.6
76.6
88.9
72.4
77.2
75.9
68.7

Cost per outcome
Per private
placement
Rate
$INA
1,298
3,539
INA
3,884
5,799
5,112
5,270
3,679
6,660
2,397
3,903
3,505

INA
75.9
46.3
INA
59.7
32.3
42.6
39.3
59.5
42.3
63.5
40.3
41.5

Per placement

Rate

$ 6,508
1,257
2,780
33,306
3,406
4,921
4,408
4,286
3,222
5,704
2,224
3,432
3,089

40.2
78.4
59.0
24.9
68.0
38.0
49.4
48.3
67.9
49.4
68.4
45.8
47.1
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tion rate of all prime sponsors averaged 67 percent. All 12
prime sponsors studied had a better record than the national
average by the positive termination criterion, but In
dianapolis and North Carolina fell below the national
average in placement rates. The prime sponsors studied con
sistently reported higher outcomes to the researchers than
were found in the national data source. The national average
cost per placement was more than double the outlay per
positive termination, but only three of the 12 prime sponsors
exceeded that ratio.
Nationally, costs per participant in classroom training ex
ceeded OJT costs by 18 percent, but half of the 12 prime
sponsors expended more funds per OJT than per classroom
enrollee. The presumed OJT cost advantage was offset in
many places by the locally subsidized and sometimes tuitionfree use of public training institutions. Public community
colleges, technical institutes, and area vocational schools are
generally eligible for the same average daily attendance fund
ing whether the student is matriculated or not, and, if tuition
is not completely free to enrollees, then the cost to the prime
sponsor is minimal except for the stipend. Another offset
against the apparently low comparative costs for on-the-job
training are the promotional costs; because there may be one
trainee per employer, the staffing requirements for either
prime sponsor or contractor associated with OJT may exceed
that of classroom training.
The costs obtainable from national data sources often dif
fer from data obtained directly from the local level. The
following locally obtained data are examples of the wide
variations in costs. At the Baltimore skill center, costs per
trainee ranged from $1,169 for clerical training to $3,344 for
construction trades. Individual referral costs were uniform
at $2,858 because the schools charged the same tuition rates
for different occupations. When allowances are added, the
total cost range grew from $2,041 for clerical to $4,696 for
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computer and office machine repair, which involved training
of longer duration than the construction trades course. Most
were open entry-open exit programs, and therefore costs are
determined by the amount of time the average trainee takes
to complete the programs (or to drop out) rather than any ar
bitrary, maximum course length. Since individual referral
courses were fixed in length and tended to be longer and in
higher skills than skill center courses, the average total cost
rose to $5,173 including allowances, despite subsidized tu
ition.
In Tucson, for example, a skill center and a private pro
prietary school provided occupational training alternatives.
The annual average cost per slot at the skill center was $3,324
in 1980. However, costs per enrollee averaged $351 and costs
per completer were $640, ranging from $95 per trainee
receiving only adult basic education or job search training to
$4,144 for a full year of skill training as a licensed practical
nurse. Also, included in the mix were 2-week pre-OJT basic
skill courses for electronic assemblers and an 8-week course
for bank tellers. The private trade school charged a tuition of
$5,200 for an academic year but, since CETA enrollees were
automatically eligible for basic education opportunity
grants, the cost to CETA was $2,000 per enrollee for the
academic year. That private school advantage was lost in
early 1981 when enrollees at the skill center became eligible
for BEOG grants in consequence of the center becoming a
unit of the community college. Because the private school
was highly selective in its entrace requirements, the prime
sponsor decided to put all its fiscal year 1981 classroom
training funds into the skill center, whereupon the private
school unsuccessfully sued. Where the classroom training
program was accomplished primarily in public postsecondary vocational and technical training institutions,
either through individual referral or in class-size groups (as
in North Carolina), CETA pays only the heavily subsidized
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tuition any individual student would pay, thus shifting
substantial costs to the state.
Indianapolis is an example of a program that has operated
classroom training totally on an individual referral basis.
One private college charged $1,690 per slot for tuition and
books for two academic quarters, while a cosmetology
school charged $1,890 for 1,500 hours of training over a
9-month period. At one technical institution, the cost by oc
cupation ranged from $1,500 to $1,800 per academic year,
while another charged $4,283 for a 1,000 hour program, and
a truck driving school charged $2,675 for 10 weeks. These
costs did not include the allowances, which were paid direct
ly to the enrollees.
Montgomery County relies primarily on class-size courses
at private and public institutions. The Penobscot prime
sponsor obtains basic education at no cost and occupational
skill training at subsidized tuition rates at public institutions
but pays full tuition costs, less BEOG's, at private institu
tions. By carefully selecting its enrollees, Montgomery
County negotiated $3,000 tuition costs for 26-week hightechnology programs at a private university and a private
technical school, while a CBO had been charging $4,000 for
training in much lower-skill occupations. Occupational
training at a community college was obtained for $1,000 per
enrollee, while non-skill training consisting of English as a
second language, basic education, and assertiveness training
for women ranged from $800 to $1,800 per person.
In general, costs appeared in line with costs of occupa
tional training outside CETA. Allowances were the major
additions over the costs considered standard to training in
stitutions. They were a necessity for many of the low-income
clientele, but some of the non-family heads probably could
have managed tuitionless training without stipends, had such
allowances not come to be expected. However, Montgomery
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County had tried nonstipended training and had ended by
serving non-family heads from households at the upper
socioeconomic levels of CETA eligibility. Dallas had manag
ed a compromise, paying stipends at an hourly rate that was
an average of 80 cents below the federal minimum. A per
suasive case can be made for changing the allowance struc
ture to prevent those stipends becoming a major incentive
for enrollment. A major cost for CETA has been the deci
sion to set the training allowance at the minimum wage for
the hours attended, plus add-ons for training expenses and
dependents. Those training for low-skill occupations may ac
tually have a higher take-home pay during enrollment than
after placement, making many reluctant to leave the shelter
of the program. Since total allowance costs are determined
by duration of training, whereas training costs fluctuate to
some extent by occupation and by institution, allowances
vary from about 40 percent to about 60 percent of total
training costs. Because length of training is the major deter
minant of both training cost and occupational level, the
highest-cost training tends to prepare enrollees for the best
jobs.

3. Quality of Training
There are no simple criteria for measuring the quality of
training; in fact, there is much mystique in the concept. Ef
fectiveness might be conceptually easier to measure, but the
data do not exist. Placement does not measure effectiveness
unless compared against controls because the state of the
local labor market may be the more critical determinant.
Many factors enter into an assessment of training quality:
the adequacy of facilities, equipment, and curriculum; the
competence of the instructors; the appropriateness of the
training occupations; the adequacy of training duration; and
the quality of the needed supportive services provided. The
characteristics of the clients and the supportive services they
require also affect the quality of training provided. The
management of training, including the linkages among ser
vices and with employers, may affect outcomes no less than
the training itself. Of course, costs are both a determinant of
quality and a yardstick against which to measure effec
tiveness.

Institutional Capacity
Because of the limited resources available to them, the
prime sponsors included in this study were dependent upon
the quality of the training institutions in existence. They were
in no position to create new ones. Prime sponsor staff could
only demonstrate acumen in choosing between alternatives
of higher and lower quality. The quality of the available in
stitutions in rural Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, and
Utah was generally good, and the prime sponsors utilized the
37
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available resources. In some isolated areas of these states,
however, there were no training institutions available. In
those situations, the choices were to rely on work experience
or on-the-job training (though potential host employers were
also scarce) or to pay costs of transportation and lodging at a
distant site. In each of these cases, at least some moneys were
allocated to institutions of lesser quality for political
reasons, to maintain a range of alternatives, or because of
the particular attachments of institutions to race, sex, or
other groupings among the eligible population.
The types of training institutions have been described but
can also be ranked according to quality. The best institutions
were those that were created to appeal to the broader, nondisadvantaged population in the community. Private pro
prietary trade schools depended upon a combination of highquality training and good placement rates to maintain a
clientele and make a profit. Attractive facilities, up-to-date
equipment, high-quality staff, sound and motivating cur
ricula, and high placement rates were all necessary to con
tinue to attract tuition-paying customers. However, this
quality came at high cost to CETA, both in budget dollars
and selectivity of enrollees.
Few CETA enrollees could meet the entry requirements of
proprietary schools on an individual basis. Pressures from
the Federal Trade Commission to advertise their placement
rate make such schools reluctant to accept the hard-to-place.
The Montgomery County experience of screening 1,100
CETA eligible applicants to find 33 persons acceptable to a
technical school for a biomedical technician program has
been noted. On the other hand, the San Francisco experi
ment with placing a class-size project in a private business
school, where the instructional and administrative staff was
never able to establish rapport, illustrates the difficulties for
such a school in seeking to adapt itself to an unfamiliar
clientele.
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There are, however, private institutions capable of serving
a broader portion of the CETA population, as illustrated by
the ABC Trade School in Tucson and the Beal and Hudson
Colleges in Maine. For the CETA-eligible persons who can
qualify, these appear to be good investments because they
train for the mainstream labor market, their training lasts
for longer periods of time, and they provide access to jobs
that pay enough to assure economic independence. But selec
tion must be made with care, and the prime sponsor should
maintain a liaison with and access to external supportive ser
vices to increase the chances of enrollee survival.
Community colleges, technical colleges, and area voca
tional schools rank next in quality. In recent years these in
stitutions have experienced a vast expansion and qualitative
upgrading. The facilities and equipment are generally of high
quality, and the occupational offerings tend to be broader
than at the proprietary schools. Some CETA prime sponsors
may be overly attracted to such institutions because of the
comparatively low cost. Most CETA enrollees can gain en
trance, but the challenge is to survive. The institutions have
adapted to the needs of the average high school graduate.
They rarely have available remedial adult basic education,
English as a second language, close counseling support, and
other supportive services likely to be needed by the CETA
population. CETA referrals who can survive in that setting
are likely to be brought into contact with the primary labor
market. Most such schools have informal and formal
employer contacts. The enrollee emerges from a mainstream
institution rather than from a stigmatized federal program.
The enrollee may well be inspired to a higher self-image as
well.
As the case studies illustrate, some of the survival prob
lems for CETA enrollees in these mainstream institutions
can be minimized by the prime sponsor staff working closely
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with the training institutions. The options are to persuade
the institution to mount its own supportive services ac
tivities, allow the stationing of agency personnel at the train
ing institution to provide the social services, or arrange to
provide access to supportive services external to the training
institution. North Carolina has attacked the problem with its
8-week human resource development program, given prior
to enrollment in occupational skill training.
The third institutional tier appears to be the skill centers.
They are typically designed around an open entry-open exit
concept in which an enrollee can enter regardless of
background, obtain remedial education and advocacy
counseling, enter individualized training without waiting,
progress through a modularized course sequence, and seek
employment upon attainment of a skill. They may also leave
when they have reached their learning capacity or upon
becoming financially pressed. All the necessary remedial and
supportive services, including placement services, were
designed to be available onsite from skill center staff or
outstationed staff of other agencies. The survival chances of
the less-qualified CETA eligibles are enhanced in the skill
center environment. However, the facilities suffer in quality
and tend to be limited to occupations in which entry for a
disadvantaged person can be attained in 6 months or less of
training.
The training provided by community-based organizations
offers the fourth tier in quality. As usual, there are excep
tions. As noted above, the Seattle OIC occupies modern
training facilities and provides superior training. That is a
unique case, however. CBOs generally operate out of
haphazard facilities, just as skill centers do, and, although
high quality training can occur in a substandard facility,
there is at least an image handicap. The comparative advan
tage of a CBO is racial and ethnic identity. The few CBOs
that offer occupational training tend to depend upon the
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charisma and commitment of staff, but the overall perfor
mance is spotty.
Contracting with CBOs for CETA services involves more
than straightforward judgments of training quality. Aside
from political considerations, which may be controlling,
CBO personnel can provide the enrollees with a sense of
identity and can offer the program greater visibility in the
community. In some localities this may be sufficient reason
for funding groups that mix training with a good dose of ad
vocacy. In general, the messages of these case studies suggest
that it is best to leave to CBOs the primary functions of
outreach and intake, remedial components, and affirmative
action sponsorship on behalf of their particular clientele.
Since these activities are generally new to everyone in the
community, a CBO can mount them as effectively as any
other available institution. Also, the CBOs are more likely to
be aware of the needs of the eligible population, and they
have greater flexibility than the educational institutions. Oc
cupational training is, however, at its best when assigned to
schools or employer settings with satisfactory facilities and
recognized competence.
The case studies demonstrate that the paucity of funds for
facilities and equipment is a distinct obstacle to CETA train
ing. The institution acting as contractor to provide training
normally furnishes its own facilities and equipment. DOL
pressures are against providing sufficient funding to upgrade
facilities and equipment, and prime sponsors are reluctant to
use scarce funds for these purposes. Private schools, of
course, charge enough for their training to cover amortiza
tion. Public educational institutions provide a substantial
subsidy to CETA through free use of facilities and equip
ment as well as through tuition charges that are well below
costs. Skill centers and CBOs must negotiate with prime
sponsors for sufficient funds to improve their facilities and
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upgrade their equipment but have had to overcome prime
sponsors' resistance to cost increases.
As noted, prime sponsors lack the resources to provide
training in areas where no effective training institution ex
ists. The differences were critical in two of the three
Penobscot consortium counties, in some of Utah's isolated
areas, and in Ottawa County. The choice left to the prime
sponsor in these areas was to make do with the available in
stitutions, limit the program to work experience, or train ap
plicants at some far-away institution involving travel ex
penses and living costs.

Curricula and Staff
The quality of occupational skill training curricula ap
peared to be generally good, though each institution was be
ing forced to adapt materials prepared for the mainstream.
A system of sharing curriculum within CETA training circles
would have been of considerable value.
Curricula for remedial adult basic education are now
reasonably well developed and available "off the shelf"
from several commercial publishers and educational
systems. English as a second language is approaching that
status with an informal network of exchange among practi
tioners. Fortunately, a separate curriculum does not seem
necessary for each language. San Francisco, where all ESL
instructors share community college certification, has its
own multilingual informal interchange, while ELS materials
for Spanish-speaking trainees have been circulating since
MDTA began. Vocational English as a second language
(VESL) seems to be the code term for this growing multi
lingual interchange. San Francisco, Seattle, and Tucson of
fered the best training noted in this field, although no case
study author identified ESL as an area of curriculum
weakness. The anxiety of the immigrant enrollees for pro-
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gress and the ethnic identification of the instructors are un
doubtedly positive qualitative factors.
In contrast, limited curriculum material seems to have
been designed for orientation, motivation, and various cop
ing skills such as grooming, personal finance, and how to
gain access to public services. The goals of orientation are
not clear nor do we know how to motivate employees, as the
experience of high-priced consultants to industry clearly il
lustrates. Job search training is too new to have developed a
widely acceptable curriculum. Most of the literature in the
field, developed in support of career choice and access to
professional jobs by college graduates and displaced ex
ecutives, has limited relevance to a CETA-eligible popula
tion. Consulting firms have begun to compete vigorously for
assignments from CETA prime sponsors, but many
unresolved methodological and conceptual issues concerning
curriculum approaches remain. Quality at this point is likely
to rest more with the charisma and good sense of the
workshop leader than with curriculum content.
Staff development seemed to be a serious problem in the
CETA training system. For institutions outside the training
mainstream, including skill centers, there is ordinarily no re
quirement for preservice teacher training and no linkage to
ongoing inservice teacher training and staff development
systems. There are no funds or provisions in CETA contracts
for upgrading contractor personnel. There is none of the
leisurely pace of public education. Instructors are paid by
classroom hour and have no built-in incentives for selfdevelopment. The generally high quality of instruction must
be attributed to personal dedication rather than to institu
tional incentives. Formal staff development ought to make it
even better. North Carolina went furthest of the 12 case
studies in attempting to meet that need but the full potential
effectiveness of its state-financed Employment and Training
Institute was thwarted by political infighting. Still, it is a
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model worth consideration, since it is close enough to the
local level to allow general staff attendance and onsite
assistance, yet has a large enough scope for economies of
scale.

Occupational and O JT Quality
The training occupations available to CETA enrollees are
limited by the policy of keeping per-capita costs low and,
therefore, training of short duration. The average classroom
course length is 5.5 months, although the law permits pro
grams of up to 2 years. Nonetheless, all of the prime spon
sors indicated the imposition by regional officials of more
stringent de facto limitations, which prime sponsors tend to
enforce in response to pressures for maximum enrollments.
In effect, therefore, CETA training is limited to 1-year pro
grams even though some prime sponsors, notably
Penobscot, enrolled their participants in 2-year programs,
with the understanding that they had to pay their own way
the second year. The availability of basic education oppor
tunity grants facilitated this approach, and the grants were
used extensively in several locations to reduce the cost of the
initial support. Enrollment of 1 academic year or less in a
low-tuition occupational program in a public institution
seemed to be generally available for those meeting both
CETA eligibility and the institution's entry requirements,
but the number who could qualify was limited, except in San
Francisco, Seattle, and Utah—areas with a generally high
average level of education—which generated waiting lists of
qualified applicants.
Occasionally prime sponsors attempt to generate class-size
CETA projects within mainstream training institutions. Ex
amples include Montgomery County's biomedical technician
program, electronic technician, computer operation and pro
gramming courses in North Carolina, Penobscot, Worcester,
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Baltimore, and Dallas. Most of these advanced projects were
funded under the skill training improvement program, which
had its own separate, more-generous funding and lessrestrictive eligibility standards than the run-of-the-mill
CETA training.
The skill center programs offer occasional departures
from the standard meager menu because of the special and
temporary employer need, but the pressures for short train
ing time, low costs, and immediate placement create a cen
tripetal force back to the basic grouping. Tucson's elec
tromechanical assembly and bank teller programs, air condi
tioning installation courses in Dallas, and Seattle's addition
of maritime trades to the skill center's offerings are examples
of efforts to meet special local needs. The difficulties of
recruiting and retaining a sufficient number of eligible
enrollees qualified for the training outside of the customary
clerical, health, automotive, welding, machine operations
and food and building service are illustrated by the class-size
computer programming and operation courses in Baltimore
and at the Dallas QIC.
Little is known about the quality of on-the-job training.
CETA prime sponsors are usually one additional step remov
ed from OJT employers. As noted, the prime sponsor con
tracts with a CBO, the local public job service, or the Na
tional Alliance of Business chapter to contact employers and
place CETA-eligible enrollees with them. Some subcontrac
tors make periodic visits to employers and some do not, and
prime sponsor staff also make spot checks. But the staff
making these checks are not training experts. OJT can range
from formal inplant courses to working under the watchful
eye of a supervisor or being assisted by a fellow employee.
The first issue is, did the employer hire a CETA-eligible per
son because of the training subsidy rather than an employee
not eligible under CETA who would otherwise have gotten
the job? The payoff is whether the enrollee is retained in an
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unsubsidized job. The fact that such retention occurs in most
cases undoubtedly explains the highly attractive benefit-cost
ratio documented in the national review.
Supportive services are an essential ingredient of CETA
training that affects its quality. MDTA pioneered in the
development of client assistance—child care and transporta
tion—to ease participation in occupational skill training.
CETA continued to provide these services, although other
programs have shared in the responsibility for their funding.
Even more than MDTA, CETA has emphasized acquiring
the personal attributes of employability, whether or not the
client participates in occupational training.
Counseling remains a supportive service whose value is
taken on faith in the absence of any strong evidence about
the extent to which it makes a difference in participant out
comes. The same applies to training for job search, which is
a more recent development without an articulated common
curriculum and to orientation and motivation activities,
which are too diverse and amorphous to make assessment of
these approaches any more than a matter of faith.
Need for transportation assistance was significant only in
Dallas and Penobscot. Most child-care facilities and services
were provided by non-CETA agencies and did not appear to
be a serious problem to prime sponsors. In general, the nontraining supportive services have been taken over by other in
stitutions during the past decade, while the nonoccupational
labor market skills such as job search have exceeded them in
importance within the CETA program.

Linkages and Sequence
A significant consideration in assessing the quality of a
CETA training program might be the degree to which it is
linked with other CETA components, with programs in
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mainstream education institutions, and with employing
organizations. The scarcity of such linkages was one of the
disappointing findings of the study. An advantage of decen
tralized administration should be the ability of the prime
sponsor to orchestrate passage of the eligible enrollee
through a sequence of locally available services, starting
from the enrollee's initial need and completing with having
attained employability and a job. Such sequencing was rare,
however. Only three of the 12 prime sponsors centralized
their total intake, and two others did so for part of their
clientele. The norm was for a service deliverer to be responsi
ble for its own recruitment, selection, and assessment of
clients whose access was limited to the services provided by
that contractor. The general tendency was to make one pro
gram referral per enrollee and provide nothing further, ex
cept perhaps placement services after completion.
There is no legal or regulatory obstacle to starting an in
dividual in ESL and adult basic education at one institution,
moving to skill training at another, followed perhaps by an
on-the-job training stint and job search training from
another institution, as needed. The obstacles are conceptual,
logistical, and financial. Prime sponsor staff generally lack
interest in and capability to design comprehensive delivery
systems, to chart client flows, and to generate realistic and
meaningful employability development plans. A systematic
client tracking system is necessary to monitor the enrollee's
progress, and it is difficult to assign accountability and
measure contractor performance in an interdependent
system. Reporting requirements further discourage mixing
components. The financial drawback is the amount of
money to be spent per individual. The longer amount of time
necessary to traverse the complex programmatic terrain in
creases the amount spent for allowances.
The standard practice of the prime sponsors studied was to
provide no employment and training services directly. Only

48

the skill centers and the North Carolina community colleges
and technical institutions provided both nonoccupational
and occupational training within the same training institu
tion. Most other institutions performed only one or a limited
range of services. Absent centralized intake centers, there
were no means of arranging a needed sequence of services to
be supplied in turn by service deliverers. Each contractor had
every incentive to keep its applicants inhouse and little or no
incentive to refer them to other institutions for alternative or
supplemental services. But centralized intake is not enough.
There must be some means of assessment to determine
enrollee capability and need.
There were some exceptions to these generalizations about
sequencing and relations with the education community.
Penobscot operated its own intake and assessment centers
and tried to develop a realistic employability development
plan for each participant. It was able to determine who need
ed adult basic education, refer them to that service, and then
on to occupational skill training when the desired level had
been achieved. Through the assessment process, only those
with good work habits were referred to OJT. PSE was
visualized as being OJT in the public sector with persons
referred there first to learn and practice skills and then to be
referred to either classroom training or private sector OJT.
Penobscot was the only prime sponsor studied that seemed
to be able to use the employability development plan as an
instrument for sequencing individuals through multiprogram
involvement.
Despite operating its own intake centers, there was little
attempt in Baltimore to provide sequential services beyond
the first referral. Dallas had contracted with a CBO for a
centralized intake and assessment center but there was no
continuing linkage between that center and the organizations
to which the individuals were referred and no arrangement
for later sequential referrals. The Washington state employ-
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ment service operated a well-staffed assessment center to
recommend choices among OJT, individual referral, the skill
center, and occupations within them. Tucson had con
siderable movement of individuals from adult basic educa
tion and ESL and other nonoccupational activities at CBOs
into occupational training at the skill center. This was ac
complished by allocating a fixed number of slots at the skill
center to each CBO that assumed the responsibility for
allowance payments and placement efforts on behalf of
those individuals. The skill center then provided vocational
assessment to help in the choice of training occupation.
Beyond these examples, assignments were based upon
availability of openings or enrollee choice.
Except in Seattle, all skill centers studied were units of the
public education systems. Yet the latter invariably treated
their skill centers as stepchildren and established few, if any,
linkages.
Tucson and Baltimore seemed to have the most significant
linkages with the employer community. In Tucson, a joint
and overlapping economic development council, prime spon
sor advisory council, and private industry council was a
useful device for program planning and for development of
linked classroom and O JT programs but not for direct place
ment. Baltimore, more than the other sponsors, seemed to
have worked out effective continuing program planning and
marketing relationships for direct placement with
cooperating employers.
By and large, CETA appeared to be a mechanism for plac
ing resources into the hands of training institutions and
channeling eligible individuals into training programs.
However, with the possible exception of Penobscot and to a
lesser degree Tucson, nowhere did any of the 12 prime spon
sors studied develop the institutional arrangements that are
necessary for a sequential training system.
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The Quality of Evaluation
The 12 case studies indicate that federal administrators
displayed little concern about training quality and few prime
sponsors appeared to have staffs qualified to assess the
quality of training offered and to recommend improvements
in it. The only prime sponsor staff with a continuing assign
ment for direct onsite observation are the program monitors,
but theirs is an entry level position characterized by high
turnover—either up or out—which prevents the accumula
tion of experiences upon which to make valid judgments.
Training quality appeared to be more often an accident of in
stitutional availability. Fortunately, the accident happened
more often than not, so that one can report favorably on the
general quality level of CETA training, including the
facilities, equipment, curricula, and staff.
But what about the results? Regrettably, the information
does not exist to measure accomplishment at the local level.
Not one of the prime sponsors studied could produce reliable
and comprehensive statistics proving the long-run results of
their training efforts. All maintained placement and positive
termination rates and pre-entry/postparticipation wage rates
because those were required by the DOL reporting system. A
few maintained followup data for up to 6 months after train
ing, but most did little followup. Baltimore had the most ex
tensive evaluation program of the 12, with a separate office
of program evaluation and research to carry it out. Rather
than evaluate on a contract-by-contract basis, the evalua
tions were structured around service components in order to
ascertain which are most effective for whom. However, the
evaluation effort necessarily relied upon measures of shortrun rather than long-run gains. Dallas is an example of a
prime sponsor which contracts for 3-, 6-, and 12-month
followup, but obtains no information on program impact.
The purpose is to assess contractor performance but not to
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test the worth or outcomes of the program. Penobscot
follows up its enrollees but does not record results separately
for each service component.
Completion rates were generally reported by the prime
sponsors to be in the 80 and 90 percentiles, a remarkably
high achievement if the data are correct. Placement rates
typically were reported to range from 65 to 85 percent, but
was the determining factor the quality of the training pro
gram, the state of the local economy, or the competence of
the job development and placement functions?
No prime sponsor had conducted any controlled study to
determine how the gains to the participants fared compared
with those experienced by a like group of nonparticipants.
Only San Francisco had attempted to calculate cost-benefit
ratios to be used as a management tool for the allocation of
funds among contractors and services. Participant costs were
compared to the annualized first postenrollment placement
wage. In some of the ESL programs particularly the gains
were spectacular, but hardly surprising considering, for ex
ample, a Cambodian pre-entry wage compared with a San
Francisco post-participation wage. Since the ESL placement
rates were consistently over 80 percent and retention rates
even higher 6 months later, there is no reason to doubt the
positive thrust of the findings.
Even excluding the unique San Francisco situation, the
average wage gains were significant, considering that many
participants had to settle for jobs in secondary labor
markets. The boosts in average hourly rates from $3.36 to
$3.97 in Dallas and from $3.60 to $4.25 in Baltimore are
typical examples.
The natural concern of a prime sponsor is the relative ef
fectiveness of service alternatives—does classrom training,
on-the-job training, work experience, or some other alter
native service provide the most placement per dollar of ex-
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penditure? Whether the unserved did as well as the served
was a question which they felt no obligation to answer. In
volved as they are in day-to-day operations, prime sponsors
do not place high priority on determining whether the
benefits from CETA services exceed the costs of those ser
vices. Process evaluation of the CETA system is con
siderable, perhaps too much so. Outcomes evaluation at the
local level is rare and the national system, though thorough,
involves long-term lags. Because they were limited to im
mediate placement data, prime sponsors are often led into
less than cost-effective strategies. Work experience and
short-duration training produce equal immediate placement
rates at lower costs in comparison with longer-duration
training, which is nonetheless shown by the national
longitudinal data to have the greater ultimate payoff.

4. The Management of Training
The CETA system involves a partnership of federal, state,
and local governments, with advice from other labor market
participants, for the delivery of services designed to improve
the employment and training experiences of eligible
unemployed and economically disadvantaged persons. While
this study focuses on training, it is necessary to assess how
training fares in this milieu. Understanding and appraising
the system in which training decisions are made requires an
examination of the decisionmaking process.

The Decisionmakers
The CETA decisionmaking process involves elected of
ficials, prime sponsor staff, advisory bodies, contractors and
subcontractors, client groups, and the public at the local
level, all interacting with state officials and agencies, federal
Department of Labor officials, and, ultimately, the Con
gress. Each has varying impact on the nature and quality of
the training delivered, but not necessarily on the outcomes.

Elected Officials
Few elected officials were deeply involved in the dozen
cases under scrutiny. Some ignored CETA's existence. Some
asked for periodic briefings to assure that no unforeseen
political dangers were lurking within CETA's complexities.
Only one, the mayor of Baltimore, perceived CETA as play
ing any significant role in his plans for his jurisdiction and
administration. For him, CETA was a key resource for ser
vices to his constituents, a welcome linkage between social
53
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services and economic development activities, and its direc
tor was a valued lieutenant in his administration.
Most chief elected officials were satisfied to leave the
management of the prime sponsorship to the staff, provided
that CETA operations did not cause political embarrass
ment. In the two cases where the governors were the chief
elected officials, their role was even less than that of mayors
and county officials. Since decisionmaking was largely
decentralized to associations of government in North
Carolina and Utah, the systems may simply have been too
amorphous for the governors to have means for participa
tion. In Utah, the previous governor had resolved to shift
from intense personal involvement to extreme decentraliza
tion, and the incumbent governor had not reversed that
trend. In North Carolina, CETA has often been a political
issue, but no governor has been much concerned with its
substance. Two-thirds of the North Carolina county com
missioners involved would have preferred the abolition of
CETA, which seemed also to be the preference of the Dallas
city council.
The finding that the elected official's involvement is not
crucial to effective CETA administration does not mean that
the role does not exist. Elected officials were interested and
evident where political sensitivities were at stake. They occa
sionally overruled their directors after counting political
costs. That meant, however, that their interest level was like
ly to be high in relation to public service employment and
low in relation to training.

The Staff Directors
The key decisionmaker in a local CETA system is the
prime sponsor staff director. This official is most often the
prime determinant in deciding how the local prime sponsor
ship will respond to the local political, economic, and
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demographic conditions in the usage of CETA funds. From
the 12 case studies, it is possible to derive a profile of the ef
fective staff director. Yet there is no evidence linking that
profile with outcomes of the program, as measured by
employment and income gains of participants. Of the 12
prime sponsors, four stood out as the most effective leaders,
whereas two others were so new that there was inadequate
evidence of their eventual effectiveness. What marked the
leadership effectiveness of these four was their ability to con
ceptualize the CETA system for their locality, derive a set of
objectives consistent with the local economic and political
mix, design a realistic program consistent with those objec
tives, and then direct the human and financial resources of
the prime sponsorship toward the achievement of those
directives. The conceptualization might not be that which
was in the minds of CETA congressional authors, and the
objectives might not be those espoused by the national and
regional offices. However, survival demands objectives and
approaches that are realistic and desirable within the local
context.
Considering the long-run interests of the CETA-eligible
population, an effective program is one in which (1) ap
propriate priorities are made for specified reasons among
those eligible for service; (2) the barriers impeding the
employment of individuals in the target groups are identified
as clearly as available data make possible; (3) a mix of ser
vices is explicitly selected which takes into account the needs
of the target group, the capabilities of potential service
deliverers, and the realities of the labor market; (4) service
deliverers are chosen on the basis of their ability to deliver
quality service; and, (5) the outcomes are as favorable as the
state of the labor market and the nature of the employment
barriers allow. The staff director must be sensitive to outside
pressures and constructively accommodate the prime spon
sor's objectives with the mix of political interests dominant
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on the local and national scene. Effectiveness in each situa
tion must be judged in relation to alternatives that the prime
sponsor might have adopted. Cross-prime-sponsor com
parisons are of limited value because of the widely varying
circumstances.
Baltimore, San Francisco, Penobscot County, and Tucson
are examples of prime sponsors operating under strong and
effective leadership. Sex certainly was not the determining
factor. Two of the four more-effective leaders were women
and two were men. All four have a clear vision of what they
believe CETA objectives to be, how much can be ac
complished within their political, economic, and budgetary
constraints, and are aggressive in pursuing their aims.
The stability or the strength of the political leadership does
not create the staff leadership. Only Baltimore of the four
cited prime sponsors could claim an elected chief executive
concerned enough with the employment and training arena
to contribute to the creation of a leader in his own image.
The San Francisco staff director had served under three
mayors, none of whom were especially enamored of CETA
or deeply involved with it. The Penobscot director served
under a corporate leadership of nine county commissioners,
none of whom loaned substantial strength to the CETA
operation. One Tucson mayor spanned the entire CETA ex
perience, supported his staff director, but did not involve
himself in CETA affairs. Except in Baltimore, the chief
elected official never added to or subtracted from the effec
tiveness of the staff director. The Baltimore staff director
could undoubtedly carry the load by herself but has been aid
ed by the strengths of her mayor.
On the other hand, political leaders established a climate
in North Carolina and Dallas, Texas in which no strong
leader could have or would have persisted. Eight successive
directors served the former, usually until abruptly removed.
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The pattern of the latter was to view the role as a temporary
assignment to be moved beyond as soon as possible. In other
cases, the political environment was essentially neutral.
Leadership can drag a program down as well as build it
up. Both the Utah and Seattle prime sponsors began under
nationally recognized leadership and their programs were
considered among the best in the nation. The original Utah
leadership left when the governor backed away from support
of a strongly centralized state program. The Seattle director
left because he felt the Congress and the incoming ad
ministration in 1977 was unduly restricting local autonomy.
He has not been replaced by leaders of equal stature as the
Seattle program subsided into mediocrity.
Concern has been expressed about the staff director's
stability of tenure. However, these case studies should be
reassuring. No strong and effective staff director was replac
ed as a result of a lost election, though some were removed in
internal political squabbles. On the other hand, those with
effective leadership in the small group of cases have never ex
perienced a change of political party in an election or have
been protected by a consortium structure in which all of the
principals did not change simultaneously.
Academic credentials appear to be irrelevant and ex
perience seems to be paramount. All four of the most im
pressive leaders preceded CETA passage in their manpower
program involvement. Typically, the less-effective leaders
were more recent entrants, leaving one to wonder whether
experience built strength or only the strong survived.
Salary and job security are not the explanation of strong
leadership, though they may often encourage its absence.
CETA directors and staff seem more responsive to challenge
than to salary. But why would an effective leader accept the
CETA assignment? The rewards are totally in a sense of ser
vice. CETA salaries are usually no more than and often less
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than those for comparable jobs in state and local govern
ments. Why would persons give up other alternatives to
function in the unstable and uncertain world of CETA? The
motivations appear primarily intrinsic and often seem to in
volve a commitment to improve social conditions and con
tribute to the alleviation of unemployment, poverty, and
discrimination. The answer may have to come from a
psychiatrist, but even in these cynical times dedicated people
can still be found.
That leaves a conundrum: How can a program attract
strong leadership? Must it remain a happy accident? The
search must be for independent spirits with sound ad
ministrative skills. They will always be scarce but not nonex
istent. Ultimately, for a system to survive, the extrinsic
motivations must be strengthened to support the intrinsic
ones.

Staff
Conventional wisdom has it that one of CETA's major
problems is the high turnover of prime sponsor staff. The 12
case studies do not support that generalization. Of the 12, all
but two, Dallas and North Carolina, had in fact experienced
remarkable stability, considering the limited access to the
customary devices for job security. In fact, the Dallas CETA
staff were city merit-system employees and that seemed to
contribute to, rather than minimize, turnover. Two prime
sponsors, Montgomery County and Seattle, had each ex
perienced a substantial one-time turnover consequent to
changes in directors but had experienced staff stability
before and after. Utah experienced a major turnover in the
leadership of its pioneering state manpower planning effort,
but that was on the eve of CETA passage and stability had
prevailed since. All of the others had experienced continued
stability in all of the key management and technical levels.
Turnover of lower-level and nonpolicy staff occurred but did
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not significantly affect policy or operation. Possibly one ma
jor contribution to staff stability has been the fact that over
the first 6 years, CETA was a growth industry and able staff
members had ample opportunity for upward mobility within
the system.
Dallas reflected a hostile political environment where
political leaders apparently wished that CETA went away,
and at least on one occasion the city council narrowly
defeated a proposal to refuse CETA funds. A CETA assign
ment was just another job to staff who expected to be pro
moted and transferred soon, and many were. There was no
noticeable commitment to the CETA mission. North
Carolina has suffered from fluctuating political perceptions
of what CETA could and should be and failure of anyone to
visualize a consistent and viable mission for the sprawling
balance-of-state structure. Yet the high turnover was limited
to the director with the staff experiencing no higher turnover
than typical in state and local government.
On the other hand, stability existed in situations with and
without merit-system protection, with low pay and high.
Two situations seemed to contribute to staff stability: (1) ef
fective staff directors and an organizational sense of mis
sion—being part of an effective and committed organization
was apparently attractive enough; and, (2) an abundant sup
ply of the college-educated who depended upon CETA for
scarce job opportunities. Utah and Ottawa County were ex
amples. The living environment was attractive and there
were few alternatives for college-educated people without
technical and professional skills. That does not mean these
staffs lacked competence. They were able people but without
a notable sense of mission. Dependence of staff stability on
leadership strength and agency commitment is in some ways
a disappointing, though not surprising, finding. Putting in
place higher salaries, job security, or a training program for
staff development is much easier than finding and develop-
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ing competent leaders or generating from the top down a
sense of mission.
Not turnover but accretion had been the staffing problem
of the 12 prime sponsors. All the prime sponsors report rapid
increases in staff following the passage of the Youth
Employment and Demonstration Projects Act in 1977; it was
not unusual for the prime sponsor staffs to increase fivefold
or more within several months of enactment.

Advisory Councils
The case studies were reassuring as to the role and con
tribution of the advisory councils mandated by CETA law,
again in contrast to what has been reported from other
CETA studies. In about half of the prime sponsors studied,
staff followed the advice of the advisory councils on most
issues. In fact, a council vote was considered the final word
by several prime sponsor staffs. The conditions that divided
the prime sponsors into two groups on this issue are instruc
tive. The effective leaders seemed to put the greatest respon
sibilities on their advisory councils, and advisory councils
seemed to respond when they had decisionmaking power.
Councils did not generally work well where the CETA
operations were spread beyond the local community lines, as
in Ottawa County, North Carolina, and Utah. However, the
Penobscot staff director had been able to develop a useful
council role by having three councils, one for each county in
the consortium, and some of the separate advisory councils
to substate planning regions have worked effectively in
North Carolina. Advisory councils also did little where their
function was not considered important by the chief elected
official and staff, or where their advice was ignored, or
where little of significance was happening under CETA.
Council subcommittees were active in recommending the
relative priority to be given to the various target groups and
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in reviewing and ranking program proposals, but had no
means for judging quality by other than gross outcomes.
They supplied a buffer for the staff in a politically sensitive
function. They tended to show sound judgment and firmness
in choosing and rewarding contractors and programs
capable of demonstrated effectiveness, as measured by costs,
placements, and other outcomes. They were not sufficiently
knowledgeable to judge the quality of program content and
conduct.
By design, the case studies paid little attention to youth
programs and the youth advisory councils established by the
1977 law. In general, it appears that these councils had not
found a meaningful role, Private industry councils had a
more programmatic than advisory role, but were relatively
new when the case studies were prepared. A problem was the
lack of rationale for three councils per prime sponsor. The
Tucson model, which effectively combined the prime spon
sor advisory council and the private industry council with the
local economic development advisory council, seemed to
have the most to offer.
A persisting controversy in CETA has been whether
representatives of service delivery agencies should be allowed
to serve on advisory councils, which make recommendations
concerning choice among service delivery agencies. This con
troversy involves particularly the job service and
community-based organizations. To avoid conflict of in
terest, federal regulations forbid representatives of organiza
tions that deliver services to vote on decisions affecting their
own funding, but membership on advisory councils is not
forbidden. Most of the prime sponsors studied had taken
steps to limit the proportion of service deliverers among ad
visory council membership, and at least one relegated them
to nonvoting status. However, the restriction did not prevent
the representatives of service deliverers, particularly private
contractors, to affect decisions by lobbying council members
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and elected officials. The job service and the public educa
tion officials were sometimes not sufficiently interested to
pursue a role aggressively, or in other cases appeared to con
sider such pursuit demeaning.
In general, private service deliverers, by aggressive lobby
ing, were able to preserve roles for themselves as long as they
were at least moderately effective in performing their respon
sibilities. Eventually, all the prime sponsors in the cases
studied tended to "bite the bullet" and dumped clearly inef
fective contractors, despite political pressure. Marginal con
tractors, however, were often continued rather than do
political battle over debatable issues.

The Feds
The prime sponsor perception of the federal role in CETA
ranged from highly to mildly negative. Few favorable com
ments were heard concerning any federal decision. That
many of the decisions complained about were products of
congressional action, not the U.S. Department of Labor, did
not appear to be recognized by many at the prime sponsor
level. However, it appeared to be universal judgment that the
department's regulation writers tended to compound con
gressional restrictions. The national office was perceived as
having no concept of the impact of its administrative deci
sions at the service delivery level. Meddling threats—rarely
carried out, but disruptive of operations—rather than
technical assistance appeared to the prime sponsors to be the
preferred remedy for any apparent transgression.
Judgments as to national office competence and intentions
were no less harsh in Labor Department regional offices than
in the offices of the prime sponsors: "They don't know what
they want or what life is like outside of Washington." A par
ticular complaint of regional staff and a source of derision
from prime sponsor staff was that any subscriber of the na-
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tional reporting services knew of Washington decisions days
to weeks before the word reached officially the regional of
fices, and the latter could not (or would not) take action until
informed through formal channels. Then, higher regional
levels were perceived as compounding the delay by rewriting
the national directives into regional directives before sending
them on to the field, often, it was claimed, distorting the
meaning and compounding the confusion in the process.
One must interpret such complaints with care. It is to be
expected that subordinate agencies and staff will complain
about those who set the rules and hold the purse strings. It is
also to be expected that national oversight agencies will con
sider the subordinate as insubordinate and incompetent,
especially to the extent those who oversee have more respon
sibility than authority. Nevertheless, there does appear to be
a real problem in contrast with the past. In pre-CETA days,
a substantial number of federal operatives at regional and
national levels had "come up" through the federal-state
employment service and through state vocational education
agencies, which were also the major providers of federally
mandated services. No important national office positions
are currently held by former members of prime sponsor
staffs. The same is true, by and large, at the regional level,
though a few are beginning to emerge at the lower levels
there. Thus, the federal staff is responsible for functions
they have never performed and that are foreign to their ex
periences. When the alternatives are remedial technical
assistance or threats, they are incapable of offering the
former and resort to the latter.
For the prime sponsor, the visible test of federal com
petence is the regional office field representative—in CETA
parlance the "fed rep." This individual, who is expected to
provide onsite supervision and technical assistance is at the
bottom of the regional office hierarchy, rarely has any
previous relevant experience, and is given little helpful train-
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ing. In the 12 case studies, only one "fed rep" gained
praise—from the North Carolina observer—as a consistently
positive influence on the prime sponsor. Two other prime
sponsors felt encouraged that after a long series of bad ex
periences, new fed reps appeared more helpful than those of
the past. Significantly, in one of the latter cases, the federal
representative had come to that post after several years with
a competent prime sponsor. Otherwise, the strongest praise
was "he doesn't bother us very much."
After North Carolina, the most sanguine of the prime
sponsors in their attitudes toward the fed reps and the
regional offices were the Baltimore, San Francisco, and Utah
prime sponsor directors. The first two both had the security
on the local scene and the reputation nationally to feel in
vulnerable to regional criticism. Both also were sufficiently
close to the national scene to realize that Congress and the
Washington officialdom were the source of unwise decisions
rather than the regional staff. In Utah, the state CETA of
fice shielded the associations of government, responsible for
program operations, from direct federal contact.
Just where the balance of truth lies in the federal-local and
national-regional relationship may be difficult to ascertain,
but the relationship is clearly not a productive one. The
Dallas case study provides a summary of intergovernmental
relations that characterizes well the frustrations of the cur
rent situation.
A study made from the prime-sponsor and national-office
levels can provide little insight into the congressional decisionmaking process. However, it may be useful to contrast
apparent congressional perceptions of the local decisionmakers with those gained by knowledgeable observers mak
ing indepth studies. Common complaints against Congress
included: (1) overloading the system with too much public
service employment too fast before the prime sponsor system
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was securely in place; (2) adding to that overload a continu
ing stream of complex new programs; (3) compounding pro
gram complexity by the detailed 1978 legislative re
quirements; and, (4) being invariably late with its appropria
tions.
The latter presents a serious obstacle to businesslike opera
tions. A prime sponsor must plan for a year's service delivery
without ever knowing within even a reasonable range what
the funding levels will be. To have contracts in place by Oc
tober 1, the start of the federal fiscal year, a prime sponsor
must begin the planning process by January or February.
The Labor Department promises budget estimates and na
tional policy constraints by May 15 but almost never delivers
on that promise. When the funding estimates arrive, they are
no better than a prime sponsor could do from reading the na
tional reporting services.
The Labor Department appropriation is almost never in
place before the start of the fiscal year, with continuing
resolutions governing for one, two, or three quarters or even
through an entire fiscal year. But that is not the end of fiscal
uncertainty. Deobligations of unspent funds make
redistribution possible throughout the year. New congres
sional initiatives often provide supplemental appropriations.
The Labor Department persistently vacillates over whether
and how much of the carryover funds from the previous year
the prime sponsor will be allowed to spend. Only after the
fact can the prime sponsor determine how much money has
been available.

Planning and Performance
This does not mean that CETA planning does not exist.
Planning is the management function that sets the direction
for future activities of the organization. Like Moliere's hero
who spoke prose all his life and did not know it, prime spon-
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sors must and do plan whether they know it or not. But it is
contingency planning, fraught with uncertainty and laden
with frustration. In addition to the delays in key data
elements, the compliance review system and the geographical
scope of the prime sponsorship present formidable obstacles
to prime sponsor planning.
Ironically, the formal planning document submitted to the
regional office may have little relation to the prime sponsor's
realistic intention. A persistent complaint is that the Labor
Department denies itself any meaningful oversight of pro
gram substance by fractionalizing the programs. At the
regional office, pieces of the local planning document are
distributed for checking on compliance, but not for its
coherence or substance. It is inevitably approved condi
tionally and then frequently rejected for some procedural
technicality. Meanwhile, the prime sponsor's real plan has
been written into the contract documents with service
deliverers, which specify who is to be served, what services
are to be delivered, and what the performance criteria are to
be.
The Montgomery County case study provides an example
of a situation in which the regional office failed to take of
ficial notice year after year not only of poor plans but also of
poor performance. As long as the form was observed, the
substance was ignored. Only when the prime sponsor failed
to spend its full allocation because it was incapable of serv
ing the more-disadvantaged population mandated by the
1978 amendments did the regional office blow the whistle.
Then, rather than offer technical assistance to solve the pro
blems, the response was a punitive restriction of funding
flows, which made planning and administration even more
difficult and certainly did not help the population entitled to
the services.
The experience seems not to be uncommon. The regional
office reviews annually the operations of each prime spon-
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sor. The published "report cards" offer a revealing assess
ment of what is deemed important by the national ad
ministrators. The fiscal 1980 Title IIBC review revealed that
28 prime sponsors experienced "serious problems," involv
ing "major barriers to the accomplishment of program
goals." Seattle and Ottawa were included in the list. The lat
ter rural county was found guilty of not assigning a staff per
son to perform EEO functions—not discriminatory ac
tion—and for not having taken "corrective action regarding
outreach, training and advancement of the handicapped."
Seattle was cited for having "difficulty in operating the
eligibility verification system . . . ." Nationally, training
quantity was mentioned as a source of difficulties in five
cases. Of these, three prime sponsors had not spent 15 per
cent of Title IID funds on training. Another was faulted for
inadequate IIB performance reporting; and the fifth prime
sponsor was apparently guilty of underutilizing vocational
education setaside funds. By comparison, inadequate EEO
compliance systems (again, not necessarily lack of actual
performance) were mentioned nine times, and 21 of the 28
sponsors were cited for inadequate monitoring or eligibility
determination systems. The quality of training was not men
tioned as a serious problem for any prime sponsor.
The priority concerns of the Department of Labor are
reflected in the point values assigned in the 1981 assessment
package for IIBC:
Management
Independent monitoring unit
Eligibility determination, verifica
tion, and tracking
Financial management
Planning (composition of council
and process, only)
Subagent management
Equal opportunity
Complaints
Corrective action

6
6
8
4
8
6
5
7
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Program Design
Recruitment and selection of
participants (says nothing
about assignment)
Assessment and employability
development plans
Job development and transition
services
Services to youth
Program activities (assess two
categories)
OJT
Classroom training
Upgrading and retraining
Work experience
Corrective action followup
Numerical Performance Indicators
Positive termination
Entered employment
Indirect placement
Private sector placement
Cumulative enrollment
Cost/positive termination
Cost/entered employment
Cost/indirect placement

7
7
7
4
18
(9)
(9)
(9)
(9)
7
5
8
10
5
5
4
4
4

The message the prime sponsor receives is that quality,
especially of training, as well as long-run results, has a
relatively low priority and may not even enter into the deter
mination of the report cards that the feds issue to the prime
sponsors. The possibility of negative local publicity is more
of a driving force than any available rewards for good
management or quality programming. Yet advance in
dicators of training quality are not readily available or easily
derived. To prescribe input measures would limit diversity.
Ultimately, long-run outcomes will have to be the basis for
judgment.
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Geographical Scope and Economies of Scale
The original CETA legislation provided a bonus to en
courage adjacent jurisdictions to combine into labormarketwide planning units. It is not working and the studies
document some of the reasons. One is simply the value of the
incentive. Tucson City and Pima County, Arizona lost less
than 2 percent of their combined budget when they split up
as a consortium. It was not a sufficient threat to dissuade the
county supervisors from seeking control of their propor
tionate share of the remaining funds. Money is power, and
the exercise of power is what politics is about. If consortia
are desirable, the incentives must be commensurate with
their worth. Baltimore County and Snohomish County (ad
jacent to Seattle) both withdrew from consortia even though
surrounding counties remained in. The benefits of consortia
were not enough to outweigh the attraction of autonomy.
The Labor Department claims to be neutral as to the choice
between consortia and individual prime sponsors, but the
labor market planning concept would require positive en
couragement of consortia.
San Francisco, Seattle, Worcester, Baltimore and In
dianapolis came nearest to having jurisdiction over entire
labor markets. The results seemed positive for the first two,
but of no particular significance for the others, which made
no special efforts to adapt their operations to special local
conditions. Tucson and Montgomery County had jurisdic
tion over less than a labor market. The loss did not seem
serious in the case of Tucson, which drew enrollees from the
city but prepared them for jobs in the suburbs as well.
However, it unduly limited Montgomery County, which had
to compete for access to jobs, training institutions, and
employers with other prime sponsors in a complex
metropolis encompassing the District of Columbia and a
dozen political jurisdictions in Virginia and Maryland. The
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Penobscot consortium administered jointly and planned
separately for each of three rural counties, and the results
were impressive. Ottawa lacked training institutions and a
budget to offer adquate training.
The two statewide operations made no attempt to plan for
or administer programs for the areas covered. They
delegated most planning and administration to local associa
tions of government, which left too few and fragmented
resources to obtain optimal results. Apathy at the highest
state levels appears to be the primary explanation for the
unimpressive performance by Utah. The North Carolina
balance of state just seemed too massive and complex to be
manageable, even had there been the will to do so.
Planning and related decisionmaking is another matter. A
state, at least those as geographically large and diverse as
North Carolina and Utah, is not a labor market. No single
plan is likely to rationalize such diversity. Since the balanceof-state concept eliminates the major employment centers,
employment and training planning is unlikely to produce a
basis for sound decisions. Breaking up the less populous
areas into labor market watersheds surrounding major
employment centers might be more effective. Such an ap
proach could probably be accomplished with adequate con
sortium bonuses and encouragement, T>ut state staffs would
have to develop the necessary expertise to provide sound
guidance.
Related to the issue of geographic scope are potential
economies of scale in staffing, planning, evaluation,
management information systems, public relations and other
functions. In 1980, 77 percent of prime sponsors received
less than $5 million in Title IIB funds, 75 percent had less
than $3 million of Title IID funds, and 82 percent received
less than $5 million from Title VI. Of the remaining prime
sponsors having higher funding, half were balance-of-state
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prime sponsors with some of the problems noted above.
More aggressive promotion of consortia would help meet the
economy-of-scale criteria as well as further the concept of
labor market planning.

The Decisions
So much for the decisionmakers and the decisionmaking
process. What can be said about the quality of the decisions
themselves? As noted, those can be generally categorized as:
Whom to serve; what services to deliver; and, to whom to
assign service delivery responsibility.

Whom to Serve?
The whom to serve decision is resolved through an interac
tion of law, regulation, politics, and objective judgments,
probably in that order. The legislation confines eligibility to
the "economically disadvantaged," representing a persistent
tradeoff between concentrating resources on those most in
need at the cost of imposing a negative image on some pro
grams. Department of Labor regulations do not direct
priorities among the "significant segments" eligible to be
served by CETA, nor do the feds direct priorities for fund
allocations for the groups who should share in the distribu
tion of those funds. Among the prime sponsors studied, the
aggressiveness and power of target-group members in the
pursuit of services was a major factor in determining the
racial and ethnic mix of trainees.
Since they were a higher proportion of the CETA-eligible
population, minority groups were overrepresented in all
cases. However, how high their enrollment was in relation to
their proportions of the eligible population seemed to be
dependent primarily upon the effectiveness of the organiza
tions representing each group. CETA staffs seemed to re
spond to groups that applied pressure, thereby leaving less
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resources for those that did not. In Worcester, for example,
black enrollments in IIB exceeded the proportion in the
population by a factor of 10. Since no one represented the
nonminority poor, they received less than a proportionate
share of the resources. Seattle, early in its CETA history,
designed a system based on relative need and probability of
success, but the effort was abandoned with changes of staff.
In most cases, local chapters of national organizations car
ried the battle for allocation. For poorly organized groups
such as native Americans and, in some locations, Asian
refugees, other organizations with service-delivery ambitions
often pursued the fight. San Francisco is a unique example
of a CETA scene dominated by homegrown communitybased organizations without national affiliation—as
evidenced by the success of gays and lesbians, as well as
foreign language groups, in gaining special attention. Ag
gressive and sophisticated, these local CBOs have been ex
traordinarily effective both politically and as service
deliverers, and the system has responded accordingly. Seattle
also had effective homegrown CBOs, but they were less
numerous and, therefore, less obvious than in San Fran
cisco. Advisory councils, in most prime sponsorships, were
involved in conflicts over the distribution of slots among the
eligible populations, and settled potential political conflicts
in a setting shielded from the public gaze.
Youth everywhere obtained a high proportion of the
available program resources. However, this was not a func
tion of organizational pressures, but of legislation and
federal regulation. Youth had all of Title IV to themselves
plus a federal regulatory requirement that the proportion of
youth prevailing in Title II before the passage of the Youth
Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 be
maintained. Since youth unemployment had been recognized
at the local level as a serious problem before the passage of
the youth legislation, prime sponsors had been allocating
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resources heavily in that direction. Most were therefore lock
ed in with around one-half of their IIB slots reserved for
youth. In general, the experience had been that expensive in
vestments in training for youth below age 18 were not
justified by their placement and retention rates. Therefore,
the tendency was to relegate them to work experience pro
grams, absorbing IIB resources that would probably have
otherwise been spent on training.
There was a wide range of responses to selectivity by
education. Areas like Utah and California with relatively
high proportions of high school graduates tended not to use
education as a selection criterion except in occupations
where course content or licensure seemed to require educa
tion. In contrast, Baltimore, with a relatively low average of
high school completers, was the most selective for its
classroom training programs. The intent was to train those
most likely to profit from the expenditure, relegating the
less-educated to a work experience program containing its
own remedial training components. As a result, classroom
training concentrated on a higher level of skills. In general,
however, the tendency was to spread the training across the
educational range, referring the high school graduates in
dividually to ongoing vocational and technical training pro
grams and to OJT, with the lesser-educated concentrated in
class-size projects. Given the additional need and cost of
remedial education and the propensity of this population to
drop out, this policy tended to restrict the deficiently
educated population to short-term, entry-level preparation.
In line with legislative requirements, it appears that prime
sponsors carried out the intent of the law and drew enrollees
from low-income families, although violations occasionally
occurred and were played up in the media. With its generally
favorable labor market, Dallas was most notable in concen
trating its CETA training efforts on an extremely hard-toemploy population. It was also apparent throughout the
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range of prime sponsors that the causes of disadvantage were
many and that a wide range of competence and motivation
existed among the eligible populations. It was no surprise to
find that immigrants were most likely to combine income
eligibility with potential for labor market success. It takes
more careful screening to find that combination among the
broader CETA population, but there are people who need
only a boost to become economically independent.

The Service Mix
The prime sponsor has discretionary authority to allocate
Title IIBC funds for training, work experience, or supportive
services. None of the 12 prime sponsors utilized all the train
ing funds allocated under the public service employment
titles. Vocational education allocations through the gover
nors' offices were a significant factor in promoting training,
but no use was being made of the upgrading options of Title
IIC. Since no separate funds were available for that purpose,
there was no incentive to use the existing pool for upgrading
the employed in preference to training the unemployed. The
targeted jobs tax credit was also not popular in the 12 areas
studied, though the Penobscot private industry council pro
moted it aggressively during the summer of 1980. Lack of
understanding by employers was the usual explanation of the
neglect.
The need for minimum reading ability and arithmetic
comprehension made it essential to include adult basic
education as an integral part of IIB training. The flood of
immigrants into many of the jurisdictions was the major fac
tor for the growth of ESL. The need to provide a transition
service for PSE enrollees as shrinking funds led to termina
tions, as well as the low costs and high placement rates
associated with job search training, served as the motivations
for the addition of that component.
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Throughout, however, the prime sponsors, while declaring
their preference for employability development, seemed to
feel obligated to maintain balance among the full range of
alternative services. They were under more pressure to
spread the funds among familiar service deliverers than to
adjust the service mix either to client need or to
demonstrated effectiveness. Few prime sponsors had
developed the technical capability to defend any other alter
native.
Most of the prime sponsors tended to be more responsive
to enrollee need than to labor market demand. Baltimore
was the notable exception. Through an extensive system of
employer advisory councils, demand was determined and
training planned accordingly. The underlying rationale was
that there were more eligible applicants than training slots
and that no one can profit from training in an occupation
that is not in demand by employers. Therefore, the CETAeligible population is best served when employers are best
served.
The high proportion of clerical and health care occupa
tions in the training mix of all prime sponsors was probably
both a symptom and an explanation of occupational choice.
Since such jobs were available, planners tended to choose
those occupations in making training decisions. However,
the high proportion of women applicants also pushed plan
ners in the same direction. Efforts to place women in nontraditional jobs were few and limited to special projects for
that purpose. Little success could be claimed. Training for
male oriented jobs seemed to be more strongly supplycentered. That is, there appeared to be a greater tendency to
search out occupations in which men might be trained and
placed because there were fewer occupations where the de
mand for men was obvious.
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The Service Deliverers
Prime sponsors must choose among a variety of deliverers
of a variety of services. This report is concerned only with
the choice among deliverers of training-related services. For
classroom training, the prime sponsor usually has few op
tions. No CETA prime sponsor has the necessary funding to
create training insitutions. If a skill center is left over from
MDTA days, it is used. If not, or in addition, individual
referral occurs wherever there are institutions willing and
able to accept CETA eligibles at reasonable cost. Where
there are CBOs with any political clout, they are used unless
they prove to be incompetent. Use of for-profit firms
depends upon their costs and their aggressiveness. Never
theless, within the limits of the availability of institutions,
the studies demonstrate that prime sponsors do drop in
competent service deliverers and continue on a small scale
and at the margin to add and test new deliverers. They re
spond to political pressures, but persistently they tend to ex
pand use of the most cost-effective and shrink use of the op
posite (to the extent they have dependable measures), all the
while sensitive to the need to maintain diversity in offerings
and institutions.
The most marked changes have been the strong shift to in
dividual referral and to private proprietary schools. Another
marked change has been the enlarged training role of
organizations that are not schools. For the most part, this is
both a cause and a consequence of the growth of nonskill
training. Community-based organizations and consulting
firms live or die by their ability to sell their services. They
tend to be much more aggressive than tax supported institu
tions or proprietary schools, which appeal to a broad
population. They push their wares by resorting to lobbying
and salesmanship, thereby expanding their role beyond what
sheer competence would have won for them.
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The on-the-job component has undergone little change.
Few employers have ever been interested in participation. An
intermediary is necessary—a job service office, a
community-based organization, or a prime sponsor
itself—to contact employers and persuade them to accept the
subsidy of one-half the enrollee's wages, which has become
standard. Favorable responses generally come from small,
struggling employers to whom the subsidy is attractive and
larger firms who use CETA OJT as a recruiting source to
meet affirmative action requirements. Whether the establish
ment of private industry councils will be able to generate
more OJT remains problematic. Based on early experience,
there is little reason for optimism.

5. Lessons Learned
The purpose of the case studies was to gain insight into the
CETA system, not to evaluate the performance of the 12
prime sponsors. The studies illustrate a fascinating diversity.
Penobscot showed the co-existence of strong staff leader
ship, minor political involvement, effective advisory par
ticipation, a weak economy, and limited service options, in
ducing the prime sponsor to expand its training capacity.
Worcester was characterized by prosaic leadership in a
revitalized high-demand economy, but with a modest place
ment record despite the favorable economic environment.
Baltimore offered strong political and staff leadership,
responsible for holding on to a consortium and making good
use of generally mediocre service institutions in a redevelop
ing economy. Montgomery County was in transition from
strong but misdirected leadership to a more promising com
bination in an economy of plentiful jobs usually requiring
credentials.
North Carolina had a sprawling service area and diverse
administrative problems too challenging for its politically
burdened leadership, but was helped by the availability of
sound training institutions. Dallas had a most favorable
economic situation with a potential for becoming a CETA
showcase, but was thwarted by political leadership that just
wished CETA would go away. Indianapolis was putting
itself back together after an initially mismanaged and dif
ficult period, but was still operating at high unit costs. It
relied almost totally on individual referral to community and
private colleges to do so. Ottawa County lacked the training
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institutions to provide a comprehensive program. Utah was
characterized by unaggressive leadership, but a strong
economy and sound institutional support shored up the
agency.
Tucson had strong continuous leadership and sound in
stitutional support in a low-wage economy. Despite effective
training, it was unable to demonstrate success measured by
earnings gains for lack of evaluation followup. San Fran
cisco had enjoyed strong staff leadership over the years, was
highly politicized, but by organizations that were also
capable service deliverers. It had a favorable job market for
women but not for men. Seattle had based a strong, but ex
pensive, program on individual assessment by the state
employment service, individual referral to community col
leges by one CBO, and classroom training at a skill center
run by another CBO.

The System in Capsule
To the extent these prime sponsors are representative, the
CETA system clearly can and does serve its clienteles
reasonably well and has generally adapted its operations to
local social, political, and economic conditions. Yet a
number of shortcomings reduce the total payoff. There is
considerable operational planning in the use of each year's
budget, but not much strategic planning relating the use of
CETA resources to the broad and long-term needs and ob
jectives of the areas served. However, the uncertain annual
funding process makes the operational planning also con
tingency planning, as prime sponsors are forced to live with
uncertainty and adapt to changing priorities directed from
Washington.
Political and administrative pressures lead to minimizing
per-enrollee costs, despite evidence that longer-duration
training tends to pay off better than that of shorter duration.
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Based on immediate postenrollment observations, results of
work experience compare favorably with those from training
programs, yet national longitudinal data disclose that the
former has long-run negative, and the latter positive, results
in cost-benefit terms. OJT payoff is generally highest in the
long run but the prime sponsor is rarely aware of this fact.
The available evidence of short-run social benefits and in
dividual gains is not sufficient to overcome marketing dif
ficulties and to attract employers.
Local decisionmakers are prone to perceive the weaknesses
in the system as being primarily federal in origin. It is true
that the federal managers of CETA lack the necessary exper
tise to provide guidance and technical assistance to prime
sponsors and have tended to emphasize bureaucratic pro
cesses rather than encourage creativity and provide substan
tive leadership. A more concerted effort is needed to ex
change federal and prime sponsor staff to familiarize each
with the other's roles and problems. It is also essential that
persons with training background be brought into the decisionmaking system at both levels.
As the intergovernmental system is presently structured
and functioning, the regional office has no meaningful role
to play in the system. Its personnel have little policy discre
tion, even if they knew what was best for the program.
Regional offices are merely a poor link in the communica
tion chain from the national to the local level since there are
so many routes for information in both directions that
bypass the regional office.
At the top levels of the Labor Department's Employment
and Training Administration, CETA administration began
under the guidance of leaders who understood and were
committed to the philosophy of the system. National leader
ship dissolved into confusion and was just beginning to get
itself together again when the 1980 election results introduc-
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ed uncertainty not only about the future directions of the
program, but its very survival.
The Congress appears to be committed to local decisionmaking only in its rhetoric. It wants to handle the helm and
leave the locals to respond, disregarding the administrative
consequences of its constantly changing priorities.

Local Staff Development
The key determinant of CETA effectiveness is the strength
and ability of the prime sponsor staff director. The attention
of the elected officials can never be held for long, and when
they do focus on the employment and training programs
their primary interest is to avoid political embarrassment.
Capable staff is essential but an effective leader will attract
and develop a competent and stable staff. However, the
measure of a leader in the prime-sponsor context is the abili
ty to accommodate a wide range of diverse social, political,
economic, and personal interests, not all of which are consis
tent with maximum payoffs in terms of employment and in
come gains for the CETA client population.
Of course, good management can be assisted to become
better, and staff development can be institutionalized to
speed and improve its effectiveness. Labor Department
regional training centers have been useful occasionally in
providing logistical support for recordkeeping and com
pliance with (frequently unnecessary) regulations, but they
have not been conducive to sound management, planning,
and policymaking. Universities, on their own initiative or in
response to institutional grants, have put together degree
granting programs for preparing entrants to the field, but
opportunities during recent years have been too plentiful in
human resource activities, especially in managerial roles, for
large numbers to enter the CETA system. Even where they
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did, preentry preparation can never obviate the need for onsite staff development.
The National Association of Counties' manpower unit has
played a significant leadership and staff development role, as
have the national mayoral and gubernatorial associations to
a lesser degree. Attachment to these local and state associa
tions has impeded the emergence of a CETA-wide profes
sional association, which could set professional standards
and promote their attainment. There is badly needed a
mechanism through which experience can be shared,
technical assistance can be provided, and staff can be
developed by the only ones who know how—those who have
been through the mill and have learned their lessons.
Experimentation is currently underway of a prime
sponsor-to-prime sponsor technical assistance and training
system. This approach has promise for training prime spon
sor managers. The rising stars, trained by effective
managers, are the most promising source for leadership in
lagging prime sponsorships. The process already works to
some degree. Efforts to institutionalize such relationships
should be encouraged.
The federal officialdom needs training no less than the
prime sponsor staffs. The feds are caught between Congress
and the locals without the competence to respond adequately
to either. There is need for a more effective focus for joining
key prime sponsor staff with the federal executive staff in
setting overall national directions consistent with local
challenges. Only a national/local consensus on mission goals
and objectives can serve as a lasting framework for local
decisionmaking and as a basis for assessing prime sponsor
performance. The compliance issues could be presented to a
CETA-wide professional leadership group who could design
means of accomplishing the goals without interference with
performance. The Employment and Training Administra-
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tion sponsors a CETA director's work group which is con
vened as a sounding board. Orchestrated by the feds, the
local administrators are invited to listen to what is going to
happen, but are not invited to suggest alternatives. Congress,
too, could be more effectively educated and influenced by
such an organized body. There is need to work upon and
develop the inherent common professional interests that ex
ist between national and local staff, substituting it for the
adversary relationship which has emerged during the CETA
years.

Curriculum Development
Sorely missed on the CETA scene is the federally con
tracted but privately operated technical assistance and staff
training system, which once developed and disseminated cur
ricula throughout the MDTA system and trained local staff.
Times have changed, and different arrangements are needed
to take the place of this defunct institution. A possibility to
be explored is a computer-assisted and computer-managed
instruction being successfully promoted in general education
and in Job Corps centers. Terminals linked to national or
regional sources could offer access to common curricula in
remedial education, English as a second language, and voca
tional instruction related to "hands-on" training. But that
would meet only part of the need. Person-to-person relation
ships are also essential. Whatever approach proves best,
there is a crying need for a positive technical-assistance-andguidance approach to replace the adversary relationship,
which has grown between prime sponsor and federal agen
cies.
Such a system need not reduce local autonomy and discre
tion. Unlike regulations handed down from above, technical
assistance is neither arbitrary nor compulsory. Prime spon
sors remain free to accept or reject. But given the hunger for
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leadership and direction, most prime sponsors would accept
help without considering it a threat.

Management Information
Related is the need for a common, computer-linked
management information system. Prime sponsors could feed
in day-to-day operational data allowing constant monitoring
of the system's inputs and outputs without the burden of
useless reports. Performance standards and records of in
dividual progress could both be incorporated. The local
operators could call up national comparative data to test
their own performance, as well as storing their own informa
tion for future recall. The same facilities could serve the cur
riculum and management functions at lower long-run costs
than the current inadequate information flows.

Structure and Planning
Judging from the 12 cases, prime sponsors cannot respond
solely to the needs of either the local labor markets or the
CETA clientele. Rather, there must be a delicate balancing
of the political needs of the chief elected official, the direc
tives of the federal funding source, the needs and desires of
the eligible population, the demands of the organizations
that represent (or claim to represent) the clients, the
marketing pressures from the alternative service deliverers,
the limited cooperation available from employers, and the
personal predilections of the prime sponsor staff. Judged,
however, against the complexities of the environment, the
fact that 12 prime sponsors could respond with acts that do
accommodate the diverse, and frequently conflicting, in
terests and still achieve benefits that exceed the costs, is little
short of remarkable. But that does not deny that there are a
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number of potential improvements suggested by the data,
which can provide promise of improved performance
without denial of any legitimate interest.
The key problem remains that of setting priorities among
competing objectives in an uncertain environment with
numerous special interest groups demanding attention. Only
strong, well-trained, and secure management can meet this
challenge. Elected officials seem to play a limited role, but
since the alternative within a decentralized system is a rigid
and arbitrary bureaucratization, there appears to be no bet
ter alternative than the present delegation of authority.
When given the opportunity, advisory councils can become
active and positive forces. However, three separate advisory
councils are too much of a good thing and there is a need for
consolidation. More important is the need to organize prime
sponsors to cover complete labor markets rather than on the
basis of a fragmented political jurisdiction. The consortium
incentives need strengthening until they outweigh the
political temptations to fragmentation.
The state level organization is inherently troublesome.
While state participation in policymaking makes sense, most
states are too diverse for the planning and delivery of ser
vices to local labor markets. The balance of state is a residual
concept with no rationale to support it and every experience
to cause doubt about its effectiveness. An alternative ap
proach might be to assign states the responsibility for helping
political subdivisions to deliver CETA services on a labormarket basis. This would require subdividing states into
areas surrounding major concentrations of population for
program delivery, but maintaining a state role in coordina
tion among these units. No simple block grant can encom
pass the complex relationships between local and state
governments.
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A Two-Tiered Training System
There are and will probably always be more eligible disadvantaged workers willing to be trained in a stipended pro
gram for low-level entry occupations than there will ever be
funding to support. There will also be a continuing flow of
those who, at low per capita cost, can be made more
employable by remedial education, English as a second
language, and job search training. Many of those may not
have the capability, endurance or resources to undergo more
extensive training for high-level occupations. Yet there is
evidence that there are many within the currently eligible
population who could and would profit from the more ex
tensive training, and at higher social benefit-cost returns.
Involved are two sets of institutions, or at least two sets of
institutional services. Some eligible enrollees are capable of
undertaking occupational training. Others need a remedial
stage to prepare for the advanced training. These latter, as
well as those only capable of entry-level work, need the
variety of supportive services described earlier, which are not
readily available in mainstream training institutions.
There should be a two-tiered system. The system would
provide short-term remedial and entry-level training accom
panied by supportive services available to all who need them.
This entry/remedial stage could be affected either by
specialized or mainstream institutions. The equivalent of 1
academic year, 36 weeks, should be generally sufficient for
this stage. The second-tier of the system would offer the op
portunity for extended career training to those initially ready
for it or who successfully complete the entry level. It would
be offered in mainstream institutions and would require only
an additional year's tuition to implement the 2 years now
legal, but never provided.
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Closely related is training allowance reform. Training
allowances at the minimum wage level distort the incentives
of training participants. Who is enrolled for the training and
who for the stipend? Training allowance might be divided in
to three components: (1) reimbursement of training-related
expenses; (2) a subsistence stipend based on family income;
and (3) a motivational component based on performance.

On-the-Job Training
OJT is the most effective of all for those who have access
to it. Increasing that access depends upon attracting more
employers by reducing their reluctance to hire CETA-eligible
applicants. Aggressive marketing that places the enrollee on
a "tryout" basis should be explored to encourage employers
to hire disadvantaged applicants. During this period of 3 to 6
months, the prime sponsor would provide a stipend to the
employer in lieu of wages.

Future Directions
The CETA training activity, in general, seems to be an ef
fective amalgam of the MDTA inheritance, the local voca
tional training system, the inputs of community-based
organizations, and the coordination and direction provided
by local and state prime sponsors. It is strong in some places
and weak in others, but there is no reason to think any cen
trally derived pattern could work more effectively than the
local designs. It is not the whip but guidance that prime
sponsors need. There is no indication of reluctance to accept
knowledgeable and positive direction. Technical assistance
from successful prime sponsors could strengthen the locally
weak systems. Some staff development and technical
assistance can be centrally provided, but much will have to
be brought to the local scene. Centrally developed curricula
could be locally adapted without reducing local discretion.
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Centralized information does not necessarily threaten local
initiative. Specific problems can only be solved at the local
labor market level.
The temptation for radical surgery as part of CETA's
reauthorization in 1982 should be resisted. One luxury
CETA has never enjoyed is stability. There is no need to
change the basic structure of the system, though there is need
to delineate the roles and relationships of the players and the
parameters of their managerial responsibilities. That does
not preclude changing the service mix or eligibility criteria,
but the basic delivery system relationship should remain in
place long enough for capacity building to take place in a
relatively orderly environment.
As a national policy, there needs to be more thought to a
human capital development approach to CETA training.
Concern for productivity, energy, and "^industrialization"
are refocusing attention on developing and upgrading the
work force. The rapid fall-off in the number of youth enter
ing the labor force during the 1980s will make each new en
trant that much more valuable. If they turn out to be sup
plemented by a continued immigrant flow, the latter, too,
will require an increased investment.
There are other systems for other components of the
human resource pool. CETA was designed to aid the disadvantaged, but overall national objectives are best ac
complished when the disadvantaged enter the mainstream.
The prime sponsors in the 12 case studies experimented with
a number of approaches, including a hard-nosed selection
process that relates the abilities of the potential enrollees to
the requirements for training in particular occupations, and
a lengthy sequencing of remediation skill training and lowor high-support on-the-job training. Each of these ap
proaches appeared promising depending on local situations.
Prime sponsors or their successors should be encouraged to
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continue with their efforts since ultimately programs will
have to be developed for upgrading the labor force in their
communities. The federally funded GETA system or its
replacement can play a major role in achieving this goal.
However, since the study was completed, the federal
government has opted for cutting fiscal 1982 CETA training
funds by more than a third, while totally eliminating PSE as
a training option. The record of the training in the 12 prime
sponsorships, as well as the national evidence of participant
income gains, does not justify the cut. On the contrary, when
the national productivity growth has almost ground to a
halt, a program that returns $1.14 on every dollar invested in
institutional training and several times as much on OJT is a
wise investment worth preserving and nourishing.
We should have learned from 20 years of employment and
training experience that institution building is a slow and
painful process. In many ways, demographic and economic
developments are recreating the issues out of which MDTA
emerged in 1962. Technological displacement and plant clos
ings were major motivations for the legislation, which was
directed toward "retraining." All of today's robots and
computers were on the horizon, but the entry of the babyboom generation and their mothers into the labor force
made available an ample supply of low-wage jobseekers, en
couraging more labor-intensive processes. Now the
economic and demographic conditions portend a swingback
to a more capital-intensive level.
Intensified international competition and technological
advances again threaten increased plant closings and the
need for worker relocation. All the signs are for continued
influx of immigrants. Geographical barriers will become
more, not less, serious for central city residents, even as their
numbers decline. Youth entering the labor force, though in
shrinking numbers, will require more, not less, training. At
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the other end of the age spectrum, delayed retirement will be
more likely to involve second careers and retraining than
continuation of the old jobs. The displaced homemaker has
not disappeared from the scene.
Clearly, the demographic portents of the 1980s are for in
creased training needs if we are to revive the growth in pro
ductivity and prepare the labor force for the inevitable
changing technology in the years ahead. Disbanding a system
which took 20 years to build, inadequate as it still is, is likely
to prove in a few years to have been shortsighted and costly.

A Review of CETA Training
Robert Taggart
Youth Knowledge Development Project

Alternatives for the "Leftovers"
There are, at a minimum, four million persons age 16 and
over whose employment and earnings problems are so
serious that they cause economic hardship. The structural
problems of these low earners, totally and intermittently
unemployed, involuntarily part-time and discouraged
workers, are only modestly alleviated by economic growth
and tight labor markets. Millions of individuals lacking
education, skills, experience, equal opportunity or good for
tune will be "leftovers" under any reasonable economic pro
jections for the foreseeable future.
There are several options for dealing with these
"leftovers." They can be ignored and left to make do with
what is available in the labor market and income
maintenance programs. Alternatively, the "safety net" of
transfer programs can be improved to reduce the hardship
resulting from their employment problems. Financial incen
tives and appeals to corporate conscience may be used to en
courage employers to reach further down the labor queue.
Job placement and economic development strategies might
try to better match these workers with available jobs. Sub
sidized jobs may be created for them. Finally, training may
be provided in order to improve their ability to compete in
the labor market.
Job Creation and Training Levels
Since the Great Society, and particularly under the Carter
administration, active efforts to address the causes and
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alleviate the symptoms of these structural problems increas
ed exponentially. Employment and training activities have
been a major growth area of social welfare policy. In con
stant 1980 dollars, total expenditures rose from next to
nothing at the beginning of the 1960s to the billion dollar
level in fiscal 1965; they doubled again within the next year;
redoubled by 1972; and then tripled between 1972 and 1978,
before dropping precipitously at the close of the decade.
Training expenditures rose, in constant dollars, from near
zero at the start of the 1960s to $650 million in 1968 and to
$1.9 billion in 1980.
The relative emphasis on training and employment ap
proaches has fluctuated, but training has declined as a pro
portion of combined expenditures, representing the
predominant activity until the War on Poverty, declining to
63 percent in 1969 and to only 15 percent of expenditures in
1978. Despite the rapid growth of real training expenditures
and the multi-billion dollar pricetag, remedial efforts for the
"leftovers" in the labor market represent only a small share
of our nation's total education and training activities and
reach only a small portion of the universe of need. Public ex
penditures for higher education and vocational education in
1980 were twenty-five times those targeted to persons at the
end of the labor queue. In 1980, new participants in targeted
training represented only 1 percent of the labor force. The
average monthly enrollment in training programs
represented less than 5 percent of average unemployment.

Training Approaches
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act is the
legislative umbrella for most of the employment and training
programs for the disadvantaged. Under a complex array of
separate categorical authorizations, it provides funds by for
mula to states and localities for activities they design and
manage within the framework provided by federal law,
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regulations and oversight. It also funds national programs
for special needs groups, as well as the Job Corps, a
nationally-operated residential training program for severely
disadvantaged youths. GETA provides four categories of
training: (1) Job Corps is a structured program of vocational
instruction, basic education, work experience, counseling,
health care, and living experiences in a residential center;
(2) local classroom training is a full-time activity, which in
cludes occupational instruction as well as basic education
and other remediation in an institutional setting; (3) on-thejob training is a full-time activity, where a participant is
hired by an employer and trained primarily at the worksite,
with public funds covering the extra costs of supervision and
training; and (4) supplemental training is a part-time or
short-term activity enhancing subsidized work experience or
a limited intensity service to help in the transition into the
labor force.
Job Corps is the most comprehensive and intensive pro
gram and focuses on the most disadvantaged among those in
need—young school dropouts from poor families. It cost
over $13,000 a training year in fiscal 1980. Local classroom
training, which is nonresidential and deals with a somewhat
more employable group, had a cost of $8,000 per year. Onthe-job training serves the most employable of those in need
and had a cost of $6,000. Supplemental training for par
ticipants in subsidized public service employment (PSE) cost
$2,700 per training year. Transition services—largely for inschool youth—averaged $800 per service year.

The Nature of Training
CETA training is typically short-term, aimed to prepare
the participant for entry level occupations or to provide basic
educational credentials or English competency. Job Corps is
most ambitious, with an average duration of stay for completers of 1.2 years. However, there is a high early dropout
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rate with 40 percent of participants leaving before 90 days
and another 30 percent leaving before full completion, so
that the average duration of stay is 6.0 months. Local
classroom training averages 5.5 months for completers, but
because of early dropouts, the average duration of stay is
around 5.1 months. On-the-job training averages 4.3
months.
Job Corps vocational training is concentrated in the con
struction trades, automotive and machine repair, health and
food services, and clerical occupations. Local classroom
training is predominantly in the clerical, craft, and service
fields. Local on-the-job training is mainly in the clerical,
operative and nonconstruction craft occupations.
All Job Corps participants receive basic education or GED
preparation along with vocational training and a comprehen
sive array of manpower and supportive services. A fifth of
local classroom trainees are exclusively in education ac
tivities and another fifth are in a combination of vocational
and educational activities. There is very little preparatory
work for OJT, since the training mostly occurs at the
worksite. Half of classroom trainees and a smaller portion of
OJT participants receive a much more limited level of such
services.

Who is Trained?
Job creation receives priority over training under CETA.
Classroom training was available for less than a fifth of new
enrollees in local programs in fiscal 1980, or three in ten ex
cluding the summer program, while OJT was available for
less than one in twenty, or 8 percent excluding the summer
program. Enrollments in Job Corps accounted for only 5
percent of youth enrollments in CETA local programs.
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Primarily Training
Local classroom training
OJT
Job Corps
Supplemental Training
PSE training
Transition services
Job Creation
Summer youth employment
In-school and out-of-school
youth employment
PSE
Adult work experience

Total Participants
(in thousands)
750
181
95
250
116
705
330
870
400

The chances of assignment to a training component rather
than a work component vary significantly among different
groups in the CETA eligible population. Local classroom
training is most often used for persons of the most limited
employability. Females, Hispanics and "other" minorities,
dropouts, single parents and persons with inadequate
English-speaking ability, have above average chances of
assignment to classroom training, while younger and older
participants, whites, males and high school graduates are
more likely to receive other assignments. In marked contrast,
on-the-job training slots are more likely to go to the most
employable among the CETA population—whites, males,
graduates, and parents in two-parent families. Job Corps is
restricted to poor youth age 16 to 21 who are from deprived
backgrounds so that they need residential treatment. To
some extent, Job Corps is the "program of last resort" for
youth who have dropped out of school (85 percent of
enrollees), been rejected by the military (one of every four)
or had trouble with the law (two of every five). Those new
enrollees in Job Corps in 1980 who had less than a high
school diploma represented one-third the enrollments of
poor dropout youth in all CETA local programs.
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Earnings Impacts
Studies of the categorical programs which preceded CETA
generally found that classroom training increased the postprogram earnings of participants, typically between $250
and $300 in the year after termination. Studies of OJT usual
ly estimated a high payoff, typically ranging between a $400
and $900 increase in annual earnings. Past assessments of
Job Corps reached very mixed conclusions, while studies of
adult basic education documented increased earnings.
New evidence is available concerning the post-program
earnings relative to control groups for 1977 Job Corps par
ticipants and fiscal 1976 local CETA participants.
Classroom trainees earned $350 more in the year after leav
ing than a comparison group, an increase of 10 percent in an
nual earnings. On-the-job trainees gained $850, an 18 per
cent increase. These post-program earnings gains were in
contrast to the patterns for fiscal 1976 work experience par
ticipants who, at best, broke even relative to like nonparticipants.
Social Security Reported Earnings Levels
Relative to Comparable Nonparticipants
(Fiscal 1976 Entrants Terminating in Calendar 1976)

Classroom Trainees
On-the-Job Trainees
Public Service Employment
Participants
Work Experience Participants
Participants in Combina
tions of Activities

1977

1978

Change
1977 to 1978
(adjusting for inflation)

$347
839

$442
574

+ 18%
-36

261
-149

326
-187

+16
-17

356

164

-57

The procedures for selecting the comparison groups and
for measuring post-program earnings using Social Security
records were as rigorous as possible and generally conser-
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vative so as not to exaggerate impacts, yet there are many
technical issues inherent in the ex post facto matching of par
ticipants with nonparticipants, and in the use of Social
Security data to estimate earnings. Nevertheless, the results
are confirmed by follow-up interviews of the participants in
different components. Comparing second-year postprogram earnings for second-half fiscal 1975 CETA en
trants, and adjusting for differences in measurable
demographic characteristics and pre-program experiences,
classroom trainees gained $588, and OJT participants gained
$965 relative to adult work experience participants, or
roughly the same relative magnitudes as estimated for 1978
by matching 1976 participants with controls. It appears,
then, that earnings impacts are substantial for both
classroom training and OJT, and that they increase over time
for classroom training while declining for OJT.
Estimates of Job Corps impacts are more rigorous because
the comparison group could be more carefully selected. Job
Corps increased the civilian earnings of 1977 participants by
$209 above those of the comparison group in the first postprogram year and $487 in the second year. This represented
an 8 percent earnings increment in the first year and a 13 per
cent increment in the second. Job Corps also increased
military enlistment substantially, so that the total earnings
impacts were even greater.

Who Benefits From Training?
Based on the evidence for 1976 local CETA participants, it
appears that all race, sex and age groups benefit significantly
from on-the-job training when compared to like nonpar
ticipants. Female participants, persons with low or no earn
ings before entry, and middle-aged participants did par
ticularly well in classroom training. The measured gains
from classroom training increased substantially between the
first and second post-program years, particularly for
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females. All groups gained more from OJT than work ex
perience, and all except minority females gained more from
classroom training than work experience (although this judg
ment about the relative payoffs of work vs. training is hedg
ed somewhat by technical issues about the measurement of
earnings of work experience participants getting jobs in the
public sector).
Female Job Corps participants gain more than males in
terms of earnings, although males gain slightly more in terms
of hours of employment. Females without children do
somewhat better than females with children.

The Anatomy of Gains
Increased employment rather than increased earnings rates
account for most (though certainly not all) of the real earn
ings gains. For fiscal 1975 classroom trainees, over fourfifths of the increase in real annual earnings from the year
prior to entry to the first year after termination resulted from
a rise in the percent time employed. Comparing the pre-entry
to the second post-termination year, increased employment
accounted for three-fourths of the real gain. Approximately
half of classroom trainees with employment before and after
participation had lower real hourly wages in the second posttermination year than in the year before entry. For fiscal
1975 OJT participants, increased employment accounted for
all of the real earnings gain in the first year and four-fifths of
the gain between the pre-entry and second post-termination
year. Among on-the-job trainees, however, two-thirds with
previous earnings kept ahead of inflation in their hourly
wages. Fiscal 1977 Job Corps participants earned 11 percent
more than controls in the first two post-program years but
worked 16 percent more hours; in other words, all their gains
came from increased worktime. These averages are the result

White Male
Minority Male
White Female
Minority Female
17-18
19-21
22-25
26-29
30-44
45 +

earnings relative
to controls for
1976 classroom
trainees

19774978 SSA

19774978 SSA
earnings relative
to controls for
1976 classroom
trainees minus
earnings relative
to controls of
work experience
participants

19774978 SSA
earnings relative
to controls for
1976 on-the-job
trainees

1977-1978 SSA
earnings relative
to controls for
1976 on-the-job
trainees minus
earnings relative
to controls of
work experience
participants

$ 832
349
1,220
1,178
413
225
326
453
2,310
1,043

$1,757
450
1,221
442
184
1,017
831
1,685
2,944
-322

$1,363
1,675
1,102
1,924
1,932
1,335
1,194
1,159
1,541
1,680

$2,288
1,776
1,103
1,188
1,703
2,127
1,699
2,391
2,175
3,045
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of many individuals moving up in wages, some moving
down, with a greater likelihood that more marginal par
ticipants will find employment but at low wages. It appears
that employment gains are more pronounced immediately
but then lead to higher earnings rates gains as individuals
prove themselves or use their skills in their new jobs.
The -increase in employment, in turn, appears to result
more from increased labor force participation than from
reduced unemployment. Among local classroom trainees in
second half fiscal 1975, the increase in the percentage of time
in the labor force from the pre-entry to first post-program
year equaled two-thirds of the increase in percentage time
employed for all trainees, while the increase from the preentry to second post-termination year accounted for half the
employment time increase. Three-fifths of the net increase in
time employed from the pre-entry to second post-program
year for classroom trainees was accounted for by individuals
who had zero earnings in the pre-entry year. For OJT par
ticipants, two-thirds of the employment gains in the first
year were also explained by increased participation, and zero
earners before entry accounted for 45 percent of the net in
crease in percent time employed from pre-entry to the second
post-termination year. For 1977 Job Corps participants, in
creased labor force participation over the two post-program
years also accounted for two-thirds of the increase in
employment.

Success Factors
The impact of institutional training is determined by the
duration of stay and placement. All of the post-program
earnings gains for 1976 classroom trainees were accounted
for by the group entering employment on terminating the
program. While it is not surprising that those immediately
employed had higher near-term earnings relative to controls
or relative to other participants not placed, it is significant
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that the differentials remained substantial two years later,
even after refined adjustment for most of the observable dif
ferences between those placed and not placed.
The earnings impacts of training increase more than pro
portionately with its length. The estimated annual earnings
gains of 1976 classroom trainees staying one to 20 weeks
were only one-sixth those of participants staying 40 or more
weeks.
1978 Earnings Gains
of 1976 Classroom Trainees
Stayed 1-10 weeks
Stayed 11-20 weeks
Stayed 21-40 weeks
Stayed over 40 weeks
Placed
Not placed

$ 83
224
832
1377
1209
8

Job Corps males who stayed less than 90 days, and those
who did not continue to completion were earning the same as
controls during the period 12 to 18 months after termination;
in contrast, those completing a vocational program earned
$1,250 more on an annualized basis. Early female dropouts
gained $300 on an annualized basis, partial completers $750,
and full completers $1,500.
Trainees who stay longer are also more likely to be placed.
Several factors are involved which cannot be clearly
separated. Sorting occurs in that those who stay longer have
measurable characteristics that are predictive of postprogram success. The sorting is greater in Job Corps, where
only three of ten participants are full completers, compared
to local classroom training where three in four complete the
usually shorter duration assignments. Yet for both Job
Corps and local classroom training, the effects of duration
of stay and placement remain significant after adjustment
for the differences between dropouts and completers.
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Moreover, the dropouts and short-stayers earn much the
same as their controls over the long-run, so that sorting of
the "winners'* and "losers" is not an explanation of the
substantial gains of completers. Completion itself appears to
be a substantial factor. Those completing local classroom
training have a high probability of being placed whatever
their duration of stay. Those who complete Job Corps train
ing gain substantially more and are more likely to be placed
than participants who stay as long but do not complete.
Corps members who secure a GED earn more than matched
individuals who do not. Finally, the effect of duration of
stay is strong even when placement is used as an additional
control variable in regression analyses of earnings gains. All
this supports the conclusion that training increases human
resource endowments and employability, and that those
trained longer are more likely to obtain certification which in
turn improves the chances of finding employment or being
placed.

Training Occupations and
Occupational Mobility
Training tends to move individuals from the secondary
labor market and irregular jobs into low level but more
regular jobs. Among 1976 classroom trainees with previous
experience, a fifth had worked primarily as garage atten
dants, transportation operatives, laborers, farm workers or
private household workers. Only a tenth of trainees with
work after termination held such jobs. The share working as
craftsmen and welders increased from 11 to 17 percent, while
clericals rose from 20 to 27 percent.
Among on-the-job trainees, over a third were placed in the
same broad occupational categories in which they had
previously worked, while over a fifth were assigned to train
ing positions in a lower occupational level. Comparing the
occupational distribution before and after training, the pro-

105

portion working as laborers, transportation operatives,
garage workers, farm laborers and private household
workers actually rose from 13 percent to 15 percent.
A third of Job Corps entrants have had no regular work
experience and the remainder have largely worked in menial
"youth" jobs. Job Corps training helps them secure entry
level "adult" jobs although only one in seven participants
ends up as a completer with a training-related job. The bulk
of "placements" are in manual, entry clerical and entry
health jobs secured by the participants mainly through their
own initiative.
Little is known about the "best bets" for training. Most
females in local classroom training are in clerical and service
occupations (usually health). While 17 percent of all 1976
classroom trainees with a job before entry worked in female
clerical occupations, 35 percent of trainees were in female
clerical occupations and 25 percent of those with a job after
training remained in these occupations. Three-fifths of par
ticipants trained in clerical work who subsequently got jobs
ended up in training-related work, as did two-thirds of those
trained in service jobs. The rates of training-related employ
ment were much lower for trainees in other occupations. For
instance, nonconstruction crafts are a frequent training
cluster for males, but the batting average of this training ap
pears low in terms of subsequent training-related employ
ment. While OJT participants are more likely to find
employment in the occupation of assignment, those "train
ed" as service workers, laborers, garage workers, farm
workers and transportation operatives are less likely than
other OJT participants to stay in the same occupation, prob
ably because they are able to find something better on their
own.
In Job Corps, the best bets for completion, placement,
and higher wages for males are manual occupa-
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tions—forestry, gardening, construction and industrial pro
duction; for females, forestry, gardening, construction and
health are the best bets. Over the longer run (12-18 months
post-termination), however, persons trained in these occupa
tions are less likely to register gains relative to controls than
those trained in some other occupations including transpor
tation and service for males and the clerical field for females.
In other words, the training that looks good in the short-run
does not look as good in the long-run. Also, some occupa
tions such as construction increase wages but not employ
ment, while health occupations increase employment but not
wages.

Educational Competencies and
Employability Skills
In addition to occupational training, the other ingredients
in local classroom training and in Job Corps include
remedial instruction, basic life skills training and attitudinal
or motivational improvement activities. Even less is known
about the effectiveness of these efforts than about occupa
tional training. While the measurement tools for assessing
maturity, socialization and job readiness are crude, it ap
pears that changes do occur, at least in programs for youth
(who may be most malleable to such interventions).
The "intangibles" are a major factor behind the Job
Corps' success. Tests of social and attitudinal changes,
health care, and job-related knowledge and behavior suggest
that participants in Job Corps for over 90 days experience
significant gains along all the social-attitudinal dimensions.
These measured changes are reflected in a dramatic drop in
arrest rates over the first year out of Job Corps (10.9 per
hundred compared to 16.7 for controls according to the
follow-up of 1977 participants), delays in marriage and
childbearing, reduced out-of-wedlock births, increased
mobility, and increased matriculation in college and post-
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secondary training. However, Job Corps achieves these
changes by creating a 24-hour a day structured environment
away from other influences. The supported work program
that provided well-organized and well-run full-time employ
ment opportunities for youth, but did not remove them from
home environments and did not include counseling, recrea
tion, motivation, student government and the like, did not
produce positive changes in criminal behavior or drug abuse,
nor did it significantly increase post-program employment
constancy.
School-based programs aiming to improve "employability
skills" through instruction and activities designed to expose
youth to work settings and requirements are able to change
tested vocational attitudes, job knowledge, job holding
skills, work relevant attitudes, job seeking skills, and sex
stereotyping in career goals (although not, apparently,
changing self-esteem). However, these attitudinal and skill
gains do not alter post-program labor market or educational
behavior except when combined with substantial job
development activities so that employers recognize that the
changes have occurred, and unless the activities are targeted
to youth who plan to immediately enter the full-time labor
market after graduation rather than continuing their educa
tion. Moreover, gains are not realized in summer programs
which have about half the treatment hours, suggesting that
intensity and continuity are necessary to change attitudes
and skills. On the other hand, short-term interventions that
provide a helping hand at the point of job search can
substantially increase the immediate chances of employment
with little or no effect on measured employability.
Education gains are easier to measure. There is clear
evidence that a variety of alternative methods can increase
the functional academic competencies of even the most
educationally disadvantaged, with learning rates far ex
ceeding school norms for such individuals. Participants in
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Job Corps, who have an average tested reading level of 5.6
years at entry, gain 1.5 years in 90 hours of instruction and
2.2 years in 150 hours. The key is a self-paced, individualized
approach with the flexibility to be delivered a few hours daily
in combination with other activities. Few of the disadvantaged and dropout participants are seeking or wishing to accept
full-time academic instruction. Computers simplify delivery
of these self-paced, individualized materials, increasing the
gain rates, helping to standardize curricula, reducing paper
work, and facilitating delivery in a variety of settings.
Finally, CETA eligibles can benefit from more advanced
education but will not participate unless extended a helping
hand. In May 1981, 2,000 of the 42,000 Job Corps members
were enrolled in post-secondary institutions with the help of
Job Corps. The retention rate of those enrolled the previous
year was 70 percent. These youth would not be in college
without this assistance. Less than half a percent of a com
parison group for 1977 Job Corps participants were in col
lege in 1979. In a structured experiment to test a GI-Bill
voucher approach as an alternate treatment strategy for
CETA-eligible youth, only half of the control group attend
ed college the next year, compared to nine-tenths of those
provided tuition and expenses, as well as counseling and
other assistance. Among the experimentals, four-fifths of
those who attended college were still enrolled through three
semesters compared with only half of the controls who
originally matriculated. Those experimentals who were in the
cohorts receiving educational and personal counseling had
better retention than those simply provided financial sup
port.

Work as Training
One justification for work experience is the claim that a
period of subsidized, sheltered employment might serve as
preparation for later unsubsidized employment, resulting in
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increased post-program earnings. The evidence suggests that
this is only true for certain target groups and only if the work
experience is structured in certain ways. The post-program
earnings of 1976 adult work experience participants were ap
parently no higher than those of matched nonparticipants,
while participants in public service employment experienced
a gain between $250 and $750 in 1977. The differential be
tween PSE and work experience outcomes is explained by the
relative likelihood of post-program employment in the
public sector. All of the increase in employment from preentry to the first year post-termination for 1976 PSE par
ticipants was due to increases in unsubsidized work in the
public sector.
The supported work experiment carefully tested the im
pacts of well-operated work experience projects structured to
provide increasing responsibility, close supervision and peer
support. It found little or no post-program earnings effects
for dropout youth, drug addicts or ex-offenders, but a
statistically significant impact for long-term AFDC recip
ients, which resulted entirely from increased post-program
employment in the public sector.
The Ventures in Community Improvement experiment
used worksites as a classroom for training in construction
trades, with journeymen instructors, linkages to unions, and
structured skill progressions. Even though there was also
substantial output from VICI projects, the aim was to teach
as much as to produce, and those participants who did not
accept the "real-life" performance requirements were more
likely to be terminated than in most youth work programs.
The resulting placement rates in construction, in unions, and
in high wage jobs far exceeded those for comparable work
projects that did not emphasize training, even though there
were very modest differences in positive termination and
placement rates.
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Where participants receive work and training combina
tions, they appear to benefit more than from work ex
perience alone but less than from classroom training or OJT.
In fiscal 1976, only 6 percent of participants in nonsummer
local CETA activities (excluding direct referral) received se
quences of primary activities such as work and then
classroom training or work and then OJT. The net gains for
multiple-activity participants equaled the weighted average
of the impacts estimated for the separate components, sug
gesting that when work and training are combined, the postprogram earnings effects will be largely determined by the
amount of training provided.
Summer employment for disadvantaged teenagers modest
ly increases the likelihood of returning to school and the pro
bability of part-time employment in school. The employ
ment effects are concentrated among the 14 and 15 year-old
participants, particularly minorities and females, i.e., those
least likely to secure employment in the absence of the pro
gram. On the other hand, there are no measurable gains in
job knowledge, vocational attitudes, jobseeking or job
holding skills, relative to control groups. Apparently, a first
work experience provides a "taste for earnings" or helps to
overcome fears about work without markedly altering at
titudes or employability skills.
In summary, work experience can be useful for young peo
ple in advancing workforce entry. It can be combined with
training activities in a sequence, with benefits roughly pro
portional to the degree of training. A worksite may be struc
tured as a training site and can yield some of the benefits of
classroom and on-the-job training while producing useful
output, but this model is the exception rather than the rule in
local work experience programs. In most other cir
cumstances, the subsidized work will only have postprogram impacts if it serves as a try out or on-the-job train
ing mechanism for an existing unsubsidized job in the public
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or nonprofit sector. This does not mean that work ex
perience and public service employment are bad investments.
If $1.00 in output is produced for every $1.00 in cost, then
any post-program earnings increases or in-program benefits
(such as reductions in crime) represent a positive return on
the outlay. However, if the aim is to alter future employment
prospects, work is only effective when properly targeted,
designed or linked to unsubsidized employment.

The Return on the Investment
The public investment in training for persons of limited
employability is profitable, as best this can be judged by
benefit-cost analysis. According to the most reasonable (and
purposefully conservative) assumptions about the fade-out
of earnings gains measured in the two post-program years,
about the dollar value of nonearnings impacts, and about the
appropriate discount rate, Job Corps provides social benefits
with a current value of $1.39 for every $1.00 invested. Utiliz
ing the same assumptions and the estimated post-program
earnings gains for 1976 local classroom trainees, CETA
training returns $1.14 in benefits for every $1.00 invested.
The estimates for OJT are less precise (because of a more
complicated estimation methodology); but the range is from
a low of $1.26 to a high of $5.93 in benefits for every dollar
invested, with a "best" estimate of $2.18. Thus, on-the-job
training pays off most, Job Corps ranks next, and local
classroom training follows. Obviously, the three interven
tions serve different client groups and produce different pat
terns of benefits. Job Corps has noticeable earnings impacts
but the "socialization" effects are equally significant. In
deed, the reduction in crime is so substantial during par
ticipation and in the year after, while the costs of crime and
its treatment are so great, that the present value of the crime
cost savings is about equal to the present value of the earn
ings gains per participant from local classroom training.
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Even though the increase in post-program earnings per
dollar of investment is greater for classroom training than
for Job Corps, the total payoff is less because there are
minimal effects on crime or dependency.
The "public" includes participants as well as the taxpayers
who pay for the program. Social benefit-cost calculations ex
clude transfer payments from costs and count as benefits all
increased earnings. From the taxpayer perspective, transfers
are included among costs and the benefits are not the postprogram earnings gains, but rather the taxes they generate as
well as the resulting reductions in dependency. Taxpayer
benefit-cost ratios are, therefore, lower than social benefitcost ratios, and though the latter are a more appropriate con
sideration from a social policy perspective, the former will
more likely concern the voters in a period when taxes are a
major concern. Job Corps has the highest taxpayer benefitcost ratio because the crime reductions are a savings to tax
payers; there is a return to the taxpayer of $.91 for every
$1.00 invested according to the most reasonable, albeit con
servative, assumptions. The intermediate estimate for OJT is
a return of $.72 for every $1.00 invested. Local classroom
training returns $.60 for every dollar. Such recondite
analysis hardly figures in the political equation, but it cer
tainly justifies the solid political support for Job Corps and
the preference for more OJT in the local activity mix.
Benefit-cost analyses of pre-CETA institutional and onthe-job training programs generally found that benefits ex
ceeded costs. Estimates for Job Corps varied considerably,
with several suggesting benefits less than costs (in part
because they excluded the substantial crime and dependency
reduction benefits and in part because they looked only at
the short-term earnings which are depressed during the tran
sition period immediately after termination). Using stan
dardized assumptions which focus only on earnings effects,
the benefit-cost ratios calculated from current impact studies
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of Job Corps and CETA classroom training are in the high
range relative to past estimates, while the ratios calculated
from recent OJT impact experience are in the mid-range
relative to past estimates.

An Interpretation of the Evidence
The Role of Training
If all persons available and looking for work were ranked
into categories based on prior experience, education,
previous training and other measurable characteristics used
by most employers in setting job requirements and in rank
ing applicants, CETA enrollees would be concentrated at the
low end of the distribution. The same standards used to
establish eligibility for CETA, and the same problems which
lead applicants to choose this option, are among those used
by employers to rate individuals as high risks. Nevertheless,
there is very significant diversity in employability among
CETA participants. At one extreme, CETA may serve a
single mother with a college degree reentering the labor force
or a machinist displaced from a job in a one-industry town;
at the other extreme, the participant may be a mentally
retarded young person who has never held a job, or a school
dropout who has spent the last five years in prison. Each set
of characteristics can be assigned "batting averages" which
are statistically valid predictors of outcomes in most settings.
The mother and the machinist are good bets for training and
for subsequent placement. The dropout or the handicapped
youth are poor bets. Yet there is also much unexplained
variance reflecting chance but also the wide range in poten
tial among individuals sharing any set of characteristics.
Some dropouts may be both motivated and intelligent, hav
ing left school because of family responsibilities. Others may
have dropped out because school was too slow and
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regimented, although they have now matured. Some may
have very serious behavioral problems which are not record
ed. Most failed in school because they simply were not as
good in academic areas as those who passed. Five years in
the future, these subgroups among the dropout population
are likely to have quite different average success rates int he
labor market. But it is impossible or at least difficult to iden
tify the differences in potential which will produce these dif
ferences in outcome. The differences emerge only when the
individuals are "tested" by some common experience.
Employers must make hiring decisions based on
characteristics they can measure and on the "batting
averages" for persons with these characteristics. Available
jobs at any point can be ranked into categories according to
their hiring requirements, i.e., how much prior experience,
education, previous training and other desirable
characteristics the employers require. The distribution on the
supply side of the labor market ranking the available
workforce in terms of employability, is paralleled on the de
mand side by the distribution of available jobs according to
the minimum employability they will accept in applicants.
Some jobs are always available for even the most unskilled,
but generally there are more available workers in the low
employability categories than there are jobs willing to
employ such workers. Hence, the most disadvantaged in
dividual could usually get a job if he or she really tried, but
the rewards are meager relative to the effort, and all such in
dividuals could not find employment if they looked at the
same time.
Among jobs with equal hiring requirements, there is wide
diversity in career potential. Some entry jobs are dead-ends
while others can be first steps on career ladders. For the
available worker entering the hiring door or reading the want
ads, it is in many cases impossible to distinguish between
jobs with career potential and those which lead nowhere.
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The labor market functions by iterative matching of
workers and jobs. An individual with low potential hired in
to a job may soon be fired or quit, or will be satisfied with
menial work. One with high potential will either retain the
job or look for another that provides more career opportuni
ty. Eventually, he or she will find a career ladder and will
move up, stay with a job long enough to be considered more
employable, or acquire a credential in college or appren
ticeship which documents to employers a set of skills or
characteristics they desire. This individual will, then, move
up the queue at the next point of availability for employ
ment. Whether bouncing from job to job or remaining in
dead-end employment, he or she will become identifiable as
a "loser," moving down the queue in the eyes of employers
at the next point of availability for employment.
Classroom training can impact on employment chances in
several distinct ways: First, the training can serve as an ex
periential sorting mechanism, not improving skills or creden
tials, but rather identifying those participants with more
potential and motivation. Employers will want to hire them
instead of others with the same external characteristics
because they know them to be better risks. Second, the train
ing activity may serve as a way of gaining access to jobs
without necessarily improving skills or credentials. This may
occur through the institutional leverage of the delivery agent
or by helping participants to find employment. Third, the
training may be able to sort both individuals and jobs,
matching persons who have been identified as having greater
potential with entry jobs identified as more promising.
Fourth, the training may improve potential by increasing
motivation, employability skills or academic competencies,
without providing credentials that employers will accept in
the labor market. Fifth, the training may provide a
demonstrable skill or a certification which is accepted in the
labor market. The distinction between these effects is of
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more than academic interest. For instance, the second im
pact process may produce measured gains in earnings
relative to nonparticipants, but will do so largely by reducing
the chances of the nonparticipants. The process will have no
impact on skill shortages and the participants will benefit on
ly to the extent their job search is shortened. The fourth pro
cess increases performance in a job once secured, but does
not increase either the chances of employment or the quality
of the first job. Only the fifth process fills skills shortages
and improves employability as assessed by employers who
have no link to the training activities and are not leveraged
by the delivery agent.

The Impacts ofCETA
The evidence suggests that local classroom institutional
training for those at the end of the labor queue functions in
all these ways. In general, however, the training is not of
long enough duration to increase competencies to the point
where they can be certified and documented. Only a small
proportion of participants get a GED, sheepskin, or cer
tificate indicating the completion of apprenticeship. There
are very few occupations where skills can be taught in short
order than can be certified or tested at the hiring door, and
where a large number of jobs are available. Clerical training
is one of these occupations, and it tends to work best where
those who are trained are mature and have adequate
academic competencies. Judging from the concentration of
earnings gains among 30-44 year-old classroom trainees,
women, and those previously out of the labor force—i.e.,
the groups most likely to be assigned to clerical train
ing—there is little doubt that this occupation accounts for a
substantial portion of the total gains from training. In some
other occupations such as welding, basic skills can be taught
quickly but lead to jobs for only a minority of trainees. For
most occupations, long-term training is needed to gain useful

117

skills or certification that is recognized in the labor market.
Only the few classroom trainees who stay long-term acquire
these skills and certifications, so that they need the place
ment leverage of prime sponsors in order to realize gains.
Likewise, just a small proportion of Job Corps par
ticipants complete advanced training or get a certification of
competency (for instance, 5 percent complete a GED). Place
ment assistance is concentrated on this minority, with little
help provided to noncompleters. The overall gains produced
by the program are largely the result of improved
"potential" manifested in greater stability of labor force at
tachment and employment, i.e., changes in motivation and
socialization are rare, achieved in less intensive and less
targeted local classroom training. The jobs which are secured
by Corps members, most often by their own initiative, do
not pay more and are not much different than those which
could be secured without participation.
The sorting that occurs in local classroom training appears
to be modest as judged by measured characteristics, but cer
tainly the most employable within those entering training are
likely to complete. Those who are placed among those who
stay longer or complete are even more employable. It is im
possible to determine how much the sorting identifies the
persons with greater potential within any set of measured
characteristics. It is likely that this occurs, but probably
more through the placement process than the enforcement of
completion standards. Those placed are the "best" both
because they include individuals with initiative to get a job
and those who are helped by the delivery agent. The fact that
the impact of placement continues over time suggests that
these individuals placed are indeed "better" after controlling
for measurable differences and/or that jobs accessed for
them are "better" in terms of stability and career potential.
The gains registered by those placed who do not have longduration training and have not, therefore, received certifying
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credentials, are probably a combination of these two factors.
The converse of this observation is that sorting does not oc
cur that will be accepted by the labor market in the absence
of CETA leverage. The distinction between completers and
noncompleters is not very specific in local classroom train
ing, and only a minority of participants even know if they
complete. An employer is not likely to give much credit to
participation alone without knowing the standards for com
pletion and whether these standards are enforced.
Job Corps sorting is much more significant because com
pletion standards are competency based, the educational and
vocational achievements are documented and the residential
experience itself tends to separate the mature from the im
mature. Those employers regularly hiring from Job Corps
know the difference. Some use the achievement records. But
the completion standards and the competency measures are
not recognized by most local employers unfamiliar with the
program, so that if a youth does not get a job through the
program, he or she is unlikely to get credit and must prove
himself or herself once hired.
The primary impact on local classroom trainees, par
ticularly on those staying less than 90 days, is to help them
get a job either by providing job search assistance, a staging
ground, or actual job access or leverage. The modest gains
for short stayers could be explained by just a few finding
jobs more quickly than they would without participation. It
is important to stress that the short stayers in local classroom
training include a disproportionate number of dropouts, so
those scheduled for short training are averaged in with the
dropouts. The evidence suggests that short-duration jobsearch assistance and "hand-holding" for both in-school
and out-of-school youth can increase short-run employment
chances. It is likely, then, that such activities combined with
traditional labor market exchange functions may work to
modestly increase post-program employment chances
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without really improving the types of jobs secured, the par
ticipants' skills, or their long-term prospects.
On-the-job training involves these same processes, but
their relative importance is different. Sorting is much more
predominant. The CETA decisionmaker can and does screen
more candidates than a typical employer interviewing for a
job, since all CETA applicants are assessed and usually the
most employable are assigned to OJT. Because OJT is rarely
a "piggyback" on other treatments, the sorting must occur
basically on measurable employability characteristics rather
than potential as demonstrated in prior participation. Judg
ing from the wage change patterns, the occupational
distributions and mobility patterns, it does not appear that
there are wide gaps between experience and job requirements
in the OJT match-ups of workers and jobs, or that extensive
training is necessary, but the gaps may still be greater than
usually exist for entry employees. Rather, the try-out period,
then, offers an opportunity to determine whether the
somewhat higher risk trainees, particularly those who have
been outside the labor force and those who have lost their
last employment and therefore may be of uncertain quality,
will adjust to the job and normal entry instruction. This may
mean the chance at more stable and better paying jobs for
those whose careers have been disrupted, or an opportunity
for entrants and reentrants into the workforce—albeit those
with more education credentials—to get a chance to prove
themselves. From this perspective, OJT is more of a screen
ing device than a training ground. The one of three par
ticipants who are not hired permanently are those who fail in
the try-out or find that the assignment does not meet their
expectations. Yet, the decline in the earnings gains from the
first to the second year after termination, in contrast to the
increase for classroom trainees, suggests that some of the
OJT participants lose their jobs and the "training" is not
transferrable, while the control group of equally employable
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individuals is able to eventually secure its own jobs with
time. The provision of an immediate job is particularly im
portant to reentrants or entrants who are more likely to re
main in the labor force when they immediately get work than
when they must search for their own employment.

Implications of the Interpretation
The interpretative framework, and its component con
cepts such as sorting, credentialing, job access, and try-outs,
as well as documented vs. potential employability, are im
portant because of their broader policy implications. First,
these concepts suggest why OJT is so hard to market to
employers. Participants are referred and the employer must
choose among them on the basis of documented employabili
ty dimensions, i.e., they are risky to the extent that on
average they have characteristics which would usually rank
them below normal entry employees and their potential is
uncertain because they do not follow the normal entry
routes, for instance, being recommended by other
employees. With the hire, the employer assumes the risk that
the individual cannot "pick up the job" in the way normal
hires do, and the subsidy must cover this risk. To the degree
the job requires substantial training as opposed to mere
orientation, the employer assumes an even greater risk. To
overcome the employers' reservations, the delivery agent is
inclined to screen participants as much as possible so that
they meet the usual employability requirements of the job.
Unless the best of the referrals is within the "risk range"
covered by the OJT subsidy, the employer will not even par
ticipate. But given the difficulties of finding OJT slots and
the clear evidence that they help participants, the delivery
agent may not want to jeopardize future placements and may
provide referrals well within the risk range—providing wind
falls to the employer—in order to assure future cooperation
and to get immediate results for their participants.
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If the public accepted the initial risk by payrolling the par
ticipant during a limited try-out period, the employer would
have to be subsidized only for extra training costs rather than
the hiring risk. The extra training costs for the individual
could be better determined because there would be some ex
perience. It would be possible to take greater risks. It would
also be easier to piggyback on experiential sorting in work or
classroom training programs, since the delivery agent would
not have to convince the employer that prior sorting had oc
curred, but rather could let him see for himself during the
try-out. This approach would also permit a better identifica
tion of what was actually occurring on the worksite in terms
of training and relative to the capacities of each trainee.
Second, the placement effect differs but is important
under all these processes. If classroom training does not lead
to credentials or measurable skills, like typing speed, that
can be tested by employers prior to hiring, its effectiveness
rests on placement leverage as well as the training
institution's reputation, which in the short-run may be af
fected by publicity and linkage efforts, but over the long-run
depends on the performance of the trainees that are placed.
If there is no sorting of completers and noncompleters based
on demonstrated acquisition of specific skills, then over the
long-run the placement leverage and reputation will erode
and individual participants who perform most effectively in
training will not be able to translate their hard work and
ability into commensurately better jobs.
Improving potential but not documented employability
will help when and if the participant gets a job, but pays off
more certainly when there is placement, particularly when
this accesses jobs with career potential where the individual's
abilities and newly acquired skills can be fully utilized.
Placement should become less necessary to the degree that
training can provide accepted credentials or measurable
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skills; however, these are likely to be discounted unless the
individual shares the characteristics and experiences usually
associated with these credentials and skills, or has other im
pediments to employment. This will be particularly true
where an individual makes a "quantum leap"—for instance,
the dropouts who entered Job Corps and were trained as
customer engineers. It may be necessary even if there has
been substantial sorting, training and certification, to pro
vide for a try-out or to exert a special effort to secure place
ment so that the skills and credentials are accepted at face
value.
Third, credentials require longer training than is usually
provided, and more sorting as well. In order to avoid hurting
those who lack the potential for a major advance, the ob
vious solution is to use a base-level training activity to pro
vide worthwhile aid to large numbers while identifying par
ticipants with the greatest potential for long training in a se
cond tier of activities. Placement in the first tier, for the ma
jority not moving on to the second, would continue to find
"better" jobs for those who are "better" but not good
enough for advanced training, while helping the remainder
to simply find employment more quickly. In the second tier,
where the number of entrants and completers would be much
smaller than in the first tier, substantial placement efforts
would and could be exerted to assure employment in
training-related jobs in order to assure that the intensive in
vestments paid off.
Fourth, improved skills mean little if not recognized and
utilized by employers. Recognition depends on identification
of competencies acquired, documentation of the quality of
the inputs which went into the preparatory experience, proof
that standards were maintained, and recognition that the
skills and competencies needed for specific jobs were, in
fact, provided. If there are no "graduation" standards, if
the certification is nothing more than a claim that some
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training occurred, if the quality of the training is suspect, or
if the competencies taught bear little relation to what
employers really want, the payoffs of training will be reduc
ed, particularly over the longer-run when jobs will depend on
acceptance of the credentials rather than the leverage of the
CETA hiring subsidies and placement efforts.
Fifth, the future implications of these interpretations are
even more significant. The size of the available workforce at
any point in time, especially at the lower end of the
employability distribution, is largely determined by the
number of entrants and reentrants into the labor force. This
number will decline dramatically relative to total employ
ment as the post-war babies age into the prime working years
and the participation rate of women levels off. The annual
rate of growth of the civilian labor force age 20 to 24 is pro
jected to fall from the 2.7 percent annual growth rate for
males in the 1975-1979 period to -.1 percent annually be
tween 1979 and 1985, then declining -2.9 percent annually in
the 1985 to 1990 period. For all women, the rate of increase
in the labor force will decline from 4.1 percent to 2.9 percent
and then to 1.9 percent. Employment grew 2.7 percent an
nually over the second half of the 1970s, and 2.1 percent over
the entire decade. Anything close to this job growth would
drastically exceed the 1.9 percent total labor force growth
projected for 1979 to 1985 and the 1.3 percent rate for 1985
to 1990.
The impacts will be greatest at the entry level. While there
may be large numbers of relatively well-educated thirty-yearolds and women competing for mid-career advancement, the
pressures at the career entry door will be reduced, as well as
the competition for menial and casual jobs. Illegal or legal
immigrants may fill the latter need, but they are unlikely to
be allowed full access to the career-entry opportunities. The
result is that many employers whose hiring policies are now
structured to take advantage of the excess supply of entry ap-
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plicants will either lower their usual entry standards,
regularize the career ladders so that the promise of a future
can be used to attract entry workers, initiate their own inten
sive preparatory programs, work more closely with public in
stitutions, recruit from areas with excess workers, increase
the pirating of trained employees and further protect their
own workers by compensation provisions and advancement
opportunities tying them to the firm. Past experience during
the tight labor markets of the 1960s and current experience
of industries and labor markets having trouble meeting man
power needs, suggests that a combination of all these
strategies will occur if labor market conditions change in the
expected directions.
If more firms provide their own training and have to reach
into the high-risk pool, they will be much more responsive to
preparatory activities by public institutions that screen and
provide some of the basic skills. More firms will be willing to
specify their requirements and work with institutions to
develop training programs targeted specifically to their
needs. Since they will have to take more chances in hiring,
they will be more receptive to a try-out approach which pro
tects them from some of the risk. Persons who are trained
and credentialed are more likely to find jobs at higher levels
and have their credentials accepted even if they lack some of
the other characteristics now expected in applicants for these
better jobs. As more firms train, there will be an increased
concern with other firms stealing their employees, and a
desire to limit this if possible.
The degree of change depends on many things including
immigration policies, military manpower needs,
technological change, foreign competition, and national and
world economic conditions. There is no crystal ball which
can accurately project these developments. But all else being
equal, the labor supply changes that can be projected with
some certainty are massive. Employers will not alter their
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behavior overnight, and the degree of change will vary by in
dustry, region and type of firm. But the market is enormous
ly adaptable and the directions of change should work in
favor of training which sorts and improves potential as well
as more ambitious efforts to provide quantum leaps in
documented skills. On the other hand, training that simply
accesses low-level, menial jobs will be relatively less
necessary or useful.

Management, Delivery and Decisionmaking
Local Variability
The local delivery system which accounts for nine-tenths
of trainees and more than seven-tenths of training expen
ditures under CETA is characterized by enormous diversity.
There were 481 state and local jurisdictions designated as
"prime sponsors" for CETA in fiscal 1980, that is, receiving
funds by allocation, planning for the use of these funds, con
tracting and managing activities, monitoring compliance,
and reporting to the federal government. Under the "com
prehensive" component of CETA (Title IIBC) which
finances most local OJT and classroom training, prime spon
sors have broad discretion to choose the types of participants
and the types of services.
There is substantial variability in how they exercise this
discretion—particularly in choosing between job creation
and training—as well as in the results they achieve. The stan
dard deviation measures the variation around the mean;
there is a two in three chance that any point in a given data
set will fall within a standard deviation on either side of the
mean. The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the stan
dard deviation relative to the mean and is an indication of
the relative dispersion of different data sets. A higher coeffi
cient implies more relative variability in one data set than
another. For almost all statistically measured dimensions of
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prime sponsor decisionmaking and performance, the coeffi
cients of variation are large.

Classroom trainees as share
Title IIBC participants
OJT participants as share
Title IIBC participants
Total trainees as share
Title IIBC participants
Classroom training cost
per participant
OJT cost per participant
Percent Title IIBC participants
entering employment
Cost per placement Title IIBC

Average

Standard
Deviation

Coefficient of
Variation Among
Prime Sponsors

50%

22%

43%

11%

8%

74%

64%

21%

34%

$1328
$1130

$580
$697

44%
42%

40%
$6308

14%
$4572

35%
70%

The enormous variability in prime sponsors' emphases on
training is not explained by the variability in economic con
ditions or in the participants who are served. The two factors
expected to have the greatest impact on local decisions would
be the unemployment rate (which should affect the
availability of OJT assignments, the jobs which could be
secured through classroom training, and the relative attrac
tions and need for job creation) and the youth share of Title
IIBC participants (since youth are usually offered short-term
subsidized jobs and are underrepresented in local classroom
training and, even more so, in OJT). Regression analysis
provides a way of determining how much one factor is af
fected by changes in another variable when the remaining
factors are held constant. It also provides a way of assessing
the amount of the variance in the one factor which is explain
ed by the variability in all the other factors within a data set.
Regression equations which measure the relationship be
tween the emphasis prime sponsors place on classroom train
ing (as measured by the ratio of trainees to total fiscal 1980
Title IIBC participants) and their unemployment rates and
youth shares reveal that prime sponsors with significantly
above average unemployment rates or significantly above
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average youth shares are slightly less likely to emphasize
classroom training. But these two factors together explain
little of the variability in classroom training emphasis.
Neither do these variables have much relationship to, nor ex
plain much of the variability in, classroom training expen
ditures as a share of total expenditures, O JT participants as a
portion of total participants, or combined OJT and
classroom training enrollments as a share of total
enrollments. To the degree a relationship exists, prime spon
sors with higher unemployment rates tend to undertake more
OJT and more total training (hence less work experience)
than those with lower unemployment. By the same token,
the unit costs of OJT and classroom training are only
marginally related to unemployment rates or youth shares.
Prime sponsors with high unemployment rates do not have
to pay substantially more to access jobs for OJT, and the
duration or intensity of classroom training which is related
to the cost per participant, is not substantially greater in high
unemployment areas nor substantially lower when more
youth are served.
The factors which do seem to make a difference, even
after regression controls for unemployment rates and youth
shares, are the type of governmental unit making the deci
sion, its size and regional location. Smaller prime sponsors
with a labor force of less than 200,000 and state government
sponsors are more likely to emphasize OJT under Title IIBC.
Smaller primes (100,000 or less labor force) and the large
cities (500,000 or more labor force) are more likely to em
phasize classroom training, while states are less likely to use
this approach. Expenditures for training as a portion of Title
IIBC expenditures are lowest in the South and Northwest.
The cost per participant in classroom training is highest in
large cities, counties and consortia, reflecting cost-of-living
differences probably as much as intensity differences. OJT
costs are lowest for the smallest prime sponsors and for
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states. Prime sponsors which place a heavy emphasis on
training under Title HBC also emphasize training under their
structural public service employment and youth programs.
Differences in participant mix and in economic conditions
are much more powerful in explaining the variability in out
comes than the variability in training emphases and costs.
Differences in participant mix—age distribution, race, sex,
and welfare recipient shares—differences in area condi
tions—unemployment rates, economic growth rates and quit
rates—and differences in activities—on-the-job and
classroom training shares, average lengths of stay and costs
per enrollee—explained almost two-fifths of the variance in
prime sponsor placement rates under Title IIBC in fiscal
1980. Of these factors, the activities dimensions—training
shares, lengths of stay and unit costs—had the least impact.
For instance, more OJT contributed to higher placement
rates but a standard deviation increase in the OJT share was
associated with less than a fifth of a standard deviation in
crease in the placement rate. In contrast, a standard devia
tion increase in the unemployment rate was related to a stan
dard deviation decrease in the placement rate. Yet the fact
remains that the placement success of a prime sponsor is not
foreordained by participant characteristics, economic condi
tions or service patterns. Three-fifths of the variance in
placement rates was not explained by detailed regression
equations including a diversity of variables, suggesting that
much may depend on the management of and emphasis on
placement at the local level.

The Delivery Level Perspective
From the prime sponsor's perspective, the benefits of
classroom training vs. work experience are not as apparent
as the national impact studies would suggest. Prime sponsors
do not undertake long-term follow-up, nor do they attempt
to secure comparison groups in order to measure net im-
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pacts. They focus, instead, on short-term outcomes and the
gains from entry to exit. Immediately at exit from CETA,
the employment rates for 1976 work experience participants
were higher than for classroom trainees (52 compared with
29 percent). At the three-month follow-up, the differential
was still in favor of work experience (52 to 46 percent). Even
though the work experience group was more likely to be
employed a month before entry, its gains from entry to exit
were significantly greater than for classroom trainees, and
from entry to three-month post-termination they were about
the same. Work experience is also shorter and less costly per
person year, so more people can be served by the work ap
proach. At the same time, the public gets back a useful social
product and locally-financed transfer payments may be
reduced during the period of participation since wages offset
welfare benefits while allowances do not. In other words, the
benefit-cost calculus is different at the local level, and the
emphasis on work experience is rational even if not socially
optimal.
Likewise, the case for long-duration training is not as
compelling from the local perspective. In the first quarter
after termination, the percent of time employed for second
half fiscal 1975 classroom trainees who stayed between half a
year and a year was 46 percent, compared to 43 percent for
those staying 30 to 90 days. The differential was 57 vs. 47
percent over the entire post-termination year and 66 vs. 54
percent in the second post-termination year. In other words,
a 90-day follow-up would not show the greater relative gains
made by the longer-term trainees. Based on prime sponsor
placement rates for trainees of varying lengths of stay, and
assuming costs proportional to length of stay, the cost per
placement recorded by the prime sponsor for the 30 to 60 day
training would be three-tenths that of training activities of
over half a year's duration. With local pressure to serve more
individuals, and Department of Labor pressure to reduce
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unit costs, it is not surprising that shorter training is em
phasized.

Federal Rules and Oversight
The prime sponsors operate within the framework of
federal regulations and federal oversight. The "feds" review
the activity plans prepared each year by prime sponsors, but
leave to local decisionmakers the choice among allowable ac
tivities and among different subgroups in the eligible popula
tion, as long as specified procedures are followed. The ex
ception is the youth share requirement. The Youth Employ
ment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 required that
prime sponsors maintain youth service levels under Title
IIBC at the pre-YEDPA level. Guidelines were introduced to
enforce maintenance of effort, and these reduced the
downtrend in youth shares which had been occurring each
year since the implementation of CETA. The regression
results suggest, however, that there is very little statistical
relationship between prime sponsor youth shares and their
overall emphasis on classroom or on-the-job training, and
the impact results provide no reason why jobs should be
preferred over training for youths. There is still significant
local choice in the degree of emphasis on training.
The Department of Labor seeks to achieve year-to-year
improvements in placement rates and unit costs in
negotiating plans, but prime sponsors may justify exceptions
in the plan or may seek modifications during the year. Ap
parently, there is not too much pressure since the planned Ti
tle IIBC placement rate approved for fiscal 1980, after the
modification process had occurred, was below the level in
fiscal 1979 and only 1 percentage point above the level in
fiscal 1978. The variance in planned placement rates or the
training shares is almost the same as the variance in actual
placement rates and training shares.
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The stick necessary to give leverage to the annual plan ap
proval and goals-formulation process is the performance
review at the end of the year. After a top-to-bottom assess
ment which considers goal attainment in the previous year,
prime sponsors are rated as either eligible for immediate
funding, as needing corrective actions over the next year, or
as having serious problems that must be solved before fund
ing. Unfortunately, the quality of training is given minimal
weight in this assessment and no prime sponsor in 1980
received a serious problem rating because of training. The
only enforcement occurred when vocational education setasides were grossly underspent or training requirements
under IID not met, i.e., quantitative requirements establish
ed in the law; but such issues involved only three of the 69
prime sponsors rated overall as having significant problems.
Process issues such as equal opportunity enforcement and
monitoring procedures have been the major concern of endof-year reviews and thus receive predominant attention by
prime sponsors.
The federal regulations do not preclude long-term train
ing. The regulations suggest that length of training should be
determined according to guidelines provided in a Bureau of
Labor Statistics publication detailing requirements for dif
ferent jobs. This source suggests that six months is the
minimum training period for almost any occupation in
which classroom or on-the-job training occurs under CETA,
and even in these cases there is a presupposition of basic
competencies which are frequently lacking for CETA par
ticipants and which would require extra time in addition to
the vocational preparation. Since less than 1 percent of fiscal
1976 classroom training entrants stayed in CETA for more
than 450 days, the two-year limitation of training introduced
in 1978 (which allows for six months further of unstipended
training) cannot be considered an impediment to longer
courses.
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The regulations do limit on-the-job training. In terms of
costs, outcomes and public perceptions, OJT is desirable
from a local perspective. While prime sponsors have varying
success in securing employer cooperation, even the most suc
cessful would probably like to do more. If a standard pro
portion of IIBC participants in OJT were increased by a
standard deviation, i.e., to a level now achieved by the best
one-sixth of prime sponsors, there would still be less than a
fifth of Title IIBC participants in OJT. The problem, then, is
not so much the management of the component, but its
design. Quite simply, the payments to the employers do not
compensate for the risk in hiring someone of less certain
qualifications and the paperwork involved. An experiment
with alternative subsidy levels for the hiring of disadvantaged 16-19 year-old students has demonstrated that employers
are responsive to higher subsidy levels, and that the response
rate escalates when the participant is payrolled from CETA
for a try-out period rather than hired first by the employer.
The evidence strongly suggests that a redesign of the OJT
regulations would be productive.

Federal Leverage Mechanisms
The federal measures which have most affected the level
and duration of classroom training are the supplemental
vocational education set-aside (6 percent of Title IIBC
funds), the legislatively mandated training requirement
under public service employment (which was 15 percent of
Title IID PSE expenditures in fiscal 1980), and the HIRE
and Skills Training Improvement Programs (STIP) which
provided funds for on-the-job training and long-duration
classroom training respectively, but only to those prime
sponsors who could use the money and meet requirements.
The increase in the vocational education set-aside from 5 to 6
percent in the 1978 amendments, the operation of the STIP
program (supported with discretionary funds) and the PSE
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training requirements, also implemented in 1978, accounted
for all of the increase in local classroom training activity be
tween fiscal 1978 and fiscal 1980. The Private Sector In
itiatives Program which established local Private Industry
Councils (PICs) and set aside funds for "private-sector"
oriented activities has increased the share of funds going to
training, simply because work experience is deemphasized in
the funds allocated for PICs. The early results suggest that
the PICs are not having an easier time marketing OJT than
prime sponsors, and, hence, turn to classroom training and
transition services. The expectations that business participa
tion in decisionmaking and the intermediation of a business
oriented group in the delivery process would make OJT more
attractive, placement easier and employer cooperation much
more likely were unquestionably exaggerated. PICs may do
marginally better than prime sponsors, and the increment
may be worth the cost, but more fundamental changes in
policies and practices will be necessary to improve the effec
tiveness of local programs in private sector placement.

Lessons from Job Corps
The Job Corps, operating under national direction and
drawing participants from all areas of the country, offers
several important lessons for the design and management of
training activities:
First, intensive investments per individual are only likely
when there is clear authorization and are only justified when
the clients are extremely disadvantaged and are provided op
portunities for significant gains. To achieve these ends, it is
necessary to clearly specify both the service mix and the
eligibility focus in the law and regulations, and to shift more
responsibility to the national or perhaps state level rather
than locally, where there are so many pressures to both dilute
service intensity or to "cream" whenever significant oppor
tunities are provided. The demography of Job Corps par-
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ticipants has changed hardly at all over the years and the
legislative stipulation of services has thwarted the attempts
by budget cutters and critics of intensive investments to trim
the sinew and bone rather than the fat from the program.
Second, one of the most important factors behind the Job
Corps' impact is mobility. The program draws individuals
from areas of greatest need—usually where institutions are
overburdened or nonexistent—and provides exposure to
alternatives as well as a sense of independence. The number
of intercity moves for job-related reasons is more than twice
as high for Job Corps participants as for controls in the 18
months after termination. Job Corps is the only CETA pro
gram which is not localized. Most "national" programs
funded under Title III of CETA provide extra service and
delivery options which augment local activities but involve
neither recruitment from multiple prime sponsors nor
mobility of participants.
Third, three-fifths of Job Corps centers are operated on a
contract basis by private corporations or nonprofit organiza
tions. Competition provides options. Where a contractor
performs poorly, another can be selected. In contrast, it is
extremely difficult to suspend decisionmaking and manage
ment authority of a local government unit. It is particularly
difficult to fire the local bureaucracies directing the pro
grams. And where the same government units are responsi
ble for decisionmaking and management, they are likely to
choose the approaches which are easiest or safest to manage,
rather than what may be best for participants. Private sector
management per se is not necessarily more effective—at least
this has not been the case in Job Corps, where nonprofit and
public managers of contract centers have done as well as
private corporations—but the competition provided by the
contract approach, the flexibility to hire and fire, the separa
tion of program decisionmaking and program management,
have all proved beneficial. By the same token, there are
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economies of scale and the potential for specialization of
staff and standardization of management approaches which
result where private or nonprofit contractors operate multi
ple sites. Operation of the larger Job Corps centers is as com
plex as management of local employment and training ac
tivities (the annual budgets are larger for some Job Corps
centers than for many prime sponsors), and the option is cer
tainly one that should be utilized where local public sector
management has been deficient.
Fourth, the Job Corps system provides a complete spec
trum of opportunities ranging from special aid to the learn
ing disabled all the way to college options for Corps
members who advance rapidly, from vocational training in
janitorial work for persons unable to perform any other jobs
to multi-year training as computer customer engineers. If in
dividuals cannot be served appropriately at one center, they
can be moved to a component at another. Instruction is in
dividualized and self-paced, while achievements are recorded
and rewarded. The standardized educational programs are
based around a diagnostic, prescriptive and progress
measurement system. Most available public and private sec
tor materials have been screened and cross-referenced to this
system, so that there are a number of options to suit the in
terests and needs of each individual. Likewise, training of
ferings are based around competency-based achievement
standards for each vocation, with a record of progress for
each individual. Thus, enrollees are placed according to
ability or interest, can advance as rapidly as possible, and
can compete for advanced opportunities available within the
system based on performance within the system. Financial
and nonfinancial incentives based on measured ac
complishments increase the effort of Corps members. This
approach is in marked contrast to CETA which offers a
"one-shot" treatment in most cases, with few incentives for
performance, no record of achievement, and limited oppor
tunities for "quantum leaps."
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Fifth, all activities in Job Corps operate under detailed na
tional standards dictating minimum qualitative and quan
titative inputs. On-site reviews can then assure that input
standards are met. The use of a standardized competency
assessment and progress systems for the vocational and
educational components allows comparison across centers.
Because there is the same essential mix of services from
center to center, enrollee surveys can be and are used to iden
tify potential problems in components. Most critically, with
costs negotiated and itemized by detailed component, and
with components relatively standardized, outcomes relative
to national norms can be used to assess performance.
Because the service mix and intensity of local CETA opera
tions is so variable and because there are no qualitative stan
dards, it is difficult to get the same torque on performance
measurement systems. Not surprisingly, the coefficients of
variation in Job Corps outcome measures from center to
center are far smaller than those for prime sponsor opera
tions. The poor performing center operators have few ex
cuses, and hence low performers are subject to greater
pressures and are more likely to improve over time.
Sixth, recruitment and placement are the weak links of
nationally-directed programs such as Job Corps, and they re
quire more attention. Job Corps recruits through its own
system of contractors, usually state Job Services. Few prime
sponsors use Job Corps as a treatment alternative on a
regular basis. Some enrollees could be better served in local
programs, while many participants in local CETA activities
should be in Job Corps. Job Corps also has its own largely
separate placement system that works in getting completers
into jobs, but does not help dropouts and partial completers
for the most part (in contrast to local classroom training
where placement is more often provided to participants
whatever their duration of stay). As a result, many Corps
members have depressed earnings during the first month or
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so after termination even though they eventually break even
or surpass like nonparticipants. This transition could be
eased if local prime sponsors had the responsibility of plac
ing individuals sent off to Job Corps for training and subse
quently returning to the locality without a job, and if they
were notified immediately or even before scheduled exit. In
other words, local activities must be better linked with
nationally-operated programs. They must begin to operate in
tandem as a system rather than as isolated activities.

Improving Policy and Programs
Needed Directions of Change
The detailed analysis of all the facts and figures on train
ing and its impacts reduced to some rather simple conclu
sions: CETA (or its successor) should be putting more
emphasis on training rather than work experience or job
creation. On-the-job training, in particular, needs to be ex
panded and the duration of institutional training should be
extended. Placement efforts should go hand-in-hand with
this training, with a focus on training-related placement,
particularly when there are substantial training investments.
Competency attainment should be emphasized and stan
dards should be maintained for participants. Career oppor
tunities should be available for those who prove themselves
in the system.
The CETA system is not now designed or managed to
achieve these ends. This is a statement of fact, not a critique.
CETA's mission over the last decade has been, first and
foremost, to create jobs, which was probably appropriate as
the economy strained to absorb the exponentially increasing
numbers of youth and female labor force participants.
Evidence in support of new missions and approaches has not
been available until recently. The decline in the number of
labor force entrants which will provide the imperative for
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change are only beginning to occur. Yet if past patterns are
justified, they also offer clues concerning the changes in
policy and practice most likely to move the system along the
paths which are, in light of new evidence and emerging labor
market trends, now more appropriate.

Guidance for Local Decisions
Decentralization and decategorization were initiated under
GETA in the belief that decisions about services, delivery
agents and participants could best be made at the local level
in response to local conditions. Diversity was both expected
and desired. A planning system and procedural rules were
formalized to assure a fair and reasoned set of decisions,
placing primary reliance on an analysis of labor market con
ditions as a guide to local decisions. It would be expected,
then, that areas with similar economic conditions or similar
target groups would tend to adopt similar choices among in
tervention alternatives. Recognizing the crudeness of area
data as well as participants, service mix and outcome
measures, it is still surprising that the service patterns which
vary so markedly bear little relation to either area unemploy
ment rates—the primary consideration in planning and
allocation—or to the proportion of youth served—the par
ticipant mix variable expected to have the largest impact on
the choice of local service strategy. The local factors which
seem to affect decisions most are the structure of the decisionmaking unit and the historical patterns rather than the
problems which are addressed. Certainly the findings
eliminate many of the most common excuses of prime spon
sors, i.e., that training does not occur because the "feds"
force too many youth to be served or that below average
OJT enrollments are necessitated by high unemployment, or
that placement rates cannot be improved because of the par
ticipant mix or area conditions.
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A basic issue is whether local decisionmakers know best
what should be done in light of local conditions, and whether
priority should be placed on adapting to these conditions
rather than helping to move people where jobs and better
training are available. A rational local decisionmaker con
scientiously assessing placement rates, costs and three month
follow-up results might rationally decide to emphasize work
experience, or to put two people through 20-week training
rather than offer one participant 40 weeks of training. From
the local viewpoint, the effectiveness differentials do not
square with those estimated by the "ivory tower" national
impact studies. If the rational decision based on local
evidence is also expedient—for instance, helping to meet
public needs and reducing local payrolls through an em
phasis on work experience rather than training—all the bet
ter! If residents must be placed in local jobs and if these are
scarce, the training options or payoffs may be limited so that
job creation and short training for menial positions is most
effective. It is not a condemnation of the quality of local
decisionmakers to suggest that they may not know best in
certain contexts because their perspectives are in some cases
too limited, and the contexts may not be most appropriate
for the individuals who are served.

Refocusing Federal Oversight
Because of the difficulty in pinning down activities, ser
vices, or outcomes, much less the interrelationships between
them, performance monitoring has been basically a ritual ex
ercise. Where the diversity is so great because of local flex
ibility and the lack of federal standards, it is difficult to
second-guess any local decision or to judge local outcomes.
Unlike Job Corps, where one center is very much like
another, and the activities are defined by a set of detailed re
quirements for each element, the descriptors for local ac
tivities which are used in the federally-mandated manage-
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ment information system are not very specific and the con
tent standards for activities are almost nonexistent.
"Classroom training," even in a single prime sponsor, may
range from a few hours of motivational and character
development activities to full-time occupational training for
a year or more. Outcome measures are not even tied to these
broad categories nor are the individuals identified who par
ticipate in any specific activity. The outcome measures are
also so vague that they tell very little about performance; it is
doubtful whether a "positive termination" really means
anything and impossible to tell whether a "placement" is
training related. Without the ability to measure what ac
tivities are occurring, without standards about what should,
as a minimum, go into each of these activities, and without
outcome measures available by characteristic of participants
and services received, it is impossible to make judgments
about whether the activities are adequate or the outcomes
appropriate. Hence, the federal oversight system focuses
neither on inputs and their quality, nor on outputs and their
meaningfulness, but rather on processes. Acceptable pro
cesses do not guarantee and in fact may not even promote
wise decisions or positive results. For instance, the summer
programs operated by prime sponsors were acceptable until
recently as long as plans were filed and the numbers of par
ticipants counted. Yet inadequate worksite activities, poor
supervision, and slack worksite standards were found in
recurring assessments by the General Accounting Office.
Beginning in 1978 the Department of Labor began to specify
standards about what was required in worksites, provided
models, demanded specification of activities in worksite
agreements and used these agreements as an instrument in
massively expanded on-site monitoring. There were substan
tial improvements in the quality of worksite activities as a
result of this emphasis on quality and on-site monitoring.
These improvements were documented by the GAO but were
no more visible in the management information collected by
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the Department of Labor than were the earlier shortcomings.
In fact, unit costs rose noticeably as a result of increased
management and monitoring efforts and more enrichment of
worksite activities.
In a system which focuses on aggregates, and on quantity
over quality, there is little incentive for the prime sponsor to
develop high quality, intensive components. If these served
only a small proportion of participants, their effectiveness
would be completely hidden in a mass of numbers under the
current management information system. Likewise, the
"feds" could not easily assess intensive investment programs
locally. Despite the massive paperwork requirements on
local systems, the management information system does not
collect the right information needed to support local or
federal management, or to promote either long-term training
or the progression of individuals in an orderly way through
the system.
The "bogeyman" of the heavy-handed federal govern
ment squelching local creativity and dictating decisions turns
out to be a pussycat. There is no evidence that the federal
regulations or the federal oversight restrict the amount or
duration of classroom training undertaken by prime spon
sors. The law clearly allows for two-year training courses,
but local pressures result in the broadest distribution of
limited resources. OJT is restricted because what is allowable
is difficult to market, but federal oversight is certainly not
the reason many prime sponsors do so little OJT. Yet if the
federal presence is largely neutral concerning the exercise of
local discretion over activity mix and design, the oversight is
not benign. It focuses attention on ritual processes while pro
viding no direction as to what is important. If the "feds"
cannot or do not say what works or what the standards
should be, nor do they review quality, neither can the local
decisionmakers when dealing with politically connected local
delivery agents. Why create new training institutions or ap-
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preaches when existing deliverers are clamoring for support
and there are no incentives and few performance or impact
standards for justifying alternatives? Why concentrate
resources when low costs and services for more participants
are favored by both local politicians and federal monitors?
Why worry about relocation (which usually results in an out
cry from some local residents and politicians) when planning
is focused on local opportunities, and procedural re
quirements are focused on choosing between local delivery
agents? It takes all the ingenuity and resources available to
the prime sponsor to avoid the process pitfalls that will be
scrutinized in federal review, and to generate the plans and
modifications that have little to do with operational realities.
If more and longer classroom training is needed as well as
more OJT, past experience provides examples of how this
can be accomplished—to a large extent simply by ar
ticulating what is wanted in sufficient detail, utilizing perfor
mance measures which can identify whether it is being ac
complished, and providing funds specifically for the desired
purposes. More classroom training can be accomplished by
expanding the state set-aside or targeting local resources that
can only be spent on training (i.e., the PSIP approach), by
requirements for training under work experience as in PSE,
or by an overlaid competitively-funded program such as
STIP. Longer training can be accomplished by duration
specifications for these earmarked and extra dollars, by em
phasis from the federal level, and by the use of management
information system descriptors that identify costs for
specific types of services so that false economies are not
achieved by simply shifting to less intensive activities within
broad service descriptors. Marginally more OJT can be ac
complished by guidelines, set-asides or competitive funding
to areas able to move OJT dollars, but the real answer is to
change the formula to provide for "try-out" employment
before a hiring decision or training contract is signed with
the employer.
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These actions would focus federal policy, but would not
represent a reduction in local control, since there are already
copious set-asides, categorical titles, minimum spending re
quirements and the like. The key is to align these re
quirements so that they achieve a coherent policy and pro
vide clear guidance.
The real issue, then, is whether a consistent national policy
can be developed and sustained. Currently the local CETA
system tries to do everything it is told to do, and make the
most rational decisions based on the evidence at hand, but
the directions are not clear and the locus of decisionmaking
inappropriate. The answer is not a new program model, or
more vigorous performance monitoring, or redistribution of
decisionmaking authority, although all these steps may be re
quired. The need is rather to determine what we are trying to
achieve, to set long-range goals, and to choose the next steps
that will, with the least rupture to the present system, move it
in these directions.
The dramatic decline in labor force entrants projected for
the next two decades will create shortages of entry workers,
increasing the importance and potential of training. The
ends and means of the CETA system or its successor should
be reoriented in light of future prospects and the evidence
that long-term training pays off most. Training rather than
job creation should receive priority. Where jobs are provid
ed, they should be combined with and lead into training.
Participants willing and able to make a "quantum leap"
should be provided the opportunity. Placement must be em
phasized, particularly for long-duration training.
Mechanisms are needed to facilitate mobility from high
unemployment and poverty areas.
Sagging productivity during the 1970s and the decline of
our relative economic growth taught us the dangers of shortterm perspectives, inadequate and erratic investments in
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capital and equipment, and wasteful use of scarce natural
resources. The lessons are equally applicable to human
resources. The future of the economy and the social fabric
depends in great measure on our willingness to initiate and
sustain policies which will develop of those who have tradi
tionally been discarded and ignored, but who will be needed
more in the coming decades.
At least on this one issue, the prescriptions to achieve equi
ty and efficiency are coincident. Those who preach the
supply-side Gospel, as well as those concerned with
mitigating the inequalities which have proved resistant to
short-duration interventions, should be able to find common
ground in support of more intensive training investments for
persons of limited employability.

Case Study Summaries

Baltimore, Maryland
The Rewards of Sound
Management and Planning
Gregory Wurzburg
Youthwork, Inc.

Introduction
The most important theme to emerge in the last decade of
evaluation and research centered on employment and train
ing programs is that the nuts and bolts of delivery
mechanisms can be as important as program design in deter
mining the ultimate usefulness of labor market interven
tions. To be credible, an analysis of training programs needs
to examine what happens as well as why and how it happens.
This point has been driven home again in evaluations of
labor market programs operated by local prime sponsors
under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(GETA). The variations in outcomes between different train
ing strategies that labor economics has taught us to expect
have been swamped by variations in management styles and
a host of environmental factors.
This evaluation of CETA training in the Baltimore
Metropolitan Area Manpower Consortium attempts to
analyze the context in which training is done and the rela
tionship between that and the quality of training.
The Baltimore Metropolitan Area Manpower Consortium
is almost legendary in the short history of CETA. It has a
reputation for competence, effectiveness, and innovation.
On closer inspection, this author finds some blemishes, but is
convinced that the federal employment and training system
has a showcase in Baltimore that offers some valuable
147

148

lessons for other GETA prime sponsors. Accordingly, this
report does not consider details of every aspect of the prime
sponsor's training operations. The scope of the description
and analysis was narrowed where it was logical and did not
jeopardize the important themes.
The report focuses on "adult" training, which is to be
distinguished from training provided under separate CETA
youth programs. Although the report recognizes the broad
definition of "training" that Baltimore uses—a definition
that encompasses almost every activity allowable under
CETA—the main emphasis is on occupational skill training;
the important exceptions are noted. Finally, the report looks
primarily at only the consortium-wide programs, excluding
certain smaller programs run within individual counties.
The author is grateful for the cooperation given by the
consortium managers and the various service delivery staffs;
it was essential. He is especially indebted to Marion Pines,
Director of the Mayor's Office of Manpower Resources, and
her staff—Mark Horowitz, Joel Lee, and Marguerite Walsh
in particular.

The Prime Sponsor Area
The Baltimore Metropolitan Area Manpower Consortium
comprises Baltimore City and four surrounding counties:
Anne Arundel, Carroll, Harford, and Howard. The prime
sponsorship serves an area of about 1,646 square miles and a
population of about 1.5 million. The population by jurisdic
tion was:
Jurisdiction
Total
Baltimore City
Anne Arundel County
Carroll County

Population
1,506,200
789,700
361,200
92,500
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Harford County
Howard County

146,200
116,600

An estimated 12 percent of the population was eligible to
receive CETA services in fiscal 1979. Nearly 8 percent of the
population was receiving AFDC, state or local public
assistance, and approximately 13 percent of the population
in the area was from families whose income was less than the
OMB poverty guideline. A quarter of the total population
was nonwhite, while slightly more than half of the city's
population was nonwhite. No figures were available for the
Hispanic population.

The Economy
The city of Baltimore and northern Anne Arundel County
are heavily industrialized and Howard County is becoming
increasingly developed with light industrial parks. Carroll,
Harford and southern Anne Arundel Counties are still large
ly rural and mostly bedroom communities. The overall
character and well-being of the economy, however, is a func
tion of Baltimore.
It has experienced a renaissance in the last decade, thanks
to creative and energetic local leadership and a massive infu
sion of federal money for mass transportation, urban
renewal, community development and manpower develop
ment. It is no boomtown by sunbelt standards but in com
parison to other large northeastern industrial cities, its
economy has been doing well. Unlike those other north
eastern urban areas, Baltimore's growth over the last 30
years has been steady and positive.
Baltimore's steady growth in labor market opportunities
belies the dramatic shifts in the composition of the labor
force, however. In the last thirty years, employment has
shifted away from manufacturing towards more service and
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government dominated occupations. This trend, which mir
rors national patterns, is expected to continue.

Political Governance
The relationships among the different political jurisdic
tions comprising the Baltimore Metropolitan Area Man
power Consortium are fairly typical of the kind of relation
ships found in other CETA consortia. However, the institu
tional setting of the city's manpower operations, which is in
tegral to the nature of the consortium's managment, is
atypical.
Baltimore City is the political hub of the manpower con
sortium. While the resources available through CETA are
important to Anne Arundel, Carroll, Harford, and Howard
Counties, the programs are not as visible nor are they of as
much strategic importance to the local political decisionmakers. Representatives of the counties participate on the
advisory council to the consortium and are especially active
on the council's steering committee. But, by virtue of the
agreement under which the consortium was established at the
inception of CETA, the counties grant a great deal of
authority to the Mayor's Office of Manpower Resources
(MOMR) in the day-to-day operations and in longer term
planning and direct contact with the Department of Labor.
Each of the counties receives a share of services and in
dividual allocations from the consortium's pot of money.
But, whether it is because the counties want to avoid the
potential embarrassment of running CETA programs, or
because manpower development simply is not high on their
local agendas, the counties' manpower administrators and
executives are willing to stay out of the limelight.
The consortium balance of power that has been dictated
by the formal agreement of delegation of authority has not
been without costs. Baltimore County withdrew from the
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consortium at the end of fiscal 1979 after years of concern
over equitable distribution of funds and disagreement over
MOMR decisionmaking practices, strategies, policies, and
programs. But so far, the other counties seem to be content
with the status quo.
One question raised by the Baltimore Consortium's ex
perience with the internal balance of political power is
whether consortiums can work when more than one par
ticipating jurisdiction has an aggressive CETA agenda.
Although MOMR staff argue that the views and policies of
all jurisdictions are accommodated, Baltimore County's
withdrawal from the consortium at the end of fiscal year
1979 indicates that there are limits to how well the consor
tium can accommodate more than one jurisidiction with
clear ideas on how to spend CETA dollars. If this is true of
other consortia, it certainly raises questions about the merits
of independent consortium management relative to those
models dominated by a single jurisdiction, and tradeoffs be
tween interjurisdictional peace and strong leadership.

CETA Funding
In 1979 only six other non-balance of state prime sponsors
received CETA allocations exceeding the Baltimore Consor
tium. The consortium received a total of $82,899,520 in new
obligational authority under formula allocations and
$1,112,918 in discretionary funds. The consortium has also
received more than $42 million in obligational authority to
operate a 21/2 year guaranteed job program for in-school
youths and high school dropouts living in certain areas of the
city. Baltimore also receives money from the governor's of
fice for individual referrals to programs outside the usual
training network (Table 1).
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Table 1 CETA Funding for Fiscal 1979, Baltimore Metropolitan Area
Manpower Consortium
1979 New
Unspent from
Unspent at
previous
obligational
end of
fiscal year
authority
fiscal year
Source
$2,293,110
$16,368,046
$2,664,729
Title IIA, B, C
22,042,044
2,106,427
Title IID
982,981
Title IV
1,735,563
4,683,551
854,744
39,156,212
Title VI
544,734
0
649,667
Title VII
Discretionary
Governor's money
429,048
1,112,918
Skill training
and improvement
program (STIP)
3,558,219
0
1,156,279
HIRE
756,105
0
488,696
Title IV—Youth
incentive entitlement
pilot project
(YIEPP)
(a)
a. $42,826,314 total obligational authority through September 30, 1980; $22,000,000 spent
as of September 30, 1979.

Influences on CETA Operations
Two sets of variables affect training policies and practices
in Baltimore: those external to MOMR and beyond its con
trol—mostly relating to governance—and those internal to
MOMR and within its control—those relating to planning,
development, and implementation.

External Factors
Some of what is good about the Baltimore training opera
tions could not be transplanted to other prime sponsors
because it reflects a combination of governance ar
rangements that are rare, if not unique to Baltimore. Prob
ably the single most important factor is the consortium's
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locus of political power, which is based squarely in the city
of Baltimore. MOMR, exercising administrative and
representational powers liberally delegated by the four coun
ties in the consortium, is most directly accountable to the
mayor of the city of Baltimore, an activist committed to im
proving the quality of life in Baltimore. This works to the ad
vantage of MOMR because Baltimore has a "strong mayor"
system of government granting the mayor authority over all
city agencies, including the public schools. The mayor also
virtually controls the "independent" city agency responsible
for approving all contracts. The mayor is interested in the
employment and training programs and is not about to let
them be subordinated to narrow political interest, and sees
more political mileage in well-run programs. While the
governance arrangements in the Baltimore consortium work
to MOMR's advantage, for sponsors where similar condi
tions of political control and accountability could never be
achieved, this fact may simply underline the influence of
politics on the effectiveness of CETA. Moreover, this very
strength in Baltimore could also be its Achilles heel. MOMR
operates at the pleasure of the mayor and his goodwill
undergirds MOMR's operations. But, just as MOMR has
benefited from the good graces of what might be termed a
benevolent despot, it could suffer badly at the hands of a less
enlightened city leader. The enormous degree of flexibility
which permits MOMR to capitalize on creative thinking and
dynamic leadership could also lead to swift disintegration
following a change in local political conditions.
The Baltimore area political environment's influence on
MOMR also highlights the tradeoff between organizational
fluidity that permits rapid adaptation for good or ill and institutionalization that may rigidly preserve the good with the
bad. MOMR's organizational fluidity has served it well dur
ing its evolution. However, it is not so clear whether

154

MOMR's ability to change will make it resistant to the
vicissitudes of the Baltimore City political agenda.
Other aspects of the governance arrangements also affect
the stability of the Baltimore Metropolitan Area Manpower
Consortium, although the relationship is not so clear. The
consortium, which was set up at the inception of CETA,
depends heavily on the Mayor's Office of Manpower
Resources having a dominant central role. On one hand,
Baltimore City's interest in participating in the consortium
seems to be premised largely on MOMR's having the
authority generously given it under terms of the delegation
of authority agreement signed by consortium members. On
the other hand, it is not clear how viable MOMR would be
were it not for the resource base available to it, thanks to the
consortium. In other words, the critical mass of ad
ministrative resources (staff, money, political discretion)
have required a scale of operation that is feasible only with
the involvement of other jurisdictions, which have been will
ing to give up administrative resources and a degree of
authority over how "their" share is spent, in return for the
savings and convenience of having someone else do the lion's
share of the work associated with running CETA programs.
This raises another question about the value of the consor
tium in Baltimore or any prime sponsor area, and the forces
which hold it together.
Consortia have been encouraged by the Congress and the
Department of Labor because it has been assumed that,
though political jurisdictions are not necessarily conter
minous with labor markets, federal labor market interven
tions would be more effective if they were. Creation of consortia are encouraged as a way, therefore, of encouraging
delivery of CETA services on a labor market-wide basis.
Economic theory, however, has not provided the glue to
keep corsortia together. Consortium bonuses and a readiness
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on the part of some jurisdictions to sacrifice some degree of
control for the sake of administrative convenience are just
two factors that appear to be instrumental in holding
jurisdictions together. The implication is that if national
policymakers consider changes in consortium incentives,
they should not underestimate the importance of either of
these factors, especially the latter, in contributing to consor
tium stability.
The idea of the necessity of a "critical mass" of ad
ministrative capacity makes it more desirable for federal
policymakers to rethink the system of incentives for forming
consortia. Amendments to CETA have consistently increas
ed administrative burden without always increasing the
resources to shoulder that burden. Since the scale of much of
that burden has not been related to size (all sponsors must
establish independent monitoring units and meet the same
reporting requirements, for example), economies of scale are
likely within consortia. Lacking a dramatic reduction in ad
ministrative burden, federal policymakers might attempt to
create more compelling incentives for jurisdictions to form
consortia, or at least differentiate administrative burdens ac
cording to prime sponsor size. This might include, for exam
ple, scaled down or less frequent reporting requirements.

Internal Influences
Many other variables internal to MOMR and under some
degree of MOMR control are more instructive about what
makes for effective prime sponsor training policies and prac
tices.
The MOMR Management Style. MOMR's style of control
and policy is perhaps the most pervasive ingredient in
MOMR's overall operations: there is a reason for practically
everything that is done and the way it is done. The planning,
contracting, and general management procedures and the

156

organizational structure have evolved to serve particular pur
poses. When changes are made, results are evaluated. If they
are not what was expected and are not wanted, more changes
follow. Where there are unanticipated spillovers, they are
considered and the original decision may be reevaluated.
What is important is that a deliberative process is followed
before decisions are made; there are procedures for ex
ecuting decisions and there is follow-up to assure implemen
tation and assess consequences.
Management Amid Crisis. The difficulties that prime spon
sors encounter in planning are practically germane to CETA.
Uncertainties and delays associated with authorizing legisla
tion, appropriations, and publication of regulations all
create a climate in which it is defensible and occasionally
prudent for local administrators to make no decisions or
defer them until the latest possible moment. MOMR must
live with the same vicissitudes, but managers cope better
than most other prime sponsors by preparing contingency
plans and hedging bets. It is a riskier style of operation than
the wait-and-see approach found in more conservative sponsorships, but it has the support of the mayor, no doubt part
ly because it has not yet led to any major calamities.
Yet MOMR is the exception that proves the point that
uncertainty in the CETA system must be reduced. MOMR is
able to cope only because of somewhat extraordinary staff
competence, a supportive political environment, and prob
ably, luck. Taking away any ingredient leaves a situation in
which CETA can become a political liability that is tolerated,
and whose damage is minimized by keeping it at an arm's
length from the political center of power. To the extent
CETA is used as a countercyclical tool, life for prime spon
sors is likely to be as uncertain as the economy. But stability
is possible in other areas—as observers have stated
repeatedly—through multi-year funding for the non-cyclical
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CETA activities and a greater sensitivity in Washington to
the perils of playing "Crack the Whip" with changing
regulations and budgetary brinkmanship.
The Importance of a Local Sense of Direction. Local control
(and good management sense) is not enough, though.
Another important factor in MOMR's training operations is
substantive policy content. MOMR's sense of mission goes
beyond either narrow political interests or compliance with
the plethora of mandates from USDOL. Organizational
goals and policies provide a frame of reference for inter
preting mandates from both local and federal authorities.
The Baltimore prime sponsorship does not have a reputation
for being responsive to whims of the USDOL regional office
because there are in-house agendas that also must be met.
By the same token, the prime sponsorship has been able to
withstand certain local pressures by countering them with
well-articulated policies and procedures.
Not only are there reasons for resisting outside pressures,
there are also means. MOMR is staffed and led in a way that
encourages decision and policymaking on the basis of merit.
Staff is enormously important in permitting this because it is
well-qualified and experienced. Half the senior staff have
worked together in the Mayor's Office of Manpower
Resources since before enactment of CETA. Individually
they almost all have firsthand experience in administration,
planning, and direct client services. There is fairly good
stability at lower staff levels as well. The reasons given for
the stability are interrelated and might be both causes and ef
fects of stability; they include good morale, competitive
salaries, opportunities for career development, and a sense
of professionalism.
These are not the kinds of ingredients that can be
transplanted readily to other prime sponsors. But they are
worth noting because they go hand-in-hand with the kind of
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institutional stability that is possible only over time and only
in an accepting political climate. Federal mandates can help
buy stability with stable funding. But to the extent the
federal hand causes institutions to be out of step with local
priorities, local political support is jeopardized, and with it,
the opportunity for institutional continuity.
Aside from the style and philosophy of MOMR's manage
ment, other factors especially important in affecting the
prime sponsor's performance include: what training is of
fered, who provides it, who receives it, and how those deci
sions are made; curriculum; job placement; and relationship
with the Department of Labor (Table 2).
Table 2 Enrollments for Fiscal 1979, Baltimore Metropolitan Area
Manpower Consortium__________________________
Cumulative new
Enrollees
enrollment
carried over
On board
fiscal year
from previous
Source____Sept. 30,1979
1979______year
2,115
Title HA, B, C
13,383
2,058
Title IID
3,519
4,646
654
Title IV
1,407
2,322
1,734
Title VI
2,978
4,882
360
Title VII
Discretionary
310a
277
Governor's money
245
188
202
252
STIP
73a
109a
45
HIRE
Title IV— YIEPP
13,895b
5,152
a. As or September 30, 1979.
b. Includes enrollments since start of program in early 1978.

Training Decisions
MOMR's training decisions revolve around three ques
tions: what training is to be provided, who is to provide it,
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and who is to be trained? At any one time MOMR offers
training in roughly 25 occupational areas as well as in basic
educational skills and job search/retention. The list of oc
cupational areas has approximately doubled since the incep
tion of CETA, partly in response to shifts in the occupa
tional mix of the Baltimore labor force. The Skill Training
and Improvement Program (STIP) and the private industry
council (PIC) spending CETA Title VII money have been in
strumental in permitting MOMR to extend the occupational
skills repertoire into new and growing occupational areas by
providing net new funds for training and increasing
MOMR's contracting with for-profit training firms.
MOMR has expanded its training offering into higher
technology occupational fields in response to changing labor
market demand, a management philosophy that has en
couraged flexibility, and federally imposed incentives which
have encouraged training in occupational areas where
placements are more likely. The continuing high placement
rates experienced by MOMR trainees—usually exceeding 75
percent—reflect the quality of training programs' curricula
and placement efforts. But the direction of change is
necessarily requiring more highly qualified trainees. It also
seems likely to be pushing MOMR more directly into a posi
tion of duplicating training offered by proprietary institu
tions. The increasing presence of such institutions as training
subcontractors to MOMR bears this out. One implication of
this trend is that if MOMR is not providing services that are
unavailable otherwise, it becomes more important that
MOMR assure that the services go to clients who might
otherwise not receive them.
Another lesson from MOMR's experience is the impor
tance of new money in producing change. Even in a system
as flexible and receptive to new ideas as MOMR, the expan
sion of occupational offerings has been the product largely
of new money. Net additional funds available under STIP,
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Titles VI, and VII, for example, have provided the resources
which have permitted new kinds of training without cutting
back training in more established areas.

What Training is Needed?
In deciding what training to provide, staff utilize the usual
sources of labor market information such as the Employ
ment Service and the Bureau of Labor Statistics to determine
the occupational areas in which labor market demand
justifies training. Another important source of intelligence
on labor market conditions is the network of labor market
advisory committees which represent, among others,
employers, unions, and trainers. Those committees—one for
each occupational area or clusterings of related occupational
areas—advise on the nature of the market demand for new
workers and the kind of training that is appropriate. Since
the introduction of the Skill Training and Improvement Pro
gram (STIP) and the increase in private sector involvement
through Baltimore's private industry council, changes in
MOMR's offerings of occupational training have needed to
be more open-ended to branch out into new occupational
areas. To meet this need, MOMR has turned to rely increas
ingly on requests for proposals to stimulate new ideas from
the training community, instead of approaching possible
training contractors on the basis of a pre-established agenda.
Though federal pressures for greater use of requests for
proposals were not a credible framework for justifying new
policies (and different deliverers), it is not unlikely that the
use of such open bidding processes can also ease the pressure
for reconsidering established policies.

Who Should Train?
MOMR contracts with private nonprofit, private forprofit, and government agencies (including community col-
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leges) to provide training. There is no evidence of MOMR at
taching a great deal of weight to the type of deliverer, perse,
but because of certain other MOMR policies, the bias at the
margin favors for-profit deliverers. In a machine skills pro
gram, for example, MOMR made a point of contracting with
a private firm because it is a major employer in the Baltimore
area. More generally, though, the bias favors for-profit
deliverers because they dominate the training field in the
newer, "high-tech" occupational areas into which MOMR is
trying to expand.
From year to year, the choice of service deliverers is
premised on the assumption that unless evidence based on
MOMR's performance indicates otherwise, trainers can be
assured of continued business. The funding level is not
guaranteed; but the assurance of continued funding at some
level—contingent on satisfactory performance—helps build
stability and continuity into the training infrastructure.

Who Should be Trained?
In certain respects the choice of who to train is given the
most attention in MOMR. Enrollment in the occupational
training program is selective; would-be trainees must meet
entrance criteria for reading and math skills as well as some
specialized criteria needed for particular training programs.
MOMR takes pains to assure that the criteria are valid and
relevant to the particular training regimen. But, in fact, be
tween the criteria and the fact that trainers can screen out
half of the qualified clients referred for training, the occupa
tional skill training programs prove to be fairly selective in
who they accept. Clients in the occupational skills training
programs have higher levels of educational achievement
from those in other activities and better work histories
(measured in terms of length and wages of previous employ
ment).
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There are three reasons for the selective enrollment
policies that MOMR practices in its occupational skills train
ing programs. First, MOMR managers will not in
discriminately enroll anyone in skill training; would-be
trainees cannot learn new skills if they are functionally il
literate, for example. Second, MOMR is selective because it
uses performance contracting for most of its occupational
skills training. When contractors are paid on the basis of ab
solute performance—placement of trainees in jobs—and not
relative performance—gains in skill performance, for ex
ample—they have a compelling interest in "creaming" refer
rals to select the most qualified, motivated, and job-ready.
The Department of Labor's emphasis on absolute outcome
measures reinforces MOMR's performance standards.
Third, MOMR's willingness to be selective about who gets
into occupational skills training also stems from its efforts to
please employers, because such training is geared more to
meeting employer needs than to meeting clients needs.
MOMR compensates for selectivity in the occupational
skills training programs by referring some clients with low
skill levels to PSE jobs that can impart skills. The rationale is
that the PSE jobs have training content which, though less
structured, is better adapted to the needs and capabilities of
clients functioning at low levels of educational achievement.
Other clients with low levels of educational achievement or
barriers to employment are referred to job search/retention
and basic educational training. But the clients referred to
training other than occupational skills training clearly are at
a disadvantage. MOMR's own evaluations show that these
clients do not fare as well as those going through the
classroom training and on-the-job training. Moreover,
MOMR has no systematic approach to channeling the lower
achieving clients into occupational skill training, once they
have had more basic assistance and are capable of learning
more sophisticated job skills.
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Though plans call for providing a sequence of activities
for more MOMR clients, certain factors work against it.
Both work experience and public service employment are
now integral components in MOMR's overall training offer
ings because they are important developmental steps that
provide progressively more structured training to clients
needing the most help. Unfortunately, statutory restrictions
on length of client enrollments in these activities prevent
their use as one link in a long term training plan. Conse
quently, MOMR can offer only a limited sequence and dura
tion of developmental services; this might be satisfactory for
clients close to being job-ready, but it is likely to be insuffi
cient for clients with multiple barriers to employment. Fur
thermore, the USDOL's use of per-enrollee and perplacement costs as the basis for evaluating costs favors
minimization of those costs and hence discourages long term
participation by the most disadvantaged clients.
MOMR's policies regarding what kinds of clients receive
what kinds of services can be seen as a rejection of the
popular assertion that CETA is for the worst-off. In fact,
while MOMR's policies do not hew to the rhetoric associated
with CETA, they are very responsive to the incentives and
disincentives built into DOL's management of CETA. If the
Congress and Department of Labor are serious about CETA
serving clients with severe or multiple barriers to employ
ment, both statutory and regulatory changes are needed to
permit prime sponsors to choose between providing limited
services to large numbers of eligibles, and providing more in
tensive services to smaller numbers. At a minimum, limita
tions on duration of participation must be relaxed when ser
vices are provided as part of a planned developmental se
quence. At the same time, the basis for evaluating prime
sponsor costs should be changed from per-enrollee to a perperiod of service basis. Client outcomes should also be
evaluated in terms of relative gains and not absolute out
come measures, as they presently are.
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'Twixt the Cup and the Lip: The
Matter of Execution
Planning in MOMR is more effective and useful than
usual because it is articulated with operations. The top
managers' experience in both functions has prevented "plan
ning" from becoming an isolated function; plans are turned
into a contract package which becomes the basis for
negotiating services and monitoring deliverers' performance.
This arrangement has more firmly institutionalized
MOMR's past planning efforts to unify planning and pro
gram development in a way that forced program implica
tions to flow from what otherwise could have been rather dry
and abstract plans. Finally, MOMR's use of performance
contracting creates a "market" for training program output;
by making payment contingent on successful completion by
trainees and placement in jobs, MOMR is able to reinforce
the connection between planning and implementation.
It is hard to argue with the success of MOMR's planning
and development practices. For that reason alone they
deserve scrutiny. But they are also noteworthy because they
are somewhat at odds with much of the conventional wisdom
about what constitutes "good" CETA management.
First, MOMR's planning is mostly incremental, accepting
previous policies and practices unless there are compelling
reasons for changes. But the policy of minimal change does
not reflect a lack of affirmative policymaking. Rather, it at
tempts economy of motion in a state of local CETA practice
in which fine-tuning rather than massive overhaul is more
appropriate. MOMR top management deliberately avoids an
annual top-to-bottom review of all aspects of operations
because it is felt that labor markets, contractor capacity, and
resource levels will not change dramatically from year to
year.
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After the federal government's bad experiences with an
nual top-to-bottom planning under zero based budgeting,
public administrators have learned that incremental planning
does have some virtue. For example, the 1978 CETA amend
ments relaxed requirements that had required a complete an
nual plan from prime sponsors; now a more limited annual
plan is submitted to indicate significant operational objec
tives and amend, if necessary, a more permanent master
plan.
But MOMR's experience is not an unqualified endorse
ment of incremental planning. Rather, it indicates that in
cremental planning works when a sound, long term plan and
underlying objectives are in place. A danger that both prime
sponsors and DOL officials overseeing prime sponsors
should be aware of is that incremental planning in a badly
designed system can be nonproductive or counterproductive
when it merely fine-tunes a dysfunctional system.
A second feature of planning in MOMR that is somewhat
at odds with "good" CETA management is the lack of at
tention given to developing the advisory capacity of its plan
ning council. The formally mandated planning council is not
ignored, but the staff do not see it as a valuable institutional
asset, and members of the council do not see it as the best
forum for influence. MOMR has chosen instead to rely
primarily on its labor market advisory committees and its
private industry council as sources of input from outsiders.
MOMR's network of labor market advisory committees
predates CETA, although the number of occupational areas
on which committees advise has increased. The advisory
committees have served a number of valuable purposes.
They have served as a means for corroborating information
on labor market demand collected from more traditional
sources (the Employment Service and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, for example) and as a source of information on
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occupation-specific training and experience requirements for
would-be workers. The committees also provide a forum for
a number of community voices where they can advise on the
issues in which they are well-versed. Finally, the committees
provide a mechanism by which participants—private
employers, in particular—can have a sense of ownership in
MOMR's programs. Because of the success MOMR has had
with its advisory committees, the Department of Labor's
regional office has not been insistent about getting the plan
ning council more actively involved. Although Baltimore's
private industry council has not been in place for long, the
PIC has effectively carved out an active advisory role for
itself and is also assuming responsibility for private-public
sector bridge activities.
Experience so far with the CETA advisory councils,
documented elsewhere, clearly indicates that their role needs
to be re-thought. Requirements for the councils were written
into the law as a way of forcing state and local government
officials to give voice to members of the community that
might be ignored otherwise, and to create a channel for the
flow of outside ideas for CETA officials to consider in plan
ning and evaluating their operations. Yet analysts studying
CETA have delivered a virtually unanimous verdict that the
councils are ineffective relative to the time, effort, and
resources invested in them.
MOMR's experience is instructive on two counts. First, it
shows that in even a relatively well managed prime sponsor,
an advisory council is of limited usefulness. Second, it shows
that an outside advisory group representing a cross-section
of interests can play a real and useful role in the context of a
more structured decisionmaking environment.
The main lesson from Baltimore with respect to advisory
councils is that, at the very least, Washington policymakers
ought to permit a variety of advisory council models.
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Operational Components in MOMR
MOMR goes to great pains to assure that there is a full
range of training services to meet the range of client needs.
Yet, though MOMR managers argue that client needs can be
met by the range of services offered, other factors build in
biases that can work against easy client access to services.
Almost all the occupational skills programs and virtually all
the job search/retention and basic educational skills pro
grams are run on fixed cycles with pre-established starting
and completion dates. MOMR's fixed curriculum approach
is not costless. Managers point out that individual assistance
is possible, but self-paced learning in the occupational skills
program is not feasible on a full-scale basis. The fixed cur
riculum makes it all the more imperative that would-be
trainees be screened to assure they have the requisite abilities
to keep up with the training program. Furthermore, while
fixed cycles and starting dates make it easier to manage the
programs, it means that clients may have to be put "on
hold" until a new training course starts. The fixed schedules
also make scheduling participation in different programs
more difficult. MOMR's job search/retention and basic
educational skills programs are designed to accommodate
more self-paced learning. They, too, have fixed starting
dates and schedules for completion, but the curriculum is
better adapted to meeting particular client needs and actual
completion time varies from client to client.
To the extent MOMR and other prime sponsors may find
themselves, in the future, under pressure to serve more
severely disadvantaged clients, sponsors may find themselves
trying to serve a less homogeneous clientele, making it less
feasible to run fixed cycle training programs because the
trainees will require a wider range of individualized attention
and services. It is not possible to compare the merits of fixed
cycle programs to open entry-open exit programs in
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Baltimore because the latter are used in only a few cases of
employability skills training. To better evaluate this
tradeoff, Washington policymakers ought to determine
whether fixed cycle training is more effective than open
entry-open exit; if it is, any mandate to serve a wider crosssection of client needs ought to take account of changes in
the cost-effectiveness of training.
Placement is another important feature of MOMR's train
ing programs. The occupational training programs (in
cluding on-the-job training) have the highest placement rates
of any of MOMR's employment and training activities, with
about three-fourths of all trainees being placed. Placement
rates for persons in less structured training activities, such as
public service employment jobs, are lower, though still better
than the national average. A large part of the success of the
occupational training program can be attributed to the fact
that placement is done using a "client-based" approach in
which training program instructors and counselors—the peo
ple who know the trainee capabilities best—contact
employers and develop jobs. This approach capitalizes on
the extensive contact many of the skill trainers have with the
employer community. Until fiscal 1981, clients in the other
training activities (including those transitioning out of PSE
jobs) were placed in jobs by means of a centralized job
development and placement office that scoured the employer
community for vacancies and then referred clients against
those vacancies. Because it put distance between the job
development and placement functions, that style of place
ment was not well-suited to "negotiating" with employers
about bona fide job requirements, providing employers with
an accurate profile of client skills and experience, or
matching client and employer interests. Starting in fiscal
1981, all job development will be modeled after the client
based approach used in occupational skills training pro
grams.
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MOMR's experience with job development offers impor
tant lessons to those prime sponsors struggling with finding
jobs for completing trainees. MOMR has tried both a
"client-based" approach that more fully accounts for client
needs first, and a job-based approach that focuses on job re
quirements. It has found the former approach is more likely
to keep both the trainees and employers hiring them happy.
But MOMR has also capitalized on the access to the
employer community that a broad spectrum of contract
training institutions provides. This means that training
deliverers should be judged not just on their training capaci
ty but their likely access to the job market.

The Response to Changing
Economic Conditions
According to conventional economic theory the best time
to do occupational skill training is during economic lulls,
because the economy does not have to sacrifice production in
the short run for increased future productivity. But in the
world of CETA, the dictates of economic theory are
swamped by the intrusions of a less than perfect world and
the sometimes heavy hand of the U.S. Department of Labor.
Theory fails partly because MOMR (and other CETA
prime sponsors) is training clients who are not likely to be
sacrificing productive time to engage in training; they ex
perience unemployment and underemployment even in the
best of times. The premium that USDOL puts on placing
trainees in jobs penalizes skill training during economic
downturns. The effect of this factor would be mitigated if
USDOL did not try to compress training and placement into
a short period of time (within a year). But the time horizons
for CETA prime sponsors as well as trainees in need of
employment are necessarily short. MOMR evidence cor
roborates other evidence that trainees do not want to get in-
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volved in long term training programs because they need im
mediate employment. MOMR avoids long contract cycles
because of newly imposed limits on enrollment in work ex
perience and public service employment—major components
in many MOMR training programs. Because of the way the
regional office enforces regulatory limits on carry-over from
one fiscal year to another, MOMR is also limited in writing
contracts that straddle fiscal years. Consequently, the
natural preference is to steer training resources into short
term training in occupational areas in which the current de
mand for new workers is strong.
In the opinion of observers, diversification of the
Baltimore economy makes it more resistant to cyclical swings
than most cities. When there is a softening of demand in cer
tain occupational areas, MOMR responds by cutting back on
training capacity in the affected areas and may relax the job
placement goals that training deliverers must meet in order
to get paid. For example, MOMR cut back on welding train
ing when Bethlehem Steel, the largest area employer, began
laying off workers. More recently, some of the building
trades projects have encountered great difficulty in placing
trainees in jobs, and are pressing for lower placement stan
dards.
It is hard to use the effects of the last recession as a basis
for judging MOMR's training policies during recessions
because the organization has changed so much since then
and because of the enormous build-up in public service
employment that was also going on at that time. It is argued
that the 1976-1977 build-up of public service employment
diverted energies in MOMR away from gearing up training
programs in anticipation of the economic recovery, and
towards the more pressing problems of developing public
service jobs and placing clients in them.
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Because the CETA countercyclical programs so far have
been in the form of increased job creation, the question of
how much training MOMR would undertake with noncategorized countercyclical funds is largely academic,
leading to more speculation than solid policy proposals. The
question of what to do with expanded training funds (with
no option to fund public service employment) is less
academic, and there is specific MOMR experience as a basis
for speculation.
Net new training money has had two identifiable effects in
the Baltimore Consortium: stimulating new programs and
spurring institutional change. One important determinant of
the effects new money has is the pace at which it must be
spent. For sudden surges of new money—like that occurring
under the 1977 Economic Stimulus Act—the imperative is to
spend quickly, leaving little opportunity for development.
MOMR managers feel that the best contingency plan for this
kind of new money is to rely on the training infrastructure
already in place. This includes expansion of existing pro
grams and start-up of new programs already "on the shelf"
with much of the developmental work already done. This
kind of expansion occurred recently when one of MOMR's
youth program allocations was increased and a limit was im
posed on carry-out, thus forcing increases in spending rates.
Under both the Skill Training and Improvement Program
and the Private Sector Initiatives Program (Title VII), there
was both more time and a mandate to broaden the local in
frastructure. Under the former, institutional changes occur
red in the form of new training contractors being added to
the training infrastructure; in the latter, change occurred in
the form of increased private sector participation in planning
certain CETA activities.
MOMR managers would like to attempt expansion of
upgrading and retraining. They feel that upgrading and
retraining programs, where they work, can spur important
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structural changes within corporate job ladders. Yet, in 1980
only 16 enrollees were served under Title IIC. Part of the
reason for underutilization of Title IIC may be a slack
economy. Retraining during a recession may be socially op
timal, but it is not optimal at corporate-level profit centers.
Underutilization of IIC probably also has much to do with
the restrictive regulations governing it. MOMR managers
feel that although Title IIC is intended to improve produc
tivity through retraining and upgrading, the regulations
thwart that purpose by restricting eligibility to clients in
dead-end entry level jobs. Title IIC retraining is restricted to
employees with bona fide layoff notices and little prospect
for recall, circumstances in which employers are likely to
have little interest in new skills. Furthermore, employers in
terested in government subsidies for retraining activities can
get 50 percent of a new employee's wages paid for under an
OJT contract, while they can get only 40 percent paid under
IIC. Finally, IIC enrollments might require different intake
procedures. Although some counties in the Baltimore Con
sortium rely on the employment service for intake, there is
no systematized procedure in the counties, nor an intake
system in the city, for identifying employees on layoff, or
those in low level, dead-end jobs. These administrative im
pediments could be eliminated by MOMR. But the other
problems associated with IIC and its accompanying regula
tions require action by the Congress and USDOL.

What Can Really Make CETA Work?
Without a doubt, the single most important force driving
MOMR is the organization's own sense of purpose. MOMR
is a local creature serving a local agenda. If it could not, the
political base in the Baltimore mayor's office and the sur
rounding counties would erode. But this has implications for
the influence of the U.S. Department of Labor. The cases in
which federal initiatives produced positive changes seem to
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have been accompanied by net increases in funding. Both the
Skill Training and Improvement Program (STIP, Title III)
and the Private Sector Initiatives Program (Title VII) helped
broaden the MOMR training infrastructure and introduce
training in different occupational areas. But regulatory
changes without additional money have, not surprisingly,
been accepted grudgingly. The requirement for the indepen
dent monitoring unit, for example, while not far astray from
certain MOMR interests in oversight, specified compliance
in a way that produced some friction between MOMR and
USDOL; that friction appears to have done nothing to im
prove the effectiveness of the IMU. Similarly, the idea of in
dividualized development plans was not alien to MOMR, but
the regulatory requirements for such plans were not readily
compatible with (nor an improvement on) MOMR's own ar
rangements. Federal initiatives in this form are probably
more objectionable simply because they limit MOMR's flex
ibility, while initiatives like STIP or PSIP may come with
their own rules, but because they represent additional
resources, increase MOMR's flexibility.
If the experience in Baltimore is to be instructive about
anything, it is on the way Washington should view the rela
tionship between the national agenda and the multitude of
local agendas present in any federal grants-in-aid program.
To the extent "CETA works" in the Baltimore area, it is not
because MOMR is a handmaiden to the Department of
Labor. Rather, it is because MOMR has a local agenda that
is being pursued in a way that is compatible with the Depart
ment of Labor's own agenda.
Congruence between federal and local priorities is not
necessary for CETA to be effective; compatibility is. The im
plications of this can be enormous. It means that, in finetuning CETA, the federal focus should be on: 1) helping
prime sponsors develop a local agenda, and 2) evaluating
any federal changes with respect to whether they increase or
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decrease the ability of CETA to accommodate two sets of
objectives. In the case of the first point, the Department of
Labor and the Congress must be willing to move away from
requiring plans that are uniform in format and respond only
to the terms of the federal notions of what CETA should do.
Prime sponsor plans should, for example, be able to
legitimately incorporate institutional self preservation goals
as well as service delivery arrangements that are mutually
beneficial to both prime sponsors and other city government
agencies. Plans and modifications could then be judged
against the interaction of two sets of priorities, not just one
set of federal priorities.
Obviously, this means that the Department of Labor needs
to have the capacity to oversee individual prime sponsor
operations carefully enough to evaluate individual prime
sponsor plans in a way that accounts for the entire context of
prime sponsor operations.
Unfortunately, the Department of Labor has been illprepared to do such a careful job. It has neither the needed
number of staff nor depth of experience. Yet without that
support only two courses of events seem possible.
In one course of events, the Department of Labor and the
Congress could back off their agenda, letting prime sponsors
do what they want with minimal regard for federal goals. In
the other course of events, the federal establishment could
steamroller over local priorities, squeezing them out as a
consideration as the Department of Labor implements
CETA. Under this approach, Washington would mandate
cookie-cutter plans that would be the same for all prime
sponsors.
The first case is tantamount to leaving money on the
stump and running. The second case requires prime sponsors
to serve as simple extension of the Department of Labor.
Neither scenario is politically acceptable. But one or the
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other seems likely if there is not a federal commitment to
make the CETA partnership the symbiotic relationship it
was intended to be.

Dallas, Texas
The Burdens of Prosperity
Robert McPherson
University of Texas

In fiscal year 1980, the City of Dallas will spend a little
over $10 million in CETA funds providing training, public
service employment and related services for eligible clients
living within its corporate boundaries. Because of the 1978
CETA amendments and the city's own interest in targeting
on those most in need, program resources are focused on the
low-income unemployed; however, this emphasis is not
matched by an appropriate mix of training and related ser
vices to equip the clients to compete effectively for the
semiskilled and skilled jobs available in the area's labor
market. Though Dallas enjoys an environment free of many
of the familiar institutional constraints affecting CETA pro
grams in most urban settings, it operates a program not
significantly different from that of other cities with much
less favorable conditions. Rather than providing long term
quality training programs to develop the knowledge and
skills of the hard-core unemployed the city serves, it con
tinues to fund short term, low-cost training programs to
serve as many individuals as possible. Why has Dallas not
used its flexibilities under CETA to develop a training pro
gram that's more beneficial to their clients and to employers
in the community?

The Local Environment
City government in Dallas is a textbook example of the
strong manager-council model. The mayor and members of
the city council are the elected representatives responsible for
making the policy decisions; however, the city manager, as
177
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the chief executive officer, runs the city. He is in the pivotal
role of making recommendations to the council and im
plementing their decisions. The current manager has been in
the job nearly eight years and is recognized as one of the
most powerful figures in city government. Under his leader
ship the city has gained a national reputation as one of the
best managed in the country. The council and manager take
pride in their successful application of private sector
management practices to city government.
The Dallas Citizen's Council (DCC), an organization com
prising some of the most wealthy and influential business
leaders in the country, makes the major policy decisions for
the city. Its primary objective is creating a local environment
where the large corporations can prosper and continue to
grow with a minimum of interference from government. The
current mayor and a majority of the council members were
dependent on the DCC for endorsement and financial sup
port for election and remain responsive to the wishes of the
special interest group. The underlying values of the leaders in
the local power structure are apparently very conservative.
Their economics is laissez-faire, and there is a strong em
phasis on individual self-sufficiency.
Economic growth in the Dallas area suggests that the city
fathers may have the right approach. Since the mid-1970s
recession, real per capita income has grown at about 3 per
cent a year, when the national economy was stagnating. Over
the past decade the city's population, currently estimated
from 865,000 to 900,000, has not expanded as fast as the na
tional average, but the small cities adjacent to Dallas have
grown 10 times the city's rate. About 33 percent of the city's
population is minority, with blacks at 25 percent and
Hispanics making up about 8 percent of the total.
According to Texas Employment Commission (TEC)
reports, the Dallas labor force has grown at an annual rate of
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over 5 percent since 1975, and the growth in employment has
more than kept pace. The unemployment rate for 1978 was
just over 4 percent; for 1979, only 3.6 percent. Though the
rate in the summer of 1980 is again over 5 percent, it is not
expected to stay at the high level.
While these statistics reflect a strong and expanding
economy, the benefits of growth are not distributed equally.
According to the city's CETA plan almost 17 percent of the
city's population are members of families with incomes
below the poverty level. Over 40 percent of the blacks live in
poverty. Unemployment rates for minorities are more than
twice those for whites, and for particular subgroups of the
unemployed, like youth, the differences are even wider.
Overall, however, the economic picture is bright, and the
demand for workers remains strong. Labor market informa
tion from the TEC and the North Central Texas Council of
Governments identifies shortages over a wide spectrum of
occupations. In construction, manufacturing, and the ser
vice industries there are acute shortages in occupations such
as draftsmen, engineers, bricklayers, machinists, computer
programmers, electronics technicians, nurses, secretaries,
and typists. Help-wanted ads in local newspapers also reflect
a strong demand for unskilled workers for jobs in the secon
dary labor market.
Local employers aggressively compete for good
employees: billboards on major highways leading into Dallas
invite workers to call Texas Instruments for a good job;
help-wanted posters are displayed in the windows of
businesses; and major corporations advertise outside the
area—and sometimes outside the country—to attract
semiskilled and skilled workers. The general feeling on the
street, from cab drivers to lawyers, is that anyone wanting to
work can find a job in Dallas.
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The CETA program in Dallas, especially after the 1978
amendments, is seen as a federal program with more poten
tial liabilities than benefits for city government. As a CETA
prime sponsor the city sees itself responsible for a controver
sial program fraught with continuing accusations of poor
management, fraud, and abuse. With private employers ac
tively recruiting workers, subsidized training and public ser
vice jobs programs are viewed as competing for the available
labor supply and therefore contributing, rather than helping
alleviate, problems in local labor markets. In July 1979 the
council seriously considered terminating the city's involve
ment in the program. Apparently, a rash of negative
publicity—mostly directed at the management practices of
minority based organizations having CETA contracts with
the city—was too close for comfort. Only after lengthy
deliberations where city staff made major commitments to
improve program management and contractor performance
did the council defeat a resolution to terminate the city's
CETA grant from the Department of Labor by a vote of six
to five.
Over the past year the media and the city council have
given less attention to the program. City staff have taken
steps to improve management, and recently hired a public in
formation officer to create a positive image for CETA. The
present calm, however, should not be interpreted as any
groundswell of support from the council for the human
resources objective of the program.
In this environment the city manager is primarily in
terested in making sure that CETA funds are efficiently
managed. Apparently, for the CETA staff in Dallas this
means developing elaborate systems and procedures for pro
cessing federal funds through city government to agencies
under contract to provide services; keeping the manager in
formed so that he is never surprised; making sure that there
are no mistakes; and keeping things relatively quiet.
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Program Planning and Operations
Management of the CETA program in Dallas is divided
between the city and its program deliverers. The city council
and manager make the major policy and program decisions
while the Office of Human Development (OHD)—organiza
tionally a part of the city manager's office—is responsible
for program planning, contracting, monitoring and evalua
tion. The city contracts with other public, private, and non
profit agencies to provide program services.
For fiscal 1980, the city had $19 million available under a
variety of CETA titles and programs. About $14 million was
programmed, and of that amount, little more than $10
million will be spent (table 1).
Almost all of the CETA funded training is in the adult and
youth components funded under titles II-B and IV. Two ex
ceptions supported by public service employment resources
amount to approximately $600,000: a work experience pro
gram including limited vestibule training—that the city inap
propriately calls pre-apprenticeship training; and a career
development program providing job-search training (table
2).
CETA eligibility criteria, combined with the target groups
set by OHD planners have definitely focused program
resources on the low-income unemployed. High school
dropouts, disabled veterans, public assistance recipients, exoffenders and the handicapped are identified as special
groups to be served by the city's programs.
The training delivery system is made up of over 20
organizations funded to provide a wide range of training and
related services including outreach, intake, referral, basic
education, training, work experience, support services, job
placement, and follow-up. Private non-profit agencies—11

Table 1. Planned Expenditures and Objectives for CETA Programs, by Component, Fiscal 1980: City of Dallas

Program component
Totals
Adult employment and training3
Youth employment and training15
Private sector initiatives
Public service employment (title II-D)
Public service employment (title VI)

Planned
expenditures
$13,899,877
4,757,039
3,151,310
944,677
2,852,982
2,193,869

Program objectives
Percent
Positive
Number to
terminations
Placements
be served
73
6,385
60
73
64
3,402
82
51
1,543
76
67
600
70
420
60
420
65
59

a. Excludes sect. 204 vocational education funds and program activity.
b. Includes an estimated $2 million in expenditures and 894 planned enrollments in the summer youth employment program.

oo
to
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Table 2. Adult and Youth Training Plan Under CETAa, by Activity, Fiscal
1980: City of DaUas
Activity
Total
Classroom training
On-the-job training
Work experience
Centralized services
Prime sponsor's
administration

Contract
levelb
$5,831,025
3,233,243
750,463
489,000
626,500
731,819

Percent
100
56
13
8
11

Number to
be servedb
3,733
2,858
555
320
—

12

—

a. Figures exclude the summer youth employment program and two training programs
funded from public service employment resources.
b. Figures will not match those on the previous table due to differences between numbers in
the prime sponsor's plan and those in agency contracts.

of the 20—dominate the system accounting for 54 percent of
the $4.5 million available for contract services in 1980. Five
public agencies—other city departments and two school
districts—receive 36 percent, while four private for-profit
firms have only 10 percent of the funding.
The city is attempting to centralize some service deliveries.
Outreach for all CETA funded training programs is provid
ed by a single agency—the Dallas Urban League (DUL). In
take, assessment, and referral services for the system are now
centralized through a contract with the city's Martin Luther
King Center (MLK). Organizations such as Operation SER,
Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC), and Dallas In
dependent School District's (DISD) skills center provide
classroom training, job development and placement services,
serve as additional intake and referral centers and conduct
30-day followup on all their enrollees. The American GI
Forum has a contract for longer term followup of par
ticipants at 3, 6, and 12 months after they leave the program
(table 3).
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Table 3. Major Service Deliverers3 and Activities Under CETA, Fiscal
1980: City of Dallas
Delivery agent
Operation SER

Opportunities Industrialization
Center (QIC)
Dallas Housing Authority13
Dallas Independent School
District (skills center)
Martin Luther King Center
Dallas County Community
Action Agency

Funding
$589,583

Activity
Basic education
Bilingual clerical training
On-the-job training
Work experience
516,461 Basic education
Career development
Vocational training
500,000 Work experience
Vestibule training
460,698 Basic education
Career development
Vocational training
414,000 Centralized intake,
assessment and referral
Support services
300,000 Work experience

a. Agencies with service contracts of $300,000 or more.
b. OHD staff call the DHA's program a pre-apprenticeship program; however, it is more
appropriately classified as a work experience program which includes some vestibule train
ing.

Three types of training are available for CETA enrollees:
basic education, vocational training and career development.
Basic education, career development, and most of the voca
tional training are provided in a classroom setting with more
than 75 percent of the participants served by two school
districts, OIC, Operation SER, and the city's personnel
department. The other classroom training enrollees are
spread among six smaller contractors, including the four
private for-profit firms. For 1980, nine agencies are pro
viding classroom training in more than 15 occupational areas
(table 4). The remainder of the vocational training is provid
ed through on-the-job training with contractors such as the
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National Alliance of Business (NAB) and Goodwill In
dustries.
Table 4. Classroom Training Under CETA, Fiscal 1980: City of Dallas
Delivery agent
Wilmer-Hutchens Independent
School District
Operation SER
Dallas Independent School
District (skills center)

Number to
be served3
Occupational area
275
Basic education
400
480

Opportunities Industrialization
Center (QIC)

420

Operation SER
City of Dallas
(personnel department)
Nurse's Aide Academy
American Trades Institute

140
520

Home and Apartment
Builders Association
Assessment and Assignment
Unit of Dallas

168
50
75
107

Bilingual basic education
Clerical
Auto mechanics
Auto paint and body
repair
Combination welding
Production machine
operator
Air conditioning,
refrigeration & heating
Clerical
Keypunch
Secretarial science
Computer programming
Auto mechanics
Auto body repair
Bilingual clerical
Truck driver training
Nurse's aide
TV repair
Offset printing
Carpentry
Apartment maintenance
Individual referral
(multi-occupational)

a. Figures will not sum to the number shown on table 2 due to the termination of one
deliverer and difference between the numbers planned by OHD and those in agency con
tracts.
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Management reports for the third quarter of fiscal year
1980—the latest cumulative information available—show
the program operating well below planned expenditures
(table 5).
Table 5. Actual and Planned Expenditures for CETAa Through the Third
Quarter, Fiscal 1980: City of Dallas
Actual
Program component
Total
Adult employment
and training
Youth employment
and training
Private sector initiatives
Public service employment

Percent
of plan
55
77

Plan
$7,536,930
2,826,009

Amount
$4,125,295
2,185,243

765,945

426,050

56

341,970
3,603,006

48,744
1,465,208

14
41

a. Excludes prime sponsor administration, centralized services and vocational education
services funded under sect. 204.

With the exception of public service employment, where
recent hiring brought enrollments to 97 percent of plan,
CETA program enrollments reflect the same pattern as ex
penditures while positive terminations and placement are on
ly half of those planned. Job placements—at 81 percent of
the positive terminations—reflect the city's high placement
goals, the availability of jobs in the area, and unattractive
options such as going back to school or entering military ser
vice.
Clients in the city's program are young, relatively
uneducated and primarily black with the distribution among
various program components about as expected. Youth pro
grams serve higher percentages of women and blacks without
basic education credentials, while public service employment
serves slightly more white, older and better educated per
sons. Similarities in the demographic characteristics of par-
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ticipants reflect stricter eligibility requirements in the 1978
GETA amendments, the city's emphasis on targeting on
those most in need, and the kinds of people applying for ser
vices. GETA enrollees in Dallas tend to be people with
several barriers to employment who cannot hold a job even
in a tight labor market. They need extensive help to over
come their cultural, psychological, physical, transportation,
and child care problems.
For adult and youth training components, expenditures
and enrollments, though closer to plan, reflect the same pat
tern as the CETA program as a whole. Classroom and onthe-job training are lagging, while the small and often
maligned work experience program is operating at 97 percent
of planned expenditures and 90 percent of planned
enrollments. In contrast, classroom training programs are
operating with expenditures at 71 percent and enrollments at
61 percent of those planned for the third quarter. Based on
this performance, the costs of positive terminations from
classroom training are averaging over $4,600, and the cost
per placement is $5,300, much higher than anticipated by the
city.
While contractors are likely to meet their enrollment goals
for 1980, they will not achieve their planned numbers of
positive terminations and placements.

The Quality of Training
and Related Services
OHD reports provide information on the number of
enrollees, positive terminations and placements by occupa
tional training area and on average wage gains and retention
rates of terminees by training contractor. While all of this
data is potentially useful for measuring the level of training
and the relative efficiency of the city's contractors, it does
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not provide insight to the quality, appropriateness or effec
tiveness of the training.
There are also technical and methodological problems
with the Dallas training system and with the way information
is gathered and organized that limit efforts to assess pro
grams. For example, wage and retention data is not available
by occupational training area for QIC and the skills
center—the two largest deliverers of vocational training. For
these agencies, the information is also not related to the
characteristics of the clients in the various training areas. A
second problem relates to the absence of any kind of a con
trol group for comparing post-program experiences of the
trainees in the Dallas program. Without comparing the in
come and employment experience of the clients with their
counterparts not receiving training, it is impossible to
measure program effectiveness. Without relating wages at
placement and retention data to client characteristics and oc
cupational training areas, it is impossible to make valid com
parisons among various kinds of training for the different
client groups served.
Several of the occupational training areas apparently do
not have quantified training objectives, and, except for
minimum reading and math skills, clients are not pre-tested
to determine their knowledge and skills. It is difficult,
therefore, to objectively evaluate the quality of training in
the Dallas CETA program.
With these limitations one cannot go beyond making sub
jective judgments about the apparent quality of the training
inputs—facilities, equipment, curriculum materials, instruc
tional staff and length of time a client spends in train
ing—and related services. A June 1980 on-site review of
seven of the 13 agencies providing training revealed the
following:
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• The quality of training and related services provided by
OHD contractors varies widely.
• The training is short term, providing some enrollees ac
cess to entry-level jobs that are, for the most part, in the
secondary labor market.
• With the exception of clerical, auto mechanics and
nurse's aide, the training areas are far below their goals
for expenditures, enrollments, positive terminations and
placements. Pressures on contractors to make their
goals are adversely affecting the quality of training.
Variations in the quality of training are best illustrated by
three agencies providing classroom training: the Nurse's
Aide Academy (NAA), the OIC, and the Dallas Independent
School District's skill center.
The Nurse's Aide program is the best small training pro
gram. Through effective outreach, it surmounted problems
of underenrollment. The five-week program provides
classroom training in combination with clinical instruction in
a nearby hospital. The facilities and equipment are modern,
and the instructors are qualified registered nurses. Instruc
tional materials are well-written and adapted to the student's
educational level and procedures and equipment used in the
training. According to OHD reports, almost 90 percent of
the trainees were placed in jobs, and about 75 percent were
still employed a year later. Average hourly wage gains at
placement were 95 cents—from $2.75 to $3.70 per hour.
In contrast, the OIC program provides open-entry/openexit training in three skill clusters: a computer cluster with
keypunch and programming, a clerical cluster with clerktypist and secretarial training, and an automotive cluster
with auto mechanics and body repair. Basic education and
career development classes are integrated with each skill
cluster to provide training-related reading and math, GED
preparation, English as a second language (ESL), consumer
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education, communications, and orientation to work. The
average length of stay in training is about 12 weeks.
QIC training is done by qualified and dedicated staff in a
converted trucking facility with only minimum renovation.
The staff are partially demoralized by reductions in funding,
their physical surroundings, and the limitations of the pro
gram; but they remain committed to providing quality train
ing for enrollees. Except for the clerical cluster, the classes
are not full. The center appears to be operating 70 or 80 per
cent of potential.
The ready availability of jobs requiring no training, low
training allowances, and minimum levels of support services
for enrollees all make recruitment and retention difficult.
Many enrollees will not stay in training long enough to be
counted as positive terminations. OIC dropouts are averag
ing more than twice the level expected, while placements are
at only 53 percent of the goal. In addition to its goal for in
direct placements, the city required OIC to make an addi
tional 325 direct placements with no increase in funding.
OIC soon discovered that few job-ready individuals were to
be found in the eligible population without a massive recruit
ment effort, which would detract from its training objec
tives. OIC probably will meet enrollment goals for the year,
but not those for positive terminations and placements.
Average wage gains reported for those employed were 77
cents from $3.26 to $4.03 per hour.
Although the quality of OIC's training varied, they have
attracted severely disadvantaged clients and adjusted the
training curriculums to their educational level. Thus, the
training is relevant, but its short duration and the lack of
modern equipment do not equip enrollees to compete effec
tively for jobs in the primary labor market, though some
trainees undoubtedly gain access that may allow upward
mobility over time.
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The Dallas Independent School District's skills
center—the designated vocational classroom
facility—provides training and related services in six voca
tional clusters: clerical; auto paint and body repair; auto
mechanics; welding; production machine operation; and air
conditioning, refrigeration, and heating.
The skills center is the best equipped multipurpose training
program in the CETA delivery system; has qualified staff,
modern equipment, and well-designed curriculums.
However, like OIC, it has underenrollment and low place
ment rates. Through the third quarter of fiscal year 1980, the
center achieved only 85 percent of its planned enrollments
because of recruitment problems and high dropout rates.
Positive terminations and placements are far below expecta
tions with cumulative placements for the period at 57 percent
of the goal. Average wage gains at placement were 61
cents—from $3.36 to $3.97 per hour.
Relatively, the quality of training provided is good. The
skills center has the potential for an excellent program, but is
limited by both the city's concern with numbers and low
average costs and a disadvantaged clientele unprepared for
more sophisticated training. With the exception of the
clerical cluster, the center appears to be operating at only 50
to 60 percent of its potential. No goal except cumulative
enrollments is likely to be met.
MLK and each of the training deliverers are responsible
for providing training related services such as intake, assess
ment, referral, counseling, and support services. However,
beyond listing the services to be provided in agency con
tracts, the city has no standard specifications concerning the
nature and extent of the services. As a result, the amount and
quality of the services are very uneven. For example,
counseling services vary from three full-time social workers
and one employment counselor at the skills center, to infor-
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mal family-style counseling in the nurse's aide program, to
no services at all at the National Alliance for Business*
(NAB) on-the-job training program. At NAB there is strong
emphasis on self-reliance. If situations arise that demand
counseling, participants are referred to MLK.
Overall quality of training and services a client receives
depends primarily on the efforts of individual contractors to
overcome the city's apparent lack of concern and the limita
tions it imposes on the delivery system. This environment
pushes community-based organizations without other
sources of support against the wall. They meet enrollment
goals, but the quality of instruction suffers. Without outside
support, they are forced to offer the same or fewer occupa
tional areas each year. Under the Dallas system, they cannot
use CETA funds to buy training equipment or renovate
facilities to expand training. Staff are underpaid, existing
facilities are inadequate, and equipment needs updating.
Training in some of these organizations resembles the pover
ty programs of the 1960s—the commitment is there, but the
resources are missing. In spite of good attitudes of the staff,
the environment does not engender feelings in the trainees
that things are going to get much better. Quality tends to be
found either in training components with low investment
costs—basic education, OJT and the nurse's aide pro
gram—or in programs that are partially subsidized by other
sources, such as the skills center or QIC's computer cluster
supported by IBM.
As for the relevance and effectiveness of the training, most
of the contractors have adjusted their program materials and
instruction to accommodate the education, skill level and in
terests of the clients. However, because of the city's interest
in short term low-cost training, they are unable to spend the
time required to provide the knowledge and skills in occupa
tional areas allowing their graduates to compete effectively
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for the semiskilled and skilled jobs available in the Dallas
labor market. The city's plan for fiscal year 1980 proposed
that, of the 1,900 to receive classroom training, 800 were to
be enrolled in occupational areas where the length of training
is five weeks or less, and only 150 were to receive instruction
in areas requiring 24 weeks or more. The occupational train
ing areas funded bore little resemblance to the list of priority
occupations identified early in the planning process. Of the
16 top-rated occupations, only two were proposed for fund
ing; several of the lower-rated occupations were included,
but the majority of the training was planned for occupations
not ranked.

Major Influences on Training
The nature and quality of CETA training in Dallas is a
function of decisions made by the federal government, the
prime sponsor, and the contractors providing training.
Responsibility for success or failure, therefore, cannot be
assigned to any one level of government or single agency; it
must be shared by all. Under the arrangement there are
several major factors affecting training programs in Dallas:
the nature of federal-state-local relationships; city manage
ment of the program; and the nature of the local delivery
system.

Federal-State-Local Relations
By design, CETA formalized a new set of intergovernmen
tal relationships significantly increasing the authority of
state and local governments to plan and operate programs.
Although there was a major power shift, the federal govern
ment retained responsibility for setting broad program ob
jectives, developing regulations, approving local plans,
monitoring, and evaluating program performance. There
are, however, several problems in the CETA version of
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federalism affecting the nature and quality of local training
programs.
• From the beginning the roles and relationships of the
major actors—federal, regional, state, and local govern
ments—were never adequately delineated.
• Legislative amendments and administrative changes
have kept the delivery system in a constant state of flux.
• The Department of Labor has not maintained a consis
tent policy framework that sets priorities among pro
gram goals and establishes the relative importance of
program effectiveness, administrative efficiency, and
regulatory compliance.
• With the exception of its emphasis on low-cost
placements, the Department of Labor focused on
developing compliance and process-oriented goals, per
formance criteria, and rewards systems rather than
output-oriented systems.
• Few prime sponsors had the critical management
capability to accept the responsibilities and take advan
tage of the opportunities available under block grant
funding.
• Before the delivery system was in place, CETA became
the avenue for massive countercyclical public jobs pro
grams and a series of new categorical initiatives.
The CETA system is primarily a federal-local one, leaving
prime sponsors with few incentives for developing working
arrangements with the states. Managing the CETA program
in Dallas involves minimal contact with three state agencies:
the Department of Community Affairs (DCA); the Texas
Education Agency (TEA); and the Texas Employment Com
mission (TEC). In each case the relationship is the result of a
legislative requirement or financial incentive. OHD staff see
all of the relationships as detracting from, rather than con
tributing to, quality of local training programs. They must
be continued to comply with CETA requirements and access
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funds from the state agencies; however, staff feel that the
less the state agencies and State Manpower Service Council
know about local programs, the better.
The coordination of CETA with other training and
employment activities, beyond the legal requirements, has
not occurred. The state is in a weak position relative to the
local prime sponsors; the governor's discretionary funds
have been used largely to fund a variety of special projects;
and the state agencies operate autonomously, using the
CETA money they control to their own ends.
The city's relationship with the federal government, par
ticularly the Employment and Training Administration
(ETA), is primarily influenced by the ever-changing CETA
legislation, regulations, and administrative directives for im
plementing the program. With major system changes in
1976, 1977, and 1978, program funding became more
categorical, leaving local prime sponsors with less flexibility
to design and deliver programs. In an attempt to make the
new categorical initiatives fit in local CETA systems which
emphasize horizontal planning and integrated service
delivery, ETA has issued volumes of regulations and direc
tives. As a result, the system is currently not being planned
and managed as originally envisioned. Staff at all levels are
filling out forms, processing paper, and building
bureaucratic processes for complying with the latest re
quirements. The city's current relationship with ETA,
primarily the regional office in Dallas, revolves around the
basic information requirements guaranteeing the continued
flow of federal funds—review of annual plans, periodic
monitoring visits, frequent special requests for information,
and the annual assessment of program performance. If the
Department issues directives that conflict with the local pro
gram initiatives, OHD fends them off by pointing out con
tradictions with previous policies or arguing points of pro-
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cess. From experience, they have learned that the first and
best response to a new directive is to do nothing. More than
likely the directive will change several times and things will
end up back where they were in the first place. This ap
proach, of course, represents dysfunctional behavior in the
management system, which causes even more directives to be
issued.
In the regional office, staff members working with the
CETA prime sponsors feel powerless and frustrated and
display resignation. They know that the major decisions are
made elsewhere in the system—in Washington or at the local
prime sponsor level. In this environment, federal represen
tatives function as little more than intermediaries who pro
cess information. For the most part they continue to ac
quiesce to the program mix determined by local sponsors
and, therefore, have not bothered to learn much about the
content of programs. More recently, they have further
disassociated themselves from the management and program
decisions made by their own organization, yet they continue
to exhibit an unfailing commitment—going through the mo
tions and pushing the paper to comply with the instructions
from above.
Staff members of the city agency try to help the federal
representative do his job with a minimum of effort on their
part. OHD staff and the federal representative have arrived
at an equilibrium of peaceful coexistence in which they try to
be accepting and accommodating. Both recognize that they
spend time on issues of form and process that have no rela
tionship to program quality. Prime sponsor's plans are
nothing more than compliance documents, and the annual
assessment is designed to measure efficiency in terms of costs
per numbers served, positively terminated, and placed, and
to document that established systems and procedures are
consistent with federal requirements. Recognizing the futility
of these and other similar exercises, the federal represen-
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tative and the prime sponsor's staff work together closely to
avoid creating any undue problems for each other. Obvious
ly, both are co-opted in the process and federal management
of the system breaks down.

City Management of the Program
The City of Dallas did not take advantage of the oppor
tunities available in the early years of CETA. Apparently,
program staff were unable: (1) to clearly set program pur
pose and direction; (2) to develop a rationale for the pro
gram that was relevant to local conditions, of interest to the
city council, and acceptable to ETA; (3) to define the ap
propriate roles and relationships among city officials, staff,
the advisory committee, and contractors in the decisionmaking process; and (4) to build a delivery system that satisfied
existing institutional biases and met local needs. In the
absence of such a management structure, the city funded ex
isting community-based organizations to continue providing
the same kinds of training as that available under the preCETA categorical programs.
Beginning as early as 1974, there were major changes tak
ing place in CETA. A series of legislative amendments began
recategorizing the delivery system and large increases in
funding for public service jobs and youth made the program
more complex and more visible to elected officials and the
general public. Selected cases of poor management, fraud,
and abuse drew national attention to issues of program
management throughout the system. In Dallas the increased
interest in CETA resulted in a change of directors at OHD.
Under new leadership the office began focusing on develop
ing efficient systems for securing and disbursing federal
funds and building administrative procedures and controls
to satisfy the process-oriented standards set by ETA. Consis
tent with the conservative values of the local power structure
and the council, OHD funded short term low-cost training
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programs offering minimum assistance to provide clients ac
cess to entry level jobs. After that, further progress was up to
the individual. Administrative efficiency and low-cost train
ing became top priorities of the agency. Even though the
1978 CETA amendments further targeted program resources
on the hard-core unemployed, OHD priorities have not
changed.
While the emphasis in the Dallas program is a legitimate
option under CETA, there are several problems with this
management approach that affect the nature and quality of
training.
• The CETA program lacks a clear statement of purpose
and goals. OHD sees itself as an administrative agency
responsible for writing grant applications, allocating
funds, managing contracts, staffing advisory commit
tees, and responding to the city manager and council.
Beyond administrative efficiency and low cost training,
the agency apparently has no substantive program mis
sion—no reason for existence—of its own. Issues of
quality and effectiveness of training are not high
priorities at OHD. Moreover, there is no sense of long
range direction, either in terms of objectives for the pro
gram or in the design of the local delivery system.
• The responsibilities and relationships among city of
ficials, OHD staff, the three citizen advisory commit
tees, and the training contractors remain unclear.
• OHD has developed a number of impressive manage
ment systems and procedures, but they are not in
tegrated. Except for the solicitation, review, and selec
tion of contractors, the various systems do not work
together. Planned and actual program performance dif
fer widely. The planning process emphasizes the selec
tion of efficient contractors, and monitoring and
evaluation systems stress review of administrative
capability, fiscal procedures, and program performance
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in terms of numbers enrolled and positive terminations.
OHD's followup system gathers information on the
post-program experience of participants; however, these
systems are not managed to achieve the program objec
tives as stated in OHD's plan to ETA. Moreover, they
do not support the development of effective training
programs.
• Local incentives do not reward time and attention to
program quality. The efforts of OHD are directed to
satisfying the city manager and the council; that is,
keeping the program out of the newspaper and making
sure the city manager is never surprised. Accuracy is not
as important as speed, and the quality of the training
and the nature of the delivery system are not nearly as
important as producing a high number of low-cost
enrollments and positive terminations. Through the
planning and contracting process this emphasis is clearly
transferred to the delivery system.
• OHD continues to experience high turnover among staff
and frequent reorganization, which hurt staff morale
and direct attention away from program issues.
Thus, OHD functions as an administrative clearinghouse
for federal funds, resembling a local version of the regional
office. Top management has learned to effectively transfer
the responsibility for unpopular decisions and management
or performance problems to citizen's advisory groups, con
tractors, or ETA. A new level of bureaucracy has been built
into the delivery system without realizing many of the ex
pected benefits envisioned by the framers of the original
CETA.

The Nature of the
Local Delivery System
Several features of the Dallas delivery system affect train
ing: the absence of an integrated delivery system; duplication
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of front-end services; the lack of effective working relation
ships among the contractors; wide variation in the level of
financial support, skills, and experience among the training
deliverers; and OHD's overriding concern with inexpensive
training.
• Apparently, OHD either does not recognize or does not
understand the interdependence between the city and its
contractors. Given the decision to contract for service
delivery, the city's overall performance depends on the
combined product of its delivery agents. Yet, there
tends to be a strong "us" and "them" attitude among
OHD staff. Contractors are given goals and told to
perform. There is no feeling people are working
together to produce the desired outcomes, and when
there are performance problems, OHD does not accept
responsibility.
• There is duplication of front-end services that creates
confusion for contractors and an obstacle course for
program applicants. Most likely because of their in
creased liability for ineligible participants, the city is at
tempting to centralize intake, assessment, counseling,
and referral services through a single contractor—the
Martin Luther King Center; however, training contrac
tors are also still required to provide most of these same
services. MLK staff provide assessment and referral,
but do only limited testing, and the two employability
development plans they prepare are not used to guide
clients through a mix of training and services. Conse
quently, nearly all of the training contractors test and
assess clients prior to their enrollment. There is similar
confusion with outreach and counseling services. Get
ting into the system is thus a frustrating process involv
ing a number of referrals back and forth among the con
tractors. Only those applicants with strong motivation
and few alternatives are likely to survive the process.

201

• There are few effective relationships among training
deliverers in the system. Because OHD has not built an
integrated system, linkages facilitating client flow
among the training agencies are informal and weak.
This limits movement among contractors, and tends to
restrict the training options available to the clients.
• There is a wide variation in financial stability, skills,
and experience among the training deliverers. In its
quest for inexpensive training, OHD has funded a broad
range of agencies. Some have a sound financial base
with support from other sources, while others are
dependent on CETA funding for survival. Staff salaries
and the level of management and program skills vary
widely among the group. OHD has not set minimum
standards for the quality of training and services to be
provided. In an effort to get a contract or, later, to meet
performance goals within cost constraints set by the
city, training agencies have cut the quality of services
and the length of training.
• OHD's emphasis on efficiency and low costs precludes
long term quality training. OHD policy limits the train
ing contractors* administrative costs to 10 percent of
their contract. In addition, training allowances are set at
$2.30 per contact hour—80 cents below the 1980
minimum wage—and the CETA-funded support ser
vices system is designed to encourage self-reliance. In
this environment, most of the training agencies cannot
afford to offer long term training, and if they did the
participants most likely to benefit could not afford to
stay long enough to complete.
Dallas has not taken advantage of its opportunities under
CETA to develop long term quality training programs for
the hard-core unemployed because it has no motivation to do
so. ETA—through grant review, monitoring, and the annual
assessment—encourages the city to produce as many low-
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cost positive terminations and placements as possible, but
offers no extrinsic rewards for doing so and levies no
penalties for failure as long as the city plays the game well
enough to stay out of the bottom quartile of performers in
the annual assessment process. None of the quantitative
measures of program performance relate to content of train
ing or quality of outcome. This encourages prime sponsors
and their contractors to play the numbers game.
The city's reward structure reinforces that of ETA. In
these kinds of systems training programs will be well design
ed only where exceptional local staff are intrinsically
motivated to develop and defend such training for the hard
core unemployed.

Potential for Expanding Training
The management systems at OHD can handle a larger
training program, but whether the local delivery system can
do so is a separate question. There are two options for ex
panding CETA-funded training in Dallas: (1) increasing the
level of activity with the current contractors, and (2) bring
ing new deliverers into the system.
The city's major training contractors—QIC and the skills
center (with the exception of the clerical and auto mechanics
clusters)—are operating at 70 to 80 percent of their max
imum enrollments. These existing training areas could be ex
panded quickly. While these deliverers would tend to offer
more of the same kinds of training, they would produce
quick results. For community-based organizations such as
OIC and SER, expansion would require funding for improv
ing facilities and updating equipment in addition to the
amounts normally allowed for training.
The second option is to bring new deliverers into the
system. Many public and private agencies in the city are anx-
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ious to demonstrate their capabilities to provide quality
training in a large number of occupational areas. These
organizations, however, have had little or no experience with
federal programs or with serving the populations currently
eligible under CETA. Adding some of these agencies to the
system would rapidly expand capacity but not output. Prob
lems associated with administering their first federal grant
and learning how to deal with CETA clients would adversely
affect output in the short run.
The issue in Dallas is really more one of the city's response
to a new training initiative rather than to local capacity. The
city has repeatedly underspent formula allocations for train
ing and has chosen not to participate in special initiatives
such as the Skills Training Improvement Program. Would it
respond differently to a new training initiative? If it did ac
cept the funding, it probably would simply fund more of the
same kinds of short term training currently offered. The
capacity is there, but the commitment to relevant training for
the hard-core unemployed should be questioned.

Recommendations
CETA has not evolved into an effective system for manag
ing federal training and employment initiatives. Currently,
the delivery system is overburdened with rules, regulations,
reporting requirements, investigations, and a backlog of
unresolved audits. There is little evidence that the program is
being effectively managed at any level. With CETA
reauthorization on the congressional agenda in 1982, there is
an opportunity to make changes to improve the quality and
effectiveness of the program.
• The goals and objectives of training and employment in
itiatives need to be better focused at the federal level.
This requires going beyond statements of what is to be
accomplished to maintaining a consistent policy
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framework for setting priorities among the goals and
objectives included in the authorizing legislation.
The intergovernmental delivery system needs to be
restructured to correct present weaknesses. There are
several interrelated issues that deserve special attention:
the state's role, elected official involvement, citizens' in
put, and determining local service areas.
The State's Role. States do not easily fit in the current
federal-local structure of the CETA system. In many
cases, balance of state is an area made up of leftovers
after all of the local prime sponsor arrangements have
been negotiated. It's difficult to define local labor
market areas or to do planning for such areas from the
state capitol. Program decisionmaking should be decen
tralized to sub-state planning boards. Another state
issue has to do with the Governor's discretionary money
under CETA. Rather than funding special training pro
jects, this money should be earmarked for investment:
to develop and demonstrate new programs and to
enhance the capability of people working in the policy
area.
Elected Official Involvement. The concept of a single
entity responsible and accountable for management of
the local program is valid; however, the decision to
make state and local governments prime sponsors
should now be questioned. In most cases, the benefits
realized—increased political accountability, com
prehensive planning, program coordination, and in
tegrated service delivery—do not approach the costs of
attaching training and employment programs to govern
ments primarily concerned with fire, police, and capital
expenditure programs financed from local revenue.
There is little evidence of local elected officials identify
ing training programs for the hard-core unemployed as
high priority on their local agenda. For the most part,
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they have hired staff to run programs designed to shift
the heat from their office and to keep the peace. Their
interest in CETA has been limited to the fiscal relief and
political benefits of the public service jobs program.
With the 1978 amendments setting average wages and
stricter eligibility criteria, the attraction to CETA has
largely disappeared.
Citizens' Input. The three citizens' advisory committees
now mandated under CETA do not appear to be mak
ing significant contributions to the quality of local pro
grams. It's too early to predict the future influence of
the private industry council, but the other councils ap
pear to be going through the motions to satisfy federal
requirements. If local councils are to be a part of the
system and to be effective, they must be made more
responsible and accountable for program results.
Determining Local Service Areas. Using the boundaries
of local political jurisdictions to determine service areas
and set residency requirements for program participa
tion runs counter to the concept of labor market plan
ning. In some cases under CETA, there are five or six
prime sponsors operating independently in the same
labor market area.
A possible solution to several of these systems problems
might be the creation of local labor market boards or com
missions. These boards—made up of elected officials, local
citizens, and representatives of business and labor—would
function as prime sponsors responsible for area-wide labor
market planning, contracting, monitoring, and evaluation.
But in contrast to CETA prime sponsors, they would not
deliver services. The board's labor market planning respon
sibility would include looking at the participation of all the
supply-demand institutions in the area. Funding available to
the board would be used at the margin to fill identified gaps
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and complement labor market services provided by the
myriad of other federal, state, and local organizations.
• The roles and relationships among the major actors in
the delivery system must be clearly delineated. It is not
enough to identify the primary recipients of funding, or
to say that all levels in the system are responsible for
monitoring and evaluation. Each level in the manage
ment hierarchy must have well defined limits of authori
ty and responsibility. Once established, these basic rela
tionships must be maintained over time to reduce the
confusion and uncertainty in the system.
• Incentives—rewards and punishment—must be built in
to the system to achieve the stated goals. Under CETA
the rhetoric encourages one set of responses; however,
performance measures, assessment criteria, and incen
tives reward different behaviors.
• Major attention must be given to developing the
capabilities of people working in the delivery system.
Few people in the system demonstrate the knowledge of
the policy area and the management skills to successful
ly implement programs. In a decentralized delivery
system, the commitment and competence of the decisionmakers ultimately determine the nature of the quali
ty of the service provided.

Indianapolis, Indiana
Recovering from Troubles
E. Earl Wright
The W. E. Upjohn Institute
for Employment Research

Introduction
The Indianapolis CETA operation can properly be
characterized as a program in transition or reorganization.
Although CETA has been operated under the jurisdiction of
the Indianapolis city government since its inception, the ex
tent to which the program has been viewed as an integral part
of local public services is somewhat questionable. Because of
the major reorganization efforts that were initiated in
1978-79, it is necessary to view the Indianapolis CETA pro
gram in a pre- and post-reorganization context. Prior to the
current administration and pre-reorganization, the In
dianapolis program was characterized by a lack of continuity
in leadership, inadequate management systems and lack of
direction, and adverse publicity regarding program opera
tions.
Prior to the 1979-80 period, the Indianapolis program was
fraught with a wide array of management problems that im
pacted adversely on both the scope and quality of the prime
sponsor's employability development and training activities.
In general, the program was loosely operated, and manage
ment systems were not adequate to assure proper controls or
decisionmaking. Perhaps the major problem was in the
financial management area, where there were insufficient
controls and reports were frequently inaccurate or
unavailable. In short, it appears that the financial manage
ment had lost control of the system. Serious problems were
207
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also evident in the program's Management Information
System (MIS). Reports from this unit were not reliable,
client records were incomplete, and inadequate information
was being generated for management purposes. Other func
tions of the Indianapolis program were also deficient. The
intake-assessment-referral function did not generate a
smooth client flow to the various employment and training
components. Monitoring and evaluation of contractors' per
formance and compliance were all but absent. Prior to the
beginning of fiscal 1979, the Indianapolis program was all
but bankrupt, and the Division of Employment and Training
was under fire from the regional office of the Employment
and Training Administration and from many groups in the
Indianapolis community.
The above comments and this report are not an expose of
the Indianapolis CETA program. On the contrary, the sum
mary of management and program problems is intended to
provide a contrast with the current organizational approach
and to illustrate that it would be highly inappropriate to
assess the Indianapolis program on the basis of historical
performance. In the broadest sense of the word, the In
dianapolis CETA system was reorganized during fiscal 1979.
The reorganization included changes in the organization
structure of the Division of Employment and Training; a
major change in the Division's reporting relationship to the
city's elected officials and administration; and changes in
policies affecting funding allocations, program design, and
contractor operations.

The Prime Sponsor Area
Demographic and Economic Features
The jurisdiction of the Indianapolis CETA program
covers the Indianapolis-Marion County area, inclusive of
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five separate general purpose muunicipal governments. At
the beginning of 1970, the balance of Marion County and the
City of Indianapolis were consolidated into a single govern
mental unit, with a population base of 728,344. The prime
sponsor serves an area of 402 square miles which is
characterized by a basically flat terrain with no major water
ways or unusual geographic features.
The total population of the prime sponsor's jurisdiction is
770,300, with approximately 72 percent of the total being
white. The minority population in the area is predominantly
black, and there are relatively small Hispanic and Asian
population groups. Slightly over 5 percent of the population
of Marion County was estimated to be eligible for CETA in
fiscal 1979. A similar proportion of the population was
estimated to be from families whose family income is below
the federal poverty guidelines. Less than 2 percent of the
total population is estimated to be receiving Aid to Families
with Dependent Children, state, or local public assistance.
Of the total estimated CETA eligible population, 30 percent
is 19 years or younger and 64 percent is nonwhite.
The Indianapolis economy is quite well diversified and
contains over 1,200 industries. The City of Indianapolis is
recognized as a service sector economy and is the home for
more than 70 insurance companies. Indianapolis is also a
major warehousing, distribution, and office center for In
diana and the region. In 1979, the total nonagricultural wage
and salary employment was approximately 410,000, with
manufacturing employment accounting for 27 percent of the
total. Nonmanufacturing jobs represented 60 percent of the
total jobs, and the government sector accounted for the re
maining 13 percent. Within nonmanufacturing, finance and
insurance companies, wholesale and retail trade, and services
account for the majority of the job opportunities.
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CETA Allocations
As shown in Table 1, CETA allocations for fiscal 1979 ex
ceeded $31,000,000, with 77 percent of the total targeted for
public service employment. Although a rather sizable fund
ing was realized for fiscal 1980 with the phase down in public
service employment, over $25,000,000 was allocated to the
Indianapolis prime sponsor. Given the sizable CETA alloca
tions, the participant enrollment figures are relatively low.
However, the Indianapolis prime sponsor was in a
reorganization phase, and actual client activity lagged con
siderably behind planned levels of service.
Table 1. CETA Funding for Fiscal 1979 and 1980, Indianapolis, Indiana8
Allocations
Source
Fiscal 1979
Fiscal 1980
II-A, B, C
$ 5,359,457
$ 6,750,219
II-D
9,125,270
6,470,354
VI
15,036,206
8,566,772
YCCIP
267,679
441,008
YETP
1,497,835
2,215,179
—
VII
1,000,009
Total
$31,286,447
$25,443,541
a. Adjusted allocations as released by the Employment and Training Administration.

Prime Sponsor
Organization and Operations
The CETA program in Indianapolis-Marion County is ad
ministered by the city's Division of Employment and Train
ing (DET). The current organizational structure appears to
be well-formulated, and the top management staff is both
technically competent and acclimated to planning and
managing CETA programs. The director of DET reports
directly to the Indianapolis deputy mayor. Under the current
organizational structure, all DET staff members are
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employees of the city and fall under the city's merit and per
sonnel system. A total of 195 staff positions are authorized,
although only 149 are filled. An additional 66 temporary
positions are authorized under a "supplemental work force"
program, a type of work experience activity run by DET.

Management Structure
The Indianapolis prime sponsor is organized along func
tional lines. In addition to the staff functions pertaining to
the entire organization (personnel, Equal Employment Op
portunity, legal services, and independent monitoring), three
deputy administrators for "line" operations report directly
to the DET administrator. The two key persons reporting to
the chief administrator are the EEO officer and the indepen
dent monitoring unit (IMU) manager, both of whom are
responsible for directing, supervising, and monitoring
policies throughout the prime sponsor's program.
The three deputy managers have responsibility over train
ing CETA administration (planning, Management Informa
tion System, and fiscal management) and employment ser
vices. The deputy for training services is responsible for the
overall direction of client services, adult work experience,
youth services, and training services. Client services include
intake, assessment, counseling, supportive service, and the
"client pool." The latter function is basically a referral ac
tivity which matches individuals to open training positions.
Training services encompass prevocational and vocational
training as well as monitoring and supervising training
subgrantees. In addition, this unit is responsible for contract
negotiations and development with service delivery agencies.
The adult work experience unit is concerned with short term
work assignments for CETA clients stationed with either
public or private-nonprofit employers. The youth program
unit is responsible for the Title IIB youth work experience
program and the Title IV youth activities.
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The deputy administrator for employment services is
responsible for the public service employment programs
funded under Title II-B and VI. In addition, this unit has
responsibility for job search programs which involve
classroom training in how to locate and obtain jobs,
simulated experiences in job application and interviewing,
and self-directed job search activities.
The deputy for administration supervises the MIS, the
planning and evaluation function, and the financial manage
ment system. The MIS unit maintains all participant data
and operates the client tracking system. Total planning and
program evaluation for all titles is performed by the Plan
ning Unit, and financial management and internal auditing
for all CETA activities are under the financial services
manager.
The senior management staff of the Indianapolis prime
sponsor are highly qualified in management and experienced
in manpower programs. Although the program was
characterized by relatively high turnover prior to the new ad
ministration, this does not appear to be a significant prob
lem, at least among the top management personnel. Perhaps
the most important change made by the current ad
ministrator is the hiring of qualified managers who have the
capabilities of managing both systems and personnel. Fur
thermore, a greater emphasis is being placed on recruiting
persons who are technically competent in areas such as client
management information systems, accounting, and financial
management. As implied earlier, this represents a major
departure from past personnel practices that involved the
hiring of individuals whose qualifications were suspect at
best. Another important personnel change that will likely im
pact favorably on the Indianapolis program in the future is
that "political appointments" to the CETA staff have been
eliminated. The impression is that individuals are selected on
their merits, and the decisions of the CETA administrator
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are supported by the deputy mayor. In short, the current ad
ministrator has introduced a much higher level of profes
sionalism throughout the prime sponsor staff.
All prime sponsor employees are covered by the In
dianapolis civil service system. Also, all positions have been
classified by the City Personnel Department. These
classifications are consistent with the system used for all city
employees. Job descriptions exist for each position within
DET, and the majority of these descriptions had been up
dated and were consistent with the management structure
under the CETA reorganization.
In general, the CETA staff salaries are comparable with
those of other city government divisions. Yet, it should be
noted that not too many of the DET positions are com
parable with other public service jobs in the local govern
mental structure. A few of the positions may be rated slightly
higher than in other divisions for this reason. From all in
dications, the salary levels are also comparable with those of
nonprofit and community-based organizations in the area. If
anything, the salary ranges may be somewhat higher than the
prevailing nonprofit pay structure. When comparisons are
made with the private sector, the only classification that ap
pears to be comparable is the secretarial and clerical area.
Although it was difficult to compare the prime sponsor's pay
structure to prevailing levels in the private sector, it appears
that the CETA salaries for management and professional
personnel are around 20 percent below private sector ranges.
The relatively low pay scale does present problems in
recruiting top-grade management personnel. It also presents
a challenge to the prime sponsor in terms of employee reten
tion. Several of the key personnel indicated that they did not
view their work with CETA as a long term career because of
the prospects for higher incomes in other organizations. To
date, however, the prime sponsor has been successful in
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pirating competent personnel from the Indiana Balance-ofState program and has been moderately successful in retain
ing key personnel. The prime sponsor's office has also avoid
ed having a union.

Management Systems
As part of the reorganization, the CETA administrator in
itiated the development of an automated Management Infor
mation System (MIS) that would satisfy Department of
Labor reporting requirements as well as provide program
managers with internal management reports. The client in
formation system is currently functioning on a manual basis.
Most of the attention to date has been placed on dealing with
the backlog of incomplete or missing client records and in
making procedural changes that lead to improvements in the
flow and quality of primary client records. Revisions were
also required for the intake documents to assure that all of
the required information was being obtained from ap
plicants. Prior to late 1979, the intake documents did not
capture such key information as complete education and
school dropout status and complete family status
characteristics. Also, changes were required in those sections
of the forms that deal with family income and displaced
homemaker status.
The client system is now operating efficiently enough to
generate the required quarterly reports on participant
characteristics and to publish a monthly management report
that details client activity by title. This latter document, ti
tled a "Planned versus Actual Output" report, details plan
ned and actual termination data by type of termination (e.g.,
"entered employment," "other positive," "nonpositive,"
etc.). In addition, a monthly "participant flow" report is
generated. The purpose of this reporting procedure is to in
dicate the planned and actual enrollments for each title and
selected programs such as adult work experience, prevoca-
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tional training, vocational training, self-directed job search,
and other similar programs. Although this particular report
ing procedure has not been fine-tuned, it is judged to be an
effective management tool. The report could be more
valuable if the program areas could be further disaggregated
and if supplemental reports could be prepared for individual
program operators. The MIS manager hopes to be preparing
reports on individual contractors by the end of the fiscal
1980 program year. In the meantime, however, it has been
difficult for the management team members to get much of a
handle on how specific programs and operators are function
ing either with regard to planned performance or program
outcomes.
After considerable time and effort, the financial manage
ment system has been restructured to provide fiscal control
and to generate accurate information. There are still prob
lems in meeting internal reporting requirements on a timely
basis. However, there is little question that this unit can meet
all routine information needs. The present accounting
system was developed in large part by an outside consultant
during the first nine months of 1979.
The monitoring and evaluation of specific programs and
contractors under the Indianapolis CETA system is a twotiered approach. Project coordinators with the responsibility
of overseeing contractors are supposed to monitor program
operations on a continuing basis. The monitoring activities
at the project coordinator level, together with information
from the MIS and fiscal units, provide the basis for program
evaluation by the planning and evaluation unit. However,
the success of the monitoring and evaluation efforts at this
second and higher level depends heavily on the scope and
quality of performance monitoring conducted by the project
coordinators and the MIS. The current program and perfor
mance monitoring system has very limited usefulness.
Because of vacancies that exist at the section chief and pro-
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ject coordinator levels, there are obvious gaps in contract
supervision. This problem is further exacerbated by the lack
of in-depth training available to the front-line supervisory
personnel. As a result, monitoring and evaluation remain
quite ineffective. It was also noted that technical assistance
to subgrantees and even planning and arranging for training
programs were suffering because of staff vacancies and in
adequate or nonexistent staff development and training. The
most recent quarterly assessment by DOL noted that many
of DET's front-line staff were not properly trained. DET
was given until September 1980 to take corrective action.
The Labor Department's primary concern was the DET
staffs ability to monitor contracts vis-a-vis compliance and
performance standards.

Decisionmaking
For most of 1979, the Indianapolis program was in the
process of restructuring its entire operation, from
philosophy and policies to strategic and operational systems.
At the time of this study, considerable progress had been
made in the planning and decisionmaking area, but the for
mal process was far from being totally debugged, and
changes were still being initiated. The underlying
"philosophy" or policies regarding the purpose of employ
ment and training programs are fundamental to the formal
decisionmaking process in the Indianapolis CETA program.
Under this approach, all CETA programs were oriented to
the structurally unemployed. The idea was to utilize the most
restrictive eligibility requirements under CETA and apply
these requirements to applicants in all titles. The intent was
to create a "comprehensive program design" that could
utilize all CETA funds as though CETA were a bloc-grant
program. All training and employment activities and all
resources would be directed toward achieving the policies ar
ticulated earlier in this chapter. The next implicit, if not ex-
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plicit, policy that guides decisionmaking is that given the
orientation to assisting the structural unemployed,
employability development services and training are viewed
as the primary vehicles for dealing with structural
joblessness. A third guiding policy is that the goal of prac
tically all manpower services and programs is to provide the
structurally unemployed worker with the skills and ex
periences that will enable him to obtain unsubsidized
employment in occupations where there is sufficient demand
for workers in the area.
Most decisions regarding policies, planning procedures,
and selection of training activities are made by the DET
staff, while the CETA advisory council exercises a review
and advisory role. Other groups do not seem to exercise un
due influence over decisionmaking. The Department of
Labor's representative apparently was more concerned
about getting the program cleaned up and back on track than
anything else. He emphasized, according to those persons in
terviewed, adhering to the CETA regulations. The federal
representative did not get too involved in decisions relating
to training policy, especially to the types of training to be
provided.
The program operators do not influence decisions to any
great extent. However, it appears that they do not approve
the concept of selecting training areas on the basis of occupa
tional demand. Their position was characterized as "wanting
to spend the money" for their existing programs. From all
indications, it was difficult to bring the program operators
into a new program design because they failed to match
client needs with training programs that will likely lead to
unsubsidized employment.
The governor's special CETA grants also do not have any
appreciable impact on decisionmaking. For example, the
supplemental vocational education funds go directly from
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the governor to the State Board of Vocational and Technical
Education. In turn, these funds are distributed to prime
sponsors on a formula basis. According to one DET staff
member, the prime sponsor has considerable flexibility to
spend the money in any manner desired. Apparently, the
state is not even concerned if the funds go to accredited
educational and training institutions. In the Indianapolis
area, the supplemental vocational education funds are used
for tuition, staff instructional cost, and supplies. The only
limitation is that allowances cannot be paid with the funds.
Twenty percent of the supplemental funds are taken out for
administrative purposes and the rest is blended into the
prime sponsor's other training programs.

Training Policies and Decisions
The policies and decisionmaking process for training ac
tivities are consistent with the prime sponsor's overall
philosophy regarding employability development services. In
essence, training and subsidized employment are viewed as
vehicles for providing CETA clients with the skills to obtain
unsubsidized employment. A wide array of employability
development services are available to CETA clients in the In
dianapolis program, including a sizable number of prevocational projects, vocational and skill training, subsidized
work, and self-directed job placement.
The overall policies and planning assumptions of training
activities are very straightforward. Training activities must
be consistent with the requirements of local occupations that
exhibit sufficient net labor demand. Characteristics and
dimensions of jobs for which training is to be provided are
identified in advance, and the programs are designed to
prepare new entrants to meet all of the job specifications.
These training design policies are supported by the prime
sponsor's policies in the allocation of funds to training pro-
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jects and activities. Under these policies, the Indianapolis
program attempts to allocate a portion of available CETA
resources to prevocational training activities whose explicit
objective is preparing the "most in need" client population
for vocational and skill training activities which culminate in
unsubsidized employment. The prime sponsor's ad
ministrator also articulated another basic policy approach
which was to make the maximum feasible allocation each
program year to projects that result in unsubsidized and selfsufficient employment.
One of the major components under the Indianapolis pro
gram is prevocational training which encompasses a wide
range of programmatic efforts including basic and remedial
education, English as a second language, motivational/at
titude training, and the introduction of nontraditional jobs
to women. However, the objective of all of these efforts is
the same—the preparation of "hard-to-employ" CETA
clients for vocational training. Under the original program
design, this was an experiment whose primary objective was
to reveal how to serve the most disadvantaged CETA par
ticipants. For clients who enter prevocational training, the
prime sponsor attempts to design an employability develop
ment plan that will lead to an upgrading of the
"characteristics" that can qualify them for skill training.
This component is designed to serve as a "feeder" system for
all vocational training activities. The training policies in
dicate that clients who complete this activity have three op
tions—vocational training, temporary work experience, and
placement into the best available permanent, unsubsidized
employment slot for which they qualify. The latter is intend
ed for those who are not successful in attaining the objectives
of their prevocational employability development plan.
The purpose of vocational training is to provide clients
with the capabilities of obtaining unsubsidized employment.
This activity is the core of the Indianapolis CETA program,
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since training policies envision skill development as the single
most important service under CETA. The prime sponsor's
staff is charged with designing, developing, and implemen
ting individualized training plans for clients by selecting an
appropriate occupation for each person from the list of high
net demand occupations approved for CETA training. After
completing vocational training, clients are to go directly into
permanent, unsubsidized jobs. If job opportunities are not
available, the client may be placed in a temporary subsidized
job.
The prime sponsor provides training under each of the
CETA titles, although the training activities under the
Private Sector Initiative Program (Title VII) are determined
by the Private Industry Council with little, if any, considera
tion given to the prime sponsor's policies. Title II-B is
primarily oriented to prevocational and vocational training.
The public service employment programs, Titles II-D and
VII, also are vehicles for providing prevocational and voca
tional skills to CETA enrollees. Clearly, training in its
broadest definition respresents the primary service delivery
thrust of the Indianapolis prime sponsor.
The criteria for determining the mix of training activities
include a number of factors. As noted earlier, the selection
of skill areas is based in large measure upon the analyses and
selection of net positive demand occupations. The entry level
wage rates for occupations is another key factor in the decisionmaking process. The service delivery capabilities of
training agencies and institutions in the community and the
quality of their programs also influence the training activities
authorized by the prime sponsor. Based on the training in
vestment policy of the prime sponsor, occupations that re
quire more than nine months will generally not be initiated.
Informally, other factors influence decisions regarding
program mix. In the prevocational training area, the

221

previous program mix plays a strong role in determining the
programs that are funded. The influence of this factor on
vocational programs is not as apparent. To some degree, the
influence of past programs on current training is due to
" political" considerations of the role of key agencies in the
community. However, political considerations are not
thought to be necessarily negative. It is more a matter of hav
ing specific prevocational activities in the Indianapolis area
funded for specific client constituency groups such as blacks,
Hispanics, and women.
The assessment and counseling unit is responsible for
deciding which clients are referred to specific prevocational
and vocational training activities. In performing this func
tion, the prime sponsor's participant policies provide very
specific guidelines and steps for client referral decisions.
During 1979, the emphasis was shifted from a "first-come,
first-served" basis to limiting access to those who satisfied
the training profiles for the specific prevocational and voca
tional programs. The assessment and counseling unit works
with each client in establishing occupational training objec
tives that are consistent with the CETA program offerings.
The underlying requirement is that the program design is
basically job- and thus employer-oriented. This approach
assumes implicitly that clients are willing to work and want a
job and that they can select a training area for which they
can qualify by meeting basic training entry requirements.
The key in this process is the role of the assessment and
counseling unit in assisting clients to identify occupational
choices vis-a-vis the high net demand jobs identified by the
prime sponsor's planning unit.
Clearly, there have been problems in attracting a sufficient
number of clients who meet the standards set for some of the
programs. The major problems have centered on the
relatively low math competence of most clients, poor at-
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titudes about training and employment, and poor problem
solving skills.
In reality, the decision process for assigning clients to
training components does not follow the procedures outlined
above. In addition to targeting clients to training areas for
which they are qualified, the availability of vacant slots and
programs and enrollment shortfalls have a major influence
on who gets trained in specific occupational areas. Because
of the pressure to increase enrollments to planned levels and
because the assessment function is far from being fine-tuned,
clients are targeted in some instances to training components
where they simply cannot succeed.
In large measure, the selection of service delivery agencies
under the Indianapolis program is now performed in a
depoliticized manner. Formal requests for proposals are
issued for all programs under all CETA activities—II-B,
Public Service Employment, Youth Community Conserva
tion and Improvement Projects Program, Youth Employ
ment Training Program, and the Summer Youth Employ
ment Program. Though a number of individuals and groups
are involved in various stages of the selection process, the
prime sponsor's management staff clearly exercises the most
influence in the decision of delivery agencies. A comprehen
sive evaluation and rating instrument guides the prime spon
sor in selecting subgrantees for training and other programs.
Under this procedure, point values are applied to specific re
quirements or program elements. The points actually award
ed any given element are determined by calculating the
average rating of scores given by members of the prime spon
sor's Education and Training Selection Committee. For
those program elements that do not carry a point value, a
majority of the committee must agree that the proposal
response meets a minimum level of acceptance. If any
response falls below the minimal acceptance level, the pro
posal is automatically rejected.
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Training Administration
Training, in its broadest context, is authorized under all of
the CETA titles in the Indianapolis area. Primary emphasis,
however, is placed on a broad array of prevocational train
ing activities. The majority of the training expenditures for
fiscal 1979 were authorized under Titles II-B and IV. Ap
proximately 44 percent of all Title II-B expenditures were for
training activities. As noted, the bulk of these outlays was
for classroom training. Two-thirds of the total expenditures
under the Youth Employment Training Program were
targeted to classroom and on-the-job training programs.
Relatively high proportions of the total outlays under the
PSE titles were also targeting toward training and
employability and development services—20 percent under
Title II-D and nearly 10 percent under Title VI.
Internal management reports for the first six months of
fiscal 1980 indicated that the prime sponsor increased the
relative expenditures for training under Title II-B, but train
ing and service expenditures for the other titles were lagging
behind the relative amounts recorded during fiscal 1979.
Training programs accounted for 68 percent of the total Title
II-B outlays during the first six months of the year, but
represented only 16 percent and 10 percent of the Title II-D
and VI expenditures, respectively. (Classroom training alone
accounted for 40 percent of the expenditures. Also, all train
ing activities and employability development services
represented 62 percent of the total Title II-B outlays.)
In contrast to the emphasis placed on classroom training,
the Indianapolis prime sponsor has accorded on-the-job
training (OJT) a very low priority. OJT programs have en
countered considerable difficulty in Indianapolis since the
inception of CETA. During the second quarter of 1980,
there were no OJT enrollees, and the prospects for initiating
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a viable OJT activity did not appear too favorable. The
reasons for not using OJT relate to the program's past ex
periences, particularly its history of adverse newspaper
publicity and charges of fraud in previous programs.
On-the-job training has declined in importance in com
parison to both the early CETA years and the pre-CETA
period. One of the prime sponsor's management staff
members noted that OJT is perceived by some as "the
answer'' to the training of the disadvantaged, but that the
program is a "sham" to a certain extent. It is one of those
activities that looks good on paper, but in actual practice
does not work well. The design and incentives for OJT pre
sent a dilemma. In most instances, the financial incentives
under the program do not appeal to large employers who
have the expertise and facilities to provide training compati
ble with OJT's program design and philosophy. As a result,
the employers to whom OJT appeals are generally small and
frequently cannot provide a viable training function. In fact,
in many instances, the primary incentive for these employers
is a "wage subsidy" that facilitates their staying in business.
In short, OJT is far from a panacea for the training prob
lems of CETA clients in Indianapolis.
Actual client service patterns in training activities tend to
support the prime sponsor's client targeting policies. With
the exception of the Youth Community Conservation and
Improvement Projects and Title VI programs, service to
females was greater than that to males in all titles. The pro
gram participation rate for women ranged from a high of 60
percent for Title II-B to a low of 20 percent in the YCCIP
program. It was not possible to collect characteristic data for
separate training components in the various titles. However,
because Title II-B is predominantly a training program,
client characteristics under this program can be contrasted
with those under the Public Service Employment programs.
Clients who were enrolled in training activities under Title II-
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B tended to be younger, less educated, and more dependent
on some form of public assistance than clients who possessed
PSE jobs. Two out of every five Title II-B enrollees were
high school dropouts in comparison with only 21 percent of
the Title II-D enrollees and 32 percent of the Title VI
enrollees. Exactly half of the training enrollees were under 22
years of age. In contrast, only 25 percent of the II-D clients
and 31 percent of the Title VI clients were in this age
category. Furthermore, almost half of the II-B enrollees
were recipients of some form of public assistance while ap
proximately one-fourth of the PSE clients were public
assistance recipients.
Service to nonwhites was approximately the same for all
titles. The participation of black and other minority group
members was extremely high for all titles, ranging from a
low of 73 percent in Title II-D to a high of 88 percent in the
YETP program. There are a number of factors that may ex
plain the relatively high incidence of service to blacks. First,
inner-city Indianapolis is about 80 percent black, and this is
where most of the intake centers for the CETA program are
located. Second, outreach and intake are not aggressively
pursued in the out-county area for a number of reasons, in
cluding the lack of advocacy groups, logistical considera
tions, and the fact that the CETA eligible population in the
out-county area is very dispersed. A third possible explana
tion may be that the program is perceived by the intake staff
as being black-oriented.

Training Quality
The analyses of the quality of alternative training activities
in the Indianapolis prime sponsor area are based on a
number of sources, including opinions and perceptions of
the prime sponsor's staff members and personnel associated
with the training contractors, assessments of all available
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contract documents and performance reports, and the field
researcher's personal observations derived from on-site visits
at eight training facilities. The on-site visits covered the full
range of both prevocational and occupational training pro
vided under the Title II-B program. The four prevocational
delivery agencies were training clients in basic and remedial
education, GED preparation, English as a second language,
career exploration, world of work orientation and the in
troduction of nontraditional employment opportunities to
women. The vocational training agencies offered skill train
ing to CETA enrollees in 17 separate occupational areas, in
cluding health and office occupations, industrial trades, and
basic electronics.
The prime sponsor's policies indicate that emphasis will be
placed on open-entry, open-exit vocational training ac
tivities. In reality, very few of the programs are designed in
this manner. However, several of the prevocational and
vocational activities are designed on a modular basis that
facilitates client access. All vocational activities are provided
on an individual referral as opposed to class-size format. The
individual referral format is considered to be advantageous
for several reasons. First, under a class-size program CETA
clients are generally segregated, and there is frequently a
stigma attached to the CETA enrollees. Second, under the
class-size programs, it appears that the instructors have
lower expectations for the enrollees. Also, according to one
member of the prime sponsor's management staff, the classsize programs are usually taught by low-paid, part-time, un
qualified personnel. Although the quality of training varies
considerably among the different training agencies and even
among different occupational areas within the same agency,
the training curricula for practically all programs appear to
be competency-based. In addition, the instructional staff
members, on average, are regarded as being adequately ex
perienced and qualified.
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Prevocational Training
The prevocational programs in the Indianapolis training
system are basically designed to prepare clients in basic and
remedial education, orientation to the world of work, and
GED preparation. One such program, "Get Set," is
operated by Indiana University/Purdue University at In
dianapolis (IUPUI). This program is operated as an "openentry, open-exit" activity with no minimum entry re
quirements. The vocational assessment system used in the
"Get Set" program is both comprehensive and continuous
during the enrollee's tenure. The curriculum for this pro
gram is highly individualized and is competency-based. The
"Get Set" philosophy of learning is based on one key prin
ciple—"who's an adult and who's not." The program staff
places the responsibility for learning on the students, grades
are not given, homework is not assigned on a required basis
and no textbooks are required. Very few discipline problems
have arisen, and it is apparent that peer attitudes influence
the work habits and behavior of the enrollees. The program
is clearly staffed by dedicated and competent personnel and
is judged to be successful in meeting its objectives.
Another basic education program is operated by Lockyear
College, a private, postsecondary, independent college. The
success of this program is due in large measure to a welltrained staff and individualized training plans for each stu
dent. In addition, the program is located in a modern, welldecorated, new office facility in park-like surroundings.
Training for this activity generally runs for about five weeks
during which there is an average increase of three grade
levels. The program staff places a high priority on con
tinuous reviews of the progress of each enrollee and prepares
very detailed reports on individual progress.
The Lockyear program is clearly a first-rate approach to
adult basic education. Strong emphasis is placed on atten-

228

dance, promptness, and task orientation. However, in a
strict sense, the Lockyear project is not prevocational since it
does not provide enrollees with occupational awareness and
career exploration.
The basic and remedial education program at the United
South Side Community Organization (USSCO) is also a very
high quality Adult Basic Education project. USSCO, which
was established in 1968, is heavily oriented to satisfying the
need for adult education among the transients and migrants
from Kentucky who live on the south side of Indianapolis.
Until recently, the agency was supported by the public
schools, but at the current time most of its funds come from
CETA. The agency has experienced considerable difficulty
in working with the separate youth and adult components
under CETA. Although the client populations overlap,
USSCO must handle them under separate contracts. The
primary training activity involves the teaching of reading and
mathematics by using job-related materials. The curriculum
materials seem to be rather standard reading tests for adults
such as the Steck-Vaughn, Lakeshore of California, and
Cambridge.
The trainees served under the USSCO program clearly
need a great deal of assistance in a number of areas. Much of
the staff time is spent on helping trainees solve or cope with
chronic problems. The clients are frequently referred to the
Southeast Multiservice Center which can provide employ
ment services, food stamps, and other forms of assistance.
As was the case with the Lockyear College program, the
training at USSCO does not involve career exploration and
occupational awareness.

Vocational Training
The vocational training activities funded under the In
dianapolis program cover a wide array of occupations.
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However, the largest programs are operated by the In
dianapolis Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC), the
Indiana Vocational-Technical College (Ivy Tech), and Lin
coln Technical Institute. OIC has the largest skill training
contract under the Indianapolis CETA program. A total of
100 individual referral skill training positions and 90
prevocational slots are funded at $617,532. Skill training is
provided in the following occupations: secretarial and key
punch, health careers, industrial skills, basic electronics, and
dental lab technology. Perhaps the most unique activity
under this contract is the industrial skills class that is taught
at an International Harvester (IH) plant. Current production
models of IH gasoline and diesel engines are used to teach
assembly, disassembly, troubleshooting, blueprinting, and
basic tool skills.
The quality of training at OIC covers a fairly wide range.
The clerical and keypunch programs appear to serve the
literate and motivated clients satisfactorily. However, there
is much to be done before the dental lab and the nurses aide
programs reach full efficiency, and even more is needed in
the electronics program. At the other end of the continuum,
the industrial skills program at International Harvester is an
exemplary model of a training program for the CETA
population. Its emphasis and training design are oriented at
just the right level for many of the CETA clients who require
training services.
Ivy Tech provides occupational training in eight separate
areas, with 25 slots available at any time for each occupa
tion. Training is available for industrial maintenance, auto
service, auto body repair, machine tooling, heating and air
conditioning, industrial drafting, general clerical, and
secretarial. Although most of these programs are considered
to be adequate, most of the training areas need considerable
updating of equipment. In general, the Ivy Tech staff is ex
tremely well-prepared, with strong teacher training plus oc-
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cupational and teaching experience. Curriculum materials
are well-prepared and are readily available.
Individual referral training is also sponsored in both
automotive technology and diesel and truck technology at
Lincoln Technical Institute. Fifty training positions are
available in each area, and the program provides for a total
of 1,000 hours of training for each area. The Lincoln pro
gram is modular and operates on a five-week cycle.
LTI is located near Lockyear College, but the setting is
completely different. It looks like the transportation-related
school that it is, with an attached service facility and parts
department which sells both to students and the general
public. The building is well-maintained, modern and func
tional for the training activities that are sponsored by the
organization.
The equipment is typical of that found in a modern dealer
ship or truck repair facility. The staff is well-qualified, with
considerable occupational experience and teacher training.
About a third of the instructors taught similar courses in the
military. Instructional materials are designed, particularly in
the more advanced courses, to prepare the trainees for condi
tions in the world of work. In general, the course outlines
and tests are well-prepared and are used effectively by the in
structional staff.
The administration of the Lincoln program is very proud
of its placement record, and it is not interested in training a
large number of hard-to-place persons. The obvious
preference is to enroll no more than 3 to 5 percent of its
trainees from CETA, and even those need to be screened
very carefully on the basis of their ability and motivation.
The Lincoln Tech administration does not like class-size
CETA programs because it believes that such programs lead
to low expectations and labeling of trainees. In the opinion
of the training personnel, individual referral trainees learn
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more, in part because of the example of and help from other
capable students. Another factor affecting the administra
tion's attitude is the Federal Trade Commission order that
each potential student be provided placement rate data for
the occupations in which the institution offers training.

Conclusions
Several first-rate training projects in both the prevocational and vocational areas are being operated under the In
dianapolis CETA programs. The basic and remedial ac
tivities sponsored by USSCO and Lockyear College are very
high quality programs. The prevocational component that is
run by IUPUI for both Title IV and Title II-B is a very welldesigned and executed program. In the occupational training
area, there is a fairly wide range of quality among the dif
ferent programs. Nonetheless, a good array of skill training
is available to CETA participants, and in most instances, the
programs are considered at least to be adequate. The pro
jects offered by Lincoln Technical Institute and Ivy Tech are
first-rate. However, neither of these institutions is especially
oriented to the "most in need" among the CETA popula
tion. The usefulness of these programs is heavily dependent
upon the prime sponsor's interest in and ability to select
clients who can succeed in the training. If there is not a will
ingness to exercise more selectivity in the referral-to-training
process, only limited results will materialize.
Because of the major restructuring efforts that have been
initiated by the prime sponsor, it is probably too early to at
tempt to render a final assessment of training policies and
programs for the Indianapolis CETA program. However,
there are a number of factors that appear to be impacting
negatively on the quality of the prime sponsor's training ef
forts. For the most part, the training policies appear to be
well-designed, and the planning system has the potential of
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generating very workable and comprehensive strategic and
operational plans. The difficulty, at this stage, is that opera
tional units are far from able to implement effectively these
policies and plans. The assessment, counseling, and training
units are not adequately staffed, either in actual numbers or
in personnel who have the skills and experiences to imple
ment a complex program design. Staff development and
training at this level is imperative. In addition, more em
phasis should be placed on attracting highly qualified per
sonnel who could perform the "front-line" functions consis
tent with the philosophy and policies of the prime sponsor.
Immediate attention should also be placed on upgrading
both the contracting and project performance monitoring
functions. In both instances, there should be a focus on
developing measurable objectives for performance stan
dards, learning objectives, and outcome goals. These
measurements should be incorporated as key elements in
each prevocational and vocational contract, and the project
coordinators should assess progress on a monthly basis.
Another fundamental problem is that there may be a
serious inconsistency between the prime sponsor's client and
training policies. Without doubt, the CETA program is be
ing targeted, either as a matter of policy or as a result of the
intake and referral process, to clients who have a wide range
of service needs and who may be characterized as seriously
disadvantaged. Yet, many of the occupational skill training
programs are quite sophisticated and have relatively high en
try standards. Unless there is an attempt to screen more
deliberately the clients who are referred to skill training,
many of the training activities will probably continue to ex
perience only modest success. This problem has undoubtedly
been exacerbated because the client employability develop
ment function has not been finalized and implemented in the
manner intended by the prime sponsor.

233

As a final observation, the major factor that may be miss
ing in the Indianapolis program is an effective "bridge" be
tween the prevocational and vocational skills programs. An
implicit assumption seems to have been made that a trainee
falls into one of two categories—ready for vocational train
ing or not ready. The overwhelming majority of the In
dianapolis CETA clients fall within the latter category. The
training model that may be more consistent with the clients'
needs is one that provides concurrent vocational training and
basic education, with the latter design built on the needs of
the vocational activity.

Montgomery County, Maryland
A Born-Again Prime Sponsor
Marion W. Pines
Baltimore Metropolitan Manpower Consortium

Montgomery County, Md., located directly north of
Washington, D.C., is one of the wealthiest counties in the
nation. The suburban home of many of the nation's most in
fluential policymakers, it is also the new home of growing
waves of Asiatic and Hispanic immigrants who constitute a
new CETA constituency. Although the minorities and the
poor are less than 5 percent of Montgomery County's
600,000 population, their problems are often exacerbated
because they are dispersed throughout the most affluent
Maryland subdivision.
Montgomery County is part of the Washington standard
metropolitan statistical area (SMSA), which also includes
three cities and four counties in northern Virginia, the
District of Columbia and two other Maryland counties.
Although these areas are part of a geographically integrated
labor market, no move has been made to encourage joint
labor market planning. Montgomery County CETA
managers have gone it alone although the 1970 census in
dicated that almost half of the area labor force worked out
side the county of residence. This mobility has been aided by
an effective highway network and the opening of parts of the
100 mile rapid rail METRO system. Until the METRO
system is extended, however, the more remote pockets of
need in northern Montgomery County remain isolated and
underserved.
In 1979, local CETA officials were faced with the
challenge of designing and managing a manpower delivery
235
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system to meet the needs of a diverse and dispersed target
population (very old and very young; rural black and new
immigrants). In addition, they are preparing this population
for an economy that seeks professional, managerial and "hitech" workers. At the same time, national policy changes in
creased their resources from $1.9 to $8.5 million in five
years. Obviously, these local economic mismatches and na
tional policy fluctuations produced serious management
challenges and raised fundamental issues for the local CETA
system. However, a review of the Montgomery County
prime sponsorship provides some illustrative insights into
some practical as well as policy issues for the employment
and training system as a whole.
A brief recap of Montgomery County employment and
training history helps to frame the issues.
Insulated organizationally within a social service umbrella
department, the focus of our attention, the Division of
Labor Services is one of four units in the agency, three
reporting echelons removed from the County Executive.
There is growing evidence that under new political leadership
(elected in 1979), closely followed by new CETA leadership,
much needed accommodations are developing to enhance interagency linkages and reduce local bureaucratic snags.
There is growing awareness that the exigencies of CETA ad
ministration make political access, immediate response and
quick signatures a necessity.
The initial response of the first CETA directorate to its
new responsibilities under the decentralized system was to
emulate the public employment service model—"only
better," as one Montgomery County staffer modestly
described the operation. All comers were welcomed, as long
as they had been unemployed a week. A fairly effective per
sonalized jobmatching activity ensued. The pursuit of train
ing was left to the individual. No participant allowances were
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paid, so the motivated and interested enrollee was free to
seek training from any of the proprietary schools operating
in the greater Washington, D.C. area. The 33 schools subse
quently selected were then reimbursed by voucher paid by
the prime sponsor. Placement services after training were
haphazard and outcome information was largely anecdotal.
As can be imagined, the target population reached through
this kind of a service/training buy-in system was generally
well educated, white, and female. During the early CETA
years in Montgomery County, management accountability
systems were largely undiscovered and relationships with the
regional office of the Department of Labor were comparable
to the "Bickersons."
The quadrupling of resource allocations under the
economic stimulus package in May 1977 ("We were OK at
$1.9 million—but kinda blew apart at $8 million"), closely
followed by the constraining CETA amendments of 1978,
brought the Montgomery County CETA system to a crisis.
Lack of fiscal controls had produced serious cost overruns
in Title II-B; negligent monitoring resulted in severe
underenrollments and underexpenditure in Title II-D; and
general management deficiencies caused poor marks on the
annual regional office assessment resulting in month-tomonth funding. This pressure cooker finally exploded. Pro
tracted debates and vitriolic exchanges with the regional of
fice culminated in a threat to deobligate $400,000 in unex
pended public service employment funds. The newly elected
county executive and congressional representatives were call
ed into a rescue mission and promply escalated negotiations
to the national level. The low profile CETA system was sud
denly thrust uncomfortably to front page news. Obviously, a
new county executive was not overly pleased with this kind
of notoriety. Not unexpectedly, the local CETA leadership
toppled—and a new experienced team recruited from other
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prime sponsors and other county agencies was assembled to
restore peace, tranquility and order, and to create CETA in a
new image for Montgomery County. The team was headed
by a former local senior CETA planner who had intimate
knowledge of the weaknesses and was able to chart the im
mediate work plan for the team with precision.
• Within six months, position and slot control systems
were in place for public service employment manage
ment.
• Disbursement approval was linked to activity progress
reports.
• Expenditure controls and fiscal reporting systems were
established.
• The management information system was redesigned to
provide the required participant tracking and STOP
date warnings.
• An independent monitoring unit (IMU) was created and
proceeded to initiate the concept of performance con
tract management.
By any standards, this evidence of administrative com
petence is impressive.
While the new team was attempting to get control of
runaway expenditures, new enrollee intake was slowed to a
trickle throughout fiscal 1980. The team concentrated first
on building sound management systems. It next turned to the
delivery system and made decisive moves to accommodate
new CETA requirements mandated in the 1978 amendments.
These amendments to the original 1973 CETA legislation
retargeted almost all CETA resources to the structurally
unemployed. Strict eligibility requirements were established
which factored in income as well as unemployment status.
Managerial mandates were clearly articulated and included
requirements for eligibility verification systems, client track
ing systems, and independent monitoring units. Limitation
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of enrollee participation to a fixed number of hours, weeks
and months in various CETA-funded activities seriously
hampered local decision-making authority and program
designs. However, the new Montgomery County team made
a conscientious effort to refocus the program to begin to
serve the structurally unemployed.
Allowances are now available to all enrollees, making it
possible for Montgomery County's truly poor to participate.
The active involvement of the private industry council (PIC)
has influenced training policy. Training offerings are based
on local labor market needs and are offered in class-size
modules. The concept of training has been broadened to ac
commodate the full range of employability development
needs of a new group of enrollees. English as a second
language, basic remedial education, motivational training,
survival skills, and carefully chosen occupational skill train
ing are now available. A new training infrastructure is
developing as well. Local colleges, women's advocacy
groups, proprietary schools, community-based organiza
tions, private vendors, and the public schools are playing im
portant roles. Training is taking place in plush office suites,
store fronts, church basements and university laboratories.
In attempting to assess the training system funded by
CETA in Montgomery County, quality guidelines were
established. Apart from organizational design, intergovern
mental relationships and other "esoteric" factors, it is
generally agreed that faculty, curriculum, equipment and
facility are key contributors to the overall quality of a train
ing program.
In examining the six different examples of CETA-funded
training in Montgomery County, careful attention was paid
to the quality of the training staff. Did they display en
thusiasm? Were they combat-weary? Did they know their
field of instruction? Did they display concern and a sense of
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responsibility for what happens to trainees "after training?"
Both technical competencies and interpersonal skills were
reviewed as well as field-tested in live training settings.
Good instructors need worthy program content in order to
get results. Curriculum materials were examined with par
ticular sensitivity to their relevance to the population being
trained as well as relevance to the labor market to be served.
Special note was taken when "canned" materials were
employed or when and how new curriculums were tailored.
Where relevant to the training, the age and quality of
equipment utilized were carefully noted. Broken or outmod
ed training equipment does not afford trainees transferable
skills. Moreover, use of such equipment often sends a subtle
negative message to trainees. Recent donations of useful
equipment by employers often denoted close involvement
and interest by the private sector.
The facility in which training is offered is not the key to
ensuring good quality, but it certainly enhances the offer
ings. Two other more subtle factors were considered in mak
ing value judgments about Montgomery County's training
programs: the "atmosphere" engendered at the training
sites; and any administrative constraints or incentives im
posed by the prime sponsor that might affect the quality or
results of training.

Basic Educational Training
Montgomery County Public Schools (Department of
Adult Education) is the contractor for an intensive program
of English as a second language, serving 75 clients in each
cycle. The program coordinator depends upon word of
mouth for staff recruitment and has successfully tapped the
rich source of foreign service government workers and their
families revolving through the Washington area to yield a
team of ESL specialists with at least master's degrees. In ad-
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dition, the program activity recruits volunteers to assist in in
dividualized instruction. An intensive curriculum planning
session including a full week of orientation precedes the
startup of the year's activities.
The contract makes a stab at establishing performance
goals for the program. For example, it stipulates that
enrollees will successfully complete the program by achieving
one of the following:
1. English language proficiency commensurate with
"enrollee's individual employment goal."
2. Placement in permanent, unsubsidized employment for
seven continuous days or longer.
3. Enrollment in non-CETA funded academic or voca
tional training.
Behavioral Science Associates provide the adult basic
educational services for the Montgomery County prime
sponsor. The relationships and responsibilities between the
contractor and prime sponsor in regard to referral, counsel
ing and termination services are identical in all Montgomery
County programs so the detailed interrelationship will not be
described again. Suffice it to characterize those services as
absentee in nature. The current Behavioral Science contract
calls for service to 120 new participants over a 12-month
period, with 24 at any given time. Actual enrollment levels
have ranged from 6 to 31.
The small staff team meets regularly to work on tasks,
solve problems and handle educational objectives. The train
ing materials include the Jamestown series for reading ver
satility, supplemented by Bloomenthal, Wiley and
McGraw/Hill materials. The staff also develops specialized
supplementary materials to enhance their instructional ac
tivities. The staff tries to specialize, with one instructor
focusing on math, the other on reading, although both are
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responsible for both areas. The coordinator oversees the
overall quality of instruction.
According to program staff, this instructional program
has resulted in dramatic improvements: 80 percent of the
enrollees have increased their reading skills by two grade
levels in two months! Unfortunately, no independent evalua
tion corroborates this achievement.

Occupational Training
Both the George Washington University and the Capital
Institute of Technology exhibit characteristics consistent
with quality skill training programs. For example:
• Both had very close ties to the private sector and had
solicited advice and recommendations in the process of
developing curriculums.
• Both had consciously attempted to assign staff that
would tailor their training activities to reflect private
sector requirements closely.
• Both were able to identify quickly the barriers to suc
cessful completion of training offered to CETA clients
and recommended and implemented the solutions to
remove these barriers.
• Both were conducted by institutions which had educa
tional activities as their major institutional focus.
Although the prime sponsor had established no formal
mechanisms to insure the quality of skill training offered,
each of these programs had developed its own mechanisms
to ascertain the requirements of the private sector and to in
corporate those requirements into the curriculum. Both had
moved far beyond contractual requirements to supply sup
plementary supportive services needed by the clients to com
plete the training successfully. Both fully recognized that oc
cupational skills alone would not enable trainees to obtain
and retain unsubsidized employment.
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Neither of these programs was contractually required to
place the trainees upon completion of the course. Both,
however, were active participants in the placement process,
again as an unpaid supplement to the Servicenter. By
capitalizing on the involvement of employers throughout the
training continuum, the trainers have developed responsive
resources for job placement.
Because both training institutions provide educational ac
tivities as their major business, a valuable resource of ex
perienced practitioners in curriculum development, testing,
etc., is available on an as-needed basis to modify, improve,
and redesign curriculums, teaching techniques and testing
materials used by the GETA funded programs.
The George Washington University sponsored biomedical
training program was spawned in the midst of a full-scale intragovernmental furor described earlier.
The full curriculum is developed around a work study
model: two semesters in the classroom, one semester in a
public or private sector field placement and the last semester
back in the classroom. Each semester of work earns four
credit hours. The students are required to use job search
techniques taught in the course to develop a resume and
secure their own paid field placement position for the third
semester. This field placement in many instances leads to
full-time unsubsidized employment upon completion of the
course. The George Washington University has a strict atten
dance policy which entails a graduation requirement of 90
percent attendance during the course. In addition, if the stu
dent is absent 10 percent of the class period, he is considered
absent for the entire period and forfeits his training
allowance for the entire period! Counseling sessions around
this policy focus on teaching students how to evaluate the
important activities of life, and how to organize their time to
complete those activities. After the third absence, the student
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must have a conference with the program director before be
ing readmitted to class. The program staff intends that the
students transfer this discipline to other aspects of their lives.
The standards for admission to the program are extremely
high and require a high school diploma or GED and
demonstrated high math, reading and vocabulary levels of
achievement. It is little wonder that the Montgomery County
prime sponsor had to screen 1100 applicants to find 33 for
the biomedical technician course!
During the fall 1979 semester, GWU enrolled a number of
foreign-speaking students. In recognition of their special
needs, the trainer requested and received a contract
modification from the prime sponsor to provide 10 hours per
week of ESL tutoring on a one-to-one basis.
Thus, incrementally, this training program was ap
proaching the total service package that is of maximum
benefit to the CETA enrollee. However, because of the ex
tremely high entry requirements, a very select sector of the
CETA-eligible population receive this high quality service
package.
The Capital Institute of Technology (CIT) is a recognized
technical institution which provides accreditation from the
certificate level through college degrees in electronics. It is
located in the Gaithersburg/Rockville corridor along Route
270 which, as described earlier, is one of the fastest growing
electronics markets in the country.
Time is allotted for students to work on individual or team
projects in the laboratory facilities. The students are able to
explain in precise technical terms the purpose of their pro
ject, the methodology they are using and the results they ex
pect. CETA enrollees also participate in tutoring sessions
conducted in preparation for examinations. These sessions
are conducted by a former student who is currently working
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part-time while studying for her A.A. degree at CIT. The
students exhibited a working knowledge of the technical
terms employed in the electronics field and were eager to ex
plain complicated electrical circuits to visitors.
Background investigation revealed that in early 1979,
Wider Opportunities for Women (WOW) approached the
Montgomery County prime sponsor asking for funding to
emulate a program model previously funded by the DOL of
fice of national programs in which "life instruction" was
coupled with math, communication skills and occupational
training. The model was intended to enhance the entry of
women into non-traditional occupations. The prime sponsor
agreed. A contract was negotiated with WOW that stipulated
a third-party subcontractual role for the Capital Institute of
Technology to fulfill the occupational training function. The
contract language spells out WOW's oversight respon
sibilities for both quality of training and job placement, but
the WOW staff interviewed appeared to be unaware of these
responsibilities. Unfortunately, in the absence of a viable
field monitoring system, the prime sponsor puts no real
pressure on WOW to fulfill these significant responsibilities.

Motivational Training
Although Wider Opportunities for Women's role was
described above in conjunction with the occupational skills
training at CIT, the major thrust of WOW's involvement
with that skills training program focuses on attitudinal
change and motivational training. The techniques employed
by WOW staff are individualized counseling and peer
pressures as well as peer counseling. Interestingly, although
the initial intent of the training program was to provide nontraditional training for women, only 31 percent of the
enrollees are females. It appears that the passion for nontraditional jobs is often more fervent among professional ad-
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vocacy groups and government agencies than among the
potential bricklayers, truckdrivers, and electronic techni
cians!
The National Center for Economic and Community
Development (NCECD) has extensive corporate experience
in motivational team building and organizational develop
ment activities. The original design of its activities calls for
agency staff and participants to spend the course time in a
live-in facility—a hotel or condominium—where the degree
of external interference can be controlled. This design had
been modified for the Montgomery County CETA contract
and had added job search "training."
The structure of the course is devoted to individual and
group exercises. Small group interaction is used extensively
to facilitate a support system for the development of job
search skills. "Personal Growth" planning is divided into
three sections—past, present, and future. Exercises are
tailored to develop a set of likes and dislikes, experiences and
skills which will lead to a "job action plan." Enrollees
develop their own job descriptions and chronological and
functional resumes.
The program staff stresses the "mentor" approach by its
own instructors in the program, encouraging them to share
their own life experiences with the participants. Problems
developed by the participants are openly discussed in group
sessions and group solutions are developed.
This program model and contractor were selected in direct
response to the passage of the 1978 CETA amendments. The
Montgomery County prime sponsor perceived that a "new"
client group—perhaps less motivated than the prior
caseload—would require additional massaging, but it has
not integrated the program into any logical sequence in the
training continuum.
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Overall, the quality of the training offerings reviewed in
the course of this study was generally superior. Training
staff members among all subcontractors displayed good
technical backgrounds as well as interpersonal skills.
Moreover, they seemed acutely aware that their respon
sibilities were to train for employment. Their major frustra
tion was the lack of information about what happened to
"their" enrollees after they completed their training course.
Curriculums were developed with a sensitivity to the needs
of participants as well as the labor market. Few "canned"
programs were noted, and a great many innovative
enrichments were being developed during the training
period.
Technical equipment was modern, affording trainees the
opportunity to learn skills that were immediately
transferable to the work place. Much of the equipment used
by trainees had been donated by the private sector, which ap
peared interested in hiring the most successful trainees.
The major weaknesses are now being corrected. Few se
quential links were noted among and between program com
ponents, to enable an enrollee to move smoothly from an
English as a second language class into an occupational skills
program, for instance. And consistent feedback information
is needed by all trainers so they can adjust curriculums based
on the eventual employability of their trainees (not to men
tion the psychological rewards to trainers based on student
success or vice versa). A major step forward would be more
specific contractual documents which clarify expectations so
both vendor and purchaser can assess performance. In addi
tion, effective contract management, consistent field
monitoring and program evaluation also await implementa
tion. Full scale outreach activities to new target populations
for the complete 1981 bill of fare were as yet untested. The
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1980 partial freeze on new enrollments did not provide an
adequate test of outreach to the structurally unemployed.
However, producing the accomplishments just described
has been an all consuming task for the talented and ex
perienced four top staffers who share 27 years of CETA and
local government experience.
But the entire before and after study of the Montgomery
CETA system and its often adversarial relationship with the
Department of Labor raises issues that should be addressed
before and during the CETA reauthorization debate.

Staff Development/Management
Assistance Issues
No system, activity, or endeavor can succeed without
qualified people at the helm who understand their mission
and who have been trained to perform their task. The fabled
high CETA staff turnover rates were not found in Mont
gomery County with the exception of one noteworthy
wholesale top leadership change in 1979.
But there is ample evidence that the gyrations in national
manpower policy have overtaxed the administrative
capabilities of a young decentralized system. It must be
remembered that the system was barely six months old when
Title VI, the first expanded Public Service Employment ac
tivity, was legislated by the Congress and implemented in a
rather taunting style by the Department of Labor. ("Decen
tralization is being tested. Deliver or else.") The system was
barely three years old when the economic stimulus package
came forth in mid 1977, tripling resources and quadrupling
paperwork. This was followed by the CETA amendments of
1978 which, as mentioned before, mandated complex
management and monitoring systems, sharpened the focus
on target populations and put limits on program design op-
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tions. With virtually no outside technical assistance spon
sored by the federal authorities, indeed with intermittent
harassment, it has been very difficult to develop local exper
tise to handle responsibilities of this scope. Whatever institu
tion building and staff development that has occurred has
been almost completely self-generated and self-nurtured.
CETA staff desperately needs a support system. Prime
sponsor associations are gaining strength. They are taking an
increasing interest in mounting prime-to-prime assistance ef
forts. An encouraging development has been solid support
for this development from the new Office of Management
Assistance (OMA) in DOL's Employment and Training Ad
ministration. There are offers to cover travel costs and in
some cases, per diem, for traveling "helpers." Many prime
sponsor associations are brokering the requests for
assistance and the offers of help. This is an encouraging
development but it alone obviously will not meet the
challenge of management capacity building for the long
haul. Nor is it intended to do so.
It must be supplemented by intensive management train
ing for the CETA system decision makers delivered by, and
if possible through the auspices of experienced prime spon
sor staff. Those institutional grant university programs that
have matured since their early DOL funded experiments
might be linked to form a national academic resource net
work. New prime sponsor directors, often hired in crisis,
must be oriented and thoroughly trained in this most com
plex and quixotic planning and management activity—called
the employment and training system.
Certainly some local environments may be more
hospitable than others for producing, attracting and retain
ing the kind of quality staff needed. Local political stability
is an important plus. The dilemma of close affiliation be
tween the CETA director and a chief elected official and the
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resultant possible loss of dual leadership at the polls has
caused serious problems of instability in some prime sponsorships. On the other hand, many strong prime sponsor
directors have managed to so professionalize themselves and
their CETA operations that they have withstood two and
three political changeovers of mayors, county executives,
and governors.
Thus, a top priority for the CETA system must be the im
plementation of practical and workable interventions to
orient, train, assist, and support local managerial capacity.
That is the heart of the system (and it is no place for the
fainthearted), and that is the kind of capacity least likely to
buckle under arbitrary political or administrative meddling.

Intergovernmental Relationship Issues
It has been suggested sometimes in jest that a massive in
tergovernmental personnel exchange (IPA) program should
be instituted for federal representatives, midlevel
Washington bureaucrats, and prime sponsor staff. The time
has come to think seriously about this. Thoroughly nonconversant with the prime sponsor system other than by
anecdote, many staff in the Washington headquarters and
the 10 regional offices of the Department of Labor have a
deep seated distrust of and disregard for the capabilities of
the local partners. The Montgomery County $400,000 caper
is a classic case in point. Slower than planned enrollments
and expenditures in the newly targeted Title II-D public ser
vice employment programs created a potential "excess"
carryover of dollars into the following fiscal year. In an at
tempt to forestall reallocation, the prime sponsor entered in
to a contract with a local university for a sophisticated and
expensive technical training program. Some 1100 applicants
were screened to produce 33 eligible trainees! Although the
previously mentioned rescue mission finally bailed out the
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prime sponsor, serious intergovernmental issues and ques
tions remain:
1. Why was the local government so unresponsive to the
legislative mandate of Title II-D—the creation of public
service jobs to reach Montgomery County's structurally
unemployed?
2. Why was the absence of fiscal controls and monitoring
of enrollment levels tolerated for so long by all levels of
government?
3. Why did the regional office accept a prime sponsor's
plan that showed no expenditures or enrollments pro
jected in the first quarter of the fiscal year and then
retort with a threatened deobligation three months
later?
4. Why did the regional office offer no clear explanations
to the prime sponsor of the difference between expen
ditures and obligations in computing carryover funds?
If such an explanation had been forthcoming in July
1979, the prime sponsor may not have proceeded to
develop a contract committing the funds in question.
5. How much staff time and energy was wasted and how
much aggravation and diversion from requisite duties
was created at all levels of government over protracted
period on matters that could and should have been
resolved by reasonable people willing to negotiate a sen
sible solution in a 2-hour meeting?
In fact, the national and regional levels have little perception
of interdependency in the CETA system. Interdependency
implies trust, responsibility, and capacity to deliver. Because
there is basic distrust of the locals, the federal and regional
attempts to monitor and manage the system can most
charitably be described as overkill.
Each side of the partnership needs exposure to the other's
perspective. Policy decisions are being made with little con-
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cept or sensitivity to the problems of implementation.
Reporting requirements are becoming more complex. Pro
gram requirements are becoming more specific. For exam
ple, in regard to proposed new youth legislation, there is
serious talk of requiring every employability plan for every
youth to be updated every month—and somehow report all
this nationally. Even if it could be done (and obviously it
can't), what would anyone at the regional or national office
do with such information?
Federal officials desperately need a refresher course in
high school "civics." At the same time, local prime sponsors
need to be informed and sensitized to the deliberative pro
cesses of the Congress, the pressures from the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), and the internal workings
of the Department of Labor.
This interchange should be thought through, institu
tionalized, and implemented in a systematic manner. In
every case in which it has already taken place, greater
understanding has resulted. But it needs to take place on a
wider scale and in a sustained manner if it is really to affect
policy development.

Intergovernmental Management Issues
By legislation, limited percentages from each CETA title
grant can be earmarked for an administrative cost pool.
Generally, staff paid from this administrative cost pool per
form the planning, evaluation, monitoring, reporting, and
managerial functions of the prime sponsorship. Because the
percent of dollars available for the pool is fixed, the larger
prime sponsors have a significantly larger resource pool for
the requisite planning, administrative, and managerial func
tions. Conversely, small prime sponsors with the same
management and reporting requirements have a very shallow
administrative resource pool to draw from.
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Some analysis of resource distribution provides interesting
insights. In fiscal year 1980, Title II-B allocations were
distributed among city and county prime sponsors as
follows: (balance-of-state prime sponsors not included)
77 percent received less than $5 million,
8 percent received between $5 million and $10 million,
2 percent received over $10 million.
Similar configurations were found in the distribution of
funds among city and county prime sponsors for public ser
vice job creation. In Title II-D:
75 percent received less than $5 million,
11 percent received between $5 million and $10 million,
3 percent received over $10 million;
and in Title VI:
82 percent received less than $5 million,
5 percent received between $5 million and $10 million,
1 percent received over $10 million.
Regions I, VI, and X had no prime sponsors funded at the
higher levels, excluding balance-of-states, which are a special
management problem.
This distribution means, for example, that in fiscal year
1980 Montgomery County had an administrative cost pool
of under $1 million. The Baltimore Consortium had an ad
ministrative cost pool 10 times that, and New York City's
pool is almost 10 times Baltimore's.
The point of this exercise is to illustrate rather dramatical
ly where the dollars are to deal with the inordinately complex
CETA management system. Those dollars are concentrated
in a very small percentage of the prime sponsorships. Yet the
demand for data, for the complex cross-tabulations, for
weekly, monthly, quarterly, and ad hoc reporting, for multi
ple plans, for endless modifications, etc., etc., are laid out
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monolithically upon the system as if there were a uniform
level of resources available to produce the response. This
situation is totally unrealistic and yet largely unrecognized.
This monolithic set of demands and requirements imposed
on a very diverse set of prime sponsors has been the source of
continued havoc and has often had an effect diametrically
opposed to its intent. With limited resources, as the focus
shifts to regulatory compliance coupled with the new focus
on audit and liability responsibilities, sponsors may well
reduce the attention paid to training policy and implementa
tion. Even talented staffs have limits on energy and creativi
ty. The signals they are receiving from the Congress and
from the Department of Labor are not addressing quality of
training.
The need for information and the responsibility for over
sight is fully acknowledged. But new procedures must be
developed. A scientifically designed sample of larger prime
sponsors and a set of smaller prime sponsors could be fund
ed to provide the requisite cross-tabulations and detailed
reporting, thereby relieving the rest of the system from this
crushing burden. Undifferentiated management re
quirements and continued adversarial relationships are slow
ly strangling the decentralized CETA system.

Decentralization Issue: How Much?
Decentralization under CETA transferred the manage
ment of thousands of manpower service delivery contracts
from the DOL's regional offices to prime sponsors (political
subdivisions of at least 100,000), freeing the regional office
network of DOL to manage just the 470 odd prime sponsor
grants. Theoretically, this change should have resulted in a
responsive, streamlined, accountable system. The Mont
gomery County case study produced much evidence to in
dicate that the DOL has not developed this kind of respon-
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sive, consistent grant management system. Protracted
debates and adversarial negotiations such as described in this
Montgomery County story are not exceptions.
Unfortunately, the side, but important, effect of these bit
ter encounters that is often overlooked, is the serious diver
sion of staff attention, energies and time at every level of
government from significant planning and management
duties. These diversions are costly. Pressures build. Staff
morale suffers. Turnover results. Important tasks like train
ing the disadvantaged unemployed to become self-sufficient
are often neglected in order to mobilize additional evidence
for the issue at hand, thus sowing the seeds for additional
future problems.
Equally at issue is the number of prime sponsors (growing
every year) and the most practical and cost effective ad
ministrative mechanism to manage this system. The federal
government demonstrated its inability to manage the old
federal system with over 10,000 contracts. It is under fire for
its non-management of the quasi-federal/state employment
service system. As it now functions, the intergovernmental
CETA system is a bottlenecked system literally choking on
the paper it generates. Nevertheless this observer would not
vote for a refederalized system.
States, for the most part, have not distinguished
themselves with their balance-of-state prime sponsorships,
nor have Governors displayed much interest in employment
and training strategies. States have shown a remarkable
ability to create new layers of red tape and to require
bureaucratic high jumps in their administration of the
Governor's 6 percent CETA vocational education grants. In
fact, Montgomery County's sole reason for negotiating with
the State of Maryland's manpower office was its desperate
need for additional training funds. But the arbitrary and
rigid procedures established by most states discourages many
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prime sponsors. So there will not be any vote here for con
solidation under state government.
But it is fairly obvious that individual contiguous subdivi
sions operating in the same labor market should be ad
ministering their grant as one. The previously described com
plex administrative systems put in place so laboriously by
Montgomery County staff to serve only 500-600 enrollees
raises serious questions about cost effectiveness of the pre
sent decentralized design. Certainly, these systems could
serve neighboring Prince Georges County as well (at a
minimum). Instead, a new Prince Georges County prime
sponsor director is trying to learn the ropes and reinvent the
management wheels for his subdivision. Suggesting a total
Washington-SMSA consortium involving three separate
authorities—Maryland, Virginia and the District of Colum
bia—would probably be too radical in the current political
climate.
However, if consortia were actively encouraged as a mat
ter of policy, clusters of counties, and city/county combina
tions would emerge that could probably reduce the number
of prime sponsorships significantly. For the first six years, as
the number of prime sponsors grew from 402 to 475, the
DOL has been totally neutral in the face of consortia forma
tion and dissolution. This is to suggest that a policy change is
warranted in this area. Consortia should be actively en
couraged. Incentive bonuses of at least 20 percent should be
guaranteed and transmitted at the beginning of the grant
year. Bonus payments have ranged from a high of 10 percent
to a low of 2 percent over the first six years of CETA. Con
sortia bonus funding often arrives 10 months into the fiscal
year. When consortia threaten to dissolve, the DOL should
play the role of active arbiter, seeking to redress grievances
and assuage political egos. The payoffs could be high. A
significant reduction in the number of prime sponsors means
fewer master plans and fewer annual plans to produce and
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read, and fewer modifications to process, and fewer
numbers of reports to complete. The potential impact on the
paperwork crush is tantalizing.
In addition, there are cogent cost effective indicators that
speak to prime sponsor mergers. We have mentioned the ef
fect on management systems, and on the plans/modifica
tions and requisite reports. The choice of vendors and the
contracting process are another area of potential benefit.
Often neighboring prime sponsors contract with the same
vendor, paying double administrative costs and fielding dou
ble monitoring teams. One contract, with a larger number of
enrollees monitored by a single unit, would obviously be
more cost effective and efficient.
Private industry councils are strong advocates of labor
market planning and operations, recognizing access to
broader job markets for applicants and a broader labor pool
for employers. The trend toward multijurisdictional PIC's
speaks to the logic of a free flowing supply and demand
manpower system.

Accountability Issue: Whose?
The decentralized/decategorized CETA concept was in
tended to allow local elected officials, supposedly most
familiar with local labor market needs and local unemploy
ment problems, to put together programs (with federal
funds) to help address those needs and problems. It was and
is intended that local officials be held accountable for
results. But over the first six years, federal intervention has
increased markedly, as indicated in the following directives:
"If job placement is underway, use the services of your local
Employment Service." Montgomery County's funding was
help up until an agreement with ES was produced. "If ser
vices are to be contracted out, give priority to communitybased organizations"; ". . . if'job creation (PSE) is con-
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templated, get union approval of every job . . . and don't
forget to meet with your planning council at least five times a
year, your youth council everytime a youth activity or con
tract is contemplated and your private industry council for
approval of all Title VII expenditures (and a good look-see at
other titles' expenditures as well." To top it off, the local
elected official is held responsible for any and all audit ex
ceptions and disallowed costs encumbered by these newly en
franchised partners! It is time to stop playing political games
with this decentralized system. If a decision is made to hold
the local elected official accountable for funds and out
comes, then he must be allowed to choose his instruments for
local policy implementation based on locally demonstrated
effectiveness. The CETA system has been overly tinkered
with to suit every special interest group. As stated at a recent
Governors' conference, "A rather fanciful form of
federalism has emerged ... it has produced a situation
where no level or set of officials is performing the functions
it is best suited to perform."

Formula Funding Issue
The political price paid for the passage of CETA was
guaranteed funding for every political subdivision, rich or
poor, with 100,000 residents or more. This obviously diluted
the impact that limited dollars could have on seemingly
limitless needs. But just as current talk of a new reindustrialization policy implies targeting and supporting key
industries for expansion and growth while acknowledging
that others may fade, so we may need to develop the political
courage to rework the CETA formula to maximize the im
pact of scarcer dollars on geographic areas of greatest need.
It may be less of a problem than in the early years, now that
local officials have experienced the nightmare of CETA
management problems, funding uncertainties, and audit
problems. Some prime sponsors are voluntarily relinquishing
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funds. This may be a propitious time to rework and retarget
the funding formula.

Expansion Issues: GET A
and Economic Stabilization
As described earlier, most of the changes and expansions
imposed on the CETA system exposed the fragility of the
management structure. In addition, these changes were in
response to immediate national economic problems; the
recession of 1974 created Title VI; the lingering aftermath of
the recession produced the economic stimulus package of
1977. However, national policymakers have failed to con
sider the time required to develop absorptive capacity at the
local level. Adequate leadtime is an absolute necessity if a
quality product is desired. The responsive training in
frastructure that has developed in the CETA system is
capable of expansion, without buckling. Montgomery Coun
ty sees its greatest potential need in vocational English as a
second language and regards its primary deliverer, the Mont
gomery County schools, as capable of handling a quintupled
enrollment! The new set of relationships with the private sec
tor, immeasurably enhanced by the private industry council
(PIC), has just begun to supply new training capacity that
the Montgomery County staff feels could absorb at least
doubling of resources in Title II-B (comprehensive man
power service) and Title VII (private sector initiatives).
However, several administrative policies constrain CETAfunded training activities from their maximum use as a tool
for increasing productivity. First of all, current performance
indicators (soon to be standards) measure cost effectiveness
in very gross terms. Total expenditures divided by total
numbers who "enter employment" equal costs per place
ment. Obviously, this provides little incentive for long term,
highly skilled occupational training. It also provides no en-
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couragement for the prime sponsor to seek out the most
disadvantaged groups and expose them to a sequential array
of costly training ranging from remedial education, survival
skills and motivational reinforcement to skill training. The
short term "quick fix" for the most employable groups
within this target population will give the prime sponsor
highest marks on the current report cards.
A second issue closely related to CETA as a tool for in
creasing productivity deals with the overly cautious attitude
in the Congress and the Department of Labor in regard to
subsidies for the private sector. On-the-job training and
upgrading training are the primary tools for interfacing with
the private sector. Yet both of these program areas are
overlaid with legislative and administrative constraints that
prevent their reaching their full potential. For example,
upgrading assistance can be offered only for entry-level,
deadend jobs. A policy decision is needed that speaks to in
creasing productivity at all levels. Flexibility is needed for
on-the-job training reimbursements that recognizes the 100
percent loss of supervisory productivity during the early
weeks of training for inexperienced workers in many occupa
tions.
The experience of the Montgomery County CETA system,
reinforced across the nation, underscores the largely untap
ped training potential in the private sector, if reasonably
unfettered by excessive regulation.

Conclusion
In concept and in original design, the decentralized CETA
system was expected to meet the employability needs of local
citizens by determining local labor market needs and
assembling a mix of activities delivered by competent local
actors. The Department of Labor, charged with oversight,
had responsibility for training its field representatives,
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establishing accountability measures and assisting the new
prime sponsorship system in creating appropriate manage
ment systems.
As documented in this study and elsewhere, all has not
gone strictly according to plan. But much of significant value
has been accomplished in six years.
Constructive and productive training activities and
management systems are in place throughout the CETA
system. There is a growing body of talented, experienced
managers and operators. There is growing recognition within
the leadership of DOL/ETA that intergovernmental
management and communication systems must be
dramatically improved and that management assistance to
prime sponsors is of highest priority. The Congress gave
birth to a decentralized manpower system over six years ago.
To date, where strong local management and training
capacity exists and flourishes, it appears to be an accident of
birth, not planned parenthood. The issues for the 1980s that
emerge from this study focus on more consolidation at the
local levels, clearer definition of roles between the "feds"
and the "locals," simplified intergovernmental management
systems that encourage the focus on quality training, and
building and supporting local management capacity.

North Carolina Balance-of-State
Decentralization and Discontinuity
Edward F. Dement
MDC, Inc.

Introduction
The study occurred during a period of considerable tur
moil within North Carolina's CETA management hierarchy
and its balance-of-state (BOS) program planning and
delivery system. At the time, it was clear that state CETA of
ficials rarely concerned themselves with the quality of train
ing because they were too busy resolving audits, enforcing
compliance, reporting numbers, and reacting to criticism.
North Carolina's experience suggests that CETA may
have asked too much, too soon, of a BOS system poorly
prepared to handle the responsibilities thrust upon it. Thus
far, management capacity has been inadequate to the
demands of a ponderous system in which problems faced by
local CETA sponsors are exacerbated by the scale and scope
of the BOS service area, the plethora of program operators
rendering CETA services, excessive federal expectations, and
the administrative layering inherent in state government
operations. Rather than being in position to articulate pro
gram policies, refine decisionmaking procedures, and pro
mote training quality, the BOS staff has struggled simply to
function as grants broker and funding conduit for contrac
tors numbering in the hundreds, and projects in the
thousands.
At best, the federal influence on the quality of training in
the BOS has been benign rather than constructive. CETA
regulations have diverted attention at all levels from matters
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of substance to matters of form, and federal policymakers
need to recognize that uniform regulations may not be ap
propriate for sponsors of widely differing sizes and
characteristics. Moreover, federal officials should perhaps
consider upgrading and expanding their BOS technical
assistance and staff development capabilities, while also
assuming at least a share of the responsibility for strengthen
ing substate CETA planning and service delivery capacity.

North Carolina Balance-of-State
North Carolina is the third largest state on the east coast,
with 5.8 million people residing in 100 counties and three
distinct geographic areas—the mountains, the Piedmont,
and the coastal plain. For administering CETA programs,
however, the state is divided into 13 prime sponsor jurisdic
tions: twelve of these sponsors are units of local government,
including North Carolina's five largest cities and seven coun
ties with more than 100,000 inhabitants; the thirteenth
CETA jurisdiction is the balance-of-state, or BOS.

BOS Area and Administrative Structure
The State of North Carolina serves as CETA prime spon
sor for a 90-county BOS area covering 45,000 square miles
and comprising 18 multicounty planning regions. Each of
these regions covers a territory larger than any local CETA
jurisdiction in the state, and annual CETA allocations and
enrollments in the BOS are roughly twice those of the 12
local sponsors combined. Other striking features of the BOS
are its geographic and economic diversity, the dispersion of
its 3.6 million residents, and its paucity of program planning
and delivery infrastructures commony accessible to local
CETA sponsors.
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The BOS is generally characterized as that area lying out
side the state's major industrial, educational, and trade
centers. A panoply of coastal villages, mountain resorts, mill
towns, farming communities, and small-to-medium
manufacturing and trade centers, the BOS contains twothirds of the state's populace with a primarily overwhelming
ly rural population. Other than the 12 localities already
designated as GETA sponsors, fewer than half-a-dozen
towns have more than 50,000 people, and nearly half the
state's population resides outside the corporate limits of
towns having 2,500 people or more.
After World War II, North Carolina began its transforma
tion from a poor agricultural state to a poor manufacturing
state, and its hourly industrial wage rates are currently the
nation's lowest. Although the state now attracts more hightechnology industry, fully half of its manufacturing jobs still
are in the low-wage, declining employment fields of textiles,
apparel, and furniture. And, with few exceptions, the more
sophisticated industrial newcomers gravitate to the more
populous Piedmont cities or to the half-dozen emerging
growth centers in the mountains and coastal plain.
The 3.6 million BOS residents represent over 1.2 million
households, of which 23 percent are nonwhite and 32 percent
contain at least one CETA-eligible member. Demographic
data show the incidence of socioeconomic distress to be
greatest for minority families and for those headed by
women; nearly half of all nonwhite and female-headed
families contain at least one individual eligible for CETA
services.

Government Structure
and CETA Infrastructure
Rural North Carolina had no local infrastructure to ab
sorb large-scale employment and training activities at the
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time of CETA's inception, although numerous program
operators had emerged under federal manpower initiatives
of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Creation of a statefinanced manpower council in 1971 constituted the first step
toward a statewide planning capacity for employment and
training programs. Another significant event that year was a
gubernatorial executive order designating in each of 17 (now
18) multicounty planning jurisdictions a single regional agent
to assist local governments in matters pertaining to state and
federal grants. Until 1974, however, these lead regional
organizations (LROs) played only a tangential role with
respect to manpower programs, serving largely as informa
tion brokers and advocates of better coordination among
program operators.
In May 1974, just two months before CETA's implemen
tation, North Carolina's first Republican governor since
Reconstruction announced the consolidation, at the LRO
level, of all responsibilities for federally financed programs
concerned with family planning, child development, nutri
tion, and services to the elderly—programs formerly
operated by local community action agencies (CAAs)
through contracts with state government. Consonant with
the dismantling of OEO nationally, this 1974 state policy
sought to eliminate most if not all of North Carolina's
CAAs. In effect, LRO boards, comprising elected officials
from member local governments, were given control over
local "human services" programs. Moreover, LROs were
assigned responsibility for planning CETA activities in the
BOS and given the option to assume administrative duties
for local manpower programs—many of which were
operated previously by CAAs. The new policy, while making
community-based recipients of federal funds more accoun
table to local officials, carried no safeguards to protect either
the quality of LRO planning or the credentials of LRO staff
performing CETA assignments.
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Thus, CETA was implemented in July 1974 amidst swirl
ing controversy—a class-action suit against the governor on
behalf of 37 CAAs, and the delegation of CETA planning
duties in the BOS to nongovernmental entities ill-prepared to
handle them effectively. Ironically, the state policymakers
who insisted on decentralizing the planning and administra
tion of CETA's Title I programs in 1974 eschewed the op
portunity one year later to approach the new Title VI public
service employment (PSE) program in the same manner. In
stead, they chose to administer PSE funds by negotiating
directly with state agencies and local governments or by
channeling funds to BOS program agents where required by
law.
Although CETA staff and funding have grown immensely
since 1975, the BOS system in place during this study remain
ed much the same as it was then. The state sponsor serves
primarily as funding conduit and program monitor; all ser
vices under Title II-B (old Title I) are still planned by the
LROs, and PSE programs are handled directly by local
governments except in the growing number of localities
where disenchanted elected officials have declined further
CETA involvement. One major change, however, is that
LROs no longer have the option to administer CETA pro
grams. That experiment, which produced more problems
than it solved, was terminated soon after a new governor
took office in 1977. Practically every CETA program im
plemented since 1974 has bypassed the LRO system,
although BOS staff have recently begun reversing that trend
by assigning LROs new planning and proposal review
responsibilities for some youth programs under Title IV.
At the state level, CETA is administered by the depart
ment of natural resources and community development
(NRCD), a new state agency created in 1977 and headed by a
gubernatorial appointee, one of the state's foremost black
political leaders. Within NRCD, CETA functions are now
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lodged in the division of employment and training—a new
unit created while this study was in progress, and one of nine
NRCD divisions reporting directly to the department's depu
ty secretary. When the study commenced, the BOS operation
was supported by a staff of 190, and functioned in
dependently of the state employment and training council
(SETC), also housed within NRCD. In August 1980,
however, state officials announced a major CETA
reorganization, precipitated by extensive media criticism and
the recognition of serious administrative deficiencies.
Under the new arrangements, BOS planning and field
operations, SETC activities, and the state's independent
CETA monitoring unit were merged into a single NRCD
division under a new executive director of employment and
training, while all CETA fiscal management, fiscal technical
assistance, reporting, and property control functions were
assigned to a new independent comptroller. Both the comp
troller and the executive director now report to the NRCD
deputy secretary.

BOS Funding and Enrollment Levels
Altogether, CETA various titles and special programs ac
counted for almost $120 million in new BOS allocations in
fiscal 1979, when over 70,000 persons participated in statesponsored CETA programs. The BOS also looms large when
enrollments are compared with those of the state's 12 local
sponsors: of the 29,500 North Carolinians receiving Title
II-B services statewide during the 1979 fiscal year, 18,000
were in the BOS. Of the 41,370 Title IV youth participants
statewide, the BOS served over 30,000. And among the
state's 26,162 PSE enrollees in 1979, over 19,100 were BOS
residents.
To implement its CETA programs, the BOS relies on a
staggering number of contractors and local operators.
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Although the numbers vary almost daily, the April 1980
count included 272 contractors, 1,665 programs, and 4,881
separate program budgets in effect. This magnitude of
CETA activity may explain, at least in part, why the BOS has
a six-year history of grant underspending and chronic in
completeness of its statistical reports to the federal regional
office.

Prime Sponsor Operations
Owing to the size of its service area, the rapidity of
CETA's growth, and the diversity of programs under its pur
view, the BOS has had little choice but to assume the role of
planning facilitator, grants broker, and compliance monitor.
The state office has no direct operational role for any CETA
program, but serves instead as contracting agent for all
funds allocated to the prime sponsor. It is apparent,
however, that the administrative approaches employed
under various CETA titles are rarely unified and sometimes
defy coordination at any level.

Planning and Decisionmaking
Although CETA provides all sponsors the statutory
authority to plan their own employment and training pro
grams, the BOS has seldom exercised its planning
prerogatives—consistently opting, instead, to delegate decisionmaking authority to others. In essence, planning at the
state level consists largely of devising ground rules and
timetables for others to follow. Thus, while the BOS staff
performs a broad grants planning function, it rarely engages
in the more substantive conceptual and operational planning
of local CETA activities.
The potential centerpiece of BOS planning (and perhaps
the state's best hope for eventually building strong decision-
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making capabilities throughout its rural areas) is the decen
tralized LRO planning process for Title II-B/C programs—a
well-defined and conceptually sound sequence executed
under the attentive guidance of state office coordinators.
The product of six years' maturation and refinement, this
process requires annual analyses of local needs and ultimate
ly determines regional program mix and service delivery
strategies. One limitation, however, is that the Title II-B/C
funds planned in this manner account for only 20-25 percent
of all CETA resources in the typical BOS region.
Planning formats for other CETA titles vary sharply in
overall approach, coherence and depth: procedures for Title
II-D and VI PSE programs are unrelated to those for Title
II-B/C. Not only does Title IV youth planning differ from
all other titles, but its program subparts each proceed on in
dependent tracks. And Title VII private sector initiative
planning resembles none of the above. Clearly, the tendency
since 1974 has been to introduce each new federal initiative
under its own special set of "house rules" and administrative
approaches—a practice that frustrates the efforts of BOS
staff, LRO planners, and local operators to coordinate their
respective activities.
The record of BOS planning councils (and many of the
substate regional advisory committees) generally has been in
auspicious. Four BOS planning councils were appointed in
CETA's first six years; each time, initial flurries of council
activity gradually subsided into lethargy. The July 1980
meeting of a reconstituted BOS council was its first meeting
in more than a year, although three of its subcommittees had
served as sounding boards for staff recommendations in the
interim. At the LRO level, CETA advisory committees range
from a highly active few to those that seem almost nonexis
tent. One common characteristic, however, is that none
engages in planning sufficiently comprehensive to embrace
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all, or even most, of the various CETA titles and program
subparts. Instead, they have focused almost exclusively on
Title II-B program mix decisions and, beginning in fiscal
1980, on Title IV summer programs.
Overall, three sets of actors appear to wield greatest in
fluence in BOS planning and decisionmaking—the state
staff, LRO planners, and local operators. Their program
planning efforts may be constrained, however, by an
overabundance of federal CETA rules, regulations, and re
quirements, by a detached BOS administrative style that
seems at times to be systems-oriented almost to a fault, and
by well-intended but somewhat inflexible management pro
cedures which can, unless applied judiciously, cause the
elimination of good programs on technicalities while failing
to correct (or even to notice) serious operational deficiencies
in others.

BOS Management Practices
Effective management has been thwarted by instability of
BOS leadership and an absence of supportive guidance or
policies from top state officials. Given the pressures of
CETA's rapid growth, eight directorship changes in six
years, and a half-dozen staff reorganizations, it is understan
dable how management by crisis became the BOS norm. In
some respects, internal systems for grant management and
program oversight are quite sophisticated; key recordkeeping, verification, and monitoring systems are in place and
function well. In other areas, however, the BOS clearly
shows the effects of CETA growth that occurred before the
state sponsor was prepared to accommodate it.
The state's management information system (MIS), for
example, digests a plethora of fiscal, client, and operational
data, and it cranks out reams of statistical reports. One
possible flaw, however—aside from persistent problems of
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incompleteness that may be inherent in any system tracking
1,700 programs and 70,000 people—is that data generated
for DOL reporting purposes is rarely what BOS managers
need to run CETA effectively. Aggregated data can often
mask major problems that exist within certain regions or on
the part of certain operators. For program managers to iden
tify and correct emerging problems before programs become
unsalvageable, however, would require a combination of
better and more timely data (disaggregated by locality and
program type), and greater familiarity with program pro
cesses and specific operational idiosyncrasies than what is
now routinely derived through BOS compliance monitoring
activities.
The BOS monitors its programs rigorously, but the focus
is on technical compliance to the near exclusion of program
substance. One 30-page BOS monitoring guide, for instance,
examines all imaginable aspects of Title II-B operations
other than those concerning program process and con
tent—two variables critical to the quality of CETA training
activities. By stressing statutory and regulatory compliance,
the monitoring process insures that BOS programs are clean
and legal, but it does not permit policymakers to evaluate
what works, what doesn't, and why. Evaluation, where at
tempted at all, occurs only in a handful of regions where
LRO planners have devised their own procedures with en
couragement and financial help from the state.
Performance data and monitoring reports are incor
porated into decisionmaking for some CETA titles through a
new system called "demonstrated effectiveness"—a process
that exempts proven operators from the competitive bidding
required of other prospective contractors. This approach,
while still being perfected, resulted from a commendable
BOS staff initiative and should help to enhance future pro
gram quality. One inherent danger, however, is that it tends
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to reflect the prime sponsor's propensity to manage yearend
reports rather than programs in progress. BOS staff are now
taking steps to insure that the process will accomplish more
than simply to encourage turnover among program
operators.
The independent CETA monitoring unit (IMU) establish
ed in 1979 initially bore little relationship to other BOS
monitoring efforts, dwelling instead on suspected cases of
fiscal abuse. Recently, IMU was placed under a new state
CETA director, where its activities can build upon and be
coordinated with those of other BOS field monitors. This, in
turn, should permit BOS field staff to place greater emphasis
on the substantive, qualitative, and systemic problems faced
by local operators.
Thus far, the BOS management environment has been one
in which planners, managers, auditors, and data specialists
communicated only rarely, and where each spoke a different
language when discussions were attempted. These problems,
however, seem largely attributable to an absence of stable
leadership during most of CETA's history, and not to the
presence of intractable problems among staff.

Organizational Staffing,
Stability, and Development
In June 1980, the 190-member BOS staff included 16 ad
ministrative executives, 105 professionals, 66 office and
clerical workers, and 3 technicians. Overall, the staff was 52
percent female and 27 percent nonwhite—much higher pro
portions than in other divisions within the state department
responsible for CETA.
The size of the BOS staff at mid-1980 was roughly eight
times that during CETA's first year of existence. Problems
predictable in any organization undergoing such rapid
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growth were exacerbated in North Carolina by leadership
turnover, sagging staff morale, and the constraints of two
personnel systems; the state merit system (of which CETA is
a part) and the departmental system governing all divisions
within NRCD.
Bringing CETA under the state's merit system in 1977
reduced the incidence of patronage appointments to CETA
jobs, but it also had the effect of depressing staff salaries
while making it more difficult for BOS managers either to
acquire new staff or to reassign those on board. Before being
submitted for merit system action, however, all BOS staff
changes now must also clear NRCD's own personnel
hurdles, and the department has not always proved respon
sive to urgent CETA requests. For example, a six-month
departmental delay in refilling a key PSE grants manager's
position—vacated in April 1980—forced a $30 million PSE
program to be handled by others on a catch-as-catch-can
basis. Other crucial actions, including the appointment of
the new CETA director, have been delayed for many, many
months.
To put CETA's salary scale into perspective, the current
BOS director is responsible for an annual budget only slight
ly less than that for the entire state community college
system, but his $27,000 annual salary upon assuming the
position in August 1980 was less than that of a high school
principal in the Raleigh area. Typically, other senior ad
ministrative positions range downward from the midtwenties, while middle managers and other professionals
earn from the mid-teens to low twenties.
While BOS staff salaries are generally beneath those for
comparable jobs in many other state and local agencies in the
capital area, they are far better than those for LRO planners
and local CETA practitioners across the BOS. With LRO
planners making as little as $12,000 annually and local pro-
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gram directors often earning barely more than PSE par
ticipants, it is unrealistic to expect GETA to attract proven
professionals into its vacant positions. Thus far, however,
the state sponsor has had little influence on the regressive
wage structures in many rural counties and community
organizations, and has seldom attempted to resolve
remunerative inequities at either the state or the local level.
Instability at the top, with eight acting or permanent direc
tors in six years, accounts perhaps more than any other fac
tor for the low morale and extensive internal fragmentation
evident during this study. Since August 1980, NRCD of
ficials have placed their CETA fortunes in the hands of a
proven administrator hired from one of the state's local
sponsors, and he has assembled a new management team
capable of revitalizing what had become a catatonic BOS
operation by mid-year. Given time and continued support
from above, qualitative improvements are almost a certain
ty.
Staff development has seldom been a BOS priority, either
in the state office or at the substate planning and operational
levels. A GETA-financed employment and training institute
was created in 1978 to address this problem, but until recent
ly it shunned staff development in favor of convening
numerous CETA-related conferences. While state officials
say that past communications problems were largely resolved
in 1980, the institute has little credibility with BOS operators
and its survival now appears to be in considerable doubt.

Planning and Service
Delivery Infrastructure
While the basic Title II-B planning process is conceptually
sound, BOS staff recognize that two essentials—CETA plan
ning expertise and LRO organizational commitment—are
sometimes lacking at the substate regional level. When the
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state delegated CETA planning to the LROs in 1974, it set no
controls on the qualifications of regional planners or on the
performance of quasi-governmental entities whose organiza
tional philosophies tend to reflect rural southern conser
vatism.
Although CETA pumps millions annually into each of the
18 BOS planning regions, CETA's programs and services
seldom receive high LRO priority, and CETA planning posi
tions are often characterized by low pay and high turnover.
In the absence of formal training or credentialing standards
for new LRO planners, CETA expertise is something ac
quired chiefly through trial and error. Once acquired,
however, this regional expertise can also vanish with the
departure of a single experienced individual, which suggests
that the BOS planning infrastructure may lack permanence
and stability. In many regions, the planning process still
centers on program mix, and perhaps no more than half of
the present LRO planners are sufficiently skilled to design
sound programs or engineer cohesive delivery systems.
Service delivery arrangements vary widely from one region
to another, but in most few "systems" exist for delivering
CETA services. The BOS designates no presumptive
operators of any CETA program, and contractors are
selected either by competitive bidding or by certification as
having demonstrated effectiveness. Despite the regional
variations, however, three delivery agents predominate in the
BOS; local offices of the state employment service (ES),
local community colleges, and nonprofit community-based
organizations.
Depending on regional preferences, programs may be
operated by any or all of these organizations independently,
one agency may be designated to contract for all programs
(offering some services of its own and subcontracting for
others) or, as in one region, counties may establish special
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departments to operate programs under all CETA titles.
These latter arrangements, however, are rare; like most rural
environs, the BOS area is seldom conducive to highly coor
dinated delivery systems. Operators and population centers
are generally too isolated from one another to relate in any
significant way, even for programs under the same CETA ti
tle. And, with the multiplicity of BOS administrative ap
proaches to various CETA titles, the design of coordinated
comprehensive CETA delivery systems has become a prac
tical impossibility.

Political Climate
In 1980, CETA was a heated election-year issue in North
Carolina. Grand juries investigated several contracts with
clear political overtones, county commissioners tagged
CETA as their least favored federal program in a special
statewide poll, the challenger to the incumbent governor
made CETA a central issue during his negativist campaign,
and the state auditor (an independent elected official) releas
ed several reports critical of the state's CETA programs.
Considerable attention focused on the secretary of NRCD,
much of it deriving from CETA audits released by the same
state auditor whose 1976 opponent was backed by the
secretary. Press releases concerning the "resolution" of
millions of dollars of questioned CETA costs came across in
the newspapers sounding as if state CETA officials were
forgiving sloppy program management as a matter of
routine. And a programmatic audit of the 1979 summer
youth program, performed by the state auditor's staff under
contract with DOL's regional office, attempted to discredit
CETA officials by alleging poor BOS management of a huge
program which, to more informed observers, was an un
qualified success.
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Politics, whether or not partisan in origin, have clearly af
fected North Carolina's CETA programs almost from their
inception. Not only must BOS administrators cope with
political pressures inherent in state government, but they
must also consider the preferences of 90 counties whose
political leadership may or may not be attuned to federal and
state CETA priorities. In the past year, for example, a
number of rural BOS counties proved either unable or un
willing to implement the new PSE training provisions under
Title II-D. Thus BOS staff members found themselves with
difficult political choices; i.e., to deobligate PSE funds in
those counties, perhaps inviting clashes with local govern
ments, or to risk more audit exceptions and negative publici
ty by failing to meet the Title II-D training expenditure re
quirements.

The Federal Influence
The BOS seems to enjoy excellent rapport with its DOL
regional office representative, an individual who clearly has
gained both the confidence and respect of state staff in the
three years since his present assignment began. Even so, it
appears that the relationship is limited. Transactions be
tween state staff and their "fed rep" most often concern
matters of technical compliance, federal priorities, and DOL
timetables. They rarely extend to the thorny problems of
BOS administration and almost never impinge on local pro
gram planning or operations. To cover these areas adequate
ly, however, would necessitate a greater commitment of
federal field staff than the single individual who currently
must divide his time between the BOS sponsor and other inhouse DOL assignments.
State staff and the DOL representative both feel that na
tional policymakers, in devising new programs and im
plementation strategies, often have failed to give large state
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sponsors adequate consideration. In the BOS, a CETA
system begun in 1974 was loaded heavily—overloaded, in
fact—by successive federal initiatives introduced before the
state had established its capacity to plan and manage effec
tively. Moreover, an unending stream of regulations and
directives from Washington has hampered BOS efforts to
educate even its own in-house staff units, much less those of
nearly 300 contractors in 18 substate regions.
Recent developments in the state office raise major ques
tions about the adequacy and the effectiveness of federal
oversight as it pertains to large state sponsors. Although
DOL conducts annual assessments of BOS performance,
these have consistently stressed compliance with new regula
tions while rarely addressing issues of far greater conse
quence. In 1980, for instance, DOL's formal assessment
found that the BOS private industry council was improperly
constituted, that efforts to remove architectural barriers for
the handicapped were inadequate, that eligibility verification
and enrollee grievance procedures were incomplete, and that
inventories of potential PSE contractors were insufficient.
At the time, however, the state's CETA program was in
considerable turmoil and receiving widespread media
criticism over the mishandling of funds by an OIC affiliate
and three private firms headed by the president of the state
AFL-CIO. By coincidence, during the same week of the
DOL assessment, a special investigative team from the
governor's office was compiling its own report, identifying
major flaws in BOS contract approval, fiscal management,
fiscal technical assistance, and internal coordination pro
cedures. These problems were the proximate cause for the
subsequent dismissal of the seventh BOS director, the hiring
of an independent CETA comptroller, and a complete
reorganization of the state CETA office. None of these
crucial points, however, were addressed by the DOL review.
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Federal officials may need to consider fundamental
changes in both the frequency and scope of their formal
assessments if DOL oversight is to become more than a
hollow exercise. Experience suggests that one-week visits by
unfamiliar teams are insufficient even to recognize substan
tive problems, much less correct them. Of particular interest
to this study was that DOL's assessments of the past four
years fail to include a single reference to BOS planning, local
service delivery, or the appropriateness and quality of CETA
training activities. One problem, apparently, is that rigid in
struments devised in Washington force their users to waste
hours on trivia, while denying them the flexibility to pursue
items of obvious import. Procedural refinements are clearly
needed, but may also prove futile so long as DOL's
assessments seek only to identify problems without showing
CETA sponsors the means for solving them.
The reliability and usefulness of federal statistical reports
also seems suspect. It was August 1980, for instance, before
the BOS could provide final grant closeout figures on fiscal
1979 expenditures, and these varied considerably from
earlier estimates. In the rush to file required DOL reports on
time, accuracy and completeness are sometimes unaffordable luxuries—as evidenced by the 7,500-person difference
between BOS enrollments reported at the end of fiscal 1979
and the final tallies of carry-forward enrollments later shown
in 1980 quarterly summaries. Such major discrepancies are
seldom reconciled, however, unless DOL officials compare
new reports with those filed previously. And current federal
reporting requirements now seem to give neither BOS staff
nor DOL recipients enough time to reflect on old reports or
to tabulate more accurate updates.
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Training Policies, Practices,
and Potential for Expansion
To the extent that BOS training policies exist, they are
policies implicit in the sponsor's commitment to decentraliz
ed planning and program development. All major decisions
on training under Title II-B are delegated to the LRO level,
while most training decisions with respect to CETA's PSE
titles are made at the county level. The BOS has no formal
policy preferences regarding the role of training in the CETA
services continuum, nor any concerning the alternative types
of training provided to CETA's participants. As a result,
decisions at the LRO and county levels may be influenced as
much by past tradition as by formal planning, and by the
needs of institutions as much as the needs of CETA clients.
The absence of coherent BOS policy perhaps also accounts
for the fact that training is emphasized in some regions but
receives low priority in others. Although training facilities
abound in most regions, there are no policy imperatives for
LRO planners and local program operators to link with such
existing resources as the state's nationally recognized system
of community colleges and technical institutes or the statefinanced prevocational training programs offered by 47 of
the 58 schools in that system.
Owing largely to the 1978 elimination of PSE as an
allowable Title II-B activity (one instance in which the BOS
did devise a clear policy before it became CETA law), the
state has gradually increased its proportion of Title II-B
dollars spent in support of classroom training and OJT ac
tivities from 41 percent of all expenditures in fiscal 1979 to a
planned 48 percent in fiscal 1981. By far, the preferred BOS
training modes are those offering maximum flexibility in
rural labor markets—individual referrals to community col
lege vocational and technical courses, job readiness training
of brief duration, and OJT.
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Course Selection and Duration
of Training
Courses and skills training categories for Title II-B are
normally identified during the annual planning process con
ducted at the substate regional level, and occupational areas
are generally limited to those in which there are known
demands for additional workers. This process, however, re
quires little specificity with respect to enrollee targeting or
the relative emphasis to be placed on various occupations in
on-the-job and individual referral training programs. Lists
of permissible training categories are developed, but most
LRO planners simply delegate to program operators the final
determinations on who gets trained and for what.
Duration of skills training varies by planning region, train
ing facility, and occupational area, but in no case is permit
ted to exceed one year. Typically, class-size skills training
ranges from 26 to 52 weeks, while individual referral training
conforms to the regular semester or quarterly calendars of
local community colleges—varying from as little as three
months (for certificate programs, such as nurse aides) to a
full year (for diploma programs in business, building trades,
and other fields).

Relative Emphasis on Training
Versus Other Activities
Despite the appearance of heavy fiscal commitments to
training under Title II-B, only 30 percent of the 70,000 fiscal
1979 CETA participants in the BOS were exposed to some
form of training activity. Excluding the 6,200 youth who
entered brief summer remediation programs, just 22 percent
of other CETA enrollees were provided institutional training
or OJT. By mid-1980, this figure had increased to 26 percent
of all enrollments, largely as a result of gains under CETA's
PSE titles. (Most PSE training, however, is of the ab-
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breviated job-search variety; although training of greater
depth and duration is being contemplated in some BOS
counties, this seems unlikely to occur extensively because of
inherent limitations in using PSE as a training vehicle.)
Most BOS training occurs under authority of Title II-B; in
fiscal 1979, over 41 percent of all expenditures under this ti
tle were associated with institutional and on-the-job training
programs. (By comparison, just 2.2 percent of all Title II-D
PSE expenditures supported training activities that year,
despite a 10 percent statutory requirement—a clear indica
tion of the difficulty the BOS has experienced in implemen
ting the new federal training provisions for PSE.) Viewed by
cost category rather than by type of activity, however, a
much different pattern emerges: Just 14 percent of all II-B
expenditures in 1979 involved the purchase of instructional
services and training materials, compared with 61 percent for
enrollee wages and allowances, 16 percent for client services,
and 9 percent for local administrative costs. Overall, 86 per
cent of all Title II-B expenditures covered costs other than
instruction in occupational, basic literacy, and employability
skills programs.

Applicant Access
and Participant Characteristics
In several of the better-coordinated regions, CETA ap
plicants have reasonable access to a number of training alter
natives; elsewhere, however, both the type and the quality of
training an applicant receives depend largely upon which
operator's door the individual reaches first.
Concerning who gets referred to which programs, distinct
patterns are evident. Blacks and women enter class-size oc
cupational and prevocational training far more frequently
than they enter OJT, where whites and males predominate.
Veterans are concentrated in individual referral, OJT, and
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PSE programs. And, overall, the prime sponsor's PSE
enrollees tend to be older, whiter, better educated, and more
heavily male than its Title II-B trainees. It may or may not be
the state's preference that most of its OJT and individual
referral participants are white, while most prevocational and
CETA class-size skills training participants are black. But
this, apparently, is part of the price paid for decentralized
planning in the absence of a BOS training policy framework.

Institutional Training Occupations
Because operations are decentralized and applicant selec
tion decisions have been delegated to nearly 300 contractors,
the BOS staff rarely has current information on how many
people are being trained, for what, or by whom. Conscien
tious regional planners and BOS field monitors may keep
tabs on their respective substate territories, but there is
seldom any state-level aggregation of training data and
almost never any analysis. Nine months into fiscal 1980,
neither the BOS staff nor the state department of community
colleges (which provides most skills training) had generated
summary information on fiscal 1979 CETA occupational
training categories. Although the state employment service
(ES) later compiled a list of occupational titles from its 1979
allowance payment records, BOS managers had no such in
formation until long after training had ended, thus raising
the possibility that CETA training activities could, in the ag
gregate, be inconsistent with BOS occupational growth and
demand patterns.
According to ES, 7,212 individuals entered BOS
classroom training in fiscal 1979. Of these, 3,135 enrolled in
programs offering specific occupational skills, with over
two-thirds entering the building trades (19.8 percent),
secretarial and general office training (13.1), industrial pro
grams (11.9), medical sciences (11.0), and automotive fields
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(10.5). As opposed to the 3,135 enrollees in specific occupa
tional programs, however, the majority of BOS institutional
trainees (4,077) entered short-term prevocational, remedial,
and developmental activities. Steering 57 percent of all BOS
trainees into employability development programs rather
than towards specific occupational skills may have been en
tirely consistent with the needs of disadvantaged applicants
in rural labor markets; in the absence of a BOS training
policy framework, however, this point remains unaddressed.
And while enrolling over 3,000 CETA participants in skills
training is no small accomplishment, that number represents
but 0.1 percent of the state's labor force and only a tiny frac
tion of its CETA eligibles.

Placement Results
Analysis of post-training placements revealed that only 25
percent of all BOS institutional training terminees actually
entered employment in fiscal 1979, while substate regional
placement rates ranged from a high of 45 percent to a low of
7 percent. Overall job accession rates for class-size and in
dividual referral skills training terminees were 29 percent,
compared with 27 percent for prevocational training ter
minees.
Two factors, in particular, seemed to account for the low
overall placement rates recorded in 1979—the slackening
economy, and the fact that the CETA "count" of terminees
entering employment was taken at the time a participant
either completed or quit a given program. As a result, the
placement percentages failed to include those terminees who
obtained jobs within a few days or weeks after their official
termination dates. The overall placement rate for institu
tional training programs was further diminished by the fact
that only 9 percent of all basic and remedial education ter
minees entered employment; instead of moving directly into

286

jobs, most of these were transferred to other CETA titles
and programs.
OJT programs, by comparison, reported an overall 55 per
cent placement rate, with substate regional levels ranging
from 24 to 67 percent. The relatively greater placement suc
cess under OJT, however, seems largely attributable to the
fact that OJT completers are, by definition, already
employed. Moreover, post-training retention by the OJT
employer is a contractual requirement in the BOS.

Potential for Expansion
In effect, the CETA system in North Carolina has bought
in on an existing vocational and technical training
resource—the state's community college system, with its an
nual state appropriations of over $140 million. The scale of
this buy-in, however, has been miniscule: The 3,135 CETA
individual and class-size trainees enrolled from the BOS last
year barely exceeded the annual student enrollment at one
school visited during this study, and there are 57 others in the
statewide system. Typically, annual CETA enrollment at any
one school represents no more than 5 percent of total student
enrollment, while CETA accounts for only 2 to 3 percent of
the school's annual operating budget.
Ironically, the state's fine system of community colleges
and technical institutes, constructed at great public expense
just 15 years ago, now finds itself strapped financially by
state budgetary constraints on the one hand and spiralling
operating costs on the other, while the state's CETA pro
gram consistently finds itself unable to spend its annual
allocations expeditiously. In short, federal money is abun
dant in a CETA system unprepared to handle it, while the
training system equipped to handle it is money-poor.
Clearly, there is great potential for expansion of BOS
training activity. Little would be achieved, however, by
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simply increasing CETA budgets in community colleges
without enunciating clear policy preferences with respect to
target groups and training priorities. The prime sponsor
should also reconsider current practices that permit dual
standards of costs for training programs in nonprofit
organizations versus those in mainline institutions.

Training Quality
Based on observations of eight training agencies handling
over two dozen BOS training contracts, it appears that
CETA thus far has had little influence on the quality of
training rendered to its participants. Owing to service area
size, federal compliance pressures, post-1978 diversion of
staff attention from matters of substance to matters of form,
and the administrative discontinuity associated with repeated
BOS leadership changes, examining the quality of CETA
training has generally been an unaffordable luxury for state
staff.
Among the CETA vocational programs observed during
this study, those operated in two community colleges were of
consistently high quality—the norm for all programs on
those campuses. Training curricula not only were thorough
but also were developed by committees of local employers
and other advisors. The schools, both of them formally ac
credited, had numerous safeguards to ensure high quality
standards. Facilities were both spacious and well equipped,
and CETA applicants had access to a broad range of training
options on each campus. In contrast, a third institution
visited—a Job Corps center operated for DOL by a private
firm which also holds a state contract for occupational ex
ploration services in one BOS region—was poorly ad
ministered and ill-equipped. The training environment was
not only inappropriate for learning, but also threatening to
enrollee psychological and physical well-being. Nevertheless,
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this program serving 10 participants received an annual
CETA budget almost as large as that of a community college
training 200 people annually in another BOS region.
Prevocational training programs were observed in one
county where a state-financed community college program
receiving no CETA funds was operating within a mile of an
QIC-sponsored pre-job program serving essentially the same
clientele. Even though the community college prevocational
program in that county has a six-year history of successful
programming, is financed under a performance-based state
formula, operates with a staff of four, and could have been a
tuition-free resource, it is not used as a CETA program. For
whatever reasons, the QIC program was instituted two years
ago as a special BOS project, is 100 percent CETA funded,
has twice the staff and three times the budget, but clearly
lacks the experience, staff expertise, and the instructional
sophistication of the community college program.
Each of the OJT programs visited—one operated by a
community-based organization, one by ES, and a third by
the State Department of Labor—was of good overall quali
ty. The strengths of these programs, however, derived not so
much from attributes of the CETA system as from the
caliber of the individuals staffing them. And, in each case,
local staff cited aspects of the current CETA system that
tend to suppress rather than enhance program quality. From
conversations with these operators, it appears that the BOS
system has not yet matured sufficiently to recognize and rec
tify major systemic problems that may affect a number of
substate regions.
ES, for instance, is sometimes ineffective as an OJT con
tractor because CETA-financed staff in some local offices
are constrained unduly by ES convention or diverted from
OJT duties by local managers who give CETA low priority.
A striking example was seen in one region where the same
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two individuals handling a state DOL-sponsored OJT pro
gram that is considered one of the best in the BOS had met
little success while running that program under ES auspices
until ES lost its contract two years ago. In another region
where ES has an outstanding OJT program, an enlightened
local office manager insists that CETA be a top priority of
every employee in his office. He has discovered ways to
make OJT and other CETA programs not only palatable to
local employers, but attractive as well. In effect, he has built
a competitive market for OJT contracts, and both his OJT
placement and retention rates are consistently high. This
manager noted, however, that he had received but one visit
for a BOS staff member in the past five years. And, as a
result, few ES administrators elsewhere have benefited from
the lessons he has learned while spending over 500,000
CETA dollars since 1975.
The OJT program run by a community action agency in
another region also enjoys the reputation of quality pro
gramming. Its staff indicated, however, that rigid BOS ad
ministrative cost limitations have prevented them from
maintaining their past effectiveness in the face of the sagging
local economy. There are simply too few staff members to
handle the increased employer contacts required to locate
jobs during recessionary times, and staff who are available
desperately need training in OJT marketing techniques in
order to reach the larger employers traditionally hesitant to
participate in the program. Thus far, however, training pro
vided by the state has consisted of a single workshop to
review federal OJT regulations for compliance purposes.
One obvious barrier to improving the overall quality of
CETA training in the BOS is the historical absence of even
rudimentary evaluative systems capable of comparing
various contractors and their implementation strategies, fer
reting out approaches that work and those that do not, and
isolating the critical variables that seem to make a difference.
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Although BOS staff have recently made commendable ef
forts to engender qualitative improvements through rigorous
annual bidding and contractor selection procedures, the
unintentional result to date may have been to promote
greater turnover among local operators rather than better
quality within existing operations.

Conclusions and Recommendations
CETA's legacy in the BOS is one of rapid growth, fre
quent change, and chronic instability at its highest ad
ministrative levels. Despite occasional expressions of interest
and commitment from top state government officials, GETA
thus far has not received their sustained active involvement.
BOS administrators, besides coping with the managerial
complexities of a CETA program of immense proportions,
must also compensate for operational dispersion, ad
ministrative layering, and other limitations seldom con
fronted by local sponsors. And they must deal with political
influences, partisan and otherwise, which raise issues
distinctly different from those in most localities, while con
forming to the same federal expectations, administrative
guidelines, and compliance deadlines as local sponsors.
These and other factors may account for the ad
ministrative style typifying BOS operations since 1974—a
style that often left little room for attention to qualitative
issues. In terms of CETA planning and decisionmaking, the
BOS has performed commendably in designing and refining
a decentralized planning process for programs under Title IIB, which supports the bulk of BOS training activity. The
relative importance of that process has gradually diminished,
however, as a gaggle of new programs and CETA titles
spawned additional federal requirements and administrative
tasks. By fiscal 1980, the result was a multiplicity of looselycoordinated BOS planning and management systems, most
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of them circumventing the Title II-B planning system which
formerly constituted the heart of the state's decisionmaking
process.
Devising unified, cohesive management systems was fur
ther frustrated by leadership changes, multiple reorganiza
tions, conflicting CETA goals, and the administrative isola
tion of BOS staff from local programs. Prime sponsor con
tact with program operators has tended more to enforce
compliance than to assess program content, promote quali
ty, or effect substantive improvements. Fiscal management
has been especially difficult, and problems surfacing in 1980
triggered yet another revamping of a BOS administrative
structure thus far inadequate to handle the demands placed
upon it.
Rather than having to establish a new training system for
CETA, the BOS had ready access to occupational and prejob training through the state's existing network of
autonomous community colleges, locally-chartered institu
tions offering many quality safeguards. CETA's buy-in for
such training has been small, however, and only rarely has
CETA concerned itself with the content or appropriateness
of these schools' offerings. Outside the community college
system, where some training contractors seem to function
without benefit of quality standards, there is evidence that
major deficiencies in CETA-funded programs can persist in
definitely. To date, the BOS has placed far more emphasis
on managing CETA grants than on creating the policy
framework and planning capacity to foster training pro
grams of consistently good quality. And, entering CETA's
seventh year, the BOS still has no coherent policies concern
ing who gets trained, for what, or by whom.
There have been encouraging signs in recent months,
however. State CETA leaders and other key state officials
now seem to generally agree on the need for devising new
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training policies and renewing the state's commitment to
economic and labor force development—two areas in which
GETA can make important contributions. The recently
reconstituted state CETA staff—including a new executive
director, BOS director, and SETC director—is clearly the
most experienced and capable North Carolina has ever had.
Given time and the latitude to run CETA openly and profes
sionally, the future may be bright indeed. To date, however,
the path has been difficult and the public perception of
CETA has deteriorated steadily.
CETA may have expected too much, too soon, of a BOS
system poorly prepared to handle the duties heaped upon it
since 1974. Yet, other than the assistance provided by the
single DOL representative assigned to the BOS, federal
guidance has consisted mostly of a flood of written instruc
tions specifying what should be done, but not hqw. Federal
oversight has been concerned far more with numbers and
compliance than with capacity-building or substance, and in
terms of affecting the quality of CETA training programs,
the federal influence has been at best benign, and not con
structive. Moreover, recent developments in the BOS seem to
raise doubts not only concerning federal capacity to correct
major administrative deficiencies, but also concerning the
ability of DOL's annual assessment process to even detect
them.
The six-year BOS experience indeed reveals problems in
the CETA system—some perhaps soluble at the state level,
and others clearly insoluble without adjustments in federal
expectations for large BOS sponsors. As currently con
stituted, CETA may be unintentionally biased against states,
holding them to the same statutory, regulatory, and reportorial requirements as local sponsors, while ignoring crucial
dissimilarities in government structure, politics, delivery in
frastructure, geography, and program magnitude. Indeed,
federal policymakers may need to reassess CETA's implicit
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assumption that all sponsors are created equal, and that all
should conform to the same set of national policies and
operating procedures.
To the extent that North Carolina's experiences are typical
of those in other BOS jurisdictions, they may also suggest
the need for redefining both the role and the responsibilities
CETA now confers on state governments. Almost a third of
all CETA funds nationally are administered through states,
fully half of which operate at levels of funding and enroll
ment exceeded by only a handful of localities. Yet DOL's
research is rarely aimed at state sponsors, and relatively little
is known nationally about the extent to which other states
share problems similar to North Carolina's. If optimal
results are to be achieved through state-sponsored efforts in
the foreseeable future, it may be imperative for policymakers
to re-examine the past performance of states as CETA spon
sors and, where appropriate, formulate new policies for con
sideration during CETA's 1982 reauthorization hearings.
In the interim, federal officials should consider immediate
upgrading and expansion of their in-house BOS technical
assistance and staff development capabilities, could assume
at least a share of the responsibility for substate capacitybuilding, and may need to declare a national moratorium on
new programs and policies that fail to recognize inherent
BOS limitations. For its part, the state could provide CETA
with a more stable operating environment, and it clearly
needs to place greater emphasis on the development of
substate planning expertise, the creation of coherent CETA
training policies, and the articulation of policy preferences to
appropriate parties. Another useful step would involve
building the capacity to look across regional lines and in
stitutional boundaries to determine what works, what does
not, and why. For now, however, these factors seem to be
largely unknown.

Penobscot Consortium, Maine
Orientation for Change and Growth
Andrew M. Sum
and
Paul £. Harrington
Northeastern University

The Setting
Geographic and Population Characteristics
The Penobscot Consortium prime sponsor provides
employment and training services to residents of three large,
but primarily rural, counties in the north central part of
Maine—Hancock County, Penobscot County and Piscataquis County. The three counties occupy 7,500 square miles, a
land area nearly as large as the state of Massachusetts. The
substantial size and largely rural nature of the area pose
logistical problems for the consortium, including a highly
dispersed population, a lack of training institutions in major
parts of the area, and transportation barriers.
The total population of the consortium in 1970 was
176,268, of which 125,393, or 71 percent, were residents of
Penobscot County. The 1970 population of Hancock and
Piscataquis Counties was 34,590 and 16,285, respectively.
Since 1970, the consortium's population has been growing at
an above-average rate because of net inmigration—a major
turnaround for the consortium, which has previously ex
perienced substantial net outmigration. The population of
the consortium is practically all white. Only a few hundred
blacks live in the consortium, and American Indians—the
largest minority group in the consortium—account for only
0.4 percent of its 1970 population.
295
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Economic Characteristics
of the Consortium
The industrial characteristics of the economies of the three
counties comprising the consortium differ in several substan
tive ways. Hancock County, which borders the Atlantic
Ocean, is highly dependent on tourism and other seasonal in
dustries, including fishing, clamming, and lobstering.
Employment in the county experiences sharp seasonal fluc
tuations, plummeting in the winter months and rising rapidly
during the summer. Piscataquis County's employment is
dominated by manufacturing, particularly woods-related in
dustries. Penobscot County's economy is the most evenly
balanced, with manufacturing and trade combined account
ing for approximately one-half of employment. The typical
economic establishment in the consortium is quite small in
terms of employment. Only 5 percent of the business
establishments in the consortium had 50 or more employees
on their payroll.
The family incomes of the residents of the consortium
have been well below the national average—14-25 percentage
points below the national median in 1969. These results were
primarily influenced by below average earnings of employed
males, due to lower weekly wages and fewer year-round
employment opportunities, and relatively low labor force
participation rates of teenagers. Although the per capita per
sonal money incomes of residents of the three counties grew
as much or more than the national average, they were still 17
to 23 percentage points below the U.S. average in 1977.

The Political Environment
Given the structure of the consortium, counties are the
governmental units most directly relevant to its operations.
County government in Maine traditionally has not played a
major role in the provision of public services, being primari-
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ly confined to law enforcement, road maintenance, and land
deeds responsibilities. The operations of the CETA system
have provided county government with major respon
sibilities in the human resources area for the first time. As a
consortium executive remarked, "CETA has given the coun
ties of the consortium a major role in providing human
resources to people. . . it has put county government back
on the map in Maine."
Each of the three counties of the consortium is governed
by an elected board of three county commissioners. The nine
county commissioners serve on an executive board governing
the Penobscot Consortium. The executive board has not had
a major independent effect on the policies or operations of
the consortium. It has in effect delegated these respon
sibilities to the executive director, demanding only that the
CETA program be run efficiently and effectively and be free
of abuse.

CETA Funding and Enrollments
During Fiscal 1979
During fiscal 1979, the Penobscot Consortium had
available approximately $10.5 million for CETA programs,
of which it spent approximately $9.04 million. In addition to
its formula-funded monies for operating programs under
CETA title II-B, II-D, IV, and VI, the consortium received
$962,000 in title III monies to administer a migrant/seasonal
farmworkers program and several national demonstration
skill training programs. During fiscal 1979, 4,758 persons
were enrolled in the various employment and training pro
grams administered by the Penobscot Consortium including
3,540 new enrollees. Title II-B programs enrolled the largest
number of participants (1,823, or 38 percent of the total).
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Organization and Operations
Formation of the Consortium
The current organizational structure and policymaking
processes of the Penobscot Consortium have been influenced
substantially by its evolution over the past few years. Each of
the three counties comprising the consortium broke away
from the state prime sponsor. Penobscot County assumed
independent prime sponsorship during 1975. A prime mover
behind this drive for independence was Earl Banks, who had
been a county commissioner for the previous 12 years. Banks
believed that by assuming independent operations the county
would obtain more control over the distribution of CETA
monies and that it would be able to provide both "more effi
cient and better" services to its residents.
During fiscal 1976, Hancock County withdrew from the
Maine balance-of-state prime sponsor and formed a consor
tium with Penobscot County. In October 1978, Piscataquis
County joined this consortium. These two counties' deci
sions to affiliate with Penobscot County were influenced by
their dissatisfaction with the quality of services provided by
the balance-of-state prime sponsor, their desire for greater
autonomy in CETA decisionmaking, and their perceptions
of the Penobscot prime sponsorship as an efficient, profes
sional, and nonpolitical organization. In addition, Chuck
Tetro, the executive director of the Penobscot prime spon
sor, lobbied the commissioners of the two counties to join
the consortium, because he believed that the additional ad
ministrative monies from such growth were critical to suc
cessful operation of the CETA program.
The evolution of the Penobscot Consortium has influenc
ed its policies and organizational structure in several key
respects. First, the executive board governing the consortium
consists of the county commissioners of the three counties,
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each of which has equal voting power despite substantial
disparities in population. Second, the consortium allocates
monies under each CETA title and subpart to each county on
the basis of the federal allocation formulas used to distribute
national CETA monies among prime sponsors. Third, to
guarantee residents of each county access to practically the
entire range of employment and training services, the con
sortium has established a highly decentralized intake, assess
ment, and service delivery system. Each county contains a
local office of training and employment programs (OTEP),
which serves as the primary service delivery arm of the con
sortium.

Organizational Structure
During fiscal 1980, the consortium assumed operational
responsibility for a statewide Job Corps center. The consor
tium is the only prime sponsor in the nation that operates a
Job Corps center. The consortium also implemented the con
solidated youth employment program, a national
demonstration youth program designed to integrate the
delivery of educational, employment, and training services
to youth at the local level. Partly in preparation for these
new program responsibilities, the Penobscot Consortium
underwent a major reorganization during the summer of
1979, the fourth such change since it assumed prime sponsor
ship.
The organizational structure of the Penobscot Consortium
Training and Employment Administration has been shaped
by three major factors. First, the Penobscot prime sponsor
has explicitly recognized the diversity of the labor market
problems experienced by its unemployed and economically
disadvantaged residents. To combat these problems effec
tively, the consortium has emphasized individualized
employability planning and the provision of an array of ser
vices to enrollees, including participation in multiple
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employment and training programs both within and among
various CETA titles and subparts.
Second, to increase participants' access to the full range of
available employment and training services, the consortium
has attempted to construct a "one stop" delivery system by
establishing a network of offices of training and employment
programs (OTEPs).
Third, the executive director of the consortium views the
CETA prime sponsor as not only a human resource develop
ment agency, but also as an "institutional change agent."
Since assuming the post of executive director in 1975, he has
attempted to establish an integrated delivery system that
could effectively respond to changes in both local economic
conditions and national priorities for the CETA system.
With only a few exceptions, the prime sponsor does not
deliver employment and training services directly to par
ticipants. Tetro has placed a high priority upon actively
working with existing institutions (schools, training in
stitutes, employers, labor unions, the job service) in pro
viding services to participants, while simultaneously trying to
make them more responsive to the employment and training
needs of the unemployed and the economically disadvantaged.
The central administrative offices of the consortium are
located in Bangor, in Penobscot County. Earl Banks, the key
mover behind Penobscot County's initial drive for prime
sponsorship, serves as a special assistant to the executive
director. He is a trusted adviser to Tetro and an ambassador
to the county commissioners and the community at large
who has played a critical role in keeping the operations of the
consortium free from politics.
The division of community employment and training pro
grams houses the major service delivery arms of the consor
tium and is responsible for providing a wide range of services
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to participants under CETA title II-B, II-D, IV, and VI pro
grams. The division consists of the network of OTEPs and
three offices providing an array of support services to them.
Each OTEP is headed by an administrator, who oversees a
staff of 18 to 30. The OTEPs are responsible for delivering
the full array of employment and training services to CETAeligible residents of the consortium. These services include
outreach, assessment, testing, employability development
planning, referrals to classroom training, work experience
and PSE programs, OJT development and placement, sup
portive services, and job search assistance.

Staffing
The Penobscot prime sponsor has experienced substantial
employment growth as its geographic coverage expanded
and it assumed major new program responsibilities, especial
ly the Job Corps. The staff of the consortium had grown
from 15 during the first year of operation to 268 permanent
employees by April 1980, of whom 105 were on the staff of
the Job Corps center. The employees of the consortium are
not protected by any civil service system. The personnel
classification system of the consortium contains 11 job
grades, with a heavy concentration in grade 5 positions
which include the bulk of the intake, employability develop
ment, and job placement personnel in the OTEP offices.
The salary structure for consortium staff is determined in
dependently of that of county government. The salary of the
executive director is set by the county commissioners, and
they also review and approve the salaries of other high level
executive staff. An analysis of the salary structure of the
Penobscot Consortium in the summer of 1979 indicated that
the consortium was competitive with the salaries paid for key
executive and managerial staff by other prime sponsors in
the region.
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Hiring authority is quite decentralized and free of political
influences. The department heads have authority to hire and
fire their own staffs, as do the OTEP administrators. Several
OTEP administrators have also delegated responsibility for
the hiring of lower level staff to specialists in their offices.
The characteristics of professional staff, particularly in
OTEP offices, have changed somewhat with the recruitment
of older, more experienced, and more stable employees.
Overall staff turnover has been rather low—less than 10 per
cent in 1980, according to the personnel director. Turnover
rates varied by job grade, being lowest among the higher
level executive staff and OTEP administrators and highest
among clerical workers and intake and employability
development staff.

Management Systems
The OTEP offices maintain comprehensive and detailed
records on GETA program participants. The participant in
take, work history, change of status, and termination forms
compiled by the OTEPs are also submitted to the consor
tium's management information System (MIS) unit. The in
take and work history data are reviewed by MIS staff as a
final check on the eligibility of participants and are used to
prepare a wide variety of internal biweekly and monthly
reports for use by consortium executives and administrators
in monitoring the on-going performance of the local delivery
system. These data are also used to produce the required
federal quarterly reports on enrollments, terminations, and
placements.
The accounting unit pays vendors within 5 days of receipt
of a proper invoice. Local service deliverers cited prompt
payment as a very favorable factor in their dealings with the
prime sponsor. The fiscal and MIS units of the consortium
are closely integrated, with allowance payments tied to MIS
approval of required paperwork.
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The Penobscot Consortium systematically and com
prehensively monitors and evaluates its program activities.
OTEP employability developers and job developers monitor
enrollees' progress during their participation in the program,
including the use of participant evaluation forms by job site
supervisors and classroom teachers. The independent
monitoring unit makes on-site reviews of work experience
and PSE job sites, monitors financial aspects of OJT con
tracts, and interviews classroom training instructors and par
ticipants. The consortium conducts in-house followup
surveys of program terminees from its title II-B and II-D
programs and has used the findings to influence its title II-B
services mix, to encourage the use of multiple program par
ticipation, and to initiate new program efforts, including
self-directed job search workshops.
All basic policymaking, program planning, and program
administration decisions are made by consortium staff.
Planning councils, community based organizations, labor
unions, the job service, and the private industry council have
contributed to the consortium's policymaking and planning
process, but do not generally appear to have had a major im
pact upon training policies or programs. The Maine State
AFL-CIO administers one part of the consortium's title II-B
OJT program, emphasizing development of OJT slots in
unionized firms. The private industry council recently fund
ed a marketing campaign to get local employers involved in
the consortium's OJT programs and the Targeted Jobs Tax
Credit program.

Federal/State Relations; CETA
and the Local Community
The executives of the Penobscot Consortium have general
ly maintained cordial relationships with the ETA regional of
fice and have received its support for a number of recent pro
gram initiatives, including the development of the con-
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solidated youth employment program and the New England
Institute on Human Resource Program Management. Con
sortium staff members, however, have had a few conflicts
with ETA field representatives, but recently more har
monious relationships have developed. Nevertheless, only
legislation, not relationships with ETA staff, has had any
major independent impact on the training policies and prac
tices of the consortium.
There was a widespread feeling on the part of many con
sortium staff that the community's perception of CETA was
beginning to improve. This positive change was attributed by
several staff to the fact that the consortium was "running
more of a training program now." The greater emphasis
upon training was believed to be more widely respected by
the community and the county commissioners.

Training Policies and Decisions
The primary goals of the Penobscot Consortium's
employment and training programs are to strengthen the
labor force attachment, improve the employability, and in
crease the earnings of economically disadvantaged residents.
To achieve these goals, the consortium has designed a decen
tralized and integrated employment and training delivery
system with five major features. First, a "one stop" delivery
system enables a CETA-eligible individual to obtain the full
array of available services at one location, that is, the local
OTEP offices. Second, the OTEP office formulates in
dividual employability development plans with occupational
employment goals and service strategies determined jointly
by the employability developer and the participant. Third,
public service employment, particularly under title II-D, is
viewed as an integral part of the training system, with some
PSE slots used as "OJT in the public sector." Fourth, most
employability development plans include participation in
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more than one CETA program. Fifth, job placement is the
participants' responsibility, and job search workshops have
recently been set up to help those who experience difficulties
in securing unsubsidized employment.

Training Purposes
and the Services Mix
The consortium has emphasized the role of training in
enhancing the employability and earnings of many par
ticipants. The title II-B programs are considered to be the
"core" of the local employment and training system and
provide the bulk of training services to enrollees.
The Penobscot Consortium has allocated an increasing
share of its title II-B monies to classroom and OJT training
activities. This trend is attributable to several factors, in
cluding the availability of title IV monies to finance work ex
perience activities for youth, the perception by consortium
staff that many of the economically disadvantaged needed
training to become employable, and the ability of consor
tium staff to develop good working relationships with ex
isting education and training institutions and build new
training capacities, particularly in rural areas.
During fiscal 1979, the consortium spent approximately 60
percent of its title II-B monies on classroom and OJT train
ing. OJT commanded slightly more than one-fourth of II-B
expenditures—more than double the national average.
Several OTEPs had to rely more heavily on OJT because
small rural communities lacked training institutions. Most
OJT in these areas consisted of one slot contracts in small
establishments.
Per enrollee expenditures for regular title II-B classroom
training in the Penobscot Consortium were only $556 com
pared with $1,430 for the nation as a whole. This cost advan
tage exists because the consortium enrolls many participants
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either simultaneously in classroom training and such other
activities as work experience and PSE, or in evening courses
for which the tuition is cheaper. The consortium has utilized
its monies under the governor's CETA vocational educa
tional grant to finance lengthier and more costly training ac
tivities in such occupational areas as licensed practical nurses
and wood harvesters.
The consortium allocated an increased share of its fiscal
1981 title II-B monies to classroom training and OJT ac
tivities despite a slowdown in the local economy during the
spring and summer of 1980. After the private industry coun
cil sponsored an OJT marketing campaign during the spring
of 1980, the OTEP job development staff claimed that the
number of OJT contracts had risen in spite of declining
overall employment opportunities.

Training Decisions
While CETA prime sponsors are allowed to utilize a por
tion of their title II-B and C monies to finance retraining and
upgrading activities under title II-C, the Penobscot Consor
tium has not done so. The executive director feels that such
activities will eventually lead to delivery of scarce resources
to less disadvantaged individuals and that employers would
tend to substitute CETA upgrading monies for self-financed
training efforts.
The selection of significant segments of the population for
title II-B services influences the planned services mix, as dif
ferent target groups require somewhat different types and
combinations of employment and training services to over
come their particular barriers to employment. For example,
work experience is frequently used as an initial service com
ponent for many young persons and adult women lacking re
cent employment experience. Work experience in the consor
tium, however, is regarded as a feeder mechanism rather
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than a final service activity. The share of title II-B monies
devoted to training activities is also influenced by the
perceived capacity of the consortium to develop such ac
tivities. The planned level of expenditures on OJT is regard
ed as a "flexible figure" to be revised upward or downward
depending upon projected local labor market conditions and
the capacity of the OTEP system to develop additional OJT
contracts. Finally, the title II-B services mix has been in
fluenced by the findings of the consortium's followup
evaluations. The persistent finding of more favorable im
mediate outcomes for participants in multiple program com
ponents (classroom training and OJT) has led to increased
emphasis on the provision of classroom skills training and
OJT services.
The determination of significant segments for programs
under each CETA title is made by the planning department.
The characteristics of significant segments have varied
somewhat in line with the objectives and services provided by
programs under the various titles. Youth (under age 22),
women, and high school dropouts have been the major
significant segments for the consortium's title II-B pro
grams.
Since its inception, the Penobscot prime sponsor has
adhered to a policy of contracting out practically all of its
classroom training, both prevocational and vocational.
Classroom training in the consortium has been operated by a
wide variety of educational and training institutions, in
cluding regional vocational high schools, adult education
programs in local public high schools, local adult learning
centers, community colleges, postsecondary vocational and
technical institutes, private junior colleges, and 4-year col
leges and universities. Recent title VII private sector-oriented
training programs have involved collaboration among com
munity colleges, 4-year colleges, and private firms. The title
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II-B O JT programs of the prime sponsor are administered by
both OTEP staff and the Maine State AFL-CIO.
Selection of the facilities and occupations in which
classroom training will be provided is frequently a joint deci
sion, because the number of training institutions in the area
is limited. The bulk of the classroom training consists of in
dividual referrals to occupations and facilities jointly
selected by the adult employability developer and the partici
pant as part of the employability development planning pro
cess. These decisions are, however, reviewed by the adult
employability development specialist and the OTEP ad
ministrator. The OTEPs have adopted a general policy of
limiting CETA funding to no more than two semesters of
training, so that CETA participants who enroll in 2-year pro
grams are expected to find other sources of financial
assistance, including federal basic educational opportunity
grants, for the second year.

Training Program Administration
Training Authority
During fiscal 1979, the bulk of the consortium's classroom
and OJT activities were funded with title II-B monies. Ap
proximately 82 percent of the individuals receiving training
services during that year were enrolled in title II-B training
programs. The consortium allocated nearly 60 percent of its
fiscal 1979 title II-B monies to classroom and OJT training
activities and another 13 percent for services to participants
(including testing, assessment, employability development
planning, OJT development, and transportation
allowances). The rural nature of most of the consortium area
frequently requires participants to travel substantial
distances (30-50 miles) to attend classroom training pro
grams in Bangor.
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Like many other prime sponsors, the Penobscot Consor
tium has experienced some difficulties in spending the congressionally mandated share of title II-D monies (15 percent
in fiscal 1980) on training activities. Hence, it used title II-D
monies to fund a self-directed job search workshop. This
program was designed to provide skills in resume prepara
tion, job interviewing and job search. Preliminary findings
of a formal evaluation of the effectiveness of this job search
program indicate that 60-70 percent of the participants were
successful in obtaining unsubsidized employment.

Who Gets Trained
The basic decisions on referral of CETA-eligible ap
plicants to specific employment and training activities are
made by employability development staff in the local
OTEPs. All enrollees must have an employability develop
ment plan formulated for them by the adult employability
developer with the approval of the specialist. Formal testing
of applicants during this process is encouraged. These plans
are viewed by many OTEP staff as a type of "trial and error
system" in planning occupational goals for participants.
Modifications in the initial employability development plans
are anticipated as participants learn through actual ex
perience what they are capable of and interested in doing.
Adult work experience programs under title II-B are used
primarily as an assessment tool to determine and/or build
basic work habits and to test the occupational interests of
participants. Young persons, AFDC recipients, and displac
ed homemakers are prime candidates for the consortium's
work experience programs. The OTEP staff tends to en
courage participants lacking a high school diploma to enroll
in adult basic education and GED preparatory programs.
Many local employers require job applicants to possess a
high school diploma or GED, and the attainment of a GED
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is believed to improve participants' self-image and build
their personal pride and confidence.
Referrals to classroom training activities consist of in
dividuals with clear and realistic occupational employment
goals. The existence of local training institutions also in
fluences the likelihood of enrollment in a classroom training
program. A substantially higher proportion of title II-B par
ticipants residing in Bangor are enrolled in classroom train
ing in comparison with their counterparts in the more rural
areas of the consortium. Women have constituted 72 percent
of the enrollments in title II-B classroom training. Young
persons—male and female—under 22 years of age accounted
for nearly 36 percent of title II-B classroom training par
ticipants during fiscal 1979, and high school dropouts of all
ages accounted for slightly more than 42 percent.
Individuals referred to the OJT programs were persons
who had exhibited good work habits and who either had an
established work history or had performed well in the local
CETA system. The majority of the OJT referrals were in
direct; that is, they had previously participated in another
CETA activity, such as work experience, PSE, or classroom
training. Men accounted for most of the participants in the
fiscal 1979 OJT programs administered by both the OTEPs
(60 percent) and AFL-CIO (79 percent). Two-thirds of the
OJT participants were age 22 or older, more than seventenths had graduated from high school, and two-fifths were
family heads.

Service Deliverers
During fiscal 1979, prevocational and vocationallyoriented classroom training was provided to title II-B par
ticipants by 71 different educational and training institutions
located both within and outside the consortium planning
area. The majority of these institutions, however, enrolled
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only one or two title II-B participants during this year. Five
educational and training institutions accounted for approx
imately two-thirds of all classroom training enrollments
under title II-B programs. These major classroom training
service deliverers do not play a key role in either policymaking or planning in the consortium.
OTEP administrators and staff have begun to assume a
more active role in developing an institutional training in
frastructure and selecting service deliverers during the past
year. Two rural OTEPs have developed and staffed in-house
learning centers to expand basic educational and GED
preparatory services to participants. The OTEPs also have
recently designed classroom skill training programs for cer
tified nurse aides and clerical workers. Greater flexibility in
designing courses and diversity in course offerings have been
sought by OTEP administrators and staff to enable them to
more effectively meet the educational and training needs of
current GETA participants and of new target groups.

Occupational Areas
of Classroom Training
The class-size institutional training programs of the con
sortium during the past 2 years have concentrated on oc
cupations with favorable employment conditions. Under ti
tle II-B, the consortium funded class-size programs for
licensed practical nurses and wood harvesters, two occupa
tions in which employment has grown rapidly within the con
sortium. During fiscal 1980, it used title VII monies to fund
class-size training programs for medical secretaries and com
puter programmers—occupational choices well-justified by
recent occupational employment trends in the consortium.
The bulk of the title II-B classroom skills training activities
of the consortium consist of individual referrals to existing
educational and training institutions. Adult employ ability
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developers in the OTEPs determine the appropriateness of
training in an occupational area, with final approval by the
specialist and OTEP administrator. Clerical (40 percent) and
allied health occupations (29 percent) accounted for the
largest shares of enrollments in title II-B classroom skills
training programs during fiscal 1979. There were substantial
differences in the occupational distributions of female and
male skills training program participants. Women con
stituted 96 percent of the trainees in the clerical and allied
health occupations while men dominated the craft (93 per
cent) and operative-related (96 percent) occupations.

OJT Program Administration
The title II-B OJT activities of the consortium are manag
ed by both the local OTEPs and the Maine AFL-CIO. At the
local OTEP level, the delivery of OJT services is carried out
through the combined efforts of the employability develop
ment and job development staffs. Employability develop
ment staff generally refer individuals that they deem "ap
propriate for OJT" to the job development staff with sup
porting material on their OJT readiness. The job developers
then either attempt to develop particular OJT slots for the
applicants or—more often—refer them to existing OJT slots
that match their occupational interests, job desires, and
abilities.
Rather than relying heavily upon formal sources of labor
market information, the job developers stressed obtaining
leads on available job openings through personal contacts
with the local business community and appressive marketing
of the OJT program with local employers. Both OTEP ad
ministrators and job development staff considered the per
sonal relationships between staff and employers as critical to
the success of the OJT program, arguing that personal trust
in staff and the ability of the consortium staff to deliver on
its promises were primary determinants of private sector
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cooperation with the OJT effort. The unusually high propor
tion of enrollees in OJT seems to attest the success of this ap
proach.
The Maine State AFL-CIO has three full-time job
developers in its Brewer offices, two of whom devote most of
their time to OJT development for the consortium. The
AFL-CIO job development efforts have focused on both the
union and nonunion sectors of the Penobscot Consortium;
however, the bulk of the OJT positions have been in bluecollar occupations in unionized manufacturing
establishments.

Training Program Operations and Quality
During the spring and summer of 1980, site visits were
made to assess the operations and quality of the training pro
vided by the six major educational and training institutions
involved in the delivery of title II-B and VII classroom train
ing services: the Bangor Adult Education Learning Center,
Eastern Maine Vocational-Technical Institute, Beal College,
James A. Taylor Hospital, Husson College, and Bangor
Community College. As part of the evaluation, participants'
views of classroom training were analyzed. For OJT, the
evaluation consists of a review of consortium statistics on the
OJT program.

Bangor Adult Education
Learning Center
The Bangor Adult Education Learning Center is part of
the Bangor adult education system, which receives the bulk
of its funding from the Maine Department of Education.
During 1980, the center was staffed by a coordinator and six
other professional certified teachers, all employed on a parttime basis. All of the teaching staff had 5 or more years of
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experience at the primary and secondary school level as well
as some experience in adult education programs.
The learning center routinely serves practically all ap
plicants; it has no family income eligibility criteria or
residence requirements. The center does not charge tuition.
Learning is individually paced, with students assigned initial
reading materials based upon their test scores on entrance ex
ams administered by the center. During their participation,
students are given the ABLE test or the GED pretest to deter
mine their progress in preparing for the GED examination.
The center administers the GED exam and scores the test.
CETA participants in the learning center are treated
similarly to other students. Participation by CETA enrollees
is open-ended, with the actual duration dependent on the
time needed to acquire the desired math and reading com
petencies or acquire the GED. The Bangor OTEP, however,
limits allowance payments for participation in the center's
programs to 6 hours per week. The center's coordinator in
dicated that CETA students often came on their own time to
the center for 20 or more hours per week.
The coordinator claimed that CETA participants were on
average more stable and committed students. Relationships
between the center and the Bangor OTEP appeared to be
quite harmonious and based on mutual respect and trust.
The effectiveness of the educational services provided to
CETA participants was difficult to ascertain, because of the
absence of any formal monitoring or evaluation of the
center's activities by the consortium's Independent Monitor
ing Unit and evaluation staff.

Eastern Maine Vocational-Technical Institute
The Eastern Main Vocational-Technical Institute (EMVTI) is a public, postsecondary technical and vocational train
ing institute in Bangor—one of six such institutes operated
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throughout Maine by the State Board of Education. EMVTI
operates both day and evening programs. The day program
includes instruction in 11 different areas leading to a 2-year
associate in applied science degree.
Most CETA participants are enrolled either in nondegree
courses during the evening or in one or two courses during
the day, thus saving the consortium a considerable sum for
tuition, which is less for evening and part-time day students.
As the OTEPs do not allow the funding of training courses
beyond one year, participants desiring to enroll in 2-year
programs would be required to arrange their own financing
for the last 12 months. In practically all instances, CETA
participants attend classes with regular students. The policy
of intermingling was advocated by the EMVTI director.
During fiscal 1979, title II-B CETA participants were enroll
ed in 20 different types of courses, but the allied health field
accounted for 55 percent of those enrollments.
The directors of the institute and the adult and continuing
education program claimed that the performances of CETA
participants were quite mixed. They said participants in the
practical nursing program performed in an exemplary man
ner while others, particularly title VI participants enrolled in
basic construction and building maintenance courses, lacked
motivation and a desire to learn. More careful screening of
potential enrollees by OTEP staff was felt to be desirable.
During the past three years, the consortium has used title
II-B monies to reserve slots in the EMVTI practical nursing
program for CETA participants. For example, during fiscal
1980, 12 of the 45 slots in the training program were oc
cupied by CETA participants. The CETA monies provided
to EMVTI by the consortium have been used to hire addi
tional instructors for the practical nursing program. The
linkages developed between the consortium and EMVTI in
this situation have expanded institutional training capacity
for practical nurses.
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Admission into the regular practical nursing program is
quite competitive, with 200 persons typically applying for the
30 to 40 available positions. Candidates must possess a high
school diploma or its equivalent, achieve a passing score on a
national prenursing aptitude examination, and be personally
interviewed by the program director and her staff. Final
selection of candidates is made by Ms. Pederson, the director
of the program.
The practical nursing program is 45 weeks long and com
bines classroom instruction and laboratory work in EMVTI
with clinical experiences in local hospitals and nursing
homes. Given the rigorous nature of the training program,
consortium and EMVTI staff developed a 10-week prenurs
ing program for CETA participants to bolster their basic
skills and increase their confidence in coping with the regular
course material. Once the regular practical nursing program
begins, CETA participants attend the same classes with other
students and receive no special treatment.
CETA participants have performed quite well in this pro
gram and in several years have outperformed other students.
Their somewhat superior performance was attributed in
large part to the effects of the prenursing program.
Graduates of the practical nursing program are awarded a
diploma by EMVTI and must then pass a national licensing
exam to retain employment as a licensed practical nurse. No
graduate of the EMVTI practical nursing program has ever
failed the exam. The placement rate of CETA graduates has
been nearly 100 percent. Practically all of the graduates line
up their own jobs prior to graduation because of the
tightness of the labor market for practical nurses.

Beal College
Deal College is a proprietary junior college specializing in
business education that is located in Bangor. The college
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operates both day and evening programs during which
students can enroll in courses leading to 2-year associate
degrees, 1-year diplomas, or certificates.
More than 90 percent of the fiscal 1979 CETA title II-B
participants attending Beal College were enrolled in clericalrelated courses. A substantial majority of the CETA par
ticipants were enrolled in only one or two courses per
semester, including evening courses rather than being fulltime day students. The consortium has used the courses of
fered by Beal College to develop basic clerical skills of CETA
participants rather than to enroll them in the school's 2-year
degree programs.
CETA participants generally attend classes with other
students and are treated in a similar manner by the faculty.
The president of the college and department heads indicated
that a high proportion of the CETA students have perform
ed quite well in the classroom, but also noted that perfor
mance was quite varied. Staff claimed that women in the
25-40 age group did best, while the 18-20 year old CETA
students often seemed to have attitude, attendance, and
basic skill problems.

James A. Taylor Hospital/Husson College
Medical Secretary Training
During fiscal 1980, the consortium funded a medical
secretary training program with its title VII monies. Services
under this training program are provided by the James A.
Taylor Hospital, Husson College, and Bangor Community
College. Enrollees also participate in several practicums in
volving other hospitals, medical clinics, and doctors' offices
in Bangor. James A. Taylor Hospital has assumed the major
coordination role for this training program. It provides
classroom facilities for several of the courses and office
space for the coordinator (an employee of the hospital),
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lends professional staff to provide classroom instruction on
specialized topics, and serves as a job site for the practicum.
The medical secretary training program was designed to
serve 20 participants, of whom 15 were expected to suc
cessfully complete the program and be placed in trainingrelated jobs. Minimum requirements for acceptance into the
program included a high school diploma or GED,
reasonably strong English and math skills, and good com
munication skills. Recruitment, testing, and initial assess
ment were carried out by OTEP and central office staff.
Final selection of candidates was made by the program coor
dinator and the personnel director of the hospital.
The medical secretary training program is scheduled to last
52 weeks and consists of three terms. Classroom training is
planned in all three terms, and a practicum during the final
term. Students will obtain 30 hours of college credit for their
classroom course work.
During the site visits, teachers and administrators of the
program assessed the students' performance positively.
Several instructors were particularly impressed with the at
tendance records, dedication, and classroom performance of
the students, indicating that the CETA participants perform
ed as well if not better than the regular students. Given the
fact that the program was only half completed at the time of
the site visits, final judgment on its effectiveness must be
deferred. It appears, however, that the participants are
developing an extraordinarily diverse set of skills in the
medical secretary and health area that should enhance their
placement potential upon graduation.

Bangor Community College Computer
Programmer Training for the Handicapped
During fiscal 1980, the Penobscot Consortium agreed to
fund, jointly with the Maine state bureau of vocational
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rehabilitation, a computer programmer training program for
severely handicapped individuals. The program is operated
by Bangor Community College. While the consortium
agreed to finance part of the training ($50,000) with its title
VII monies, the bureau of vocational rehabilitation retained
responsibilities for most program operations, including
recruitment of eligible participants, selection of the contrac
tor, job development, and placement of program terminees.
A rather rigorous screening process was employed by the
bureau of vocational rehabilitation in selecting participants.
Over 120 individuals applied for the 12 positions available in
the program. Final selection of participants was made jointly
by staff from the bureau of vocational rehabilitation and
Bangor Community College and members of a business ad
visory group overseeing program operations.
The length of the training program was 37 weeks. The cur
riculum consisted of four courses for which a total of 14
hours of academic credit was awarded by Bangor Communi
ty College. The courses included an introduction to com
puter sciences and emphasized the application of COBOL
programming techniques to business problems. The fourth
segment of the program included a 4-5 week work practicum
involving training-related employment in a data processing
department of a cooperating Maine firm. Course instruction
was provided primarily by a teacher hired by Bangor Com
munity College.
The participants in the program seemed to have performed
quite well, with all but one earning an average grade of "B"
or better in their formal course work. The instructor at
tributed the solid performance of the class to the effec
tiveness of the screening process. By September 1980, all but
two of the participants had received training-related job of
fers from companies.
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The OJT Program
During fiscal 1979, there were approximately 500 title II-B
OJT positions in the consortium. The vast majority (73 per
cent) were in establishments located within Penobscot Coun
ty. Typically, OJT contracts (86 percent) consisted of only
one or two slots; the largest contained 34 slots. Craft and
operative-related occupations accounted for 58 percent of
the OJT positions. The dominance of blue-collar occupa
tions is readily understandable because the skills needed are
more specific to the particular firm and are more likely to be
acquired in an actual production setting. The occupational
distributions of the OJT positions held by men and women
differed substantially. More than three-fourths of the OJT
positions held by men were in craft and operative occupa
tions, while a majority of those held by women were in
clerical and service occupations. The average (mean) starting
hourly wage of title II-B OJT positions was $3.33, with men
averaging $3.57 in comparison with $3.08 for women, large
ly reflecting differences in the occupational characteristics of
jobs obtained. The OJT positions developed by the AFLCIO paid $4.19 per hour, while OTEP-developed positions
paid only $3.27 per hour, largely because the AFL-CIO slots
were in more highly skilled blue-collar jobs in unionized
manufacturing firms.

Participants' Views of the
Quality of Classroom Training
The findings of a spring 1980 IMU survey of a sample of
participants in title II-B classroom training revealed that they
were generally quite satisfied with the training services pro
vided. The students tended to give very high ratings to the
quality of the instruction, with 87 percent describing their
teachers as "very good." The equipment and supplies made
available to students by the training institutions were also
assessed quite favorably, with 93 percent of the respondents
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rating the equipment and supplies as "very good." The vast
majority of the participants believed that the course material
would be of value to them in finding future employment.
More than 9 out of 10 participants indicated that they would
recommend the training program to a friend.
Qualitative assessments of the services received by par
ticipants are also available from the consortium's 6-month
followup survey. Findings of interviews with 232 terminees
from the consortium's fiscal 1979 title II-B and II-D pro
grams again revealed substantial satisfaction with the pro
gram services. Approximately 70 percent of the terminees
stated that program participation had enhanced their pro
spects for obtaining unsubsidized employment. Again, about
9 in 10 terminees indicated that they would recommend the
program to others, and over 8 in 10 rated the GETA program
overall as either excellent or good.

Potential for Expanding
Training Activities
The Penobscot Consortium has always emphasized its role
as a "training" institution. It has stressed training more
heavily during the past few years, and allocations of titles IIB and II-D monies have been shifted toward classroom and
OJT activities. The consortium also seems to have developed
the experience and skills for expanding and diversifying its
training capabilities.
The prime sponsor has recently expanded the local train
ing infrastructure in the areas of basic education and GED
preparation by working closely with local adult basic educa
tion agencies and by developing in-house learning centers in
the more rural areas of the consortium. The consortium has
developed effective working relationship with the area's ma
jor public and private postsecondary educational and train
ing institutions. The consortium has also designed and im-
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plemented innovative training programs that tie together
public and private educational and training institutions and
private firms.
The offices of training and employment programs have
begun to plan and design a variety of mini-training pro
grams. These programs have tied together existing institu
tions in a new delivery approach to expand course offerings
to participants in the clerical, allied health, and basic educa
tional areas.
The private industry council was using title VII monies to
market the OJT and Targeted Jobs Tax Credit programs to
local employers. The prime sponsor recently implemented a
job search workshop to assist in the placement of terminees
from both its title II-B and II-D programs. The private in
dustry council and the local chamber of commerce became
more actively involved in the planning and administration of
the job search program, and their contributions may
enhance its potential for expanding unsubsidized employ
ment opportunities for CETA participants.
The Penobscot Consortium has steadily moved toward
establishing a comprehensive, integrated training delivery
system that utilizes effective service deliverers, both public
and private. This system has been designed to respond effec
tively to the diverse needs of the local unemployed and
economically disadvantaged populations. Only the future
will reveal the limits of such an employment and training
strategy within the context of the consortium's economic
structure. Currently, this prime sponsor appears to have
moved in a direction that the drafters of the 1978 CETA
reauthorization would find to be highly desirable.

San Francisco
The Politics of Race and Sex
Garth L. Mangum
University of Utah

San Francisco has to be counted among the most capable
prime sponsors in the nation. But competence in the CETA
system must be assessed by the sponsors' ability to respond
to local circumstances, rather than by a set of national stan
dards.
This summary first sketches the economic and political en
vironment within which CETA functions in San Francisco.
It then describes the planning and decisionmaking processes
that govern the city's CETA activities, including the nature
of the staff and the roles of federal and state governments.
That leads to a description of the program that has emerged
from those decisions. Finally, it appraises the quality of
training in San Francisco's CETA programs and offers in
sights for understanding the national system.

The Political Economy-of San Francisco
Race and sex politics is the key to understanding CETA in
San Francisco, a fact that has its origins more in the area's
geography than in its economy.

Geography and Population
Bounded on the north and east by San Francisco Bay, on
the west by the Pacific Ocean, and boxed in on the south by
another political jurisdiction, San Francisco encompasses
only 49 square miles. With this limited area and only 650,000
residents, it is relatively small in numbers as cities go, but it is
one of the most densely populated areas in the United States.
323
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Widely renowned for the beauty of its physical setting and its
cosmopolitan atmosphere, and serving as the major U.S.
door to the Pacific, the area has experienced pressures on its
housing market that have tended to prevent the deterioration
of private and public buildings seen in many other cities.
Slums develop and are rehabilitated through private financ
ing in relatively short cycles.
The white non-Hispanics, who dominate the U.S. popula
tion are a minority (49 percent) in San Francisco. Because
the city is the U.S. door from, as well as to, the Pacific,
Asians and Pacific islanders comprise the second largest
population category (about 20 percent of the total). Within
that group are people from at least a dozen nations, the
largest groups being Chinese and Filipinos. The inflow of
Orientals waxes and wanes with the fortunes of war and the
economies in the Far East, with Indochina the major source
in recent years. In third place is the substantial black popula
tion (16 percent of the total), which had its origin during the
shipbuilding boom during the Second World War and has
experienced little influx since. Finally, the majority of San
Francisco's Hispanics (14 percent of the total) have their
roots in Central and South America, with relatively few
Mexican-Americans and fewer Mexican nationals.
The proportions of the population who are CETA
eligibles—that is, the long term unemployed living in pover
ty, and those receiving benefits under the program of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)—are all
remarkably consistent with the ethnic ratios, except that
blacks are overrepresented and Chinese underrepresented
among the unemployed poor. By age, young adults are overrepresented in comparison with national norms, indicating
San Francisco's role as a youth mecca during the 1960s, and
its continued attractiveness to young singles.
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The strong social and ethnic consciousness among San
Francisco's population is perhaps not remarkable, but the
degree of political organization and potency is. The city has
at least a dozen strongly organized political associations bas
ed on ethnicity. Homosexuals, both gays and lesbians, con
stitute another well-organized and aggressive political entity.
The rights of women, the handicapped, and the aging are the
foci of other politically potent groups. Each of these has its
role in GETA politics.

Government
Despite its apparent unification, the consolidated city/
county government in San Francisco is almost as divided as
its political constituencies. City government scandals in the
1930s led to a deliberate weakening of government. A mayor
is chosen at large in nonpartisan elections. A board of super
visors, each elected from a different section of the city, plays
the legislative role. A chief executive officer—appointed by
the mayor, confirmed by the board and removable only by
impeachment—is responsible for administering the major
departments of government such as health and sanitation.
Another batch of professionally oriented services (such as
police and fire) report to commissions also appointed by pre
sent and past mayors but removable only by impeachment.
A group of relatively independent agencies, such as the air
port, have the power to generate and spend their own funds,
yet every expenditure must be approved by the finance com
mittee of the board of supervisors. Several other agencies,
such as the housing authority and the Bay Area Rapid Tran
sit district, known as BART, are city/state organizations
that operate outside the city civil service.
The mayor gains substantial independent power through
federal programs such as GETA. Appeal to the various race
and sex organizations is the key to electoral success. Organiz-
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ed labor traditionally has been a power in San Francisco
politics, but its influence has withered as blue-collar employ
ment drifted out of the city.
Perhaps because of the lack of other elective entities, the
school districts in San Francisco are a focus of political ac
tivism, despite a relatively small school-age population. The
San Francisco unified school district is responsible for
elementary and secondary schools, the community college
district for San Francisco City College and nine community
college centers, which include adult education. The city also
has an extensive parochial school system, an extraordinary
number of private elementary and secondary schools, small
colleges, and private proprietary training institutions. There
is also in the city the state-supported San Francisco State
University and the University of San Francisco, affiliated
with the Catholic Church.

The Economy
In the past 30 years, San Francisco has shifted from a
blue-collar labor market based in shipping, shipbuilding,
warehousing, and manufacturing to a predominantly whitecollar market based in company headquarters and govern
mental agencies. Shipping activity and traditional manufac
turing have tended to move across the bay to Oakland, and
other East Bay locations, while newer manufacturing enter
prises have settled in the "silicon valleys" of the peninsula,
some 30 miles away. Meanwhile, the selection of San Fran
cisco as a regional headquarters for federal and state govern
ment activities has added to public employment. The
westward movement of the U.S. center of economic gravity
and the country's growing trans-Pacific ties have changed
San Francisco's skyline (much to the chagrin of many local
residents) by the growth of downtown corporate head
quarters.
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The outflow of manufacturing and the inflow of govern
ment reduced the city's tax base, as did the 1978 Proposition
13 limitation on local property tax rates. As a result, public
services have deteriorated somewhat and the city has become
more anxious to grasp every source of state and federal
funds available.
San Francisco's unemployment rate—5.4 percent in April
1980 and 5.9 percent in May 1980—is not high for a central
city. In fact, even construction activity was being maintained
halfway through 1980. More notable is the abundance of
white-collar and the dearth of manual jobs. All 41 occupa
tions listed as demand categories for CETA purposes in the
spring of 1980 were in the professional, clerical, sales, and
service categories. Among San Francisco's job openings, on
ly automotive repair, building maintenance, and truckdriving, along with a few jobs for welders and machine
operators, could be described as blue-collar. Almost all of
the recent employment expansion has been concentrated in
services; finance, insurance, and real estate; and retail
trades. That industry and occupation structure is clearly ap
parent in the choice of CETA clientele and activities in San
Francisco.

Planning and Decisionmaking
Planning is, of course, a staff function but decisionmaking involves not only the prime sponsor's staff, but also the
mayor and her staff, the board of supervisors, the employ
ment and training council, and the influential communitybased organizations (CBOs). Federal and state officials have
a pro forma role, but not much more.

Staff Qualifications
The outstanding capability of the San Francisco prime
sponsor is attributable primarily to the quality and influence
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of its staff. Their combination of longevity, experience, in
fluence, and technical competence is unlikely to be exceeded
anywhere in the GETA system.
The staff director, Eunice Elton, has been called the
"mother of manpower" in San Francisco. She is a 43-year
veteran of the California State Employment Service who has
managed local offices, regional field offices, and antipoverty
specialty programs, and directed the San Francisco Concen
trated Employment Program (CEP), and its Community
Manpower Program, which was CETA's predecessor. She
has directed the Mayor's Office of Employment and Train
ing (MOET) from the beginning of CETA (under three suc
cessive mayors) and her technical judgments are considered
beyond challenge in the city. Her position is even more in
vulnerable than her credentials, because she has remained on
the Employment Service payroll throughout her CETA ser
vice and is beyond retirement age.
Ray Holland—director of the planning, evaluation, and
management information system from CETA's initia
tion—is a veteran of the Peace Corps and the community ac
tion program.
Elton and Holland are the only "Anglos" among the top
staff. The two program directors, one for employability
development (training) and youth programs and the other
for public service employment programs, also have MDTA
and Economic Development Act program experience and
have held their positions from the beginning of CETA. One
is of Puerto Rican-Filipino origin, the other of Chinese de
scent. The heads of the various housekeeping departments
have been with MOET from the beginning though they have
been promoted from lower level positions. Currently, the
three top staff members heading these departments are a
Chinese, a black, and a Mexican-American. There is con
siderable turnover in subordinate positions but almost none
in top management.

329

Staff stability has been maintained despite the absence of
formal job protection. All MOET employees are temporary
city employees who, along with most of the mayor's staff,
cannot achieve tenure. They receive health benefits and vaca
tions but no retirement benefits. They are paid according to
the entrance rate for the city's regular civil service grades but
receive no in-grade step increases, so they earn less than their
peers, although they face as many, if not more, job
pressures. The explanation for MOET's staff stability must
be adrenalin intoxication.
MOET has done an unusual job of structuring its lower
ranks so that GETA enrollees can join the staff as
paraprofessionals and then, by substituting experiences for
academic credentials and perhaps taking further training,
rise to technical and even professional roles. The Labor
Department's regional training center is given high marks by
the staff and community college and time off can be
negotiated for university courses. Although staff develop
ment has included training workshops, it has consisted
primarily of guided on-the-job experience.

Prime Sponsor As Decisionmaker
MOET is a paradoxical decisionmaker. Probably no
CETA prime sponsor is more data-oriented and planningminded, yet few others are more politically responsive in
their decisions. The MOET staff is personally well shielded
from political influence, yet recognizes the necessity of
responding to political pressures on the employment and
training council, the mayor, and the board of supervisors.
MOET's staff of qualified planners accumulates the
available labor market information and adds a good bit of its
own. It has a highly sophisticated management information
system and knows almost constantly what is going on
amongst a vast array of contractors. Although its decisions
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are, for the most part, promptly, smoothly, and objectively
made, ultimately they must be recognized as political.
To a large extent, the nature of the labor market and the
unusual competence of politically potent institutions make
possible this combination of objectivity and politics. The
San Francisco labor market has no mysteries on the demand
side. It is diversified, homogeneous, and stable.
It is diversified because no one industry or set of firms
dominates it, nor does its activity rise or fall appreciably with
any one set of economic forces. As an export-import center,
its international markets are so diversified that no one coun
try's economic colds can become its pneumonia.
It is homogeneous because it is a white-collar and service
market. San Francisco houses corporate headquarters and
financial institutions, not producing or materials-handling
facilities. Its jobs are white-collar managerial, not technical
or scientific. Surrounding those managerially oriented jobs
are service jobs (in and out of the firms) that support the ex
ecutive workforce. Its use as a regional headquarters for
both federal and state governments intensifies the central
focus on management.
Because these activities tend to emphasize overhead per
sonnel, San Francisco's labor market does fluctuate as much
as would a more production-oriented economy. Its set of
clerical and data processing occupations seem always to be in
demand, and employers' demand and employees' turnover
can guarantee relatively continuous employment opportuni
ty in a number of service occupations. If demand is quite
stable, a satisfactory set of institutions and programs can be
developed and continued.
On the supply side, San Francisco has a remarkably
diverse but unusually sophisticated population. The stream
of immigrants from both domestic and foreign sources tends
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to be those who departed by choice and selected their
destination. The most successful from along the rim of the
Pacific basin—Asian, Latin-American, and Pacific
Islanders—choose San Francisco as their new home. They
tend to combine relatively low incomes with education and
other characteristics not generally associated with poverty.
The domestic youth movement makes San Francisco a target
for a new life style. The typical indigenous underclass is less
notable than in many central cities.
Thus, San Francisco's population includes many who are
eligible for CETA by economic criteria, yet who possess an
organizational and political capability unusual in a poverty
community. Most of these community-based organizations
(CBOs) are indigenous to San Francisco; the national
organization play little or no role in CETA decisionmaking
or the delivery of services. What other prime sponsor in the
system states explicitly in its request for proposals (RFP) that
priority will be given to programs providing services to gays
and lesbians? San Francisco's indigenous CBOs can obtain
access to resources and then deliver services with a level of
competence that is generally beyond challenge.
The area's economic stability has made it possible to
predict a continuing need for a familiar set of services.
Therefore, MOET has been able to set criteria which, when
met, qualify the contractor for guaranteed 3-year fund
ing—not for a stipulated amount of money, because federal
funds cannot be known in advance, but for a proportionate
share of the action. Of nearly 200 MOET contractors, 14 are
in that secure status currently.
As decisionmaker, therefore, MOET has been able to re
spond to political realities but defend its actions by standard,
objective economic criteria. The use of labor market infor
mation to determine service needs and of management infor
mation to evaluate performance need not lead to markedly
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different decisions than those which politics would have dic
tated.
For related reasons, MOET has been able to spread the
base of decisionmaking without losing control of the decisionmaking process. Its advisory employment and training
council, though too large for optimal effectiveness, is very
active in its decisionmaking, but generally sides with the staff
on most issues. The council is made up of roughly one-third
ex officio members from public agencies, one-third mayoral
appointees representing various interest groups, and onethird appointees of the board of supervisors drawn from
geographical areas of the city.
The council's two most potent committees are the plan
ning committee and the evaluation committee. The first
decides annually how the budget will be distributed by
enrollee characteristics and service functions. The evaluation
committee is supplied twice a year with a mass of data on
contractors' performance. Then each contractor must
publicly defend its stewardship. The careful preparation,
volume, and sophistication of the data supplied by MOET
staff make it highly unlikely that the council will refute it. A
former MOET staff member, now in the mayor's office, also
sits in on all of these sessions so that the mayor's preferences
get into the decision stream early, while the staff has a strong
advocate with the mayor.
If the staff gets overruled, as it does occasionally, it is
generally by the board of supervisors, which is much more
difficult to reach and influence as a body, although any
board member can be more easily subjected to political
pressure from outside.
Monthly meetings of all MOET contractors provide infor
mation, communication, and an opportunity to vent feelings
and frustrations.
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Despite MOET's adroit decisionmaking process and its
favorable economic setting, the presence of the competent
but political CBOs has costs as well as advantages. Some
CETA activities which staff members consider to be of high
potential, notably individual referral and high-support onthe-job training discussed below, are difficult to defend for
lack of a political constituency. Politics need not and
generally do not force acceptance of a less than adequate
program but it may block an outstanding one that lacks
political support.

Federal, State, Local Relations
MOET has the advantage of history in its relations with
both the DOL regional office and the state CETA system. In
effect, MOET, in the person of Eunice Elton, was there first
and the others are newcomers. The state CETA system has
no supervisory role over any prime sponsor. However, San
Francisco has done reasonably well in garnering governor's
discretionary funds. The State Employment Development
Department spends considerable state CETA money in the
city. In addition, a variety of state-funded programs con
tribute significantly to the resources available to the city.
Probably the most significant fact of MOET's relationship
with other government bodies is that federal regional staff
rarely hassles anyone from MOET. Residence in the regional
office city helps, because misunderstandings sometimes grow
with distance. MOET staff reports favorable experience with
the regional training center run by a local consulting firm of
strong reputation in the employment and training field.
Beyond that, the regional staff is most helpful by not secondguessing MOET's decisions or intervening in its activities.

334

Training Policies and Practices
San Francisco's CETA program—its funding,
enrollments, and performance—demonstrate a clear and
longstanding preference for training over all other CETA
services if training is defined broadly as employability
development. In fact, that is the name of the MOET ad
ministrative unit responsible for all services except public
service employment. What do CETA-eligible residents need
to make them acceptable to employers in the stable San
Francisco economy? Given the diversity of the population, it
is not surprising that the most frequent answer is "enough
command of English to be able to function in a white-collar
or service job."
Table 1 summarizes the total CETA budget and
enrollments for fiscal 1979. Of the Title II B-C funding total
over which the prime sponsor had considerable discretion,
56 percent was spent on classroom training and 16 percent
for on-the-job training. The 10 percent spent on work ex
perience was, in effect, mandated.
Table 1. Total San Francisco CETA Funding and Enrollments, 1979

Title
Total
II B-C
II D
III
IV
VI

Total funds
$35,194,728
10,247,052
6,740,497
2,600,408
6,626,243
8,980,528

Enrollments
As of
Cumulative
Sept. 30, 1979
fiscal 1979
4,232
588
1,465
254
206
1,719

18,110
4,926
2,135
512
7,165
3,372
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Maintenance of effort requirements imposed by the Youth
Employment Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 dictate
that MOET reserve 48 percent of its Title II-B CETA slots
for youth. A substantial amount of these services take the
form of work experience, because many youth are not
prepared to settle down to a training program or to work in
its intended occupations afterward. Work experience is an
acceptable "aging vat," but the MOET director objects to
the way that theory works out in practice. School counselors
too often refer students who are not CETA-eligible to any
jobs they hear about, usually with private employers,
because they know publicly subsidized jobs are available for
disadvantaged youth. Thus, youth with the best out-ofschool contacts leading to the regular labor market get fur
ther reinforcement and those without any such contacts are
diverted to a semi-income maintenance situation.
MOET has little or no control over that situation but has
an explicit policy forbidding work experience programs for
adults. Nine percent of Title II B-C funds were spent on sup
portive services for the disadvantaged clientele. For public
service employment under Title II-D, MOET is inaugurating
an approach for 1981 in which PSE enrollees will spend half
the day in classroom training and the other half on the job
applying those skills. Title VI will remain standard PSE.
San Francisco CETA also has one other important nontraining service—advocacy programs. Seven contractors
have an explicit affirmative action role on behalf of age,
race, sex, or handicap groups. They provide no significant
training or employment. These agencies have been effective
in the comfortable demand situation in working with
employers to meet affirmative action goals by hiring CETA
eligibles of various characteristics. The advocacy programs
and miscellaneous services absorb the 9 percent of Title II
B-C funds not accounted for above.
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In fiscal 1979, 192 contractors had assignments to deliver
CETA services in San Francisco. Of these, 146 were hosts for
public service employment. Seventeen supplied classroom
training and seven promoted on-the-job training, in addition
to the seven advocacy contractors. The largest investment is
in English as a second language (ESL). For several contract
ing institutions, ESL is the primary reason for being. Each
concentrates on a specific language group: Spanish, Chinese,
Korean, Filipino and so forth. Each teaches English in a skill
training context, primarily clerical skills, and therefore most
of their pupils are women. For smaller numbers of men, each
also provides some training in service occupations as a vehi
cle for language training.
A larger group of contractors emphasize skill training and
treat language training as an adjunct skill. For instance, the
Jewish Vocational Service has an outstanding program for
Russian Jewish emigres. Because most of the emigres have
university degrees, knowledge of U.S. weights and measures
and similar material is taught to refurbish chemists,
engineers, and so forth, with English instruction as an add
on. With help from the Jewish Vocational Service, a similar
program is being designed for Vietnamese.
Nonlanguage training institutions in San Francisco also
tend to concentrate on a single skill or a narrow range of
skills. Thus, the choice of an institution at which to enroll is
equivalent to a choice of training type. Intake is centralized
only for youth. For those with language problems that is no
handicap, because enrollees must be referred to the institu
tion specializing in their native language. For others,
however, it means that the accident of contact determines the
nature of the training opportunity. The sophisticated may
learn of all of the alternative institutions and their offerings
and select from among them. Those who go to a Job Service
office and are fortunate enough to find an interviewer who
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recognizes their CETA eligibility may be referred to
whatever the interviewer knows to be available. A Youth
Service Office, funded by MOET and operated by Job Ser
vice, provides central referral services for the young. But
what is available for them is primarily work experience. A
Job Service office located in the MOET building has a con
tract to make individual referrals to ongoing programs in
regular public and private schools.
San Francisco has no actual skill center, even though one
institution bears that name. Under the Manpower Develop
ment and Training Act, it approached but never achieved the
qualification requirements for a skill center; the provision of
training in a broad range of occupations, onsite counseling,
job development and placement, and supportive services,
and a concentration on the disadvantaged. In the interim, it
has become one of nine nondegree community college
centers serving a broader audience. It now serves CETA
primarily by accepting individual referrals who can function
on a par with its other students. Its one class-size CETA pro
ject—for health care professionals—has an excellent place
ment record but is somewhat selective in its enrollment.
The skill center is an example of a simultaneous boon and
bane built into the California education system. When a
CETA client enrolls in a tax supported school, that school is
rewarded with the same average daily attendance education
funds it would receive for any other student. Hence, the
school usually absorbs the training costs; only the training
stipend comes from CETA sources. That allows an attractive
leverage of the CETA training dollar, but it may also bias
training decisions. Better training in some fields may be
available from private institutions, but the trade-off between
the higher cost of these institutions and the pressure to
spread available funds to serve more enrollees may tip the
balance in favor of public institutions.
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Some of the MOET staff would prefer a centralized intake
system for assessing all enrollees and referring them to the
institution offering the most appropriate mix of services. In
stitutions that specialize in services for particular age-racenational origin-sex groups, however, would resent such in
tervention between them and their client groups and have the
clout to prevent it, so the MOET staff has never actually pro
posed to centralize intake.
The staff also harbors two related preferences that are not
politically viable. Neither has a constituency of its own, and
both are opposed by powerful community groups.
One is an expansion of the individual referral program.
The majority of San Francisco CETA eligibles have high
school diplomas and many have some college credits. By
selecting trainees carefully and working with the schools, the
staff members feel they could overcome the need for suppor
tive services and purchase a higher level of training. The staff
desire to move to training in higher level skills, even at higher
per enrollee costs, reflects a nostalgic pride in the MOET
Skill Training Improvement program experiences, all of
which had been completed before this study began. This ap
proach, too, would face opposition from those with vested
interest in CBO based programs. The staff hopes to expand
upgrading programs and does not expect as much opposi
tion, because that emphasis probably can be accommodated
within the current mix of contractors.
Similar political problems exist for the second staff
preference: more and better on-the-job training. As noted
above, the national CBOs have no political clout in the city.
Only the local Urban League advocates OJT but the power
lies with the indigenous organizations, which tend to look at
OJT as a diversion from the resources available to them.
The staff also has no preference for standard low support
OJT, which is seen as merely a wage subsidy for small
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employers. However, they are enthusiastic about highsupport OJT, of which there have been some outstanding ex
amples. Primarily in response to affirmative action
pressures, public utilities and other large employers have oc
casionally approached MOET or a contractor, and CETAeligible persons have been selected to meet these employers'
needs. A MOET contractor has provided vestibule training
in simulated work settings. Grooming, deportment, and
basic education, as well as entry level skills, have been stress
ed. Then the enrollees have moved into an OJT phase but
still have been coached by the contractor until secure in their
jobs.
High level clerical, substantial technical, and low level
management positions have been obtained in this way. A
consortium of engineering and architectural firms is current
ly inducting young blacks into technician positions by the
high support OJT approach. But such opportunities are
sporadic. Employers that can provide them cannot be per
suaded by a modest wage subsidy. They respond to their own
needs, and their affirmative action emphasis is shifting from
the entry level to the upgrading stage. Employers will not
participate in the competitive RFP process, so someone has
to act as surrogate for them. Without strong direct ad
vocacy, it is difficult for MOET staff to retain an uncommit
ted pool of OJT funds to respond quickly to employer invita
tion. Any uncommitted funds are well known to the CBOs,
which bring pressure on the employment and training coun
cil, board of supervisors, and mayor for their allocation.
High-support OJT seems unattainable as a regular pro
gram, but it has been accomplished often enough to remain a
tantalizing dream to the MOET staff.

340

The Quality and Results of Training
One could summarize training in San Francisco CETA by
saying that:
1. Employability development in a broad sense is the first
priority of nearly all actors in the system.
2. The language problems of new immigrants are so over
whelming as to swamp other needs.
3. The skills, qualifications, and commitments of the im
migrants are sufficient, combined with a favorable
labor market and competent trainers, to guarantee high
placement rates and even higher retention.
4. The mix of services and service deliverers is probably
not optimum, but it certainly is defensible.
The correlation between program quality and program
outcomes is distorted by the nature of the population and the
labor market. The ESL programs are the most successful,
even though not necessarily of the highest quality. The
facilities are generally crowded and uninspiring. The instruc
tors must meet community college certification requirements
and are generally competent and committed. Over time, the
instructors in the various ESL programs in San Francisco
have developed their own approach and denominated it as
vocational English as a Second Language. They all tend to
take pride in and use the same approach, regardless of
language. There is no way to separate the competence of the
instructor and the quality of the curriculum from the com
mitment of the student body in assessing results. What is
clear is that the participants do learn English—at least
enough to get by and get a job. The job skills components of
ESL are generally not well-equipped and often seem to be an
afterthought. Nevertheless, placement and retention rates in
the high 80s are standard across the ESL range and are
bought at very low per enrollee costs.
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The quality of individual referral is dependent upon the
quality of the institutions involved. The private proprietary
schools are designed to meet the market and generally have
impressive facilities and excellent equipment. Their major
handicaps from a CETA standpoint is that many CETA
eligibles have not been able to survive in those competitive
environments. Most of the community colleges also offer
good facilities and instruction and adequate equipment.
However, the skill center is housed in an abandoned elemen
tary school and carries the marks of a second class institu
tion. Nevertheless its health programs are taught by profes
sionals who maintain high quality.
Most impressive in the San Francisco setting are the high
support OJT projects. The initial pre-entry training is ade
quate but the employer involvement and commitment to hire
is what makes all the difference. But these are sporadic and
difficult to mount.
All in all, San Francisco can be described as a CETA
system with a successful training emphasis, more because of
the nature of the population and the economy than because
of the training quality. In fact, San Francisco's native black
and white poor would debate its effectiveness for them.

Capacity to Develop
and Manage Training Programs
All of these factors are reflected in the development and
management of CETA training programs. Stability of need
and offering reduces the challenge to develop new programs
and new approaches. That which works well can be con
tinued without need for continuous modifications and new
beginnings. A combination of ESL and clerical training is
relatively easy to put together. Decentralized delivery lets the
prime sponsor hold the contractors' feet to the fire without
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having to take full and direct responsibility for managing the
training program.
Still there are always prices to pay. A decision to decen
tralize to service units sponsored by politically potent groups
means that almost every group has a right to a funded in
stitution of its own. They cannot all be equally competent.
Only in dire circumstances can one national origin group be
denied any funding and its constituents required to seek ser
vice from another group's entity. The California system of
state-supported educational institutions offering free tuition
is a boon to the leveraging of CETA funds, but it may lock
MOET into continuation with a mediocre institution because
of the low per enrollee cost. More selective individual refer
rals and more high support OJT are the staffs own nonpolitical preferences. The price of survival in a political at
mosphere is compromise. But MOET has been able to mount
an impressive service delivery mechanism in a political set
ting which could have been chaotic.
The diversified employability development system also has
the advantage of being readily expandable. MOET received,
in 1980, proposals for over twice as much training as it was
able to fund. The capacity for individual referral is almost
infinite, given the number of private as well as public train
ing institutions in the city. None of the San Francisco CETA
training programs is capital-intensive and expansion of
language training requires only instructors, which are plen
tiful. Every program has a substantial waiting list of eligible
applicants. MOET staff believes classroom training could be
expanded by one-half in a few months if given the funding.
Expanded classroom funding would also take the opposing
political pressures off high support OJT, freeing resources to
develop more of those programs.
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Conclusion
CETA in San Francisco is well managed by any set of stan
dards. Its decisionmaking has a broad base and responds to
both politics and economics. Its staff is not plagued by turn
over and has extraordinary competence. The federal agency
is neither a help nor a service hindrance. A major training
need—the Americanization of a new generation of im
migrants—has been identified and is being met within the
limits of available resources. All of these achievements are
being accomplished in a highly politicized atmosphere, and
the response to those pressures is adroit. One might argue for
a different response—one that would centralize intake and
assign clients to training institutions by need and capability.
But politics is as real as economics, and there is no obvious
way to choose between them.

Seattle, Washington
A CBO Delivery System
R. Thayne Robson
University of Utah

The CETA program in the Seattle-Everett SMSA, a con
sortium until recently of seven cities and two counties, is a
strong and successful program when viewed from the
perspective of the services delivered to clients, but not
necessarily as viewed from the regional office. In fact, the
King-Snohomish Manpower Consortium (KSMC), can
almost be described as two relatively distinct systems: (1) a
system for delivery of services to clients by program agents
who are predominantly community based organizations,
along with a significant role for the Washington State
Employment Service, and (2) a higher administrative and
policy level, which encompasses the regional office of the
Department of Labor and the prime sponsor organization
and staff, whose primary focus is the implementation of
federal regulations and guidelines. The latter functions
within an environment which creates friction and too often
diverts attention away from the primary goal of improving
the services to and the accomplishments of the clients. The
distance between these two levels appears to be growing
wider and causes concern for everyone involved.

The Political Economy
of Seattle Area
King and Snohomish Counties cover a large area of 4,226
square miles with a population of 1,500,000. The Cascade
Mountain range is the boundary on the east as the Puget
Sound is on the west. Seattle is the commercial and service
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center of the region, and the Seattle-Everett SMSA is the
seventeenth largest in the nation.
As the trading center for the Northwest, and with the ex
panded energy activity in Canada and Alaska, growth in
aerospace and defense, and increasing trade with the Orient,
the economy of the Seattle area is strong and growing.
Historically, the port facilities, the trade routes to Alaska
and the Orient, fishing, lumber, pulp and paper, dominated
the economy of the area. Since World War II, the general
growth of manufacturing, and especially electronics, and of
aerospace, particularly the Boeing Company as the area's
largest employer, has broadened the economic base of the
area.
Unemployment, however, has been significant, averaging
between 6 and 8 percent over the past several years. The
migration of minorities up the west coast and the recent im
migration of Asian refugees continues to confront the area
with a significant population of people who are disadvantaged and eligible for CETA services.
The political climate of the area has been somewhat mixed
but generally Democratic, especially in state offices and the
city of Seattle. Mayor Wes Ullman, Seattle's mayor in the
early 1970s, was the driving force in implementing the new
CETA legislation and in gaining support and cooperation
from the King County executive, John Spellman, who was
recently elected governor. The state of Washington and the
city of Seattle had profited in federal budgetary matters
from an influential congressional delegation, especially while
Senator Warren Magnussen was Chairman of the Senate Ap
propriations Committee.
Recent growth has occurred mainly in the suburban areas
outside Seattle where more conservative views and traditions
hold sway. Republicans have won important elections for the
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U.S. Senate and the governorship. Even so, the traditions of
the Northwest, like those of the West generally, have provid
ed strong support for education and human services. The
metropolitan areas in particular have welcomed and general
ly supported efforts to provide employment and training ser
vices. These traditions have given the area quality education
systems and a strong employment service. Also characteristic
of the metropolitan area has been the multiplicity of units of
government, school districts, and community college
districts, each with a high degree of autonomy.
The emergence of a CETA delivery system utilizing com
munity based organizations is probably best explained as a
result of the power void that existed within the educational
and human service institutions. There was no one who could
convene and organize a metropolitan delivery system. Only
the Washington State Employment Service had a network of
area wide offices and interests which made possible its early
and strong role in employment and training programs,
dating to the beginning of MDTA and subsequent activities
under the Economic Opportunity Act.
The employers of the area traditionally have been strongly
involved in social and community affairs, as have the labor
unions. As a result, the establishment of the planning pro
cess with supporting advisory committees could draw on
strong traditions of communtiy support and involvement. It
is quite likely that this same tradition also explains the early
and continuing involvement of elected officials in the new
consortium activity.

Planning and Decisionmaking
The King-Snohomish Manpower Consortium (KSMC)
was established as an independent governmental unit by the
seven cities and two counties in the area. Thirteen elected of-
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ficials serve on an executive board that governs the consor
tium. The chairperson of the executive committee has alter
nated between the mayor of Seattle and the county executive
of King County. Seattle with three of the thirteen votes is
larger in population (500,000) than all of the other cities
combined, and King County outside the limits of the
member cities is the largest partner, as measured by popula
tion. Snohomish County, which withdrew from the consor
tium during the course of this study, represented slightly less
than one-fifth of the total population and had three votes,
one for the county and one each for Edmonds and Everett.
During the formative period, the executive director of the
KSMC was Robert McPherson who built the alliance of
elected officials and community based organizations that
formed the core of the CETA system. The involvement of
elected officials was accomplished by the establishment of a
group of "subexecutives" consisting of key staff members
serving each of the elected officials who met regularly to
agree on the policies and actions that could be ratified by the
executive board at monthly meetings. Strong employment
and training advisory committees (ETAC) were established,
one for Snohomish County and one for King County, with
broad based representation from public and private
employers, unions, and citizens representing major interest
groups in the community. Organizations contracting with
the consortium to provide services became non-voting
members of the ETACs. The organization of two ETACs
was initially a matter of geography. The thirty-five miles be
tween Seattle and Everett seemed to justify the wisdom of
separate meetings and committees although a joint commit
tee was created to act for the two ETACs as needed.
McPherson left the KSMC staff in September 1977 during
the dramatic expansion of CETA activities resulting from
the Carter countercyclical initiative and the new youth pro-
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grams, a year during which the staff and funding for CETA
activity in the area approximately doubled. Some of the key
staff members who had been responsible for much of the
development of training policies left with him.
Mayor Ullman arranged for the appointment of Lee Pasquarella as the new executive director, just prior to leaving
office later that year. The switch from McPherson to Pasquarella came at a difficult time in KSMC's history and was
accompanied by a sharp change in management styles. MacPherson was a recognized expert with a great deal of ex
perience in employment and training programs. His "open
door" management style involved full communication with
staff, program agents, and interest groups. Pasquarella had
worked for Mayor Ullman and then moved on to
Washington, D.C. to work for Senator Magnusson. He had
no previous experience in employment and training pro
grams and chose a much more formal style of management
with his staff and the major program agents.
Despite the loss of key staff members in 1977 and a few
changes since then, the core of managers of the various func
tions and departments have considerable experience and are
generally regarded as competent and dedicated. The
managerial systems developed to handle personnel, MIS,
planning, and the other functions are efficient and shared
broadly with other prime sponsors throughout the nation.
The essential decisionmaking mechanisms have always in
volved an elaborate planning process. Staff analysis and pro
posals are developed after consultation and input from the
program agents, and submitted to the review and comment
of the ETACs. The advisory committees have done much
more than simply review and approve proposals. Plans and
policies have been thoroughly debated at the ETAC meetings
and the differences largely ironed out. The final plans and
funding are approved by the executive board at regular
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meetings. The planning process has been continuous, but has
taken a great deal of time for at least six months of each year
over the period from March to October. CETA in Seattle has
been a sizeable undertaking with total funding under all titles
in fiscal 1979 of approximately $84 billion dollars (Table 1).
Table 1. KSMC/CETA Funding for Fiscal 1979
Fiscal 1979
Fiscal 1979
availability3
Title/program
expenditures
$68,001,781
$83,913,773
Total
II-B
10,377,650
12,466,879
II-D
14,164,325
15,919,346
4,471,030
IV SYEP
4,807,193
756,252
945,315
IV YCCIP
IV YETP
VI
VII
HIRE II
STIPI
STIP II
YIEPP
Vocational Education
Administration
Cost Pool

Fiscal 1979
carry-out

3,443,029
27,256,709
491,106
620,646
1,720,467
999,798b
10,105,362b
757,576

3,049,202
24,752,382
47,531
427,596
1,159,879
484,476
4,258,719
757,576

$15,911,992
2,089,229
1,755,021
336,163
189,063
393,827
2,504,327
443,575
193,050
560,588
515,322
5,846,643
—

4,380,347

3,295,163

1,085,184

a. Figures adjusted for Administration Cost Pool set-asides where appropriate,
b. Includes availability for fiscal year 1980.

From the outset, there has been considerable friction be
tween the Seattle regional office of the Department of Labor
and the prime sponsor. In the formative years, the KSMC
staff chose to deal directly with DOL officials in
Washington, D.C., a practice that proved annoying to the
regional office. In recent years the communications have re
mained strained as the regional office has sought to enforce
policies that the prime sponsor staff thought were either in
appropriate or of a lesser priority. The regional office has
given KSMC poor ratings for failure to maintain services to
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youth under Title II-B, slowness in implementing the in
dependent monitoring unit, for lack of adequate systems to
check enrollee eligibility, and other matters. Behind all of
these issues have been clashes of personalities and a lack of
genuine efforts to resolve issues which for the most part ap
pear within the range of relatively easy solution. Yet the fric
tions at the top level do not seem to have adversely affected
the delivery of services to clients.
Effective in October 1980, Snohomish County, along with
its two cities, Everett and Edmonds, withdrew from the con
sortium and established itself as a prime sponsor. This left
approximately 80 percent of the old consortium intact, with
King County and the five cities of Seattle, Bellevue, Kent,
Renton, and Auburn in the King-Seattle consortium. This
realignment also had little impact upon service delivery since
Snohomish County continued to use the same program
agents to perform approximately the same functions at the
same levels of activity.

Training Expenditures and Costs
Of the total fiscal 1979 funding of $83,913,773,
$16,565,366 or 20 percent was devoted to training (Table 2).
Of the $11 million reported as spent under II-B in that year,
77 percent went for classroom training, 14 percent for OJT,
and 9 percent for adult work experience (Table 3). Skills
training accounted for 85.5 percent of all classroom training
funds, with adult basic education, English as a second
language, and general education development accounting for
the remainder.
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Table 2. CETA Training Funds for KSMC, Fiscal 1979
Funding
source

Funds
available

Funds
expended

Carryout

Total
Title II-B
STIP I
STIP II
Vocational Education

$16,565,366
12,466,879
1,720,467
999,798
757,576

$13,207,177
10,377,650
1,159,879
484,476
757,576

$3,358,189
2,089,229
560,588
515,322
—

Table 3. Title II-B Expenditures by Subrecipient, Fiscal 1979
Category and agency
Total
Classroom training
Concerned Chicanes
Chicano Education
Central Community College
Seattle Indian Center
Seattle QIC
Operation Improvement
OJT
SER
WSES
Carpenters
University of Washington
Seattle Urban League
Job Therapy
Adult work experience
Operation Improvement
New Careers
Passage Foundation
SOURCE: KSMC.

Expenditures
(includes allowances)

Percent
by category

$11,210,043
8,613,940
168,543
307,940
613,782
161,677
4,556,480
2,805,518

100.0
100.0
2.0
3.6
7.1
1.9
52.9
37.6

1,612,967
367,846
436,533
81,706
143,467
410,192
173,225

100.0
22.8
27.1
5.1
8.9
25.4
10.7

983,134
531,250
295,771
156,113

100.00
54.0
30.1
15.9
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Training costs are relatively high at KSMC (Table 4)
because of the cost structure of its two major classroom
training institutions discussed below.
Table 4. Classroom Training Cost Analysis, KSMC, Fiscal 1979

Total
Classroom
Concerned
Chicanes
CEMS
SCCM
Seattle Indian
Seattle QIC
GIF

Terminations

Cost per
placement
(excludes
allowances)

Cost per
positive
outcome

percent
employment

other
positive

$ 7,599

$5,179

50.1

23.4

4,746
10,866
9,405
112,408
6,610
9,808

3,622
3,675
5,905
1,972
4,610
8,163

50.9
28.0
58.7
1.1
50.8
63.1

15.8
54.9
34.8
61.5
22.0
12.7

Who Provides the Training?
The distinguishing features of the KSMC delivery system
for training are: (1) A unified recruitment, intake, assess
ment, and referral program operated by a largely indepen
dent unit within the Washington State Employment Security
Department. These functions are carried on at 10 offices
located throughout the area. (2) Community based organiza
tions (CBOs) as the major actors in delivering both
classroom training and on-the-job training. One CBO, the
Seattle QIC, has conducted more than one-half of all the
classroom training for KSMC, and another, Operation Im
provement Foundation, manages an individual referral
system which places participants in classroom training in 35
public and private training institutions. These two CBOs,
OIC and OIF, provide over 85 percent of all classroom train
ing. Two other CBOs, the Seattle Urban League and SER,
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are major contractors in the on-the-job training programs.
(3) The Washington State Employment Security Depart
ment, in addition to the operation of the intake centers, is
also a major OJT contractor, and has also been a contractor
for work experience and PSE activity. Prior to 1977, WSES
operated the individual referral activity which is now manag
ed by Operation Improvement Foundation. Placement ac
tivity was formerly limited to WSES which now shares the
responsibility with the other contractors. WSES still plays a
major role in the placement activities for KSMC par
ticipants. WSES also handles all allowance payments from
the state offices in Olympia.
There are, of course, other contractors providing both
classroom training and OJT. The adult basic education,
English as a second language, and general educational
development programs, which account for approximately 15
percent of Title II-B funds, are operated through four con
tractors. The largest and most rapidly growing of the pro
grams is an English as a second language (ESL) program for
Asian refugees operated by the Seattle Central Community
College. There are two small Spanish ESL programs, one in
Snohomish County and the other in King County. In addi
tion, KSMC funded a small basic education program for the
Seattle Indian Center.
Of the six contractors operating OJT programs, WSES is
the largest with approximately 27 percent of total funds.
Seattle Urban League is second with approximately 25 per
cent, and SER has a program that accounts for about 23 per
cent of the OJT funds. In addition to the big three OJT con
tractors, the Seattle Carpenters' Union operates a small OJT
program and there are two coupled classroom/OJT pro
grams, one for handicapped at the University of Washington
and the other a small specialized program run by Job
Therapy, a non-profit group serving ex-offenders.
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Who Gets Trained?
Women were over one-half of the participants in
classroom training but less than one-third of the OJT
placements. Minorities were 60 percent of classroom trainees
and approximately 46 percent of the OJT placements. Youth
were one-third of the classroom trainees but only onequarter of the OJT placements (Table 5).
KSMC was serving approximately 49 percent youth in Ti
tle II-B prior to the introduction of the youth programs and
the guidelines required it to continue to do so. The decline in
Title II-B youth enrollment has been a constant source of
friction between KSMC and the DOL regional office. Given
the relatively low proportion of minorities in the population,
the high enrollment proportion is undoubtedly due to the
role of the CBOs in the delivery system, as well as the general
reputation of CETA as a minority program in Seattle.
As noted above, the WSES operates the recruitment, in
take, screening, and referral centers for all CETA titles.
These intake centers generally screen three people for every
person referred. Forty-three percent of the persons screened
for service were female, 39 percent were 21 years of age or
under, 38 percent were high school dropouts, but 20 percent
had some post-high school training. Approximately 48 per
cent were minorities, 79 percent were below the poverty
level, and 93 percent were unemployed.

The Geographic Issue
Executive board representatives and the ETACs of the
three major geographical divisions within the KSMC area
have been very sensitive, to the geographical distribution of
funds and activities. As a result, all reports filed by contrac
tors must report the residence of persons served by the pro
gram. The goal for fiscal 1979 was that 53 percent of the par-
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Table 5. Client Characteristics for Qassroom and OJT Training by Contractor, Fiscal 1979
Contractor and type
of service
Classroom
Concerned Chicanes
CEMS
SCCC
Seattle Indian
Seattle QIC
GIF
OJT
SER
WSES
King County Carpenters
University of Washington
Seattle Urban League
Job Therapy
OJT Direct Placement

Characteristics by percent
Youth
Minority
Female
33.7
60.1
56.0
32.5
54.5
88.3
29.4
43.7
98.3
28.5
51.5
100.0
54.0
100.0
58.0
32.8
68.1
49.6
35.1
69.1
26.9
29.8
29.9
27.1
34.4
45.7
28.6
24.7
30.0

45.7
68.4
27.4
43.8
15.2
65.6
41.6
69.2

26.6
36.7
31.0
34.4
7.6
23.9
13.0
26.9

Lft

ON

Geographical distribution by percent
Snohomish
King
Seattle
13.1
26.3
60.6
100.0
0
0
15.1
0
84.9
20.0
2.0
78.0
6.0
0
94.0
2.6
15.1
82.3
28.8
52.0
19.2
59.5
48.6
40.4
40.6
73.9
87.6
62.3
63.8

22.0
29.4
27.4
56.3
21.7
9.7
9.1
23.1

18.5
22.0
32.2
3.1
4.4
2.7
28.6
13.1
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ticipants should be residents of Seattle, 30 percent residents
of King County outside of Seattle, and 17 percent residents
of Snohomish County. The distribution was based upon
population, estimates of need, and some recognition that the
major contractors were better located to serve Seattle
residents.
For 1979, Snohomish County was more nearly propor
tionately served by OJT than by classroom training. Seattle
enrollees were overrepresented compared to goal by both
types of training, and King County outside of Seattle City
was slightly underrepresented in classroom training (4 per
cent) and OJT (8 percent) compared to goals. Since
classroom training has served the largest number of people
and spent the most money, this has been the area of greatest
sensitivity. Because of the persistent overrepresentation of
Seattle residents, the funding allocations for fiscal 1981 were
based upon a formula which rewarded or penalized contrac
tors according to their records in achieving the desired
geographical distribution. This was a major factor in the
withdrawal of Snohomish County.

Training Quality
Training outcomes at KSMC are more impressive in terms
of wage gains than in placements. The total classroom train
ing enrollment during fiscal 1979 was 2,787 with 2,075 ex
iting the program of whom 1,616 or 77.9 percent were completers. Of this latter group 50.3 percent entered employment
and another 23.5 percent were recorded as positive termina
tions, leaving a nonpositive termination rate of 26.2 percent.
The before and after wage data for fiscal 1979 showed a
median pre-CETA wage of $2.87 and a median post-CETA
placement wage of $4.43 for an increase of $1.56 per hour or
54.4 percent. Only the Indian and Concerned Chicanes pro
grams fell substantially below the average gain. However,
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the outcomes are probably more a product of the economy
than of the training which is generally of high quality.

Seattle QIC Skill Center
The Seattle QIC, the largest skill training program in the
consortium with total funding of $5.5 million in 1980,
operates one of the most modern skill centers found in the
United States. The center serves people who are educational
ly and economically disadvantaged in a full range of services
from extensive counseling and GED/ABE, to skill training
in any of 12 occupational areas. The facilities, equipment,
and curriculum materials appear to be at or near the best
available. The director and the managers are outstanding in
their knowledge, experience, and skills in operating the
facility. There are waiting lists of people desiring to enter the
program.
Training costs are high at SOIC due to a combination of
quality facilities, extensive supportive services, and unusual
ly high administrative costs. However, the costs are not ex
cessive in relation to the quality of the training. One of the
strongest bases of support for the SOIC has been the
employer advisory group which has assisted the SOIC to ob
tain the facilities and equipment which high quality training
demands. The employer advisory group has also been impor
tant to an effective placement program for the students who
complete the program.
During 1979 the costs associated with SOIC training were:
Total costs of SOIC program
SOIC costs as program agent
Allowance costs (paid by WSES)
Administrative costs (percent
as proportion of SOIC costs)

$4,556,480
2,376,492
1,661,025

100.0%
52.2%
36.5%

563,963

23.6%
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Based on figures showing the total number served as 1,577,
the total number entering employment as 604, and total
positive terminations as 866, the costs per unit of service
were:

Cost per person served
Cost per placement
Cost per positive termination

Total
$2,889
7,544
5,262

Program
agent
$1,507
3,935
2,744

Seattle QIC is not without its problems. SOIC now serves
well over one-half of all those enrolled in classroom training
in KSMC. However, as noted, SOIC serves predominantly
the residents of Seattle. Therefore, strong pressure to shift
resources away from Seattle to the balance of King County
threatens the continuing growth of the SOIC program. SOIC
has major expansion plans underway at a time when future
funding is increasingly in doubt. Two additional floors are
being added to the center, and plans are underway to add ad
ditional areas of occupational training. These plans require
that both SOIC and the consortium staff have a common set
of goals and commitments regarding the future of classroom
training, and SOIC's high role in providing training.
These issues highlight the difficulty of long-range planning
given the current funding cycles of the CETA system. The
gambles on expansion in the past have generally paid off.
SOIC may need to explore some set of arrangements under
which state and local financial support can be increased.
Alternatively, employer support which has already been
significant may be expandable. Can a community based
organization operating a local educational facility gain ac
cess to the tax base which supports the public training in
stitutions within the area which already has an extensive net
work of community colleges? The question may be a key one
in SOIC's future.
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Operation Improvement Foundation
The individual referral program operated by the Opera
tion Improvement Foundation is impressive in terms of the
number of training institutions involved (35) and the number
of occupational areas (40) in which training is offered. Ap
proximately 800 CETA enrollees are enrolled annually with
CETA funding of $2.8 million. The entire system is difficult
to evaluate simply because of its size and diversity. The com
munity college facilities visited were generally excellent and
the Seattle area has a tradition of high quality training. The
state vocational education system which exercises mandatory
certification has been important in assuring quality control.
However, the CETA supported students are a small part of
the total training programs in the area and no special atten
tion is paid to their needs.
A smaller number of training institutions or more em
phasis on class-size units would simplify the administration
of the program. However, the extensive network of com
munity colleges, vocational-technical institutions, and
private training schools each claim a role that would be dif
ficult to simplify. The geographical territory serviced by the
consortium is large. Even though it appears that CETA has
had little impact upon the training institutions or their curriculums, the private schools are most vocal on insisting on a
share of the CETA training effort. CETA buys whatever
training is available on the terms and conditions set by the in
stitutions. These terms and conditions are generally
favorable, although the length of training time does add to
per enrollee and per placement costs.
Financing of training costs comes from a combination of
CETA funds, basic education opportunity grants, local tax
support for the colleges, and state funds for GED/ABE.
Once a CETA client enrolls at a community college, the con
sortium's control over time in training, training given, and
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training costs becomes limited. The consortium does retain
effective control over the payment of allowances. The
primary reason for high per enrollee costs appears to be the
length of time in training and the cost of operating the in
dividual referral system with its own assessment program
added to what is already done at the WSES assessment pro
gram. As noted, the average length of training in this
program ranges from nine months to one year, and there are
a few two-year programs still being provided to CETA
enrollees. For the consortium, the individual referral
system's strength is its ability to serve the residents of King
County outside of Seattle. These clients are mainly Cauca
sian women, with high levels of educational attainment,
though they qualify on the basis of economic disadvantage
and unemployment.
Up to now, it has not been possible to trace carefully the
success rates of enrollees by training occupation and by
training institution. The steps now being taken to install a
computerized management information system should
remedy this lack.

Washington State Employment Service
The intake, assessment, and referral centers operated by
the Washington State Employment Service's special CETA
unit appear to offer an important and successful control unit
in a highly pluralistic CETA delivery system. For the most
part, the program levels have been maintained, slots have
been filled, and waiting lists have been managed with con
siderable skill. Program agents can obtain from WSES refer
rals enrollees for the service available with client assessment
information based on professional counseling and extensive
testing. The Washington State Employment Service must be
somewhat unique in its willingness to create a separate
CETA unit with considerable autonomy within the Job Ser
vice system. While each of the major program agents
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sometimes find fault with the others, the WSES unit seems
firmly entrenched by virtue of the support it gets from all ac
tors in the GETA system.

Conclusions
The classroom training program in the Seattle area could
easily accommodate a significant expansion. The individual
referral approach is highly expansible and SOIC is already
strongly programmed for an expansion which may not be
forthcoming. It would be safe to conclude that the classroom
training activity within the two counties could be expanded
to double the present levels, if funds were available. The
training appears to be of high quality. But, unfortunately,
there is no data available to determine whether quality train
ing at relatively high cost brings a commensurate improve
ment in the employment and income experience of its par
ticipants. A careful evaluation of training results, especially
for the individual referral program, should be completed
prior to any major expansion.
By most tests, KSMC must be given reasonably high
marks for operating what the staff considers to be one of the
ten best CETA programs in the nation. The people being
served are generally economically disadvantaged and
unemployed but somewhat better educated than CETA
enrollees in most locations. Strong emphasis is placed on
training, especially classroom training, with reasonably
strong secondary emphasis on OJT. The elected officials are
both involved in and supportive of CETA activities, and
most other interested groups within the community have am
ple involvement in the planning process.
In reaching this basically favorable conclusion regarding
the KSMC program, it is necessary to acknowledge that
regional DOL officials have expressed some displeasure with
performance during recent years, and have given KSMC an
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unsatisfactory rating. The major issue identified by inter
views with both federal and local staff has been the failure to
maintain 49 percent youth enrollment in Title II-B programs
after the Title IV youth programs, including the entitlements
program, became operative in Seattle. The other issues
regarding eligibility, IMU, and minority staff should be easi
ly resolvable under the circumstances. The underlying issues
over the years, and more particularly under Pasquarella's
administration of the consortium, have mainly related to
communications and personality problems, including a
general lack of responsiveness to regional office concerns.
None of the issues go directly to the quality or effectiveness
of the services provided.
The management of a complex CETA system is not easy.
There is room for discussion and even debate over what
numbers should be collected and how they should be
presented for analytical purposes. There is a tendency to
focus too much attention on some of the daily frictions—on
the irritations of late reporting, on the present and prospec
tive changes in regulations and funding. Under these
pressures, it is possible to neglect the basic obligation to
assist eligible clients to obtain improved skills and jobs.
The KSMC CETA program has been heavily funded and
has operated with relatively high costs, especially in
classroom training. The emphasis is on skills training with
duration ranging from an average of six months at SOIC to
between nine and twelve months in the individual referral
program. The quality of the training provided is reflected in
the wage gains if not in the placement rates. But whatever is
accomplished in Seattle CETA, it is the CBOs which do it,
counting the specialized WSES CETA unit as more like a
CBO than a public agency.

Tucson, Arizona
Orchestrated Decentralization
Garth L. Mangum
University of Utah

The Prime Sponsor Area
Tucson is the second largest city (next to Phoenix) and the
only other metropolitan area of any size in Arizona. The
city, with its 1979 population of 319,300, has the only
population of more than 6,000 in Pima County. Most of the
county's 539,800 people live in Tucson and its suburbs, while
the county spreads over a geographical area larger than the
State of Connecticut.
A little more than one hour's drive from the Mexican
border, the county was populated by 118,600 Hispanics,
15,000 blacks, 12,900 Native Americans, 3,600 Asians, and
352,600 non-Hispanic whites in 1978. The area's nearness to
Mexico contributes to a low wage structure which makes
jobs at the federal minimum wage relatively attractive, even
though the area's cost of living is above the national average.
Historically, copper mining has been an important source
of employment, and Pima County is still the home of the
fourth and fifth largest copper mines in the country.
However, attractiveness as a retirement community and an
emerging electronics industry have moved to center place in
the local economy. Low wages and the human resource base
of the 30,000-student University of Arizona and the
22,000-student Pima Community College have been the ma
jor attractions for the emerging industry. The community
suffered heavily from the 1974-75 recession but gives prom
ise of riding through that of 1980 more comfortably.
365
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Unemployment was at a low of 3.9 percent in the spring of
1980, rising to 5.8 percent by midsummer.

Staff and Institutional Stability
Contrary to a general CETA reputation for high staff
turnover, the Tucson prime sponsor has experienced almost
total stability throughout the entire CETA experience. The
staff is, of course, small—a total of 35 in 1980—as behooves
a relatively small prime sponsor in a modest sized city.
That staff has functioned under one director from the
CETA beginning, and he directed the public employment
program under the Emergency Employment Act of 1971 and
was director of the Tucson Cooperative Area Manpower
Planning System under the Manpower Development and
Training Act prior to CETA. The Tucson Employment and
Training Administration is divided into five major depart
ments. Only one department head has ever left the post and
he only to enter private business, run successfully for the city
council, and become a strong supporter of his previous col
leagues from that position.
Top management as well as staff has grown with the ex
pansion of CETA, and those who came, stayed. Two techni
cian level positions were lost to the city when a city-county
consortium split in 1979 but the incumbents continued with
the county prime sponsor. Thus the record of stability is
maintained at the technician level. There has been the nor
mal turnover of clerical personnel.
Only one position experiences troublesome turnover.
Eleven persons have rotated through the five positions as
field monitors, or service delivery coordinators in Tucson
parlance, since the function was established in 1977. The job
is a difficult one. Approximately 80 percent of the time is
spent at CETA contractors' facilities observing and checking
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the delivery of service to enrollees. If there is any conflict
between prime sponsor and contractor, the service delivery
coordinator is in the middle of it. The service delivery coor
dinator is also in circulation to observe and be observed, and
all who have left did so for better jobs. Because the assign
ment requires judgment and experience, that turnover could
pose a recruitment and training problem. However,
replacements are usually hired from the lower ranks of con
tractor staff with readymade familiarity with the CETA
world.
At the director level, the explanation of the staff stability
is political stability. One mayor, now in his third 4-year
term, has headed city government throughout the CETA ex
perience. Tucson also has a city manager of similar tenure.
The CETA staff director reports politically to the first and
administratively to the second, and has the trust of both. For
the rest of the staff, the primary explanation is that all have
been incorporated into the city civil service with full rights
and protections rather than being grafted on in some tem
porary fashion as is the more usual CETA experience. In a
small city like Tucson, city jobs are attractive ones, secure
and competitively paid and few leave them.
However, the stability of Tucson CETA is not limited to
the prime sponsor staff. The primary service delivery con
tractors—the Tucson Skill Center, the Arizona Department
of Economic Security (DES), Tucson Manpower Develop
ment, Inc., Operation SER, and Tucson Urban
League—were all actively involved under the pre-CETA
Manpower Development and Training Act and Economic
Opportunity Act. Other minor contractors come and go,
either providing specialized services or acting as hosts for
public service employment slots, but these five carry the bulk
of CETA service delivery responsibility year after year.

368

Contractor staff are almost as turnover-free as prime
sponsor staff. The skill center went through a double transi
tion at the end of MDTA as the director left to head a private
trade school. The deputy became director but was not com
fortable with the annual competitive funding process of
CETA. The head of the DES/CETA unit, who had served
the National Alliance of Businessmen-Job Opportunities in
the Business Sector (NAB-JOBS) program from within DES,
took over the skill center directorship in 1977 and has re
mained since.
The DES/CETA unit is staffed by professional employ
ment service staff, primarily of Mexican-American extrac
tion, and has experienced only that one change of leadership.
SER, the Urban League, and Tucson Manpower Develop
ment all continue to function under their pre-CETA leader
ship. Turnover below the director level has been moderate
for all. Only the prime sponsor and DES enjoy the protec
tion of tenured systems. But salaries of all are competitive
within the employment and training fraternity and with the
private sector in a relatively low wage labor market.
Personal relationships are good except with the SER direc
tor, who is the "stormy petrel" of Tucson CETA. Militant,
aggressive, and competent, he is a constant battler for more
funds to provide adult basic education and English as a sec
ond language programs for his Hispanic constituency.
Private sector members of the planning and private industry
councils find his conduct in meetings disruptive and ir
ritating. But all of that is offset by SER's outstanding per
formance. Thus Tucson CETA tends, in cliche, to be a
reasonably happy and relatively close family.

Prime Sponsor/Federal Relations
"Adversary" is a better description of relations between
the Tucson prime sponsor and the Labor Department's San
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Francisco regional office. For the Tucson staff, that rela
tionship is personalized by the federal representative or "fed
rep" assigned full time to the Tucson consortium and now to
both the city and county prime sponsors. The position is
characterized by high turnover, both because the fed reps do
not stay on the job long and because there is deliberate rota
tion. Of the eight fed reps who have served Tucson, only the
current (mid-1980) one has ever had experience as a member
of a prime sponsor staff. The Tucson staff, until that recent
change, have viewed the fed reps as uniformly incompetent
and uncooperative, inexperienced, and unwilling to invest
the time to learn the Tucson scene and the reasons for and
nature of its policies and practices. Knowing no way to be
helpful, the Tucson staff feel, the fed reps can only be nit
picking enforcers.
Compounding the problem of local-regional relations is
the national system, devised by the Congress and the U.S.
Department of Labor, which requires the prime sponsor
each year to complete planning for the next without knowing
what level of funding will actually be available and to adjust
to frequent funding and policy changes within each program
year. Then too, the Tucson director has excellent
Washington contacts and invariably knows of national of
fice decisions weeks before they are communicated to the
regional office and more time passes before the regional of
fice can translate and transmit them through field directives.
Confidence in the regional office is not helped by situations
in which that office is accusing the prime sponsor of noncompliance for advance response to a coming national direc
tive.
On the other side of the coin, many of the regional staff
consider Tucson staff obdurate and uncooperative. Admit
ting all of the shortcomings of their position, they point out
that relations are good with other prime sponsors in the
region, despite the same set of obstacles.
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At the time of this writing, however, the whole CETA ad
ministration in the regional office has been restructured and
restaffed. A new federal representative has been assigned
who has several years of prime sponsor level experience
behind him. He has spent extensive time in Tucson to learn
local conditions and practices and has been helpful in break
ing loose some longstanding requests for information. Both
sides are hopeful that a new and more positive relationship
may emerge.

Political Vulnerability
The Tucson experience is an instructive example of the
vulnerability of the CETA system to erratic forces of local
politics. Tucson CETA functioned for five years as a consor
tium consisting of Tucson city, Pima County, and the city of
South Tucson.
At CETA's advent only the city or the county including
the city had the 100,000 population required for prime spon
sorship. The county, at the time, lacked the administrative
structure to handle such an enterprise. A consortium was
formed including the city of South Tucson—a mile square
enclave of 6,000 population, three-fourths of them MexicanAmerican, totally surrounded by the city of Tucson.
Tucson city assumed lead position in the consortium and
the CETA staff all became city employees. A liaison commit
tee of one member each from the Tucson city council, the
five county supervisors, and the mayor of South Tucson
were the chief policymaking body reporting back to their
larger groups. Administratively, however, the staff director
reported to the Tucson city manager. The prime sponsor ad
visory council was dominated by contractors who could not
vote on issues of pecuniary interest to them, but meetings
were long and acrimonious and tainted by self-interest.
Despite that flaw, the system ran well except for continuous
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complaints from Hispanics and Native Americans about
their share of the resources.
The county outside the city limits grew to prime sponsor
eligibility. However, Tucson still so dominated the county's
population that four of the five county supervisors were
elected by a totally Tucson constituency and the fifth
represented the rest of the county along with some Tucson
voters. The latter, a university professor, came to resent the
city's dominance in CETA affairs and agitated for exercise
of the county's right to separate prime sponsorship. The city
CETA staff charge that the federal regional office staff en
couraged those ambitions, but the latter deny it. At any rate,
Pima County filed in 1979 for independent prime sponsor
ship, which became official October 1, 1979, for the
1980 fiscal year. South Tucson could only go along with the
county.
The split brought no evident gain for the CETA-eligible
citizens of either the county or the city or for employers or
for the labor market. The city staff continued intact except
for the loss of two positions. A new county staff had to be
developed and the aggregate administrative cost rose. Except
for one private not-for-profit organization providing rural
services, the same set of contractors serve both prime spon
sors and both populations. Two sets of requests for pro
posals go out each spring and each contractor makes two
responses and keeps two sets of books and reports. The two
sets of enrollees remain mixed in the receipt of services. The
consortium bonus of $260,000 per year (a little less than 2
percent of the new-CETA funding authorized for fiscal
1979) was lost to both prime sponsors. A prime sponsor
which had planned for an entire labor market and more was
replaced by two, each operating over a fragment of both the
demand and supply sides of the local labor market.
The only observable gain was reform of the advisory coun
cil structure for the city prime sponsor.
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The Decisionmaking Process
The city had become eligible during the 1974-75 recession
for aid under the Economic Development Act and an
employer-dominated committee had been appointed to
prepare the Overall Economic Development Plan (OEDP).
That committee had worked well and the CETA staff direc
tor and the director of the Urban League were already
members of it. At the CETA director's advice, the mayor
assigned CETA responsibilities to the same committee, add
ing the representatives required by CETA law and regula
tion.
The OEDP/CETA advisory council has worked ex
ceedingly well during its first year, despite the OEDP group's
amazement at the CETA workload. A long range planning
committee and a plant siting committee carry on the major
OEDP responsibilities. There is a CETA planning committee
with task forces for Title II-B programs, youth programs,
and public service employment programs. The CETA com
mittee actively participates in setting the boundaries for the
annual request for proposals and the task forces read, assess,
and rank all of the proposals and join with the staff in
recommendations to the full OEDP/CETA council.
The council chairman is vice president for economic
development of a major bank and the membership is heavily
weighted by business interests. The private industry council
(PIC) chairman, another banker, is a council member, as are
all but one of the PIC members. Council membership is for
bidden to any person whose salary is paid from CETA
funds, thus eliminating from membership all contractors ex
cept the employment service, the skill center director whose
salary is paid by the community college, and the Urban
League director who is paid from United Way contributions.
A nonvoting subcommittee of Community Based Organiza-

373

tions (CBOs) exists to give a voice to the contractors and
other interested parties.
The council chairman requires advance written request for
all agenda items and will not allow any meeting to last more
than two hours. Appearances before the full council are by
invitation only but interested parties can be heard at the task
force and committee levels at their own request. Not only the
chairman but other private sector members have let it be
known that they will continue to serve and devote the
necessary time only if the meetings are brief and businesslike
and if their advice is taken seriously.
The first year of the new arrangement was promising.
Several training sessions were held to acquaint the council
members with CETA history, goals, and procedures. The
members turned out to be strong allies of the staff in favor
ing objective criteria and rejecting political judgments. The
mayor and council overturned only one joint council-staff
recommendation. They funded a Native American contrac
tor whose weak administrative abilities and fiscal controls
produced chaos. Economic development and labor market
policy decisions are admirably linked. Whether the private
parties will continue to devote the needed time and energy re
mains to be seen.

Orchestrated Decentralization
At first look, the Tucson decisionmaking process appears
to be so decentralized as to prohibit any meaningful plan
ning. The staff, along with the CETA planning committee of
the OEDP/CETA advisory council, decide what mix of age,
race, and sex characteristics is appropriate for the next fiscal
year's enrollees. They make their best guess of the amount of
funds likely to be available under various CETA titles. They
then send out a request for proposals containing only those
two pieces of information. With no further guidance except
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past experience, contractors then propose what groups and
how many they hope to serve, what mix of services they pro
pose, and the price tag. Each contractor is expected to be
responsible for intake, all service delivery, whether directly
or by subcontract, job development, and placement. Pro
posers are provided with the limited amount of labor market
data available from Department of Economic Security
sources but essentially contractors are left to their own
devices to judge what the labor market needs or will absorb.
Confronted with the charge that the procedure delegates
or abrogates to the contractors the essential planning deci
sions, the director counters, "Not so." He would prefer a
centralized intake system, but is convinced that the political
strength of the race and ethnic groups and their community
based organizations and the responsiveness of the politicians
preclude it. Advance allocation of the available funds among
the alternative service components would tie the hands of the
decisionmakers, he argues. Suppose most of the proposals in
one service area such as classroom training are mediocre
while all of those on-the-job training are outstanding. It
would be necessary to fund the mediocre proposals up to the
limits of the allocations for classroom training and reject the
outstanding ones beyond the OJT limit. Under present pro
cedures, staff and council select the best from an open
"smorgasbord" of proposals and assemble a community
employment and training program from among a concrete
set of proposals rather than supposition and expectation.
But where is the impact of employer need and labor
market information? The contractors know the needs of
their constituent groups better than anyone else can, is the
argument, while response to the demand side is kept flexible
by the role of the skill center. A high proportion of the eligi
ble enrollees need remedial education, language preparation,
and job search training—all determined by the labor supply.
Most training occurs in the skill center which contracts to
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deliver training unbounded by predetermined occupational
clusters. If changing demand is signaled, by either employer
contacts or placement rates, enrollments are simply shifted
from less- to more-demanded occupations. In reality, of
course, the CETA training occupations in Tucson, as
elsewhere, tend to be in a set of high turnover, continuous
demand entry level occupations which rarely change
significantly. Therefore, the key decisions in Tucson are seen
to be the relative competence of the contractor and the
choice between occupational and nonoccupational pre
requisites of employability. These choices can be made from
the proposed smorgasbord.

The Primacy of Training
Training, in the broad sense of employability develop
ment, is clearly the preferred choice of the prime sponsor,
most contractors, and most eligible applicants whenever
discretion is given and perceived. CETA Title VI offers no
choice but public service employment. Title II-D funds could
legally be used for training, but they are designated as public
service employment (PSE) and the possibilities for reallocation are viewed as a legal technicality rather than a practical
possibility. Depending as it does upon contractor initiatives
to change the mix of services, the Tucson prime sponsor has
been slow to take advantage of the invitation—and now the
directive—to add and enlarge a training component to ac
company Title II-D PSE. However, it has declared an inten
tion to move more strongly in that direction in 1981.
Work experience is considered appropriate for youth and
maintenance of effort regulations added by the Youth
Employment Demonstration Projects Act keep a substantial
amount of Title II-B funds allocated to youth programs and,
therefore, in part to work experience.
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Beyond that, however, Title II-B funds, over which the
prime sponsor has greatest discretion, are spent entirely on
various forms of employability development with emphasis
on occupational skill training (Tables 1 and 2 provide the
mix of expenditures and enrollments for 1979). Under the
Tucson smorgasbord approach, the training priority is exer
cised in the selection of contractors. And since each contrac
tor performs its own intake, contractor selection to a
substantial degree determines who is to be served as well as
what services are to be provided.
Table 1. CETA Funding for Tucson, Pima County, Arizona, Prime
Sponsor, Fiscal 1979
Available funds
1979 funds
1978 funds
carried over
1979 funding
still available
to 1980
authority
in 1979
Funding source
Total
Title II-B
Title II-D
Title III
Title IV
Title VI
Discretionary
Admin, pool

$303,229
15,963
287,266

$15,648,679
3,098,374
2,925,509
691,979
2,302,338
3,700,261
1,248,991
1,681,227

$1,869,620
217,500
119,817
195,982
922,462
340,745
73,114

Table 2. CETA Enrollments under Programs Funded by the Tucson, Pima
County, Arizona, Prime Sponsor, Fiscal 1979
Total for
As of
fiscal 1979
Funding source
September 30, 1979
7,997
Total
1,660
2,349
410
Title II-B
700
Title II-D
553
322
Title III
Title IV
4,008
176
Title VI
618
521
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SER serves a substantially Hispanic population and em
phasizes English as a second language (ESL) and adult basic
education (ABE). Its program is a well articulated and highly
effective one in which those who are monolingual in Spanish
undergo six months to one year of ESL instruction, are
taught job search and survival techniques at the same time,
and are then placed by SER's job development staff. To add
skill training to such extensive language training is con
sidered to be an excessive investment in some individuals at
the expense of others when SER applicants already wait two
to four months.
For those with limited English speaking ability (LESA),
SER conducts a program offering a few weeks to a few
months of English language instruction followed by referral
to the skill center for occupational skill training or to on-thejob training. For those verbally functional in English but of
limited literacy, there is a three-level ABE program. The am
bitious goal which has been accomplished by the average
enrollee is to achieve three years of basic education advance
ment for each six months of enrollment, the most advanced
level leading to a General Educational Development (GED)
certificate. The ABE program does not lead into the skill
center but into on-the-job training or direct placement.
The services of the Tucson Urban League are available to
all, but they are used by a primarily black population. After
intake, the Urban League specializes in on-the-job training,
job search training, and referral to the skill center for oc
cupational training. On-the-job training has been the special
ty of the national Urban League, and the Tucson chapter has
followed that lead. Substantial numbers of Tucson
employers are susceptible to affirmative action pressure, and
the Urban League uses these pressures as leverage for on-thejob training placements.

378

In addition, the Tucson Urban League staff were in
structed by their national and regional leaders in the arts of
job search training as that activity came into vogue across
the country. The Tucson Urban League therefore initiated a
pre-job training program through which, in a 2-week for
mat, those considered job ready are taught how to search for
their own jobs. Aided also by the job developers, enrollees in
this 2-week sequence have maintained placement rates well
above 80 percent.
Finally, Urban League, like SER, maintains responsibility
for 31 slots at the Tucson Skill Center. All league applicants
considered appropriate for skill training are first sent to the
skill center for vocational assessment. Though the skill
center must accept for skill training whoever the Urban
League (or any other contractor) refers to slots controlled by
the contractor, the assessment helps determine who should
receive what service. Those referred by Urban League to its
skill center slots continue to receive stipends from the con
tractor and return for job development and placement at the
completion of training. (That is also true for the other major
contractors.) Tucson Urban League has also referred a few
of its applicants to private clerical and trade schools, paid
tuition for their enrollment, but has not found them effective
because of their lack of supportive services.
The CETA unit of the Department of Economic Security
belies any implication that the employment service cannot or
will not serve the disadvantaged. Staff members pulled out
of their regular DES activities appear to do as well in serving
the total poverty population as the community based
organizations do for their racially and ethnically concen
trated poor. DES/CETA performs a broadly based intake
role from a central city multipurpose center and outlying
employment service offices. After counseling by one of the
counselors assigned to the unit, clients are referred directly
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to jobs or to on-the-job training, classroom training, or prejob training, prior to job development and placement.
DES/CETA maintains 13 OJT slots with cooperating
employers. It maintains an additional 35 slots at the skill
center. Many of the numerous applicants it cannot serve in
either of these ways are put through its pre-job training pro
gram, similar to the Urban League approach but somewhat
higher in volume, with approximately 15 entering each two
weeks. The mixes of age, race, sex, education, public of
fender status, and handicap give no evidence of pre
selection. A lone staff member puts them through an inten
sive week of motivation, self analysis, resume writing, video
taped simulated interviews, and telephone practice. They
then decide upon an occupation to pursue and draw from the
telephone yellow pages and other sources a list of employers
likely to hire in that occupation. Goaded and cajoled by the
instructor, they then spend the second week on the telephone
eight hours a day seeking interviews or out being interviewed
until a job is found. The placement rate is above 90 percent.
The retention rate, as in all Tucson CETA programs is essen
tially unknown.
The skill center is the primary source of occupational skill
training in Tucson. A few applicants have been individually
referred by contractors to a private clerical college and a
trade school. The trade school had a direct CETA contract.
The training in these two institutions is of high quality, but
trainees can survive it only if they have the same attributes as
the general student bodies. The prime sponsor and the con
tractors prefer to allocate the training dollars to an institu
tion designed to serve the disadvantaged.
The Tucson Skill Center is such an institution. It began
under MDTA within the jurisdiction of the vocational
education department of the public schools but made a suc
cessful transition to CETA and administration as a unit of
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the Pima Community College. It conducts an extensive voca
tional assessment program using an extraordinarily broad
range of assessment tools. In fact, many schools and other
institutions in the area refer their enrollees and applicants for
assessment on a fee basis. It employs a sympathetic counsel
ing staff, maintains a nurse on site and a doctor on call, has
some supervised residential facilities, maintains two vans to
bring students in from rural areas and Indian resevations,
keeps its curriculum bilingual in Spanish and English, and
offers basic education supplementations.
Current occupational offerings at the skill center are: auto
body, automotive repair, basic financial skills (teller,
cashier, etc.), building maintenance, business and office,
electrical helper, electromechanical assembly, food service,
and health occupations (licensed practical nurse and nurses
aide). However, the skill center obligates a blanket number
of slots to CETA without limiting them by occupational
area. Intake is left to the other contractors acting as referral
agencies. The vocational assessment unit recommends an ap
propriate assignment for each referral. However, that is not
binding on the referring agency or the applicant. The skill
center must accept whoever is referred except that licensing
requirements make it necessary to impose a high school
graduation or equivalent minimum for the nursing program.
If some occupational clusters grow as others shrink in
response to the referral process, the skill center must meet
the administrative challenge.
Despite administrative attachment to the community col
lege system, skill center staff have none of its job security,
few of its fringe benefits, and a lesser level of pay. On the
other hand, they are not required to have the same set of
credentials, though many do. Most instructors have substan
tial trade experience, receive less pay than they had been ac
customed to, but have more job security and more pleasant
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surroundings. Above all, they enjoy the challenge of
teaching and the sense of community service.
The skill center has a well developed philosophy of educa
tion based on the enrollee as an adult self-directed learner
and the instructor as a resource person. It follows practices
of open entry (enter any time from any background), open
exit (leave whenever job ready), and individualized modular
instruction. It trains in broad occupational clusters from
which placement is possible into a range of jobs. It maintains
a remedial learning center to which trainees are referred by
their skill instructors according to need. It designs its own
curricula as well as drawing upon those obtained from other
sources. It is gradually using its community college affilia
tion as leverage, so that its enrollees are now eligible for
federal Basic Education Opportunity Grants and it is begin
ning to give community college credit in some courses.
The skill center has worked closely with new or expanding
employers in coupled classroom-OJT programs. Most
recently in electronic assembly, the trainees receive short
periods (typically two weeks) of pre-entry instruction from
the skill center before entering an OJT phase of CETA sub
sidized employment.
The skill center maintains a completion rate above 85 per
cent. It is not responsible for job development and place
ment. The enrollees return to the referring contractors for
that. For 1979, placement rates were 74 percent placement
rate for SER enrollees, 67 percent for Urban League, and 86
percent for DES/CETA. However, data are not available to
break tfut skill center completers from those overall place
ment rates.
The only black mark on the skill center escutcheon is its
facility. An abandoned department store in a declining part
of town, its oft-remodeled innards resemble catacombs and
its plumbing and air conditioning facilities (a must in the
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Tucson climate) are in frequent disrepair. For overflow it
rents other buildings which are even worse. However, help is
on the way. As another by-product of the fortuitous
OEDP/CETA partnership, an industrial park developer
member of the committee has offered to provide new space
at submarket rates which will be designed specifically for
skill center needs. Given the high maintenance costs of the
present facility, the actual cost will not be much higher. If
the Tucson skill center can maintain the current attitudes of
dedication within the new setting, it will be a most admirable
institution.
Overall, Tucson intake agencies report that 85 percent of
CETA applicants request skill training. But skill training
costs over $7,000 per trainee, including stipends, whereas
OJT costs average less than $1,000 per enrollee and job
search training costs about $150 per person. Table 3 provides
a comparative breakdown of Title II expenditures between
training and other services. The preference for classroom
training is demonstrated by the fact that nearly all funds
available for that purpose are spent, whereas there is less
pressure to spend OJT and supportive services funds. The
other services exist because the prime sponsor attempts to
maintain a balance among alternative services. Waiting
periods for CETA enrollments range from two to four
months for all contractors. But within budget limitations,
classroom skill training is nearly everyone's favorite.
The Tucson training system is still essentially what was put
in place under the Manpower Development and Training
Act. It has proven its adaptability as well as its durability.
The decentralized nature of the system enables it to expand
and contract without breaking. There is no large investment
in buildings and equipment. No permanent commitments are
made to instructors who seem to be readily available. Ex
panding means renting space and adding instructors. Con
tracting requires the opposite. The Tucson CETA training
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system appears to be capable of operating in a range of 75
percent to 125 percent of current enrollments with no undue
strain.
Table 3. Title II-B Authorizations and Outlays, Tucson, Pima County,
Arizona, Prime Sponsor, Fiscal 1979

Service
Total
Classroom training

On-the-job training
Work experience
Supportive services

Authorization
$3,098,373
2,166,434
72,588
358,831
500,520

Outlays
$2,965,001
2,146,943
56,227
402,608
359,223

Outlays as
percent of
authorization
96
99
77

112
72

Need for Specialized Institutions
One of the lessons of the Tucson experience is the need for
institutions that specialize in the serving of various popula
tions. The Tucson Skill Center, SER, the Tucson Urban
League, DES/CETA, and Tucson Manpower Development
(not described here because of its youth concentration) sur
vived their MDTA origins because they continued to meet a
need. All serve a racial and ethnic mix, but their enrollees ap
pear to have a preference for those that carry their own iden
tity. That specialization is crucial when language and sharp
cultural differentiation is involved. Thus SER specializes in
bringing Hispanics to the point where they can compete in
the skill center and the job market. The Papago Indian tribe
meets most of CETA's reservation Indian responsibilities, as
does a rural contractor for the Yaquis. Lacking a competent
urban Indian contractor, members of those tribes living in
the Tucson metropolitan area (and some of the reservation
dwellers) are served by the skill center and other contractors
but not without considerable dissatisfaction.
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But despite the need for racial and ethnic specialization,
there are plenty of CETA eligible non-Hispanic whites as
well as the less culturally different of other races who can be
served effectively by a sympathetically specialized unit
within the employment service. DES/CETA has the advan
tage of direct linkage to major labor market and social
welfare institutions. But without the specialized assignment
to serve the CETA eligible, it is doubtful that they would
seek and receive the same level of service from the
mainstream Job Service offices.
As training institutions, the community college and the
private proprietary schools can serve those few CETA
eligibles who possess all of the characteristics of their regular
student bodies except for family income. However, if there
were not a skill center in Tucson, someone would have to in
vent it. There are too many of culturally different and com
petitively disadvantaged backgrounds who could neither sur
vive in training institutions nor succeed in the labor market
without specialized help.

Is CETA Worthwhile?
Hardly anybody in Tucson would categorize CETA as a
four-letter word. Judging from employers who serve on the
advisory and private industry councils and participate in
OJT programs, the business community welcomes its help.
Organized labor is not strong in Tucson but has been suppor
tive of CETA to the extent of cooperating in specialized pro
grams not described here for lack of space. The racial and
ethnic communities want only more. The political support is
bipartisan. To the extent they are aware of the situation, all
would respond to the federal government, "Leave your
money and go away and don't bother us. We need your
resources, but, in administration and planning, you are only
in the way." One can hope that attitude is subject to change.
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CETA's administrators and decisionmakers have well ar
ticulated policies. To an outside observer, it would appear
that a centralized intake and assessment process would be
more likely to get each applicant the most compatible assign
ment to services. The actors on the scene have concluded that
the political price would be too high.
The labor economist sees the need for a greater labor
market information input into planning, including projec
tions of the future level and structure of employment by oc
cupation and industry. The administrators argue that a flexi
ble training institution responding to employer and enrollee
demand and placement rates is more dependable. The truth
in between is that the occupations trained for are those
characterized by high turnover and always in demand or
undergoing secular expansion such as the local electronics in
dustry.
But do the enrollees complete training and get jobs? The
administrator responds with impressive placement rates. But
are those jobs which would not have been obtained without
program participation, do they last, and are the benefits
worth the cost? The administrator cannot answer except to
protest that followup is too expensive, taking scarce money
better spent on direct participant services, that control
groups are impractical, and that only limited analysis is
possible without a computerized management information
system. The observer/analyst responds, "I know in my heart
you are doing good but I can't prove it."

Utah
The Perils of Pioneering
R. Thayne Robson
University of Utah

Utah's experiences served as a model in the design of the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act. Today,
however, the state is a backwater in the CETA mainstream.
Perhaps that fate is a penalty of pioneering. Utah established
a statewide manpower planning council in 1969 by guber
natorial initiative and legislative act. From then until 1972,
Utah was a manpower mecca beckoning visitors from
around the country. In 1972, the same governor who in
itiated centralized manpower planning chose to decentralize
it among nine multicounty associations of government. That
pattern persisted into 1981 with Utah listed with the Labor
Department as a single statewide consortium which consists
in actuality of nine relatively autonomous planning and
operating units. At the close of 1980, when two of the larger
counties indicated they were withdrawing from the statewide
consortium to become prime sponsors, the director of the
Utah CETA consortium advised and the subsequent gover
nor agreed to disband the consortium. Utah's innovative
period actually ended before CETA became law. For CETA
as a whole, the state offers little to write about. But there are
useful lessons for a study of training.

The Utah Setting
Utah, relatively large in territory and small in population,
is surprisingly urbanized. Approximately 80 percent of its
nearly 1.5 million people live in what is essentially one
metropolitan area 15 miles wide and 80 miles long. As
Ogden, Salt Lake City, and Provo and their overlapping
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suburbs are plastered onto the lower slopes of the Wasatch
Mountains (the westernmost range of the Rockies), the met
ropolitan area is informally known as the Wasatch Front.
Demographically, Utah's major claims to distinction are
the nation's highest birthrate (30 per 1,000 or about double
the national average) and one of the lowest minority percen
tages (7 percent divided among Hispanics, blacks, Native
Americans, and Asians in that order). The state has the na
tion's highest median years of school (12.8) and the second
largest proportion of college graduates (17.5 percent). In ad
dition, 37 percent of Utah's population is under age 18, com
pared with a national figure of 29 percent.
Without an industrial base, Utah was hard hit by the
depression of the 1930s. The Second World War brought a
defense-based prosperity but a postwar vulnerability which
kept Utah's unemployment rates well above national levels
until the 1960s. Then a gradual growth of diversified
manufacturing, followed by resurgence of its mineral wealth
(coal, uranium, oil, oil shale, and tar sands, in addition to
the longer exploited copper and allied metals), reversed that
relationship so that Utah's unemployment rate is now about
2 percentage points below the national level. The State Of
fice of Labor and Training estimated CETA eligibility to be
52,000 during 1979, of whom 41,000 had been unemployed
15 weeks or more. Nearly 8,000 persons were registered for
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
Politically, Utah shows the general conservatism of the
mountain west. Its entire congressional delegation (two con
gressmen and two senators) all classify themselves as conser
vative Republicans. Yet the state is just beginning its fifth
4-year term of being led by two conservative moderate
Democratic governors. With brief exceptions, the legislature
has been Republican since the end of the Roosevelt era.
While the rhetoric in Utah is persistently anti-federal, every
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available federal dollar is aggressively pursued and federally
funded programs are generally well-administered, in part
because of an oversupply of well-trained administrators.

Utah as a CETA Pioneer
Utah's pioneer position in CETA was part of a drive by its
1965-76 Governor, Calvin Rampton, to strengthen the
Governor's office by consolidating state activities. During
his first 4-year term, he had learned that the governor was
largely a figurehead with power vested in the relatively
autonomous merit system-protected department heads.
Many of these departments operated with federal funds and
were somewhat autonomous of the legislature as well as the
executive branch of state government. Ramptom resolved to
corral these independent operations by consolidating them
into cabinet departments headed by his own appointees.
The Johnson-Goldwater presidential race produced the
first Democratic legislature since the Roosevelt years and
made that consolidation possible. The Republicans swept
back into control of the legislaure two years later, but the
governor chose the most able of those 2-year Democratic
freshmen as his appointees to head the new departments sup
ported by new funds.
By 1968 Rampton was chairman of a National Governors'
Association subcomittee with responsibility for employment
and training programs. He found that other governors
shared his concern that federally funded manpower pro
grams operated through state agencies without any control
from the governor's office. Hearing national discussion
about the need to decentralize and decategorize manpower
programs, Rampton resolved to add that effort to his own
consolidation drive. In 1969, he persuaded the state
legislature to establish a state Manpower Planning Council,
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composed of all state agencies involved in employment and
training, and authorizing the council to direct and coor
dinate all such activities within the limits of federal law.
Thus while the Congress was debating the CETA legislation
from 1969 to 1973, Utah was operating a significant pilot
program for all to see. In what would later emerge as CETA
language, Utah was operating a statewide prime sponsor
ship.
In another vagary of personality politics, Rampton, upon
being elected to an unprecedented third term in 1972, sud
denly moved from consolidation to decentralization as the
thrust of the manpower policy of his final term. As CETA
was being shaped with the Utah experience as a major
model, the Utah statewide system was being, in effect, split
up and delegated to nine local associations of government
(AOG) which had originally emerged around reclamation
and natural resource issues.
The State Manpower Planning Council, as a statutory
body, continued to exist but became meaningless insofar as
CETA was concerned. The original chairman, a Ramptonappointed university professor, and the executive director
who was also state planning coordinator, resigned. The
deputy director, a nationally experienced manpower expert,
became director but soon found the position to have little
clout and moved on to take over the public employment ser
vice of a neighboring state. A State Office of Labor and
Training (SOLT) was established, primarily to collect federal
funds and disperse them largely autonomous to multicounty
associations of government on the same formula by which
they are allocated from the federal government to the state.
As of 1980, Utah had six entities eligible to be CETA prime
sponsors—Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City, Weber Coun
ty, Davis County, Utah County, and a 25-county balance-ofstate. Because each had the autonomy of individual prime
sponsors and had won additional concessions from the state,

391

the eligible jurisdictions, all of them strung along the
Wasatch Front, agreed to remain within the official
statewide prime sponsorship.
CETA in Utah appears on the Department of Labor's map
as a single prime sponsor, but funding is immediately divided
among the nine state associations of government. Funds for
fiscal year 1979 were divided among those units in the pat
tern shown by Table 1. Each planning district prepares its
own annual plan and these are merely consolidated for the
state plan.

Administering CETA in Utah
"Don't rock the boat" seemed to be the operating slogan
of Utah's CETA program, but the program did not lack
sound administration. Utah's high levels of education com
pared with its relatively small size and its economy's orienta
tion to the basic industry, have generally provided an ample
supply of high quality public administrators. Despite the antifederal rhetoric heard in Utah political campaigns, the state
has long had a reputation among federal agencies for
outstanding conduct of federally funded programs. Com
petency is high and turnover low at both the state and AOG
levels in CETA. Each of the small AOGs have from two to
five CETA staff positions and often share staff with related
activities. Those eligible for independent prime sponsorship
have staffs ranging from 5 to 43, whereas the state office
employs a staff of 30. Most at all levels are college graduates
and a high percentage have specialized advanced degrees in
human resource management.
These are the people who make the CETA decisions. The
elected officials of the multijurisdiction planning units are
mostly part-time politicians and have very little involvement.
The state office does not try to tell the AOG professionals
what to do except "obey the law." The statutory statewide

Table 1. CETA Expenditures in Utah, Fiscal 1979a, by Planning District and CETA Title
CETA Title
II-D
Planning districts
Total
IV
II-B, C
Statewide
Salt Lake/Tooele Counties
Weber/Morgan
Mountainlands
Davis County
Bear River
Central
Southeast
Southwest
Uintah

$24,813,611
9,506,395
4,098,016
3,717,231
1,601,484
1,669,753
1,438,370
863,482
1,074,150
529,587

$6,085,910
2,227,774
896,378
1,101,015
431,372
426,688
305,295
268,635
258,662
124,252

$3,855,978
1,541,692
708,465
493,034
233,450
207,399
277,069
108,023
214,079
72,767

$4,950,903
1,771,137
883,153
723,456
264,365
369,136
257,262
189,913
193,511
101,195

a. These figures are prior to final accounting adjustments and do not include special projects or the Governor's grants.

$

to

VI
$9,920,820
3,965,792
1,610,020
1,399,726
672,297
666,530
598,744
296,911
407,898
231,373
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Manpower Planning Council has lapsed into disuse. A state
Employment and Training Council has been created, but it
can get no handle on the decentralized system. Each AOG
has an advisory council, but few really give advice. CETA in
Utah is a local staff responsibility.
A favorable economy, a small minority population, and a
waiting list of relatively homogeneous CETA-eligible ap
plicants simplify decisionmaking and administration.
Whatever CETA funds are not earmarked for other pur
poses go into classroom and on-the-job training, primarily
the former. Until the 1980 recession, which slowed but did
not reverse economic growth, job opportunities were plen
tiful and obvious. CETA's task in Utah has been to prepare
the disadvantaged for jobs. The eligible populations were
sufficiently homogeneous to allow first-come, first-served
policies to distribute the available slots except in the
metropolitan Salt Lake City and Ogden areas and in the Uintah Basin, and Southeastern planning districts which include
major Indian reservations.
The CETA planning process consists of (1) getting an
estimate of available funds from the State Office of Labor
and Training, (2) contracting with the one pubilc postsecondary training institution in the planning district for provision
of classroom training (only two districts have more than one
such institution), and (3) contracting with the state Job Ser
vice for promotion of on-the-job training and for intake,
determination of eligibility and placement. With these pro
cesses established, neither planning nor administration is dif
ficult. The State Office of Labor and Training makes no at
tempt to shape or influence local decisions but offers
technical assistance. The only complexities in CETA ad
ministration are those imposed by federal legislation and
regulation.
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The minority populations of Salt Lake City and Ogden are
sufficient to place the local CETA staffs under some political
pressure. In response, in Salt Lake County particularly, the
CETA staff has chosen to allocate funds to community
based organizations for orientation, adult basic education,
English as a second language, and similar nonskill training
activities, as well as a minimum number of on-the-job train
ing slots. Having purchased peace at that price, the staff
allocates most of the remainder of the budget to the skill
center at the local public technical college and to Job Service,
as in the other planning districts. As followup and evaluation
have been largely ignored by the planning districts and have
not been pushed by the state office, the administrative
assignment of the planning districts consists of getting the
contracts negotiated and the money out. In the rural districts
the CETA director knows personally everyone involved in
the delivery of CETA services and often every individual
enrollee, so formal evaluation does not seem essential. For
Job Service, the assignment consists of identifying CETA
eligibles, adding them to a waiting list, and peeling them off
for referral to on-the-job and classroom training. Employer
contact representatives maintain established relationships
with employers and continue to negotiate on-the-job training
contracts with a limited number of establishments. New onthe-job training employers enter the system primarily at their
own initiative. The system has been a simple one, with never
a taint of scandal. At one end, complexities are added by
federal requirements, but these are blunted by the state of
fices which maintain all federal contacts and act as an in
termediary vis-a-vis the planning district. At the other end,
an internal squabble between the State Board of Vocational
Education and the state Board of Regents about who should
control postsecondary vocational education in the state adds
the only touches of complexity confronting state and local
CETA administrators.
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The Quality of Training
How good is the training under Utah's decentralized
GETA system? The simplest generalization is "very good."
GETA classroom training occurs in two technical colleges,
one university, two 4-year colleges, three 2-year colleges, and
four area vocational schools. One technical college and one
4-year college operate separate skill centers maintained for
CETA and other disadvantaged clients. All other classroom
training follows the individual referral model, with all CETA
enrollees included in the same classroom groups as the nonsubsidized student body. Utah's educational institutions en
joy high rankings and these institutions are among the state's
best. The major issue, leaving aside for the moment the two
skill centers, is whether the training needs of the CETA
clientele are adequately met by immersion in mainstream
training situations.
With the exception of the Indian population near the
reservations and the minority populations where the skill
centers exist, the answer appears to be yes. Statewide, blacks
constitute 3 percent, Hispanics 14 percent, and Indians 4 per
cent of the CETA population—in each case, about three
times their overall population proportion. Only in counties
containing skill centers do blacks exceed 5 percent of the
CETA population. Hispanics exceed 10 percent only in the
Wasatch Front and the mining-oriented southeast. American
Indians exceed 6 percent of CETA enrollment only in the
planning district which contains part of the Navajo reserva
tion. Only 60 percent of CETA enrollees have high school
educations, although only 13 percent of Utah's high school
students leave before graduating.
At any rate, no planning district has any difficulty finding
CETA eligible people capable of competing successfully with
the non-CETA enrollees in the available training institu-
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tions. In fact, there are waiting lists of such people needing
only tuition and training allowances to make training as at
tractive as possible. Once enrolled, trainees are not iden
tifiable among other students in the same classrooms. Excep
tion in Wasatch Front North and South (Ogden and Salt
Lake City and their environs), those who cannot compete in
the classroom are relegated to work experience (if youth) or
left out of CETA entirely, because they are unlikely to be ac
ceptable to employers, public or private, hosting public ser
vice employment or on-the-job training. CETA enrollees
who enter these training institutions with CETA stipends get
excellent training, and the vast majority (generally over 80
percent) get jobs. Those not placed are typically women who
withdraw from the labor market or youth who are not yet
ready to settle into it.
The Salt Lake and Ogden residents and CETA system are
more typical of national patterns. CETA enrollees in the
Ogden area (Weber-Morgan planning district) are approx
imately 9 percent black and 20 percent Hispanic. The Salt
Lake County area (Wasatch Front South) enrolls 5 percent
blacks, 22 percent Hispanics, 4 percent urban Indians, and 5
percent Asians. Davis County, between the two districts
geographically, enrolls 11 percent Hispanic but hardly any
other minorities. These minority populations are large
enough to have their own ethnic organizations. There is also
a noticeable women*s movement in this metropolitan setting.
As a result of the larger number of minorities enrolled in
these counties, the training institutions there have been
designed to handle a more disadvantaged population, and
CETA planners have responded with a more diversified mix
of programs. One can be less confident of the quality of
training offered, but more assured that the disadvantaged
are being served.
The Wasatch Front South district has allocated 74 percent
of its II-B funds to classroom training and 19 percent to on-
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the-job training. Of the classroom training funds, 45 percent
go to Skill Center South, administratively attached to the
Utah Technical College at Salt Lake City; 45 percent for
orientation, adult basic education, English as a second
language, and similar employability related but nonskill
training; and 10 percent to a nonprofit organization that
assists women who wish to break into nontraditional jobs.
Except for a few slots at the women's organization, the onthe-job training is managed by the Utah Job Service.
The quality of the training provided by the communitybased organizations (CBOs) is doubtful at best, but may still
be worthwhile. These CBOs lack both staff and facilities for
quality training, but do provide access routes for the small
groups of minorities who might otherwise be left out of the
CETA action entirely. CBO support does not depend on
large minority populations, but occurs wherever ethnic
groups feel the need to organize. The CETA contracts offer
the only significant funding source for the struggling CBOs.
Funding them not only increases the visibility of minority
populations but also offers a visible source for employers
wishing to meet affirmative action requirements. In addi
tion, significant portions of their enrollees then enter the
skill centers.
The women in the nontraditional occupations program
have a tough assignment in a traditional community. The
program's success rate is low and it spends more effort on
raising the level of consciousness and assertiveness among its
enrollees than on providing skills or persuading employers.
Its enrollment is small, its placement rate ranges from 33 per
cent to 50 percent, and many of these jobs are not far from
being traditional. However, many of its completers then
enter the skill center for occupational training (in the tradi
tional occupations). The effort is probably best thought of as
a pilot project which should be tried without expecting quan
titative success.
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The Salt Lake Skill Center suffers the same limitations as
many similar institutions. It offers quality training to a
disadvantaged population in a second class facility.
Although the skill center's instructors have the same train
ing, experience, and credentials as those on the technical col
lege campus, its equipment and buildings are only marginally
adequate. The curriculum is limited to clerical, auto
mechanics, and welding programs.
The primary problem at the skills center is one of stigma.
The skill center is clearly second-class when compared with
the technical college programs. The trainee in a 26-week
CETA course may get as much training of equal quality hour
for hour at the skill center as the enrollee in a 1- or 2-year
program at the technical college. But in both the students'
self-assessments and the employers' assessments, those who
can claim technical college credentials are way ahead.
The same problem exists for Skill Center North at Ogden.
It is administratively attached to Weber State College, a
4-year academic institution with a substantial on-campus
2-year technical offering. The skill center is housed in an
abandoned high school closer to the central city, which
nevertheless is fully adequate; its instructors are fully
qualified; and its equipment is more nearly adequate than at
the Salt Lake Skill Center, because the whole operation is of
more recent date. Skill Center North has its own curriculum
development unit, a good library, and its own day care
center. Its course offerings are broader, ranging over bench
and service trades, building trades, clerical, health services,
and metal trades, and supported by adult basic education,
and English as a second language. Objectively, it maintains
an excellent program. But still, the stigma is there. The short
scope of the courses and the disadvantaged backgrounds of
those eligible give some objectivity to those negative
judgments, but there is probably a significant stigmatic com
ponent from the facility itself. Providing CETA-sponsored
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courses on one or both of the two campuses would be an in
teresting and worthwhile experiment in public relations.
Nevertheless, a placement rate averaging over 80 percent
at a cost of only $1,650 per placement should remove any
doubt that the current program is worthwhile. Education in
the State of Utah is in a financial bind, squeezed between a
taxpayer revolt and an extraordinarily high birth rate. What
little state moneys have gone into training the adult disadvantaged are likely to disappear. Federal training moneys
available in Utah are on the decline. The waiting list of eligi
ble applicants is already six months long and growing. The
economy remains promising despite the 1980 slowdown.
Facilities, equipment, and instructors are available for a
doubling of enrollments. The only missing element is the in
evitable one—budgets.

Conclusions
Prior to CETA, Utah was a national pioneer and in
novator in employment and training activities. But the
pioneer often experiments, shows the way, and then gets
locked into some mode while those who followed pass it by.
In Utah's current CETA stance, nothing is worthy of special
notice and emulation. There is no significant labor market
planning and no innovation. Nevertheless, there is in place a
solid program resting upon service delivery by efficient and
effective Job Service and vocational education systems.
Federal statutory provisions, regulations, guidelines, and
policies are given a scripture-like sanctity and followed to the
letter. The system is a conservative one, seeking always to
avoid conflict. Moneys are carefully accounted for, with
never a breath of scandal. Most important, eligible enrollees
get, for the most part, high quality training and jobs. This
study has not examined nontraining services, but training is
clearly the preference of nearly all actors in the system.
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The common thread throughout the entire history of
employment and training programs in Utah has been the
prominent role played by the Utah Job Service and the State
Office of Vocational Education. Most of the area councils of
government have obtained the services of well-educated and
competent CETA planners and administrators. While the
programs differ considerably from one AOG to another,
there are few if any serious problems relating to improper
management, misuse of funds, or failure to implement the
programs in a timely fashion. Utah has managed to spend
CETA funds as they became available.
The relationship between the Utah CETA administrators
and the federal Department of Labor Officials has been both
friendly and supportive. Utah has given little cause for
federal monitors to be concerned. The regulations have been
followed, and the State Office of Labor and Training has
served to keep some distance between the federal represen
tatives and the program operation levels. On the other hand,
federal representatives have had no influence on the nature
or quality of the programs.
Elected officials have not played a strong role in the Utah
CETA system. In the rural areas, many elected officials serve
only part time and generally lack interest and time to follow
programs such as CETA, and policy is made by the CETA
planner/administrator, with participation by representatives
of the Job Service and educational agencies. In metropolitan
areas, the elected officials have been more involved in plan
ning because of the competition for funds and programs, but
their involvement has usually been confined to an annual
review of funding allocations. During the period when PSE
was operating at its peak level, the elected officials became
involved in the allocation of funds among departments want
ing PSE slots, but their activity in PSE did not carry over in
to other CETA programs.
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The decentralization of Utah's CETA system to the nine
subgrantees changed the relationship between the federal
program managers and the program operating levels by plac
ing the state in the role of middleman, translator, and buf
fer. It would be difficult, however, to identify any specific
programmatic impact of this role. Indeed, the Utah CETA
program operates under an umbrella at the local level
without either a strong federal or state role. The State Office
of Labor and Training can legitimately claim to be carrying
out some functions which the federal managers would carry
out if each of the eligible prime sponsors operated in
dependently, so the "feds" may miss the Utah consortium
more than anyone else. On the other hand, the new prime
sponsors may learn for the first time how onerous federal
regulations can be.
The work of the State Office of Labor and Training can
not be separated from the general acknowledgement that the
Utah Job Service is among the best in the country by all DOL
rating schemes. The state's educational agencies likewise rate
well in comparison with others throughout the country. Fur
thermore, the local AOGs through 1980 had jealously pro
tected their autonomy (there had not been time at the conclu
sion of this study for them to react to the governor's an
nouncement). In short, the Utah CETA system is very much
a product of the institutions, traditions, and general level of
public service in the state.

Organization, Management and Policy
The most important conclusion of this case study is the
recognition that the present system seemed satisfactory to
almost all of the actors. There was little or no pressure for
change within the system itself, although Salt Lake County,
Davis County, Utah County, and Salt Lake City had
threatened to withdraw from the consortium. Each time an
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eligible prime sponsor threatened to pull out, the governor
intervened to encourage a continuation of the system. The
primary benefits of the consortium are increased overall
funding and better services in the rural areas. The prospec
tive urban prime sponsors have been told that a breakup of
the consortium might endanger the cordiality of overall
urban-rural relationships. In addition, the governor had
resolved some non-CETA issues during discussions about
the preservation of the consortium.
During 1980 the Mountainlands AOG, or more particular
ly Utah County within that AOG, went on record as intend
ing to pull out of the consortium the following year. This
county has grown somewhat faster than the state as a whole
and has claimed that it is being underfunded. The claim,
while probably true, would not affect funding until alloca
tion formulas are revised to conform with the 1980 census
data. Present policy about using federal formulas to allocate
funds among the subgrantees gives the state little flexibility
in handing out money. In fact, the whole system has been
remarkably free from controversy over fund allocations. In
the midst of this apparent stability, the governor's an
nouncement of intent to disband the consortium was a com
plete surprise to all of the actors, except apparently the
SOLT director who gave his advice concurrent with his
resignation.
An important question is, "What can be done to restore
some managerial and policy initiatives to employment and
training programs in Utah?" The answer must begin with the
simplification of the federal statute, a reduction in the
number of separate programs that it entails, and more flex
ibility for local decisionmaking. The local actors are
somewhat intimidated by the system, but at the same time,
they seem pleased with their ability and success in accom
modating to it.
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A second change at the state level would require strong
leadership from the governor's office and some attempt to
focus on broader labor market aspects beyond the local
AOGs. With the spread of large coal-fired power plants, the
advent of the synthetic fuels program and other energy
developments, and the possible deployment of the Air Force
MX Missile system, the state appears to be on the verge of
massive and perhaps disruptive development. In the years
ahead, there is likely to be stronger support for more
statewide planning. The governor could have chosen to use
the statewide consortium as a vehicle for much of the labor
market aspect of that planning. On the other hand, the
metropolitan areas will be affected only indirectly by the
pending energy and defense developments. A strong balanceof-state system dominated from the governor's office might
be better able to shift CETA resources from one part of the
state to another in accordance with need than could the pre
sent system which assures each area of the state of its propor
tion of limited CETA funds. Whatever happens, the pace of
development makes clear the need for training and promises
jobs for those trained.

Training Policy and Practice
Probably the single most important impact of Utah CETA
and its predecessor and related programs has been to
broaden the base of state funding for classroom training for
high school dropouts. MDTA programs were coordinated in
the larger cities by creating the two skill centers and pro
viding more counseling and other support services, thus
underscoring the needs of people who had dropped out
before completing high school. The State Board of Educa
tion first requested the legislature to raise the upper age limit
at which the state educational program could pay for high
school completion from 18 to 21. It then abolished the upper
age limit completely, thereby making all area vocational
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centers, skill centers, and adult education programs of the
various school districts eligible for regular state support to
provide high school completion to dropouts regardless of
age. These resources were utilized most effectively by those
institutions which, because of their federal CETA, WIN,
and related programs, were serving significant numbers of
persons who had left school without a diploma.
A third step in the process occurred when the Board of
Regents strengthened their claim over the governance of the
two skill centers by obtaining from the state legislature a
small but significant line item of support from state funds.
As federal funding has declined appreciably, the existence of
the high school completion support funds and the general
appropriation have kept the two skill centers alive. The
decline in federal CETA and WIN funds clearly will alter the
nature of the institutions and the clientele they serve. The
federal programs provide funds and disadvantaged enrollees
and when federal funding declines, the state support will
shift to enrollees who are less likely to be disadvantaged.
For the most part, the training in Utah is of high quality
with institutions, curriculums, instruction, and facilities
operating within the general framework of postsecondary
public education. Except for the Salt Lake and Ogden areas,
individual referrals to existing programs dominate classroom
training. In the Ogden area, all training is done at the skill
center except for a small project for the handicapped. In Salt
Lake, the skill center is the largest training institution, but
five CBOs also have relatively small programs.
Funding CBOs appears motivated as much by perceptions
about the institutional identification and support for ethnic
groups as by the need to provide high quality training. The
criteria to be applied in funding allocations for CBOs and
for the skill center are not, and probably cannot be, the
same. The recognition of this fact seems to enforce the need
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to preserve local options and flexibility, but the forces that
must be dealt with go far beyond any geographic area. The
CBO is to the ethnic group or to the feminist movement in
the modern city what the national grange movement and the
national cooperative movement were to the farmers 50 years
ago. GETA and its predecessor programs have been the one
consistent source of funding sustaining these institutional
developments. The CBOs in Utah provide opportunities for
identification and self-realization to the groups in
volved—both for the administrators and the clients served.
Utah is an interesting setting from which to observe the
CBOs because its minority population is less than 7 percent
of the total. CBO support does not depend upon a large
minority population any more than the success of the farm
cooperative movement hinged on the size of a state's
agriculture. The "movement" goes well wherever the setting
creates an environment in which the ethnic groups feel the
need to develop organizational and social support.
The skill centers are caught accidently in the issue of
governance between the State Board of Vocational Educa
tion and the Board of Regents. It is over who should govern
postsecondary vocational education and would exist if there
were no skill centers. It does complicate the lives of the skill
centers, however. The funding and autonomy issues impact
the centers more directly. Educational administrators dislike
depending on funding from programs not under the control
of the educational establishment. Education in Utah
cherishes its autonomy and does not like the CETA funding
process or the evaluation and monitoring from outsiders.
Whether to maintain separate identities for the skill centers,
absorb them into their parent institutions or, in the case of
Skill Center North, transform it into an Area Vocational
School, all are options centrally related to the issue of con
trol.
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Those directly teaching or administering the training pro
grams, however, are not concerned about these issues. They
understand that CETA is a source of enrollees as well as
funds, and the skill center staffs are generally committed to
serving the enrollees referred under the CETA program.
They are comforted by the fact that every study has praised
their effectiveness. There are people whose need for training
is very great and these same people achieve significant suc
cess: between 6 and 8 of every 10 people served gain a
substantial boost in income, employment, and self-image,
although the immediate success rate declines during reces
sion years.
The portion of Title II-B funds going into classroom and
OJT training has risen in recent years from two-thirds to ap
proximately four-fifths. There are waiting lists of persons
who want to be enrolled but who cannot be served because
programs are operating at capacity. In some cases prospec
tive enrollees have waited from six months to a year to enter
a program.
Among the most important conclusions of this study of
CETA classroom training in Utah is that the present
classroom training system could be doubled or even
quadrupled without reaching all CETA-eligible clients. The
training facilities can accommodate more students, and
many eligible enrollees are not now being served or must wait
too long for service. The long run promise is also for a rapid
growth of jobs which can be met only by training or by im
porting labor. Equally important, CETA has served to iden
tify and refer to training significant numbers of disadvantaged people who would not receive training were it not for the
CETA linkages between jobs, training, and income
maintenance. While some progress is being made in educa
tional circles to obtain more state funds for the disadvantaged, it is also clear that if CETA were to disappear, the disad-
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vantaged would be the first to be dropped from educational
services.
If CETA is to continue as a major funding source for
classroom training and for on-the-job training, the system
should greatly expand efforts to develop curriculums and
more importantly to finance training equipment and sup
plies. Indeed, it may be appropriate to require state and local
matching funds in defraying training costs to make possible
the better funding of curriculum development and training
equipment and facilities. Finally, institutions providing
classroom training are not immune from the ravages of infla
tion, and when increasing costs are incurred during a period
of declining funding, the entire system is subjected to a
serious strain that threatens not only quantity but quality of
training as well. There is little in CETA funding and ad
ministration that reflects an awareness of, or an effort to
meet, the rising costs which inflation thrusts upon the pro
gram operators.

Major Conclusions
Looking to what now exists, the important conclusions of
this case study are:
1. Very little real planning is being done in Utah CETA,
and the planning that is taking place is short
term—usually confined to the next fiscal year.
2. CETA staff members defend their work but show lit
tle real enthusiasm for the system within which they
operate. The Utah vocational education establish
ment divides almost equally between those who think
CETA and similar programs will eventually disap
pear, and those who think that CETA, or something
which accomplishes much the same objectives, will
continue indefinitely.
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3. State and local advisory councils play a very limited
role in Utah CETA. They meet infrequently, show
poor attendance, and function mainly to ratify CETA
staff actions worked out in advance with the Job Ser
vice and education authorities.
4. The entire system seems to be conservative and
oriented toward avoiding risk and conflict. In achiev
ing this goal, the system rates high marks.
5. One advantage of a CETA organization which
delegates program responsibility to the local area
councils of government is the coordination of CETA
with other social programs in the rural areas. Here,
staff positions are sometimes shared, the problems
are small, the number of clients few, and the linkages
well established.
6. Only in the Salt Lake/Tooele Wasatch Front South
area does CETA take on the attributes of a system
generally associated with larger cities. It is the only
case in Utah where CBOs have contracts to provide
services and where there is any degree of competition
for the roles which Job Service and the public educa
tion agencies perform elsewhere in the state.
7. The CETA system has made a great contribution to
the current acceptance and strength of the Associa
tions of Government (AOGs) by providing staff and
program money to give these relatively new govern
mental entities a strong role in their respective areas.
Undoubtedly, this potential dominated the decision
to decentralize the CETA system in 1972. To this ex
tent, the current organization of CETA in Utah may
be an accident of history—even so, it will not be easy
to change.
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8. The statutory Utah Manpower Planning Council,
created by the state legislature in 1969 with a mandate
to coordinate all federally funded manpower pro
grams within the state, has fallen into almost total
disuse, even though it still exists on paper.
9. It is difficult to determine just what the State Office
of Labor and Training staff might have done dif
ferently given the diffusion of power and the decen
tralization or fragmentation of the system. The exper
tise of the state staff has been available to the local
subgrantees, and its role in compiling reports, plans,
and in establishing standards and interpreting regula
tions and guidelines has been substantial. It would be
too easy to reach a wrong conclusion and blame the
SOLT staff for the demise of the once-strong state
role in employment and training programs. The key
decisions were made in the office of the governor, and
any effective state-level impact on the administration
of CETA would require the governor's power to
coordinate the state's three major CETA actors;
namely, the Job Service, the educational agencies,
and the SOLT staff with local counterparts.
10. Through it all, eligible participants have received
sound training and the preponderance of them have
obtained jobs. That is the bottom line.

Worcester, Massachusetts
Decentralization in a Tight
Labor Market
Morris A. Horowitz
and
Joanne Loscalzo
Northeastern University

The Labor Market
In mid-1980, the economy of the Worcester Labor Market
Area (LMA) exhibited considerable strength. Employment
reached record highs, unemployment rates indicated near
full employment, the industrial structure of the local
economy appeared to be sound, and a number of firms were
completing significant capital investment projects. Substan
tial labor shortages existed for many categories of labor,
especially skilled machinists, computer programmers,
medical care personnel, and some types of clerical workers.
The local economy appeared to be providing jobs for almost
all of the available labor force.
The Worcester LMA is located entirely within Worcester
County in central Massachusetts and contains only one city,
Worcester, the second largest in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, and 26 towns. The population of the LMA at
the time of the 1975 state census was 385,600, up 1.9 percent
from the 378,300 at the time of the 1970 federal census. The
population of the City of Worcester declined by 2.4 percent
in the 5-year period, from 176,600 in 1970 to 172,300 in
1975.
The Worcester Employment and Training Consortium
(WETC) is located within the LMA, and contains the City of
411
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Worcester plus 13 surrounding communities. The population
of the consortium in 1975 was 306,600, or almost 80 percent
of the population of the LMA, and the consortium area con
tinues to contain about 80 percent of the population and the
labor force. Nonwhites represented 1.5 percent of the
population and of the labor force in both the LMA and the
consortium area. The participation rate was substantially
lower for nonwhite males than for white males; and the same
held true for nonwhite females compared to white females.
Except for a slight dip in 1977, the labor force has grown
steadily since 1974. From 1974 through 1979, employment
rose every year, for a total gain of 11.4 percent over the
period. Unemployment increased sharply in 1975, but
recovered relatively quickly, and by 1978 was below 5 per
cent. The Worcester unemployment rate has been consistent
ly below the national and state figures.
By far the greatest demand among occupations in short
supply is for skilled machinists; other skilled trade positions,
auto body mechanics in particular, are also going begging.
The largest shortage among white-collar occupations is for
nurses aides, showing a continuing shortage of health care
personnel in the area.
The only significant change in the demographic and
economic characteristics of job applicants available and
those actually placed in new jobs through the division of
employment security offices throughout the Worcester LMA
was the substantial decrease in the number of economically
disadvantaged individuals—from about 36 percent of all ap
plicants in fiscal 1978 to about 16 percent in fiscal 1979.
Possibly, improved economic conditions—combined with
concerted efforts at training, job development, and direct
job placement—increased significantly the employability of
the economically disadvantaged. There are job orders for
employees in a number of semiskilled and skilled occupa-
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tions. There are needs for sales and service employees. The
implication is clear that training programs are the basic tools
which can help match those persons seeking employment and
the job openings in the labor market.

The Political Climate
While the Worcester Consortium is composed of the City
of Worcester and 13 surrounding communities, the city, with
56 percent of the population, has taken the lead as prime
sponsor of CETA activities. All of the surrounding com
munities are very small and depend upon the city for their
economic activities and life. The CETA prime sponsor for
the consortium is in fact the City of Worcester and is run by
the employment and training office, which reports directly to
the city manager. The Worcester Employment and Training
Consortium functions as an agency of the city's government.
The Worcester city manager is appointed by and reports to
the elected city council. The city manager, who has held the
position for more than 30 years, considers himself a profes
sional who does not have to play day-to-day politics. As a
result, the prime sponsor's staff members are employed
because of their skills and experience. This professionalization assures a capable staff, but the staff has little political
clout of its own.

The Prime Sponsor's Staff
and Organization
WETC's organizational structure is unusual, at least
within Region I of the U.S. Department of Labor. Opera
tionally, the CETA prime sponsor is the office of employ
ment and training, directly responsible to the city manager.
This office is the administrative and planning unit for CETA
provisions which involve the employment and training of the
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economically disadvantaged, but not the public service
employment (PSE) provisions. The office of employment
and training provides no direct services to CETA par
ticipants, but rather contracts out all services to communitybased organizations (CBO).
The relationship between the prime sponsor's staff and the
regional office has been cordial, but each has been critical of
the other. Members of the prime sponsor's staff feel that in
sufficient understanding and assistance from the regional of
fice have affected the WETC organization and operations.
The regional office staff feels that WETC has not acted on
any of the significant suggestions made to it.
The public service employment (PSE) program—not
operated by the office of employment and training—func
tions as a branch of the city's personnel department. This ar
rangement appears relatively unusual, especially because the
prime sponsor is a consortium of 14 communities. The PSE
program provides services ranging from intake to job
development, as well as the administrative, planning, and
monitoring functions, for the public service employment
program. The office of employment and training and the
PSE program maintain separate fiscal units which, accord
ing to the regional office of the employment and training
administration, "perpetuate problems, past and present, of
coordination and of administrative cost control, financial
recordkeeping, audit resolution and overall accountability
by the prime sponsor." No formal agreement outlines the
responsibilities and defines the lines of authority between the
prime sponsor and the PSE program. Hence, the relation
ship between the two organizations could falter severely if
other (different) persons were involved. These programs
should not depend on the chance of congenial personalities.
Over the past two years, the current PSE director has built
the organization as it stands today, increasing the staff from.
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20 to 53. For some time, intake was conducted independently
by each consortium town, but it is now centralized. The
fiscal officer has been in the personnel department; now PSE
has an in-house fiscal unit with a staff of 10. Assessment had
been contracted out, but starting in fiscal 1981 it was con
ducted in-house at some savings.
Turnover for the principal positions in the office of
employment and training has been surprisingly low. During
the past five years the key officers—the director, deputy
director, management information system supervisor, and
chief planner—changed only once. The directors' and the
supervisor's positions are currently filled with persons who
were on the staff in lower level positions, indicating WETC
either provides career opportunities for staff or it does not
recruit from the outside with much success. It came as a sur
prise that turnover was low, because the salary structure is
also shockingly low. According to the "Employer Salary and
Fringe Benefit Survey for All New England Prime
Sponsors," November 1979, the Worcester Consortium has
the lowest salaries in Region I for director and PSE director,
and is well below the median for other staff members. This
survey showed that the maximum salaries for directors
ranged from $21,944 (in Worcester) to $39,374. A similar
comparison for job developers showed a low of $10,062 and
a high of $26,286. Staff salaries are determined in accor
dance with the City of Worcester's established salary struc
ture.
The fiscal 1980 regional office assessment revealed that an
affirmative action plan does not exist for the Worcester Con
sortium staff. Of 11 principal positions, 6 were filled by
white males, 2 by black males and 3 by white females. Nonwhites represent less than 2 percent of the population and of
the labor force in the Worcester LMA and in the Worcester
Consortium area.
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A review of the education and work experience of five key
staff indicates that the length of employment with WETC
ranged from 10 months to 7 years. Average tenure has risen
as staff members have advanced within the organization.
Levels of education attainment vary, but every top staff
member has at least a bachelor's degree.

Management System
WETC operates a totally decentralized system with each
program operator conducting intake, assessment, and
eligibility determination. Information is submitted monthly
by the program operators to the management information
system (MIS) unit on standardized forms. At the time of the
study an automated data processing system was being
developed in the MIS unit, and this will increase the prime
sponsor's ability to analyze the data.
All participant and program monitoring data are collected
and analyzed by the MIS unit. Functional areas analyzed in
clude intake, assessment, eligibility determination and ser
vices to participants. For an evaluation of a followup of par
ticipants, WETC has contracted with the Worcester Consor
tium of Higher Education, Inc., an organization of represen
tatives from local institutions of higher education. This an
nual report is one factor in assessing the performance of pro
gram operators.
The results of the evaluation and information gathered
while monitoring are compiled and presented to the employ
ment and training council's (ETC) subcommittees.
Worcester's ETC appears well informed, and meetings of the
planning and review and the evaluation and monitoring sub
committees suggest that the evaluation and monitoring
results are a meaningful consideration when recommending
modifications and funding levels for programs.
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While evaluation and programmatic monitoring are done
by the prime sponsor's MIS unit, the independent monitor
ing unit (IMU) is concerned with compliance monitoring.
The IMU was established in August 1979. Although a work
plan and monitoring tools were developed during the first
quarter of fiscal 1980, many questions concerning roles and
procedures remained. Independence is the key to the IMU's
operations, but it appears to function as a part of the prime
sponsor's staff rather than autonomously. Further, several
areas are monitored by both the IMU and MIS staff, sug
gesting that the functions are not clearly defined.

Decisionmaking
As mandated by federal law, WETC established three ad
visory councils: the employment and training council, the
youth employment and training council, and the private in
dustry council. After consulting with the current chairper
son, the prime sponsor's director forwards recommenda
tions on council memberships to the Worcester city manager,
who selects council members and chairpersons. The GETA
coordinator provides staff support to the councils.
WETC has demonstrated creativity and organizational ex
pertise in working with its councils, committees, and task
forces. An intercouncil agreement was drafted outlining
membership, responsibilities, roles and procedures for con
flict resolution. A recent assessment by ETA regional office
staff found the intercouncil agreement "effective and in
novative."
Because WETC relies on contractors to deliver services, its
planning and decisionmaking process is more intricate than
that of prime sponsors providing in-house services. It thus
must begin the process quite early to select all the contractors
and determine the allocations before preparing the annual
plan required by the DOL. An inherent problem with this
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procedure is that WETC begins allocating funds to contrac
tors before DOL releases the preliminary funding levels.
The prime sponsor's staff does a thorough and profes
sional job in preparing and presenting information to the
various committees and councils. In general, the staff
members are highly regarded by the employment and train
ing council, and staff recommendations are always given
serious consideration. Council members' questions to pro
gram operators about their programs are pertinent, in
dicating knowledge about the program operators' services
and local labor market needs.
While there has been relatively little turnover of organiza
tions that have obtained funding under the CETA program,
the decisions on contracts and size of funding appear to be
based on objective criteria. The committee views the staff
recommendations as professional judgments, with no
political axe to grind. The prime sponsor's staff views the
council members as persons with a public interest, acting
without the pressures to make political decisions on program
contracting and funding.

Training Policies
With the ready availability of jobs, the CETA programs
have focused largely on job placement and job readiness
(basic and prevocational education), rather than occupa
tional skill training. The distribution of funds between voca
tional training and other CETA programs has remained
relatively stable over the past few years. In fiscal 1980, the
career education training center (CETC), which handles
almost all of the vocational skill training programs, received
$251,000, or 11.2 percent of the total title II-B funds. The
proposed allocation for fiscal 1981 showed a decline for
CETC in absolute terms, to $246,000, but because the total
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title II-B allocation declined even more, CETC was to receive
a slightly larger percentage (13.5 percent). One may note that
this is a relatively small percentage of the total allocation of
funds under this title. Neighborhood Youth Corps (in-school
and out-of-school) was to receive over $328,000; New
Careers, over $80,000; and Opportunities Industrialization
Center, almost $138,000. In general, one can conclude from
the fiscal 1981 funding recommendations that vocational
skill training does not have the highest priority.
The WETC evaluation of economic conditions may be the
principal reason for the vocational classroom training versus
nontraining fund distribution. However, within the scope of
the training funds there are choices and decisions to be
made, in terms of titles used, program deliverers selected,
and occupations trained. These decisions and choices do not
always appear thoughtful from the perspective of contrac
tors competing for funds. Nevertheless, the funding alloca
tions can be rationalized from the standpoint of conditions
in the labor market.
Serving those most in need while maintaining low cost per
participant frequently presents conflicts for programs that
are also attempting to train for higher paying occupations.
In an effort to show a good record, contractors could
"cream" among eligible clients, and some of this un
doubtedly occurs. Intricate compromises must be made
when distributing funds to contractors, always keeping in
mind placement and cost rates, which are areas emphasized
by the federal Department of Labor.
An analysis of contractors' program status summaries
shows minimal movement of participants between program
activities. Evidently, under a broad policy of decentralized
intake and referral, contractors operate independent pro
grams, thereby reducing opportunities for participants to
receive a range of CETA activities.
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An additional deterrent to transfers between program ac
tivities is found in WETC's program design: there is little
evidence of coordination between contractors concerning
course scheduling and content. It appears that the situation
may be improved during fiscal 1981.

Training Decisions
The process of making training decisions is very complex.
With numerous individuals and organizations involved at
different levels and at different stages. There are various and
different inputs of information at all points of the process,
as well as pressures by the numerous organizations and
groups that are affected by the decisions.
Key participants in the training decisions of WETC are the
three councils. As in any large organization with diverse
representation, key functions are performed by committees,
principally the planning and review committee and the
monitoring and evaluation committee, each composed of
eight ETC members.
Program operators participate in the decisionmaking pro
cess in a number of ways, especially through their represen
tation on councils. The prime sponsor's staff contributes to
the decisionmaking process by analyzing program operators'
performance data, conducting site visits, analyzing labor
market information, and recommending program modifica
tions, if necessary. The ultimate staff authority is the WETC
director, David L. O'Toole, who reports to the city manager.
In fact, however, decisions work their way through the pro
cess, and action by the employment and training council has
turned out to be final.
Many sources of information are used in various combina
tions to make the basic decision about trainees, occupations
and service deliverers. A key source is an analysis of needs of
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both prospective clients and the labor market, which the
staff prepares from data provided by the division of employ
ment security, the Massachusetts department of manpower
development, and the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory.
Another source is the six-month follow-up study of title II-B
participants which presents pre- and post-program profiles
of participants and analyzes their job and wage status six
months after they leave a CETA program. A third source is
the MIS monitoring reports which contain performance in
dicators, such as placement rates and costs for each program
operator.
An examination of the characteristics of clients served and
the occupations for which they are trained, indicates that
WETC is similar to the national picture. Women represent
66 percent of the enrollees in classroom training programs
under title II-B, most of which focus on white-collar clerical
jobs. The title VII program, concerned with private sector
opportunities for the economically disadvantaged, trains
electronic technicians, machinists and computer
operators—male-dominated fields—and enrolls 80 percent
men. Only 11 percent of the higher paying positions are filled
by women.
A core of established program operators has provided the
employment and training services in Worcester for many
years. As a management strategy, WETC seems to en
courage the program operators to alter their programs as
needed and then retain them, rather than examining each
proposal, old and new, on its merits. Fortunately, the
monitoring reports by MIS staff straightforwardly address
performance and administrative issues, and program
operators apparently heed the recommendations and con
tinue to strive for better performance. Evidently, also, pro
gram strategies are adjusted in order to comply with staff
and committee recommendations.
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The total funding requests submitted by potential program
operators for fiscal 1981 under title II-B were approximately
50 percent higher than the fiscal 1980 funding and about 85
percent higher than the proposed funding for fiscal 1981.
Actual funding was reduced by 20 percent. Clearly, the re
quests had to be reduced below the 1980 level. The WETC
staff recommended that no new programs be funded for
fiscal 1981, which clearly supported the current program
operators and therefore got their support. Thus, when total
funding is severely slashed, the staff is prepared to make
drastic recommendations. However, new programs are not
likely to receive funding unless ETA funding is increased
substantially. The better of the existing programs were cut
back in their funding in a relatively uniform percentage.
WETC is more committed to maintaining the status quo
than to introducing innovative programs.

Training Administration
The general framework of CETA policies is not determin
ed at the local level, but in Washington when funds are
allocated by formula to the prime sponsor and to specific
titles.
In fiscal 1979, WETC received a total of $14.8 million
across all CETA titles. The $3 million allocation to title II-B
represents approximately 20 percent of total funding, and it
is under this title that most vocational training is funded.
The CETA legislation requires prime sponsors to use 15 per
cent of the title II-D funds allocated in fiscal 1980 for train
ing. WETC allocated 18 percent for training, although near
ly half of this was applied to a work experience component.
Over 40 percent of title II-B expenditures in 1979 were allot
ted to classroom training activities, which include basic
education, English as a second language, and prevocational
education. It is quite evident that a substantial proportion of
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the resources available to WETC is not devoted to occupa
tional training and related instruction in labor force par
ticipation skills and basic literacy. To some extent, this is an
overt decision by the prime sponsor as a result of functioning
in a relatively tight labor market where job opportunities ex
ist even for those with comparatively few occupational skills.
Regardless of the title, the majority of CETA participants
served are men, with 62 percent under title II-D and 54 per
cent under title II-B. The smaller proportion enrolled under
II-B probably reflects the heavy emphasis under this title on
white-collar clerical occupations, which attract more
women.
Representation by ethnic groups was also similar for each
title, with whites constituting 62 percent of title VI, 71 per
cent of title II-D and 73 percent of title II-B. The comparable
percentages for blacks were 13, 10, and 10, respectively—on
the order of 10 times the percentage of blacks in the local
labor force. Hispanics were the largest minority under all
titles, and they accounted for 24 percent of title VI par
ticipants.
A typical title II-B training participant for fiscal 1979 was
white, young, a female, and a high school dropout. Further,
title II-B enrolled a higher proportion of ex-offenders, of
AFDC recipients, and of handicapped persons than any
other title.

Quality of Training
WETC has four major deliverers of training services. The
career education training center (CETC), sponsored by the
Worcester vocational school department, provides occupa
tional training, English as a second language, and basic
education. The opportunities industrialization center (OIC)
offers prevocational clerical courses, English as a second
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language, and basic education. The National Alliance of
Business (NAB) provides all the on-the-job training. The
preemployment seminar program teaches job seeking to all
public service employment participants and, upon request,
to classroom-training enrollees. In addition, four CBOs of
fer smaller training programs for the special population
groups of women, physically handicapped, youthful of
fenders, and persons over 55 years of age.
The career education training center was started in August
1972 to meet the needs for more extensive vocational and
skill training in the Worcester area. As a unit of the voca
tional school department, CETC receives technical
assistance in curriculum design from the vocational school
staff. The center offers CETA-funded programs to qualified
individuals, and during fiscal 1980 the following programs
were offered under title II-B: bookkeeper, general office
clerk, culinary arts, patient care assistant, secretary, ward
clerk, and English as a second language. Course offerings
under title VII differed substantially and included electronics
technology, machinist, and computer operator.
CETC requires applicants to spend two half-days in the
actual classroom situation for assessment by instructors and
to complete a pretraining test. Those not selected are to be
referred to the prevocational training program run by OIC,
but because there is no centralized intake system, some re
jected applicants never receive any CETA services or train
ing.
The ETA regional office has directed WETC to discon
tinue the tests for selection and has encouraged WETC to
implement a centralized intake system which would make
available the full range of CETA services to all eligible ap
plicants. WETC is the only prime sponsor within Region I
that does not conduct centralized intake and assessment.
WETC's resistance to change has been due largely to the at-
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titude that its placement rates indicate it succeeds without a
centralized system.
The Worcester opportunities industrialization center
(OIC) aims to assist participants in establishing and attaining
realistic career goals, through skills assessment, career
counseling, basic education, and general educational
development (GED). The following programs are offered by
OIC:
1)
2)
3)

General prevocational— 10-week program providing
education and job readiness skills that will lead to fur
ther skill training.
Clerical prevocational— 12 weeks of prevocational
and English as a second language courses.
Hispanic prevocational—-20 weeks of prevocational
and English as a second language courses.

OIC also provides assistance in determining interests and
skills, individual counseling, group counseling, referral for
supportive services, and referral to further training or
employment opportunities.
OIC is basically designed to help trainees get accepted into
higher level skill training programs, although about onefourth do obtain jobs directly. The staff has increased the
length of time required for each course, claiming that it was
needed to master the material. The lengthening of courses
suggests that OIC is moving toward operating vocational
rather than prevocational programs. Since many of their
participants are not interested in further training and 35 per
cent of those referred to CETC (during two quarters of fiscal
1980) were not accepted, this seems to be the logical step to
take. It is not, however, consistent with the OIC goals of
operating a prevocational center.
The preemployment seminar program (PSP) is a series of
motivational seminars, under the authority of the CETA
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public service employment (PSE) program. PSP is designed
to assist PSE participants in acquiring the motivational skills
and self-confidence necessary to obtain an unsubsidized job.
PSP has been operating for two years and is mandated for all
public service employment participants. Unfortunately, no
evaluation and followup is conducted on this program, so it
is impossible to assess its quality based on assisting clients
with a job search.
The National Alliance of Business (NAB) administers all
WETC's on-the-job training services. Although the division
of employment security conducts intake and initial assess
ment, NAB operates as a personnel agency after it receives a
referral. Except for one class-size project, bank teller train
ing, OJT positions are individual placements, made in a
large variety of firms in different industries.
The one class-size project conducted by NAB is sponsored
by the American Institute of Banking and enrolls 9 to 12
trainees per year. The program has been in operation since
1970 and the current funding is 34,000 at $2,700 per place
ment. Although this program leads to unsubsidized employ
ment within the occupation trained for, the numbers involv
ed are so small as to make this OJT program in Worcester of
very minor consequence.
Results of the six-month follow-up study of title II-B par
ticipants conducted six months after termination indicate
that post-CETA incomes remained low; in fact, 33 percent
would still have qualified as economically eligible for the
program. Participants enrolled in training for 21 weeks or
longer earned substantially more than those enrolled for less
than 21 weeks ($6,884 and $5,934 respectively). Clients who
were job-placed, that is, placed in jobs developed by the pro
grams, had higher post-CETA incomes than those who were
not job-placed ($6,312 compared to $5,559 respectively).
NAB-OJT emerged as the program producing the highest
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post-CETA main income, at $8,809, while CETC averaged
$5,818.
Two-thirds of those surveyed were employed six months
after terminating from GETA. Again NAB stood out, with
84 percent employed, while CETC had 68 percent and OIC
had 53 percent.
Although a sizable proportion of trainees were employed
six months after leaving, apparently only OJT participants
realized a substantial income gain. If WETC is concerned
with increasing the earning power of participants, their skill
training programs must be lengthened and must encompass
more than secretarial and clerical courses.

Conclusions
The Worcester prime sponsor is somewhat atypical in at
least three separate areas. One is the relatively tight labor
market area that WETC has been operating in for a number
of years. The second is the rather complete decentralization
of the total system, the result of an overt decision by the
prime sponsor. The third distinction is the administrative
separation of the PSE program from other CETA programs.
This separation has not had substantial or significant effects
on the training programs or the public service employment
program, but the cooperation between the two organizations
depends upon the personal relationship between the direc
tors.
Prime sponsors continually face decisions on how to
design, implement and maintain employment and training
programs. Because of the system's decentralized structure,
the decision process starts at the staff level, where relevant
information is gathered and analyzed. Program operators
and potential operators participate at various levels of the
process, sometimes as members of a committee, and
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sometimes only as discussants. The principal organization in
the making of major decisions is the employment and train
ing council. In fact, the recommendations of the ETC are
final decisions, and all participants in the process are aware
of this and expect it.
In identifying target groups, the staff found more people
were eligible for CETA than could be served in a meaningful
way with the available funds. WETC's response to this issue
defined certain segments of the population as most in need,
estimated their size and characteristics, and specified ap
propriate levels of service. WETC's staff planning unit
presents this information in its annual analysis of need.
WETC adheres to a complex process of selecting training
occupations through analysis of many sources of informa
tion. Apparently the most important element in the decisions
relates the current program operators' training capability
and capacity. The bulk of WETC's training occurs in the
secretarial and clerical fields, with only one contractor offer
ing a small program for machinists, which are much higher
on the list of growth occupations.
WETC has an elaborate and thorough method for select
ing service deliverers. Although for several years no change
among the major service deliverers had taken place, the
deliverers are subject to exhaustive performance monitoring.
Monitoring results are used wisely and contribute
significantly to improved program performance.
Communication between WETC and the ETA regional of
fice on management and decisionmaking appears limited to
routine, noncontroversial matters. In general, the federal
representatives have made little or no positive contribution
to the operation of CETA programs in the Worcester area.
Several WETC staff members expressed a reluctance to ask
the regional office for advice; they felt that the regional of
fice staff was overly critical and made no effort to under-
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stand their problems. For the most part, no federal interven
tion concerning planning decisions has occurred; manage
ment issues addressed in the 1980 assessment include assur
ing the independence of the independent monitoring unit and
consolidating the financial management systems of the prime
sponsor and the public service employment program.
Performance indicators alone do not adequately assess the
quality of training offered under the sponsorship of WETC.
Some program operators claimed that the CETA system's in
stability was a deterrent to the long-range planning necessary
for excellent program development.
In our opinion, WETC has the capacity (in terms of
facilities and staff) to expand its training program quickly
and economically. The following suggestions, if im
plemented, would increase WETC's capacity to develop and
manage programs:
1.

Implement a centralized intake system, permitting
selection, assessment, and referral to programs on a
more equitable basis. Individual employability could
be developed and kept up to date, rather than starting
over with each program. Transfers among program
activities could be based on participants' needs, and
job development could be conducted in an intensive
nonduplicating manner.

2.

Restructure the organization, merging the public ser
vice employment organization with the Worcester
Employment and Training Consortium. The coopera
tion of the two organizations should not depend upon
the personalities and relations of the two directors.

3.

Assign the responsibility for coordinating program
operators to one staff member. Currently, many staff
members contact a program operator, but no one per
son monitors the memoranda of agreement among
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community-based organizations. It is left to each
agency to coordinate its CETA services with other
agencies.
4.

Increase the frequency of the present 6-month
followup study report. This would make the results
available and useful in planning of the training pro
grams.

5.

Require the contractors to eliminate the use of tests
and other preselection devices which tend to screen
out eligible clients from CETA training programs.
Such tests are inequitable, and are a "creaming"
device which eliminates those most in need of CETA
services.

6.

The role of the independent monitoring unit should
be clarified to differentiate its responsibilities and
functions from those of the management information
system unit. Further, the autonomy of the IMU
should be strengthened.
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